

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The Christian State

THE CHRISTIAN STATE

THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND CHRISTIANITY

By
SAMUEL ZANE BATTEN

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TO

THE MEMORY OF MY

Father and Mother

FOR THEIR DEVOTION IN CHRISTIAN
LIVING AND THEIR EXEMPLIFICATION
OF CHRISTIAN CITIZENSHIP

THIS BOOK
IS
GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

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INTRODUCTION

The supreme interest of mankind is the progress and perfection of the human race. In this higher interest all lower interests are involved, and toward this great end all lesser ends must contribute. In this all-inclusive process all other processes appear as incidents and means, and by this final result all systems and sciences must be valued. It follows that whatever factor in life concerns man's welfare and has relation to his progress is a proper subject of human inquiry. This is all the justification that is needed for the study before us.

There are three great outstanding facts and phenomena of our modern world which overtop all others, and are most potent in life. The first great fact is the State, that familiar, dominant, all-inclusive institution of man's social life. The State in some form is a universal phenomenon, and its influence is as masterful as fate. It has always held a large place in the life of man, but in these modern times it claims the whole foreground of his interest. It has everywhere played a leading rôle in the drama of human progress, and signs multiply that its power is destined to wax rather than to wane.

The second great fact is Democracy, the steady, irresistible, world-wide coming up of the people out of obscurity into authority. Democracy as a name is old indeed, but democracy as a fact is a modern phenomenon. But be it modern or not it is one of the most significant and certain tendencies of our time. In some lands it is only a suggestion; in others it is at best an approximation; but in all its complete realization it is only a question of time

and application. The democratic drift is a world gravitation, and one of the potent movements of the age.

The third great fact is Christianity, the system of life and truth and motive of Jesus of Nazareth. Men's conceptions of Christianity differ widely and their interpretations run the whole gamut of possible variety. But Christianity itself is one thing, and men's definitions of it are quite another. Christianity is the most potent force in our modern civilization. The world dates its chronology from the birth of its Founder; its terms have become a part of our common speech, and it is not without meaning in world history. The State is a universal phenomenon, democracy is a universal drift, and Christianity, its followers believe, is the universal religion.

This suggests a natural and important question: "Is there any vital and necessary relation between these three great phenomena?" Philosophy, we are told, is the art of thinking things together. Is it possible for one to think together these three great facts, the State, democracy, and Christianity? These questions are among the most fateful questions of the time, and upon their right solution depend a hundred issues in man's life and progress. Through their neglect great loss has already come, and through their wrong solution great calamity may result. But these questions have hardly come, as yet, into the foreground of human inquiry. Aspects of these phenomena have been considered, and each of these great facts has been studied; but so far as I am aware no one has considered each fact in its relation to the others. The inquiry before us, it is believed, has a timeliness and a value for reasons which may be briefly stated.

The signs of the times indicate that the great struggles of the future are to be fought within the boundaries of the State. Current movements in human society show impending changes in our social and political institutions.

The foundations of all human institutions are being examined with pick and shovel, and everything is challenged to show its warrant for continuance. Human society has begun to investigate itself, with the result that a chain of problems constitutes man's horizon. The interrogation mark is the sign manual of the age. The word, problem, is the most recurrent word in every language to-day.

As might be expected, men are taking different attitudes toward the problems presented, and this greatly complicates the issue. Some are trying to hush men's fears by declaring that the evils of society are greatly exaggerated; and they close their homily by saying that all things will come right in time. At any rate, some of these things are inevitable—and perhaps necessary—in an imperfect society. And, anyway, they say, nature's processes cannot be hurried. Others, going to the opposite extreme, are demanding the overthrow of all existing institutions and the creation of a new social order. The old must go before the new can appear. Still others, and probably the largest class, stand confused, realizing that something is wrong, and that something must be done, and yet without any sense of direction or programme of action. With all these, of whatever class or party, there is the foreboding that vast changes are impending in our Western civilization of which no one is clairvoyant enough to see the end. And beyond all these differences, there is the conviction that a part of this something to be done must be done in and through the State, and that it is to the State that we must look for help. In a word, there is the conviction that there must be a wide extension of State activity into man's social and industrial life. And this means that the State is becoming one of the media of the new social consciousness that is growing, and that it must assume many new functions and exercise many new powers.

But while these demands are being made upon the State some embarrassing questions are being asked concerning the State itself. What is its place in the economy of life? What is its mission and what are its functions? But even more disturbing questions are asked: By what right does the State exist at all and make its demands? Has not the time come to abolish all present political institutions and make a new beginning in human progress? Of one thing I am persuaded—and this persuasion is based upon years of earnest thought upon the questions of citizenship and of practical effort in behalf of reform—that one of the great needs of this present time is some large conception of the State, its meaning, its functions, its relation to man's progress, and its place in the purpose of God. However it may have been, and however it may be, now when men are coming to social self-consciousness and are asking why the State is here, and what is its destiny, the great need is some sense of direction in social action and a clear vision of the goal.

"Where there is no vision the people perish." In these days the number of brave and thoughtful men is rapidly growing. In every community, large or small, there are groups and associations of reformers studying the questions of the day and bent on change. In many cities there is a growing demand for better government and more worthy conditions. But the one who will take the pains to investigate will find, alas, that too often these men are considering some little task with small conception of the total task which confronts society. They are working for a better city, and yet few have vision of what a city should be. They want better government and worthier conditions without always knowing when government is good and what conditions should exist. In short, they want a better world, but they do not know where to begin nor how to proceed. Under these circumstances the great

need is some human synthesis, some social ideal, which shall both show men the direction of progress and shall marshal them as one host to build the City of God. To understand the special task of one man we must know its relation to the total task of mankind. To know how to use that mighty agency of human progress, the State, we must know something of the meaning and mission of the State. In fine, the great need of to-day is some adequate conception of the State, its nature and functions, some definite sense of the direction of human progress, and some clear understanding of the relation of Christianity to the whole life of man.

And this suggests the thesis with which we are concerned in this study. It is easy for one who is interested in some special line to suppose that his interest should be the concern of all. Be this as it may, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of this subject or exaggerate its relation to man's social progress. In his day John Bunyan rendered the individual an incalculable service in that he interpreted the soul to itself and made it know its calling, its duties, its dangers, and its destiny. But the interpretation of the "Pilgrim's Progress," clear and scriptural as it is in its personal aspects, does not satisfy either the mind or the heart of the modern man. In the providences of God and the processes of history the age of the social man is dawning, and the social problem is becoming urgent. The man who can now interpret the State to itself, who can make society know its meaning, its functions, its tasks, and its goal, who can interpret this modern phenomenon known as democracy and can show its relation to human progress, who can show the real relation of the State to the kingdom of God and can indicate the lines of effort for the divine potencies of the gospel, will render mankind an even greater service. That the writer has fulfilled more than a fraction of this

great task he is not vain enough to suppose. But that he has indicated some of the factors entering into the problem he may confidently believe. The fact is, this is a task that will require the combined efforts of generations of men fully to approximate. That the author has tried to see things clearly and has blinked no difficulty he may modestly claim. This is probably all that may be expected of any man in any one generation.

That great changes are imminent in our modern world, that a new age is struggling to the birth, that a new order of society is impending, that political institutions are still evolving, and that the State must assume some new functions, the signs of the times indicate and the most discerning men believe. What will be the attitude of Christian men in this time of crisis? Will they misread the signs and take an attitude of opposition and suspicion? What will be the relation between the democratic movement and the Christian spirit? What will be the outcome of the formative forces that are now at work in society? These are some of the fateful sphinx questions of to-morrow, and upon their right solution depend a hundred issues. Will Christian men see to it that the age is Christian in spirit and method? Will the citizens of the democratic State see to it that the social and political institutions of the future are motived by the mind of Christ? Will the Church and the State work with each supplementing the other, or at cross purposes? Finally, will the State become the medium through which the people shall co-operate in their search after the kingdom of God and its righteousness? The answer to these questions lies still in the future; and though we may not forecast the result, we may yet hope for the best. This is certain, that if Christianity fails here it will spell a most tragic failure. If Christianity succeeds here, it will win a most momentous victory and will gain the allegiance of mankind.

Book I. The State

A State contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence; and it is first founded that men may live, but continued that they may live happily.

—Aristotle, Politics, Bk. I, Chap. 2.

The State—the greatest institution on earth—elevates everything that appertains to it, every duty, interest or measure, into great importance, for the simple reason that it affects all, and, what with its direct and indirect operation, it very materially influences the moral well-being of every individual. . . The State with its laws and government affects materially the manhood of all living in it. Good laws elevate men; bad laws, if persisted in for a series of years, will degrade any society.

—Francis Lieber, Political Ethics, Vol. I, Sec. XXXVIII.

Honesty, morality, religion, and education are the main pillars of the State, for the protection and promotion of which government was instituted among men.

—Commonwealth vs. Douglas, 100, Ky., 116. Affirmed by 168 U. S. Rep., 488.

The social order, the national sentiments, the governmental regulations influence immeasurably every soul that comes within their reach. More and more men are coming to see that the State has a moral end, and that the real work of citizens consists in so shaping institutions and framing legislation that conditions may be secured favorable for the development of noble characters. . . Politics is the science of social welfare, and has at heart the achievement of a social order in which the ideals of humanity shall be realized.

—Batten, The New Citizenship, pp. 245, 246.

The State is, in one view, a piece of machinery produced by the social process, but the justification for its existence is its *continued furtherance of the process. . . The State never is, but is always becoming.* This is true because the persons composing the State never are, but are always becoming. A process is going on, is our most general way of telling the essential truth about a person or a society.

—Small, General Sociology, p. 240.

I

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

WHAT we call the State is a recognized force and factor in the life of all peoples. In the study of history we find men at all stages of mental and social development, but we never find them without political institutions. If savage means a people without a settled form of government, without laws, and without a religion, says Max Müller, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race ("Nineteenth Cen.," Jan., 1885). In the study of sociology also we find peoples at all levels of progress, but if there has ever been a people without some form of social and political life, we have no record of its existence. Everywhere we find men associated in some way, submitting to some public authority, and exercising certain powers through an agency termed government. The forms of their social life may vary, the scope of authority may differ among different peoples, and the functions of these governments may run the gamut of variety, but beneath all appearances and differences there are constant elements and essential resemblance. The State is a universal phenomenon.

The State makes many demands upon its citizens and exercises wide control. In its worst forms, the State may override the individual and may become an intolerable tyranny; it may treat men as means to its own ends; it may compel them to hold their lives, their fortunes, and their happiness at the will of another; in fine, it may affirm that men have no rights as against the State. In its best forms the State asks the service of all in its behalf;

in the form of taxes it requires a portion of every man's income; by the right of eminent domain, which it asserts is older and deeper than any individual right, it may claim a part of his estate; and in times of danger and need it may ask him to lay his all upon its altar. In the Grecian States, in their palmiest days, the State was everything, and the person counted for little (De Coulanges, "The Ancient City," pp. 297, 298). In the most democratic States, in these modern times, the State is the unit and the final worth of man is his value to society. In view of all this, as rational beings we should consider the right of the State to be, and should be able to conceive clearly its nature. What then is this institution, so universally known as the State? What is its essential nature, and what are its constant characteristics? And by what right does it exist and assert its authority?

The moment we ask these questions our perplexity begins. For "The conception which prevails generally among the men of our time of the State, its nature, and the part it has to play, is singularly confusing and confused. . . When it approaches this theme, which has so weighty a bearing on human destinies, their thought loses itself in mist and fog" (Beaulieu, "The Modern State," p. 1). In this chapter we are concerned with the nature of the State; in other chapters we shall consider its functions and its goal. Clear thought here will help us all the way, while confusion here means increasing confusion at the end. It is evident that any conception of the State, to be adequate, must be one that will disclose its nature and characteristics; it must be one too, that will contain justification of the right of the State to be and exercise authority; and it must contain a satisfactory statement of the attributes with which a State is endowed and by which it is distinguished from other corporations (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," p. 6).

Such an inquiry has its difficulties, for the reason that the forms and functions of the State have varied so greatly. But with it all we shall find certain constant and irreducible elements, and these are worthy of careful consideration. We are not concerned primarily with the exterior features of the State; our chief concern is with its ultimate nature and essential quality. These former characteristics are interesting, and Bluntschli has analyzed them with great discrimination. Thus we are told that in every State we find a number of men combined, holding a permanent relation to the soil, and bound together in a more or less firm cohesion; in all States we find a distinction between the governors and the governed; and in every State we find the people associated in some organic whole (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State, Bk. I, chap. i). These last characteristics are vital, and these we must consider in detail.

I. The State is the Political Organization of the People. There are three great institutions which in some form are universal—the Family, the Church, and the State. These three institutions cover the entire range of human life, and their perfection implies its perfection. Each has its functions, though they all occupy much the same sphere. Each has its distinctive mission in the economy of life, yet they all work toward the one common end. In any complete and synthetic view of man and society, these institutions must be considered, and their relation to one another determined. It is not necessary to our purpose, however, that we enter upon a discussion of the family and the church, for that would carry us too far afield. And yet, to form an adequate conception of the State, we must note some of the distinctions that exist in the fundamental life and organization of these institutions. By marking the contrasts each may be more clearly defined.

Thus the family, the Institute of the Affections, is the medium through which the person begins to be. It is the channel through which the stream of human life flows on. The church, the Household of Faith, is the agency through which divine and quickening influences are brought to bear upon the unfolding life. Through it man is brought to God, and the human spirit is lifted up into fellowship with the divine Spirit. The church is concerned primarily with the work of informing the mind, training the conscience, stirring the affections, and directing the will. The State, the Institute of Right Relations, is the means through which the environment of life is determined. It is the chief function of the State to provide and conserve the conditions of human existence, and thus make it possible for each life to attain its fullest development.

These three institutions, though essential to man and representing vital factors of his being, yet have a different basis of organization and assume a different form. The family is in a real sense necessary to man, for it is in the family that he begins and completes his life. He who made them in the beginning made them male and female, and ordained that a man shall leave his father and his mother, and cleave unto his wife, and they twain become one flesh (Matt. 19 : 4). But implied in this very distinction and involved in the very relation of husband and wife is one element all important, and that is love. In the most real sense, it is love that draws the man and the woman together; it is love that creates the family; it is in love that the family has its potency and its life. In the most real sense, therefore, the family may be called the commonwealth of the affections; in the poetic and significant words of Mazzini it may be called the heart's fatherland.

The church no less than the family is necessary to man,

and grows out of his great needs. It is true that what we call the church is more or less limited to Christian peoples; but the church, which represents the religious life of man, is found in some form in every land. For wherever we find man we find him observing certain religious forms and creating definite religious institutions, and these in a general way represent what we may call the church. We are here concerned with the developed and differentiated idea as it exists in Christian lands in the Christian church. This church, we find as we consider it, is a voluntary organization. It is true that among the earlier peoples of the world the institutions of religion were regarded as fixed, not to be created by man nor to be changed by him. It is true also that in many divisions of Christendom the church is regarded as a necessary institution, in that membership in it is determined for man, and not by him. Thus in some communions the child is baptized in infancy into the church, and without any choice of his own is "made a member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." But it must be observed that in all of these churches something depends upon the will of the person himself; for as he comes to maturity he is expected to ratify this action of his sponsors, and thus his church life is the expression of his own personal choice. In many divisions of Christendom special emphasis is laid upon this element of personal choice, and membership in the church is wholly a voluntary matter. A man is not born into the church as he is born into the family or the State, but he is reborn into it through his own personal faith. But—and this is the one thing that concerns us here—the church in its life and organization depends wholly upon its appeal to man's reason and its harmony with his will; or, it may be said that the church is the visible form of man's faith in Christ and the organized expression of the divine

life. The church has not always been true to its essential idea, and has sometimes approximated the State in its methods; it has more than once employed other agencies than the persuasives of the gospel, and has sought the arm of the State in making its wishes effective. But more and more the best men in all communions are coming to see that this is contrary to the mind of Christ and is in contravention of the very idea of the church. The church is a voluntary organization; it has its foundations in the faith of men, and it may be called the household of faith and the building of the Spirit.

The State, while quite as necessary to man as either of these institutions, has yet a different basis, and depends upon other factors. Wherever we go we find the State in some form, and the man who does not wish to be a citizen must consort with savages or leave the world. He is born into the State, and he must accept its political institutions. He may not find himself in harmony with the institutions and policies of the State, and may refuse to vote or accept office, but none the less he is subject to its authority, must pay his quota of taxes, and must conduct himself in an orderly manner.

This means that the State represents other factors than those of affection and faith. It may be said that the State will flourish best where it has both the affection and confidence of all its citizens; but the State is concerned with other interests than the family and the church, and may employ very different machinery. The State has to do with rights, and in a way depends upon these. But rights imply duties; a duty is always the obverse of a right. The State that would maintain rights must also enforce duties; and this means a government that can make its decrees effective. To secure these human rights and to enforce these corollary duties governments are instituted, and are just in so far as they hold the

balance even. This does not tell the whole story, and is not a full definition, but it is true so far as it goes. This means that the State is concerned with what may be called the civic and political interests of man; that it exists to secure for men their rights, and that its authority must be employed in defending those rights; it means, in a word, that the State is the political organization of the people, with powers sufficient for its task. The State may be considered as society in its corporate capacity and as exercising a definite control over the lives of its members; that is, "The State is the politically organized national person of a definite country" (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State," Bk. I, chap. i).

II. The State is the Organ of the Political Consciousness. In his great treatise on politics, Aristotle, "The father of them who know," lays down the dictum that man is by nature a political being; and the man who is naturally and not accidentally unfit for human society is either below or above the human stage ("Politics," Bk. I, chap. ii). Thus the Cyclops reviled by Homer are proved to be less than human in that they have neither courts nor markets, and live as solitary as a bird of prey:

> No laws have they; they hold
> No councils. On the mountain heights they dwell
> In vaulted caves, where each man rules his wives
> And children as he pleases; none give heed
> To what the others do.
>
> —*Odyssey*, IX : 136-140

With keen analysis Aristotle shows that there is in all normal persons an instinct which impels them to some form of political organization; and he who first established civil society was the cause of the greatest benefit to mankind. This primary affirmation of the Stagirite subsequent thinking has not invalidated, but rather con-

firmed. For which reason every State is a work of nature. The fact is, some form of human society is to be found among every people that is truly human, and in a large way it may be said that a people is to be ranked as high or low in the scale of life according to the degree in which the art of living together has been learned and political institutions have been developed. Men, as we know them, are made for fellowship, and they can attain perfection of being only through association with their kind. One man, says the German proverb, is no man. Could a man grow up with lifeless nature, without human association of any kind, says a modern psychologist, "there is nothing to indicate that he would become as self-conscious as is now a fairly educated cat" (Royce, "Studies of Good and Evil," p. 208). It is easier for the rose to grow without soil and to bloom without sunshine than for man to unfold his possibilities and to become man without human fellowship.

In the development of political thought, various views have been advanced to account for the State, and to define its essential nature. Some of these views, with reference to the origin of the State, we shall notice in the next chapter. Not one of these views, as we shall see, is satisfactory; the only views which are at all adequate are those which assume that man is a social and political being, possessing a consciousness and instinct which seek and find expression in association and institutions of political life.

An illustration of the growth of the State may be found in the history of many of the American commonwealths. A number of immigrants from different lands move into a new territory and settle there. At first the families are few and scattered, and do what seems right in their own eyes. But the day comes when these isolated settlers become established and begin to find one another out.

Now men begin to feel the need of some formal organization which shall represent the common life and conserve the common good. Each man has an impulse toward association. Each man in his place looks up and sees another. In some way they will seek to express their mutual life and become united in political relations. This instinct for fellowship, this consciousness of kind, at once finds expression and realization in certain associations and institutions. Men have an instinct which impels them to seek association; they are conscious of mutual rights and duties; in this instinct and consciousness we find the forces that draw men together and create the State. Thus when these persons come together to form some association and to create some government they do not have to begin at the beginning. In the persons that compose the State consciousness of their oneness exists, and this becomes explicit and objective in the political organism. Call it what we will—the sense of kinship, the consciousness of kind, the instinct of fellowship—the fact is, there is that which leads man to seek out his fellows and to associate with them. The State is the expression of this human fellowship, and becomes the organ of the political consciousness.

III. The State is the Institute of Right Relations. "A State," so Plato reports Socrates, "arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

"'None,' replied Adeimantus.

"'Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose, and another for another; and when these helpers and partners are gathered together in one habitation, the body of inhabitants is termed a State?

"'True,' he said" ("The Republic," Bk. II).

A simple and primitive condition of life may not need much in the way of a political organization. The early settlers in some of the American States, it is said, cared little for the protection of government, and felt well able to get along without it. Each man depended upon himself and his trusty rifle. At best, such a Stateless condition is possible only so long as families are widely scattered. As soon as men come into closer relations and society becomes more complex, some organization or institute of right relations becomes necessary. Robinson Crusoe and his man Friday can get along very well on their solitary island without a government, so long as Crusoe is master and Friday is servant, and there is no one else to encroach or interfere. But the moment Crusoe returns to civilized life, that moment his relations are multiplied and the State becomes necessary.

Life, according to the best definition, is a matter of relationships. The higher the life the larger the number of these and the more complex they become. Modern society, as we know it, is complex and intricate, and the dependences of man upon man are manifold. It must be evident that these relations cannot be left to individual caprice. The relations of man with man must be just and right, or they become intolerable. In a modern city where life touches life at a thousand points, and where each man is dependent upon his fellows, it is necessary that there be some power or authority over and above the individuals which shall define and adjust the relations existing among them. The strong must not be allowed to tyrannize over the weak. It is clear that men must not be left to shift for themselves, with each taking all he can get and keeping all he has secured. There are a thousand and one questions concerning the things that are more or less in common, such as streets and paving, fire and police protection, transportation and communica-

tion, that must be defined in charters and ordinances. In brief, there are certain rights which each person may claim as a member of society, and these rights may be defined as "the organic whole of the outward conditions of a life according to reason."

In the history of political progress much has been said about the rights of man, and great revolutions have been fought to obtain these rights. In any complete account of the State, it is necessary that these rights be considered and their nature determined. It would be necessary also to show that these rights are social things, and that their very conception by man implies an order of social relations. This work has been done most thoroughly by Thomas Hill Green, in his "Principles of Political Obligation," and by Professor Ritchie, in "Natural Rights." This inquiry reveals the fact that every right implies a duty. To assert that one is a person with rights society is bound to respect, is to assert that he is a person with duties society may require. Thus we are led inevitably to the conception of man, with mutual rights and duties; and also to the conception of the State as the organ through which these rights and duties are defined and enforced. It is possible for one to deal with these rights and duties, but it seems better to deal directly with human relations as more vital and personal. And inasmuch as rights and duties rest upon human relations, it is better to deal directly with the relations themselves.

These human relations are woven into the very warp and woof of man's life. The State finds that there are certain relations which men sustain to one another in society, and then it attempts to define and safeguard these relations. It does not create these relations, it does not even create the consciousness of them. There is a sense in which we may define a civil law as the legal formulation of a social custom. The law implies a custom

and a consciousness; it defines what is found in this custom and consciousness; it delimits and sanctions these; it defines what each person owes the other; it pledges itself to safeguard these relations of men so far as they are in justice and truth; it puts the stamp of its authority upon them and makes them obligatory; and it punishes the person who violates and dishonors them. The law of the State is thus the pledge of security and fair dealing; it defines the rules of social conduct which each member of society shall observe in his dealings with others; it throws over these relations the mantle of its protection and sets upon them the stamp of its approval.

There are certain relations in which men stand to one another, as husbands and wives, fathers and children, friends and neighbors, masters and employees, taxpayers and officials, which are before and above all governments. These relations of man with man, however, must be correlated and adjusted or they become intolerable. The rights with which man is endowed and the duties which he must fulfil must be defined and safeguarded, or they will be overrun and neglected. The purpose of the State, through its institutions and laws, is to interpret and define these relations, to throw over them the mantle of its protection, and to hallow them with its authority. In what we call the State we have the substitution of a general, beneficent, definite, universal will for an uncertain, arbitrary, personal, fractional will. As members of society each man consents to have his interests interpreted and measured by the common will and welfare, instead of his personal and special will and wish. In case of a conflict of wills and interests, each agrees to settle the questions at issue by an appeal to this common interest and verdict. The nature of the State in this part of our definition is now becoming clear. It is the Institute of Right Relations; and it becomes the guarantee to each man that his

rights shall be conserved, and his proper status in society maintained.

IV. The State is the Partnership of Men in all Good. Very different conceptions of the nature of the State have been promulgated from time to time. These conceptions range from the very lowest minimum of State action to the highest point of social control. These conceptions may be briefly considered, as a kind of background against which we can see the whole picture.

1. It has been maintained that the State is a jural society. In the early stages of their associated life men feel the need of some authority which shall protect their rights and shall maintain justice. And so it comes about that men create some forms of political control which shall maintain their private interests and maintain peace. The State, in this conception, is a great policeman whose sole function it is to prevent disorder. The State is also a judicial authority whose business it is to adjust differences. Beyond these functions the State can claim no authority. It is needless to multiply names, but some great reputations are associated with this conception. Thus, Herbert Spencer declares that the State is simply a committee of management, and it has no intrinsic authority; its authority is given by those appointing it; and it has just such bounds as they choose to impose ("The Man versus The State," p. 411). Macaulay, in his essay on Gladstone's "Church and State," maintains that the primary end of government is the protection of persons and property; he thinks "that government should be organized solely with a view to this end." This conception, it may be said, is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough; in fact, it ignores those very things which have been most conspicuous in the life of all great States. It thinks of the State as a vast machine driven by the forces of public and private interest—a sort of huge insurance

society, the taxes being the premium (Lilly, "First Principles in Politics," p. 29).

2. It is maintained that the State is an economic society. This view, it may be said, has had few exponents in the past, in theory at least, but it is finding many defenders to-day in practice. In this view the State is an organization for the promotion of man's physical and commercial well-being, and when this is conserved the State has fulfilled its office. Man cannot live without property, and this property must be protected. Human well-being is promoted by trade, and trade must be extended. The State in this conception furnishes the conditions in which each man can best advance his material interests. It is evident that this is the conception of the State which holds the first place in the mind of the average statesman to-day. An examination of the measures that come before the modern Congress or Parliament or Reichstag, will reveal the fact that an increasing proportion of these measures are concerned with the economic interests of the people. There are many who insist that the State has little to do with other matters, such as education and morality; such things must be delegated to private individuals and voluntary associations.

3. Included in these conceptions, and yet rising far beyond them, we find the conception of the State as a partnership of men in all good. Aristotle, than whom no clearer political thinker ever lived, maintained that civil society was not founded for the sake of preserving and increasing property. "Nor was civil society founded merely in order that its members might live, but that they might live well. . . It is evident then that a State is not a mere community of place, nor established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic. A State is a society of people joining together with their families and their children to live well, for the sake of a perfect and independent

life" ("Politics," Bk. III, chap. ix). The same thought runs through the masterly oration of Pericles, delivered over the Athenians who fell in the Peloponnesian war. All through this oration, which may well be the model of its kind, there runs the conception of the State, not as a mere dwelling-place for men, nor as a provision for their material well-being alone, but as the sphere of highest activity. The great words of Burke emphasize the same truth, and are worthy of careful consideration. "The State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection" ("Reflections on the Revolution in France").

The State we find is the one organ great enough and varied enough to express and correlate the varied powers and talents of mankind, the one medium through which all men can co-operate in their search after social perfection. The State is the only organ through which the people can act as a unit in their pursuit of righteousness, and it is the only medium through which they can act together in the organization of their common life in truth. The Earl of Shaftesbury, like many another man, had found in himself the desire to help his fellows in their struggle after better things. How could he make his desire most effective and himself most helpful? By personal work with individuals he might have inspired and saved a soul here and there, but by working for the enactment of better laws regulating factories and mines,

by bringing the power of Parliament to bear upon abuses and wrongs, and by enlisting the whole life of the nation on behalf of the downmost man, he made the goodness and wisdom, the power and love of the whole nation the means of uplifting and helping the weaker and more backward. There must be some medium through which men can work in giving themselves for society. The State is the only organ great enough to express the varied powers of man, the only medium through which men can co-operate in the attainment of the social perfection.

V. The State is the Realization of Man's Rational Life. This end, the realization of man's rational life, is the one end in view. Man is a being of relationships, and he is what he is through fellowship. "Individuality does not come first and society next as a product. Society is fundamental, and is an essential condition for self-consciousness. However contradictory it may sound, it is nevertheless the fact, that there could be no self without many selves. Self-consciousness is a possible attainment only in a world where it already exists. Personality at every stage involves interrelation" (Jones, "Social Law in the Spiritual World," p. 58). "To be a person one must be a conscious member in a social order. Man is what he is because he is a member of society. It is impossible to be a person without being in a broad sense a member of society, a citizen of a State, for it is through the organized life of the world that one comes to himself" (Jones, *ibid.*, p. 74).

The State, it is thus seen, has a most vital relation to the development of personality. The individual comes to self-consciousness in and through social fellowship. Freedom, morality, personality, and perfection, the things that give meaning and dignity to life, are all developed and realized in and through the social organism. Freedom can be realized not in individual caprice, but in social

control. Morality can be realized not in individual isolation, but in social relationships. Personality can be realized not in individual independence and self-living, but in social dependence and social living. Perfection can be realized not in individual self-seeking, but in social self-sacrifice. In the State, there are secured and maintained for the person the sphere and conditions of his highest personal development in freedom and morality. The State brings the wisdom and the strength of all to bear upon the weakness and ignorance of each, that each may become wise with the wisdom and strong with the strength of all. Paradoxical as it may seem, the State, by its social control, secures to each member the largest measure of personal freedom, as the State, through its social organization, provides the field for the realization of the largest measure of morality. The individual comes to self-realization as he sacrifices himself for the common life. He that findeth his life for himself shall lose it; but he that loseth his life in the State, shall find it.

There can be no conception of a right without a consciousness of common interests on the part of the members of a society. And there can be no realization of a right except in and through the social organism. The person and the State exist in organic and vital relations with one another, and in the fulfilment of these relations the normal development of each is secured. The State is not something external and formal, something apart from the essential life of man, some arbitrary and conventional compact for securing the private rights of individuals; it is something organic and vital, the necessary medium and vital organism through which life itself is conserved and realized. In a word, man is here to fulfil the purpose of God and to realize his own rational life, and the State is one of the agencies through which this purpose is realized.

We are now in a position to gather up the threads and weave them into a full conception. There are certain necessary and vital conditions of man's life in society, and there must be some institution which shall concern itself primarily with these conditions. There is in all men a political and social consciousness which draws them together, and tends ever to express itself in social and political forms. There are certain necessary relations that subsist among men, and these must be interpreted and safeguarded. Men have certain interests, personal, jural, economic, and political, but over and above these there is what may be called the vital interest. There are among men various associations for various purposes, economic, educational, social, religious; that life may become a unity and society may have peace, there must be some synthesis which shall include these partial interests, and some association which shall correlate all lesser associations. And last of all, since the supreme interest of man is the promotion of human welfare, and since true progress is only possible through the co-operation of all for the sake of all, there must be some agency which shall represent the interests of all, and shall be a medium for their mutual sacrifices and services. This organization and association and agency and medium is what we may call the State. The State is thus "a microcosm of the whole human process. The State is the co-operation of all the citizens for the furtherance of all the interests of which they are conscious. . ." The State embraces all other associations of persons. "All lesser associations find their correlation within the State" (Small, "General Sociology," pp. 226, 227).

II

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

IN the study before us, we are concerned not alone with the outward and visible stages through which the State has passed in its progress from beginning to maturity; but we are concerned as well with its primary causes, and are interested in knowing the social forces that bring men together. These outward and visible stages can be traced with comparative ease in the history of any of the great States. But these inner and causative forces must be found rather in the nature of man and the meaning of society. The fact is one thing, and the cause of the fact is quite another. It is through the knowledge of the fact, however, that we are led back to the knowledge of its causes. And it is through the knowledge of the fact and its causes that we are led on into a knowledge of its meaning and end. When this is attained, knowledge has fulfilled its task, and the way is prepared for action.

The theories that have been advanced from time to time to explain the origin of the State are simply innumerable and deal with all aspects of the question. But beneath all this diversity, it is found that these theories arrange themselves in certain more or less definite classes. These characteristic and outstanding views we may now briefly consider.

I. The State as a Divine Creation. This is the earliest view, and it is the view that has had many advocates all through the centuries. According to this conception the State is the creation of God, either direct or indirect, and so it may be regarded as the human revelation of his

divine government. Among the earliest peoples of whom we have clear knowledge, the Semites, we find this conception in full expression even in the most primitive times. In this conception every human being, simply by virtue of his birth, became a member of what we call natural society. "This circle into which he was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk and fellow-citizens, but embraced also certain divine beings, the gods of the family and of the State, which to the ancient mind were as much a part of a particular community . . . as the human members of the social circle" (W. Robertson Smith, "The Religion of the Semites," p. 29). If a god was spoken of as father and his worshipers as his offspring, the meaning was that the worshipers were literally of his stock. In all cases also where the god was addressed as king and the worshipers called themselves his servants, it was implied that the supreme guidance of the State was in his hands (W. Robertson Smith, *ibid.*, p. 30). In all these conceptions the social organization and the religious system rest upon the same common foundation, and no distinction is made between them. This means that the social order has a religious basis, and that the god of the people is the creator of their political relations.

This conception lay at the basis of the Jewish State, and finds expression all through the nation's history. Lawgivers and prophets emphasize the thought that it was Jehovah who had made Israel to be a people; it was Jehovah who had called Abram and had guided the fathers of the nation; it was Jehovah who had led them out of Egypt and had given them a law for their national life; it was Jehovah who was their sole and rightful king, and it was his law that they were to obey. Lawgiver and judges may be given from time to time, but these are the spokesmen and representatives of Jehovah; the lawgiver is to hear the word at Jehovah's mouth and speak

it to the people; and the judge is charged to judge righteously, for the judgment is the Lord's. When the people at last demand a visible king who shall reign over them and lead their armies, Jehovah declares that they have not rejected merely his representative, but "they have rejected me that I should not be king over them" (1 Sam. 8 : 7). When at a later time the people, through their representatives, declared, We have no king but Cæsar, Judaism was guilty of a denial of God, of blasphemy, of apostasy. It committed suicide (Edersheim, "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," Vol. II, p. 581).

It is not necessary to consider the various forms of this theory. With many modifications, it was the one adopted by the Romans to account for the origin of their State; and it was the view of the Greeks and Egyptians, and in fact of practically all nations of the world.

It may be said in criticism of this view that no State can be found whose origin is clearly a divine creation. This view is formulated late in the life of a people to account for its existence and as a reason for fidelity to the gods. It has given occasion for all sorts of pretensions and usurpations on the part of human rulers. On the one hand it has given rise to priest rule, which always and everywhere has produced evil results; and on the other hand it has given validity to the assumption of the divine right of kings and has been used to uphold the powers that be.

II. The Patriarchal Theory. One of the most plausible and prominent theories of the State is that known as the patriarchal theory. In this view it is maintained that whatever social organization existed originated in kinship. "The Patriarchal theory of society is the theory of its origin in separate families, held together by the authority and protection of the eldest valid male descendant" (Maine, "Early Hist. of Inst."). "The original bond of union and the original sanction of magisterial authority

were one and the same, namely, real or feigned blood relationship. In other words, families were the original units of social organization" (Wilson, "The State," pp. 2, 3). By degrees, and driven by hard necessity, these families spread over new territory, and came into contact with other families and groups. "All the evidence we possess, says Westermarck, tends to show that among our earliest human ancestors the family, not the tribe, formed the nucleus of every social group, and in many cases was itself perhaps the only social group" ("History of Human Marriage," p. 538). In this social group the father ruled as king and priest, and as long as the father lived there was no majority for the sons. Their lives and their property were at the disposal of the absolute father-sovereign, and all who would live in the family must accept his authority. This made a firm and compact group which meant safety and protection to all within its circle. "Such a group naturally broadens out in the course of time into the house or gens, and over this too, a chief kinsman rules" (Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 7). New members may be admitted into this house, through a real or assumed blood-kinship, but they are all subject to the same authority. As time passes and the father of the family dies, his people deify him, and this becomes a new bond of union. The family is now a religious brotherhood, worshiping some common hero who has become a god, and thus the bond of blood is strengthened by the sanctions of religion. In course of time this house or gens broadens out, and comes into contact with other houses or groups. In the struggle that follows one or the other must go down, and here we observe two things: Sometimes this conquered gens finds some blood-kinship with the conquerors, in which case the weaker is absorbed by the stronger. Sometimes, however, the weaker is reduced to subjection, and we have the beginning of a

servile class in the tribe. But this new group becomes a tribe, or clan. And this same process is continued and one tribe absorbs others, and these again unite to form the State. By and by this composite tribe obtains a local habitation and a name, and becomes a settled nation. "The family was the primal unit of political society, and the seed-bed of all larger growths of government" (Wilson, "The State," p. 13).

The patriarchal family is no doubt one of the earliest forms of family life. The book of Genesis carries us back to the early times, and shows us this form of the family in full development. The patriarchal government was no doubt one of the earliest forms, and traces of it are to be found in many lands. The father had the right to govern his household; authorship was the root of authority. In the early Semitic family the father was supreme over his household, even in questions of life and death. In the early Roman empire the father retained a proprietary right in his gens or household, and with this the State had little or nothing to do.

Without attempting a formal discussion or criticism of this theory, it may be said that it fails to account for the State itself. It has to do with the forms through which the State passes in its growth, but it does not account for the causes and forces that create the State. By no possible means could the State have developed out of the small unit called the family. The two institutions are different in essence, as the rights and powers which belong to the State wholly transcend those that inhere in the family. The right of the father to govern his household grows out of the fact of authorship; but this authority is necessarily limited to his children, and cannot be extended over aliens. Just so far as it is extended over others it conflicts with the unity of the family, and finds its justification in some other fact

than in authorship. There may be some resemblance between the father's rule over his children and the State's authority over its members; but it has not been shown that any actual State has grown out of the family. "The evidence of history shows that where society has not passed beyond the development of the family, there has been no national existence" (Mulford, "The Nation," p. 39).

III. The Theory of Conquest. The origin of the State has been found in the conquest of the weaker by the stronger. According to this view, the State is the product of force. This theory, it may be said, has had many exponents, and it is finding wide currency in these times. Thus Plutarch ascribes this saying to Brennus the Gallic king: "The most ancient of all laws, which extends from gods to the beasts, gives to the stronger rule over the weaker" ("Life of Camillus"). In these later times Count Tolstoy opposes the State conception of life on the ground that the State is a usurpation. "Without the aggrandizement of self and the abasement of others, without hypocrisies and deceptions, without prisons, fortresses, executions, and murders, no power can come into existence or be maintained" (Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God is Within You," p. 242). As government begins in usurpation and self-aggrandizement, so it continues in social tyranny and oppression.

This view is also advocated by many modern sociologists, and in a way seems to be the sociological theory. "It is a commonplace of history that the unceasing agglomeration of communities has never been due to the mutual attraction of peoples. . . Not sentiment, but invariably force or the dread of force has called into being that most extensive of co-operations, the State" (Ross, "Social Control," p. 18). "The earliest state-building forces are greed and fear; that is, groups ally themselves in order to

make or to resist attack. People dread the enemy, and hence cheerfully submit to the yoke of the war leader. They tremble before the predatory, and therefore rally around a power that can make law respected. These fear-forces are strongly seconded by the love of power which impels the masterful to supply more government than is needed. In time the absolute State arises in all its grimness and men start back in affright before the Frankenstein they have created" (Ross, "The Foundations of Sociology," p. 175). Under such circumstances, a few wise and strong men who will agree to maintain order and repel the aggressors, are allowed to seat themselves in the saddle. Around these strong men, be they few or many, the great mass of the people gather themselves. Thus a little group is formed, compact and strong, that soon subdues any opposing groups. The great and growing mass of evidence shows, says Professor Ross, that "the historical State, has in almost every instance taken its origin in the violent superposition of one people upon another. Born in aggression and perfected in exploitation, the State, even now, when it is more and more directed by the common will, is not easy to keep from slipping back into the rut it wore for itself during the centuries it was the engine of a parasitic class" (Social Control," p. 386).

It must be confessed that governments have given too much reason for this theory of the State. But we are searching for origins, and are concerned not alone with results, but with causes. This view lies open to very serious objection, and it cannot stand in the light of all the facts. We may grant that might has been the basis of many of the governments of the world thus far, but this might does not serve as an adequate foundation of the State. For, what causal necessity is there between might and right? Force may have produced certain governments and sustained them for a time, but upon force alone

no great State has ever been built. Superior force and physical power can never add themselves up and yield a right. "Every polity, however rude, requires the ideas of right, and of law for the maintenance of right. Might, without these ideas, would not give rise to a commonwealth, but to a gang of robbers; to anarchy plus the sword" (Lilly, "First Principles in Politics," p. 19). Besides, the theory before us fails to go to the root of the matter, and the doctrine contradicts itself at the most vital points. For one thing it recognizes only masters and slaves, and is thus a flagrant contradiction of human freedom. For another thing "it contradicts the idea of Right or Law, which manifestly has a spiritual and moral significance; mere physical force ought to serve right and, if it pretends to be right, it has risen against its proper master" (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State," p. 293). And last of all, it assumes that the fact of authority creates the sentiment of obedience, whereas the sentiment of obedience itself justifies authority. It is sometimes said that priestcraft—to take a somewhat parallel illustration—is the creator of religion; that the priests have invented religion to justify their claims and to keep the people in submission. But this explanation is a complete inversion of the facts; for the presence of a priesthood is an evidence of religion among the people, and it is this religious sentiment that tolerates the assumptions of the priests. In like manner the strong aggressor may usurp the authority of the State and may rule with a high hand; but the political instinct of the people accepts this usurpation, and the tyrant appeals to this sentiment in justification of his claims. This sentiment exists in men, otherwise they would not submit to the authority of one man. "A monarch is not remarkable for bodily strength or intellect, and yet millions permit themselves to be ruled by him. To say that men permit themselves to be governed

contrary to their interests, ends, and intentions, is preposterous, since men are not so stupid. It is their need, and the inner power of the idea which urge them to this, in opposition to their seeming consciousness, and retain them in this relation" (Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," sec. 281). Again: "Often it is imagined that force holds the State together, but the binding cord is nothing else than the deep-seated feeling of order which is possessed by all" (*ibid.*, sec. 268).

IV. The Social Contract. This theory is one of the most subtle and significant ever framed. During the last two hundred years no theory of the State has been more widely accepted, or exerted a more potent influence over political action. Some of the most illustrious names are connected with this theory, as Hobbes and Locke, Grotius and Kant, Rousseau and Jefferson; in exposition and application of this theory there has been created a literature of incomparable power and richness; men have appealed to it against governments and in behalf of revolution; and two most significant documents, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, are simply the formulations of this theory. It is not necessary for our purpose to attempt to trace the rise and development of this theory. It may be said, however, that it was suggested by Thomas Hooker in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," in 1594; and Locke finds its underlying ideas plainly expressed in a speech of King James to Parliament in 1609. Professor Willoughby shows that the whole feudal system of the Middle Ages was saturated with the ideas of this social contract. But the names of three men must forever be associated with the development and illustration of the theory, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

It is assumed in this theory that men existed in what is called a state of nature, and that they were free, happy,

and prosperous. In this state men were all equal, and all possessed certain natural and inalienable rights. Thus Rousseau declares in the opening chapter of "The Social Contract," that "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains." This man, in some ways one of the most potent personalities of the eighteenth century, was himself little more than an echo, putting into clear and understandable and popular terms the thoughts and theories of other and greater thinkers. It had been assumed by Locke and Hobbes that men at first had lived in a state of nature, and they were more or less happy and contented. But this state of nature, free and desirable as it was in many respects, yet had some serious drawbacks and disadvantages. Among these latter were the aggressions which men inflicted upon their fellows, and which seriously interfered with their happiness and prosperity. In this state of nature all men felt free to follow their own inclinations and interests without any respect to the rights and preferences of their neighbors. But such a state with all of its advantages, was a state of mutual fear and ceaseless strife, and in such a condition there could be no law, and no justice. These men, dwelling in a state of nature, early felt the need of combination and co-operation for certain social and commercial purposes. These men voluntarily agreed to form a social State for the protection of their rights and the effectuation of certain definite ends. The time came, however, when these men entered into covenant with one another and adopted certain rules and laws for their governance and security. But these laws and rules cannot execute themselves, and so it is necessary that certain men be chosen as rulers in the State who shall represent its authority and execute its decrees. According to Rousseau "The public force then requires a suitable agent to concentrate it, and put it in action according to the directions of

the general will, to serve as a means of communication between the State and the sovereign, to effect in some manner in the public person what the union of soul and body effects in a man." This is, in the State, the function of the government, and is improperly confounded with the sovereign of which it is only the minister.

What then is the government? An intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and with the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political ("Social Contract," Bk. III, chap. i). The various exponents of the theory differ somewhat in many details, and in none more markedly than in the question of sovereignty, but they all agree in this, that the source of all sovereignty is in the people themselves. Each man, by a natural and imprescriptible right holds a certain proportion of sovereignty, and the sovereignty of the State is simply the sum of these individual wills. Locke claims that this original compact between the members of the State must be renewed from generation to generation in the person of every citizen when he comes to the age of discretion. In Rousseau the distinction between sovereign and government is hopelessly confused, and "while he makes government but the servant for executing the will of the State, he makes this will practically identical with the popular demand. The permanence of all government and its authority is thus practically destroyed" (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," p. 79).

This view has had a marked influence upon the thought and life of mankind since Rousseau's time. It may be said to lie at the basis of the Revolution in France, and it finds expression in the Constitution of the United States; it is also the working theory in the democratic States of to-day, both in America and in Europe. This

theory did good service in opposing the arbitrary and monarchical governments which claimed to rule by divine right without being answerable in any way to the people. To attempt a formal criticism of it is not necessary, for this work has been well done by others. "Natural Rights," by Professor Ritchie, and "The Nature of the State," by Professor Willoughby, may be named in this connection. There are, however, several counts in the indictment that may be here noted.

For one thing, this theory rests upon a wrong interpretation of the facts of life and the nature of man. One may search history through and he will not find an instance of any State, however small or large, that has ever been formed in this way. The theory presupposes individuals as contracting, when the researches of Maine and others show that in early times law was applicable not so much to the individual as to the family, and that in fact, in those early times the individual as such counted for almost nothing. "In addition to this, there is, of course, a manifest absurdity in conceiving a sufficient mental qualification for such a formal act on the part of a people in the very first stages of civilization" (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," p. 117).

The theory also rests upon a complete misinterpretation of the nature of man. In the first place no such men as this theory assumes have ever been found. On the contrary, everything confirms the statement of Prof. Max Müller that, "Go where you will, no people is ever found without some form of government, with laws and religion, and the beginnings at least of a civil society." "As far as we go back in the paleo-ethnology of mankind," says Kropotkin, "we find men living in societies—in tribes similar to those of the highest mammals. . . Societies, bands, or tribes—not families—were thus the primitive form of organization of mankind and its

earliest ancestors. This is what ethnology has come to after its painstaking researches" (Kropotkin, "Mutual Aid," p. 79). In human history, whatever has been found that is great and admirable and free has been found in governed communities. In nothing is the progress of a people in the scale of life so accurately measured as in the degree of their social co-operation and governmental control. Men who approximate the state of nature as it is called, are destitute of the things that make life worthy and admirable.

There is another most fatal objection that may be filed against this theory. It assumes that men in a state of nature possess rights which are antecedent to any social order, and that men create the State that these rights may be conserved. But it is a delusion to suppose that what are called innate rights existed apart from society. For the very consciousness of the individual and his rights implies a social consciousness and a social order. That is, the very conception of a person who claims rights for himself, assumes that there are other persons against whom he makes his claims. The very conception of the right implies that these persons are related in some way. It is in and through the relation and inter-relation of members of a social order that the person comes to self-consciousness and learns to conceive of certain rights as belonging to his personality. The very ability to discuss and classify rights implies a society in which men are becoming conscious of the relations in which its members stand to one another. This social contract theory falls to the ground at its first steps, and utterly fails to explain the facts of life.

And last of all, the theory fails to account for the consciousness which impels men to form political associations. Either there was a political consciousness prior to the contract or there was not. If the consciousness is

prior to the contract, the theory is disproved at the very beginning. If the contract is the cause of the consciousness, the theory is also negatived, for this implies rational action without reason and social fellowship without social consciousness, which are both absurd. It is very evident that no contract between individuals can possess a political character unless there is already present a social consciousness that is above and before the contract itself. No number of individual wills can add themselves up and yield a common will. No surrender of any number of personal rights can produce a social and political right. The State, which is the organ of the political consciousness of its members, cannot by any possibility, come into being out of the consciousness of isolated individuals. In the words of Bluntschli: "For practical politics this doctrine is in the highest degree dangerous, since it makes the State and its institutions the product of individual caprice, and declares it to be changeable according to the will of the individuals then living. . . It is to be considered, therefore, a theory of anarchy rather than a political doctrine" ("The Theory of the State," Bk. IV, chap. ix).

V. The Natural Sociability of Man. This is the view of Bluntschli and others, and, with variations and modifications, it is the view that is more or less prevalent to-day. The author named declares that it is not enough to refute the current speculative theories, but we must endeavor to discover the one common cause of the rise of States. This common cause he thinks we find in human nature, which besides its tendency to individual diversity, has in it tendencies of community and unity. "Thus the inward impulse to society produces external organization of common life in the form of manly self-government—that is, in the form of the State" (The Theory of the State," Bk. IV, chap. x).

This social tendency, we are told, works at first instinctively and unconsciously. The many look up, half with trust and half with fear, to a leader by whose courage and genius they are impressed, and whom they honor as the supreme expression of their community. At first this consciousness of community is found chiefly in the leaders of the people, but in time it extends itself among the more intelligent classes, until at last it permeates the lower orders in society and becomes active and effective in all.

This view has many things in its favor, and it approximates the true conception. It recognizes the necessity of the State, and it grounds the State in the nature of man. It declares that the State is the natural and appointed work of man, and it recognizes the fact that it is a potent agency of progress in society. "The State is the fulfilment of the common order, and the organization for the perfection of the common life in all public matters" (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State," Bk. IV, chap. x). So far as it goes, therefore, this theory is satisfactory enough, but it does not fully solve the problem before us. For "to speak of the State as naturally created, makes of it an entity independent of man, uncreated by him, and as such, not requiring justification in his eyes. . . To say that political authority is natural neither answers the question as to how its empirical manifestation is brought about, nor shows the manner in which its control over the individual is harmonized with the latter's natural freedom" (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," pp. 33, 34).

This brings us to the last view as to the origin of the State.

VI. The Origin of the State in the Nature of Man and the Purpose of God. In the statement of this view several things are to be noted. The first is what may be

called the fact of organic solidarity. The crowning discovery of this modern age, says President Moss, is the unity of the universe, the oneness of all things visible and invisible in one great system of matter and force and law. The world, it is becoming more and more evident, is an organic totality, and all things move together because all things are linked together. One thing is as it is because all other things are as they are. "It is a mathematical fact," says Carlyle, "that the casting of this stone from my hand changes the center of gravity of the universe." The entire universe is one great system, and atom is linked with atom and star is bound to star by ties that are most real. But the facts of the physical and material world are only so many parables of human life and its relations, and from the one we may learn much concerning the other.

When we come to the study of man we find that this fact of solidarity becomes most real and important. Man, by the very constitution of his being, is a creature of relationships; in fact, it is in and through these relationships that he comes to maturity and power. It is impossible to be a person without being in a true sense a member of society, for it is in and through the life of others that man comes to be himself. The law is written: You cannot live by yourself alone and be a man at all. The Creator has so linked the race together that no man can give the race the slip and rise into perfection by himself. In the most real sense, it is true that we are members one of another and dependent the one upon the other. The whole race is bound together in a solidarity of interests and responsibilities in which the one and the many are mutually means and ends. Adopting the figure of the apostle we may say that "The whole body of humanity fitly framed and knit together through that which every person supplieth, according to the working in due

measure of each several part maketh the increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love."

The second thing is this: that in all living beings there is an instinct and impulse toward association, and this is the most fundamental fact in life. It would be interesting to trace the beginnings of this instinct among the lowly forms of life, for it is found in the rudiments at least in creatures that are far down in the scale. The fact is, this principle of association is practically coeval with life itself and is rooted in the very nature of things. But we are considering the origin of the State, and so we are concerned more intimately with what may be called the subjective factors in the making of States; that is, those instincts and impulses which *draw* men together and lead them to unite in social institutions. And the more we study this aspect of the question the more real and potent these factors appear. If one were searching for the beginnings of the political State it would be necessary to search far down among the social instincts of lowly creatures, for these instincts are everywhere present with this difference: among the lowly creatures we find the instinct of mutual aid and the forms of social life; but we find also that this is unconscious and instinctive. But when we come to the world of man we find all this changed; for the tendency which among animals appears as an impulse and instinct more or less unconscious and automatic, among men appears as an impulse and appetency more or less conscious and rational. Because man is man, by nature a social and political being, some form of society is inevitable. The form that this society shall assume at any time or in any place will depend upon many incidental factors, and will vary according to the degree and quality of this sense of human fellowship and social obligation. The form of the State in any age and land is thus the expression of the political

consciousness of the people, and we can measure the quality of this consciousness by the form which the State assumes.

In fulfilment of their strongest imperatives, men have given expression to their political consciousness and founded political institutions. They have done this more or less unconsciously and spontaneously, but in all they have been working in harmony with the purpose of God in the world and with the meaning of their own nature. The State, like all other vital things, is a growth and not a manufacture. And since man is by nature a social and political being, the idea of the State is grounded in his very constitution and its formal appearance is only a question of time. And since man is a vital being, the idea of the State is itself a process of growth. Thus the idea of the State, which is implicit in man's constitution, becomes explicit in and through the processes of history and the unfoldings of life. The idea creates the form and finds expression through it, and the form conserves and perpetuates the idea. Adopting the figure of Hegel we may say that "the idea of God and the will of God are the factors that enter into the making of society; the one is the warp and the other is the woof in the vast arras web of universal history" (Hegel, "Philosophy of History," Introduction). The idea of the State hence takes shape slowly, being hindered or retarded by circumstances, such as nationality, intellectual development, and above all, religion.

And thus we find that man is by nature a social and political being; that some form of social fellowship and political co-operation is implicit in his very nature; that the State itself becomes explicit in and through a natural process of development; that in the earlier stages this process may be more or less instinctive and unconscious, but in all the higher stages it is furthered and quickened

by man's conscious choice and rational co-operation; and that thus the State is here in fulfilment of the purpose of God and has its justification in the nature of man himself. In this conception of the origin of the State, we find that all of the causes that were named in the other theories have been more or less at work. There is a soul of truth in each of these theories, but they all err by defect in that they take a part for the whole and consider results that are much larger than their causes.

This view, however, gives us the two things that we need for all clear and rational thought. It gives us at once the origin of the State and the justification for its existence. It grounds the State in the very nature of man and the purpose of God, and it contains a justification for its existence in the very nature of life itself.

III

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

THE determination of the true functions of the State is one of the urgent and practical problems of our time. There could be no greater misfortune to society, than for men to proceed blindly, without any clear vision of the ends they are to seek and the methods they are to employ. This inquiry is all the more important in view of the growing complexity of society and the widening range of State activity. In the world as we find it, there is an ever-increasing diversity and differentiation, and we see society breaking up into distinct trades and classes, with the most minute division of labor and the most rigid delimitation of trades. Everything indicates that this process is to continue even more widely. But there is also an ever-increasing inter-relation and interdependence, and we are discovering that every man needs his neighbor and is dependent upon his co-operation.

This imposes new responsibilities upon political machinery and makes new demands upon modern statesmen. The State is slowly but surely extending its activity and multiplying its functions; and this process is likely to continue and even widen. There are those who view this tendency with alarm and declare that man is forging for himself the chains of a new slavery. There are others who regard it with unmixed satisfaction, and in fact, demand a much wider extension of State action. Between these two extremes stands a third class uncertain which course to take, whether to array itself with the former or with the latter.

The right conception of the State will give us the key to the true interpretation of the functions of the State. There are two methods that may be followed in this study. One may follow the historical and empirical method, and may consider the functions of the various States of the world; he may then compare these, noting those more or less recognized in all and rejecting those that seem sporadic and isolated. By this process he may obtain results suggestive and possibly helpful. But this process is questionable at best; for no two peoples have the same characteristics and conditions, and the method most effective in one set may be wholly unworkable in different conditions. And this method fails to meet all the demands of life, for it takes no account of the ideal element in society. To know what is good for the State we must have some ideal of the State and some conception of its mission. According to the teachings of sociology, "That is good for me, or for the world around me, which promotes the ongoing of the social process. That is bad for me, or for the world around me, which retards the ongoing of the social process" (Small, "General Sociology," p. 676). This means that we must have some conception of the meaning and end of the social process in order to appraise any method or function of the State. The other possible method for us is to adopt or to devise some ideal of the State and its functions, and then seek to bring the actual State up to the ideal standard. This method has its advantages, but at best it is questionable and may be unreal. States are growths and not manufactures. In view of this, it is possible that the better method of study is one that shall combine the two methods. We seek to know what are the functions now performed by the most advanced States; we seek to discover how far the State can promote certain great ends; and then with some ideal of the true

end of the State we inquire what are the functions that it must perform in order to fulfil its highest aims.

In the development of political thought many attempts have been made to determine the essential functions of the State. It is needless to multiply quotations, but a few of the more significant statements may be given. "The powers that be are ordained of God," says the Apostle Paul. The ruler is the deacon of God unto men for good; rulers are set for the punishment of evil-doers and the praise of them that do well (Rom. 13 : 1-4). In old Rome a simple motto glittered upon the walls that in a way summed up all the legislation of that people: "*Salus populi suprema lex*," "the safety of the people is the supreme law." Aristotle, the father of political science, declares that a State "exists for the sake of life; and not for the sake of life only, but for the sake of good life. . . Whence it may be inferred that virtue must be the serious care of the State which truly deserves the name" ("Politics," Bk. III, sec. 9). In the preamble of the Constitution of the United States, we have the great words, "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." In the Bills of Rights of many of the States of the Union this same purpose is affirmed in somewhat different language: "To safeguard and promote the three main pillars of the State, morality, religion, and education." These statements are definite enough so far as they go, but for purposes of careful thought it is necessary that they be analyzed and classified more accurately.

In the progress of political thought many attempts have been made to arrange the functions of the State under

certain definite categories. Thus we have them divided into Primary and Secondary Functions; we have them arranged in Essential and Non-essential Functions; we have them grouped into Positive and Negative Functions; and so on indefinitely. These divisions are all more or less unsatisfactory, for the reason that they are arbitrary and introduce false distinctions; any real function of the State is primary, essential, and positive. These divisions are unsatisfactory for the further reason that they subject the lower interests of man to the care of what are called the primary and essential functions, and commit the more immaterial and spiritual interests to the keeping of the secondary and non-essential. Other writers have sought to classify these functions with reference to the varied interests of men and the different branches of government; and we have what are called the Police Functions, the Legislative Functions, the Judicial Functions, the Educational Functions, and the Economic Functions. These classifications have much in their favor, and, for purposes of study, are very useful. But they "cut things in two" and introduce divisions that are unreal and possibly mischievous. For these reasons this classification is suggested: The Defensive, the Conservative, the Socializing, and the Promotive Functions.

I. Defensive Functions. In all States that deserve the name the guaranteeing of human security has been regarded as fundamental and essential. In early times it is quite possible that this need of protection was one of the chief factors in the making of the State. Even in later times the need finds clear expression in political constitutions. Thus, the preamble of the Constitution of the United States among other things, declares that government exists to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity and provide for the common defense. Here is a clear recognition of the State's duty to provide for

the common welfare. The State is the true unit, and each member is defended by it. The State has not always been true to its calling in this respect, for governments have sometimes been little other than organized oppression, and have shown scant regard for either justice or tranquillity. And yet governments, even the worst, have done something for human welfare, and the worst government has been better than no government at all. But this term, the Defensive Functions, demands further analysis; it is not a simple term. We find that the State sustains a double relation to its citizens: first to those who are without and secondly to those within its fold.

Toward those without, the State appears as the defender and guardian of its members in person, life, property, and security. In its early stages this is about the only function assumed by the State; but it is a function everywhere recognized as fundamental. In all primitive societies the principle of solidarity is most fully operative, and in a real sense the individual is lost in the tribe. Any aggression against a member of the tribe is an aggression against the tribe itself, and it must be resented by the tribe in the person of its ruler. This, as we know, is not by any means the only function recognized in modern States, but it is a function which every State worthy of the name is ready to assert in clearest terms. A citizen of this republic, *e. g.,* be he missionary or trader, who has been admitted into any foreign country may always appeal to the home government for protection, and the home government is bound to extend such protection.

But the State also assumes the function of protecting its members from one another. It exists that it may guarantee to its weakest and lowliest member the secure possession and enjoyment of all his rights and privileges. These, that may be called the police functions of the State,

are quite generally recognized in all States that are well ordered. Here we find that the individual members surrender to the government the duty of protection, and the State accepts this responsibility and holds all its resources in pledge for its fulfilment. All experience shows that this work of insuring protection against aggression and securing redress for wrong done, cannot be left wholly to individual action and private initiative. Where wrongs are left to private redress a system of revenge and retaliation obtains, and the vendetta never ends. In addition, each person is a member of the State, and any wrong done the person is an attack upon the State. Hence, the State which assumes the protection of its members, must assert its authority and must insure its own existence by dealing with the offender. Besides all this the punishment which overtakes the wrong-doer must not be inflicted in a spirit of revenge; it must be visited on the malefactor in the name of the people and for common security.

This work of defense against the outer world and the maintenance of justice within its borders, are the two most elementary and irreducible functions of the State. Where these two forms of service are not performed by the government we have a condition of anarchy and not a civilized State.

But this defensive function of the State has a much wider scope. The State is the natural guardian of those who are unable to protect themselves, and this lays many new responsibilities upon it. There are those who advocate the doctrine of non-interference by the State, and in the name of scientific naturalism assert that the individual must be left to fight his battles for himself. It is only in and through this struggle for existence that each can prove his fitness for survival; and to keep alive those who are unfit is to fly in the face of the whole cosmic

order. This being so, the functions of the State should be kept at the lowest minimum, and we must see to it that the State does not interfere with the stern but beneficent processes of nature. That is to say, the State has no duty whatever to defend the weak and unfit from themselves and from others, beyond the general police functions of government. Such a view as this, it must be said, is at variance with the best thought of the world, and is based upon an utter misreading of the facts. Out in the jungle there is indeed a struggle for existence, and unfailingly the unfit go down. But human society is higher than the wild jungle mêlée for the simple reason that human society is subject to the sway of mental and moral principles. The authority of the State must be directed, therefore, in all spheres in which men need protection.

The State that fully recognizes its duty in the direction of defense, will not allow conditions to exist which make it impossible for any class of people to realize the innate possibilities of their being. Thus, in the early years of the nineteenth century, it was found that the condition of thousands of mill operatives and mine workers was utterly and deplorably bad. The Earl of Shaftesbury and his colleagues in England clearly saw that there was here a great wrong against the life of these people. He plainly stated in his speeches and reports that there were thousands of persons in the land, who were utterly unable to defend themselves against these conditions, and so they were wholly unable to rise into a more worthy life. These persons by themselves could not change the economic conditions that virtually enslaved them and debarred them quite hopelessly from any inheritance in life. The State, so the earl maintained, must intervene by its authority and must protect these helpless ones. Remedial measures were enacted despite bitter opposi-

tion; and the authority of the British Parliament exerted in proper legislation, ameliorated the condition of millions of English workers and made it possible for them to maintain their standing in society and become self-respecting citizens. The State is the natural defender of the person against aggression; it is charged with the maintenance of justice between man and man; and it must protect the weak and helpless against any forces and conditions that would hurt and oppress them.

II. Conservative Functions. In order that men may live in security and society may fulfil its mission, there must be some authority that shall safeguard the necessary conditions. This agency is the State, and this conservation is a necessary part of its mission.

That the State is charged with the conservation of the *physical conditions* of the people is quite generally recognized. Thus the government is charged with the protection of the streams from pollution and their preservation. The man whose home is by the riverside cannot be allowed to use that river as he pleases, for the simple reason that his conduct must not be allowed to imperil the common safety. Nothing can be more plain than the duty of the State to conserve the sanitary conditions of the territory subject to its authority. The management of all matters pertaining to public sanitation and general healthfulness cannot be left to the individual initiative of the citizens themselves. As an illustration we may consider the matter of public health.

There are those who insist that all such matters shall be left to the individual citizens to manage as they will, either by voluntary associations or by individual action. But suppose for a moment that this is left to free individual and voluntary control. It may happen that a number of people who do not see the necessity for drains and sewers refuse to co-operate. Nay, worse; they will not

allow the sewer to cross their property in order to reach the river, and they refuse to abate the nuisance that is causing their neighbors discomfort. In this case it is evident that unless some conservative and coercive power can be employed, human security is at an end and human society is practically impossible. It is argued by the friends of political non-intervention, that persons so acting must be left severely alone to reap the consequences of their ignorance and stubbornness. That may be the most effective way, so far as they are concerned, but it may prove entirely too expensive for the other members of society.

Again, clear thought recognizes that the *climatic conditions* of a country must be preserved, so far as they are under human control. The watercourses must be kept free from pollution; the arable land must not be unduly injured, greed and short-sightedness must be opposed; in short, the general conditions of life must be safeguarded. No generation is an end in itself. Each is the heir of the past and the parent of the future. Prudence would seem to dictate that the men of every generation should give careful attention to those means and measures that are likely to improve the natural conditions of life and make it easier for the generations that are to come. The person is for a single generation, but "the State is for all generations. . . The State being the representative of social permanence, it ought to see that the general conditions of existence do not deteriorate among its people; this is the minimum which can be asked of it; what would be better still would be that it should improve them" (Beaulieu, "The Modern State," p. 202). The earth has been given to the children of men, and no generation can claim the exclusive title to it.

But the physical conditions of a people are not the only ones that influence them. The welfare and happiness of

men depend most intimately upon the *economic* and *industrial conditions* that prevail, and here the State has a clear duty. In every community there is a large class who possess no real inheritance in society, and are sadly handicapped in the race of life. It is not necessary here to consider whether this condition has come about wholly through the fault or the misfortune of the parties in question. In either case it would seem that the State has a clear duty. For the State must see to it that no section or class shall be allowed to deteriorate, either physically or economically. In case higher reasons do not prevail, there are lower reasons that should convince. We are all bound together in a solidarity of interests and responsibilities, and whatever endangers one endangers all. If the deterioration of the people has come about through excessive toil, low wages, and defective industrial conditions, the State must do what it can to remedy these defects. If the handicap that is upon a large section of the community has come about through control of natural resources by a few, the monopolization of the avenues of industry and the crowding of the weaker to the wall, the State must exert its authority to give all a fair opportunity.

This means that the State which will conserve human conditions will see to it that all begin the race of life on a footing of equality. There is a growing tendency among political and sociological thinkers to question whether the present cruelty and waste in human society through irresponsible monopoly and uncontrolled competition are not fraught with evil consequences. Professor Marshall maintains that "the present extreme inequalities of wealth tend in many ways to prevent human faculties from being turned to their best account." "The fact is," as Benjamin Kidd points out, "a large proportion of the population in the prevailing state of so-

ciety take part in the rivalry of life only under conditions which absolutely preclude them, whatever their natural merit or ability, from any real chance therein. They come into the world to find the best positions not only already filled but practically occupied in perpetuity" (Kidd, "Social Evolution," p. 232). In view of this, it is evident that the old *Laissez Faire* doctrine is entirely outgrown. The State that would fulfil its higher mission, must do what lies in its power to equalize opportunity and conserve the interests of the weaker as well as those of the strong.

In many ways this conserving function of the State is recognized by all modern progressive governments. In fulfilment of this function there are certain principles of all intelligent legislation. Thus, where natural parentage is manifestly defective or inefficient, the State intervenes and assumes the guardianship of the children. The State will not allow obscene pictures to be sold whose tendency is clearly to degrade. In the rightful exercise of its authority the State may remove the sources of physical contagion, and may employ its machinery to secure safe and sanitary conditions. It may forbid the entrance into the country of diseased cattle, and may even encourage intelligent and profitable cattle-raising. It may prohibit the prize-fight and the lottery; it may also prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. In short, it may do whatever lies within its power to secure safe and healthful conditions for all the people within its jurisdiction. According to a significant decision of the United States Supreme Court, "No legislation can barter away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest themselves of the power to provide for them."

A State, in the judgment of Aristotle, is the collective body of the citizens sufficient in themselves for all purposes of life ("Politics," Bk. III, chap. i). The true end of the State, as defined by Bluntschli, is "the development of national capacities, the perfecting of the national life, and finally its completion." Therefore, it cannot control private life in what is essentially individual, but only so far as that life is affected by the common nature of all men and by the common necessities ("The Theory of the State," p. 325).

There are those who make light of State action, and declare that everything must be left to the control of private parties and voluntary associations. No doubt there are many things which should be left to individual initiative; there is no mystic chemistry in the State by which man's folly can be transmuted into social wisdom. "The State, as a matter of fact, invents nothing, and never has invented anything" (Beaulieu, "The Modern State," p. 83). At best, it is the social machinery through which men act in bringing about certain social results, and by the nature of the case it suffers from the defects of all machines. But while all this is true, while many things may be left to private initiative, it is evident that there are many important interests which would be neglected if left in private hands. The fact is, humanity has progressed thus far by not letting things take their own course, but by directing them by intelligent and moral ends. "The history of progress is the record of the gradual diminution of waste. The lower the stage the greater is the waste involved in the attainment of any end. . . When we come to human society, the State is the chief instrument by which waste is prevented. The mere struggle for existence between individuals means unchecked waste. The State by its action, can in many cases, deliberately and consciously, diminish this fearful

loss. By freeing the individual from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for the mere conditions of life, it can set free individuality and so make culture possible. An ideal State would be one in which there was no waste at all of the lives, the intellects, and the souls of individual men and women" (Ritchie, "Principles of State Interference," p. 50).

III. Socializing Functions. There is another large class of functions, performed alike by the lowest as well as by the highest States, that can best be described by the term Socializing Functions. By socializing functions of the State we mean the harmonization of all interests therein and their conscious co-operation in behalf of social progress (Small, "General Sociology," chap. xxiv). In a sense this class of functions includes all those that have been named or that may be named; but in a most true sense also this class of functions involves aspects of social activity that are not considered in any of the other categories. Whatever promotes social betterment comes within its province.

In society as we find it there are all kinds of individuals and classes, and these, because of their divergent interests, are more or less in a chronic state of conflict. How can this struggle between individuals and interests be limited to the smallest degree? How can they be so correlated and harmonized that social peace may take the place of social conflict? And how can all these be so guided and directed that they all shall work together for the perfection of the social process? These questions are among the most fundamental and practical that man can consider, and upon their right solution depend many issues in social progress. There are two directions in which this socializing function of the State may be noted, the socializing of individuals and the harmonizing of interests. Under the first division may be classed all those efforts of the State

to define the relations of man with man and to train them in the divine art of living together.

The primary interest of every man, as of every animal, is the sheer effort to keep alive. One of the inevitable forms of this interest is what may be called the food interest, and this is as true of cave men as of modern philosophers. But there are other interests that assert themselves, and so we have a list that runs along the whole scale of human life. Life, as we know it, may not be a free fight, with every living being fighting with every other, but life in one aspect at least may be described as a struggle for existence, with the survival of the fittest. The amount of food that is available at any one time for beast or man is wofully limited, and hence there is a constant competition for the choicer portions. There are not enough warm places in the sun for all to enjoy themselves, and so there is a constant struggle for place. In the lower ranges of life these forces act in a more or less instinctive and unconscious way. But when we enter the world of man we find that this socializing process is more or less under the direction of conscious and moral powers. In a colony of ants the various members arrange themselves in an instinctive way with little or no initiative of their own. In a hive of bees the same process is seen, and while the order is most wonderful, it is yet almost wholly instinctive, if not automatic. But when we come to a human group or tribe we find that a new factor is at work, and this acts in a more or less conscious and rational way in establishing some *modus vivendi*. This factor or agency is what may be called the State.

The State which we have defined as the organ of man's political consciousness is thus one of the agencies whereby the socialization of man's life is promoted. Thus the State serves a useful purpose in socializing and civilizing

the individuals; that is, it develops within them a consciousness of kind, and promotes the social process. The State, however sadly it may have failed in its mission, has yet done much to repress and discourage the individualistic and unsocial impulses of men and to encourage and foster the social and sociable impulses. Its service in these directions cannot well be overestimated.

Under the second division of this subject are comprehended all those efforts of the State to adjust the different classes of conflicting interests, and thus to secure the welfare of all. "In the beginning," says Professor Small, "were interests." "An interest is a plain demand for something regardless of everything else." "An interest is unequivocal, intolerant, exclusive" (Small, "General Sociology," pp. 196, 201). We have seen that the various individuals in society have various interests of their own, and each tends to seek that interest which to him seems most important at the time. But as we look at human society, we find that these individuals arrange themselves in groups and classes and parties, according to the interests that are represented, and whereas before we had a conflict of individuals, now we have a conflict of groups and parties. This warrants the conclusion that "the social process is a continual formation of groups around interests, and a continual exertion of reciprocal influence by means of group action" (Small, *ibid.*, p. 209). It is needless to describe in detail the groups and parties and classes that form themselves around certain interests and become their representatives and defenders. These interests, as described by Ratzenhofer and Small, range through the whole gamut of human life from the universal interest of sustenance, through the kinship interest, the national interest, the creedal interests, the pecuniary interests, the class interests; and these last again divide and subdivide into many minor interests of

manufacture, trade, capital, culminating in the rank interests and corporate interests (Small, "General Sociology," p. 252). Professor Ross groups these interests somewhat differently into the economic, the political, the religious, and the intellectual interests, but he declares that these are the interests which constitute in effect the chief history-making forces (Ross, "Foundations of Sociology," p. 170). We find as the culmination of this process that is going on in society that "The various institutions, political, ecclesiastical, professional, industrial, etc., including the government, are devices, means, gradually brought into existence to serve interests that develop within the State" (Small, *ibid.*, p. 233).

In order that men may live together at all, and that society may become possible, these conflicting and clashing interests must be correlated and harmonized. That this may be done there must be some agency or institution comprehensive enough to represent all these diverse interests. This agency, it is evident, must be something more than the agency of some one interest; it must be in the most real sense the representative of all. This agency of the common interest, this representative of the common life, is nothing less than the State, and the special function of the State in representing and harmonizing all interests we may call the socializing function. Thus "The State is a union of disunions, a conciliation of conflicts, a harmony of discords. The State is an arrangement of combinations by which mutually repellent forces are brought into some measure of concurrent action." "The State is a working compromise between the unsocializing and the socializing possibilities of individual selfishness" (Small, *ibid.*, pp. 252, 332). This socializing function of the State is second to none in importance, and deserves more consideration than it has hitherto received.

In its exercise the State can do much to mitigate the

severity of the social struggle and to conserve the interests of the weaker. In every society there are persons who are unsocial and selfish, who seek their own interests without any reference to the interests of others. This selfish spirit may manifest itself in many ways; it may appear in the outlaw who commits aggression by physical force; it may appear in the monopolist who corners the necessaries of life. It may incarnate itself in some corporation or institution or system, ecclesiastical or economic, that regards its own interests as chief and tries to bend all others thereto. Under such circumstances the State has a very clear duty and an important function. It is the duty of the State to protect its members from aggression, be that aggression individual or corporate; it is its duty to make it possible for the just man to compete on fair terms with all other men. Thus far in the history of human thought this socializing function of the State has had a somewhat restricted application, but the time has come when it must be exercised in many new directions. It has been assumed that the State will protect its members from physical force; that it will protect its members in reputation and property; and, in a general way, it may be said that the State has fulfilled this part of its office. It is, however, more and more becoming evident that the State must protect its members from aggression of a more subtle and cruel character; that it must exert a more socializing and civilizing influence in society.

There are two impulses, never stronger than to-day, that are pretty constant in human nature—the love of money and the love of power. These impulses lead to combinations and corporations, the representatives of certain great and controlling financial interests. The man who would live and trade must either come into these combinations or he must accept the hard option of com-

peting with the almost certain prospect of ultimate extinction. In view of this, it is evident that the State has a most important function to fulfil in socializing the competing interests of society and in elevating the plane of social action. It can establish a legal plane of competition and can provide standing-ground for every man. It can define the conditions under which manufacture and trade must be conducted, and thus make it possible for the moral man to compete on fair terms with all others. It can socialize the whole life of man by restraining aggression and make it possible for the just and moral man to maintain his footing. It lies within its proper function to determine the character of such competitive action as shall take place, to define the terms on which all economic action shall be conducted, and to make it possible for the most conscientious and social members of society to compete on the human plane and not on the jungle plane. "The matching of strength against weakness is contrary to fighting codes; equal armor and equal weapons were the rule of knighthood" (Professor J. B. Clarke, "The Philosophy of Wealth," p. 165). "It is utterly illogical to say that aggrandizement by physical force should be forbidden, while aggrandizement by mental or legal fiction should be permitted. It is absurd to claim that injustice committed by muscle should be regulated, while that committed by brain should be unrestricted" (Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 322).

This socializing function of the State is second to none in importance, and it promises to play a much larger part in the future than in the past. It is probable that this function will be manifested in a greater extension of State action in the realms of man's social and industrial interests. Thus far these realms have been very jealous of their own prerogatives, and have resented all State action as an interference with their rights. But it is

becoming increasingly evident that the State cannot allow its authority to be denied in this way; nor can it tolerate any influences and interests that are clearly unsocial and destructive in their tendencies and actions. The State must determine the plane on which men shall live and trade and compete; it must persuade or compel the different interests of society to subordinate their special interest to the one common interest; in a word, it must do all in its power to harmonize and socialize the divergent elements of society and to train them all in the divine art of living together.

IV. Promotive Functions. The State has an important function to fulfil in promoting the welfare of man. According to Aristotle a State "exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only. . . Whence it may be inferred that virtue must be the serious care of a State which truly deserves the name" ("Politics," Bk. III, Sec. 9). According to Locke "The end of government is the good of mankind." According to the Apostle Paul civil authority is appointed of God for the good of man (Rom. 13 : 1-6). It is not necessary to consider in detail the many things that the State may do in behalf of human progress, but a few lines of action may be suggested.

The State can do much to promote social well-being by removing the obstacles that hinder and disqualify men for free development. It is clearly the duty of the State to make possible a free, worthy, human, and moral life for all its members. The State is called to consider not only the best interests of the largest number, but the highest interests of the whole number. It is clearly its duty to create conditions which shall give every person a fair fighting chance for life and happiness.

Again, the State can do much in promoting human well-being by providing that every person shall have a

fair standing in society. Every child born into the world has a claim to the common inheritance of earth, air, and water; it has birth-right to a fair chance for life, property, and happiness, and any society that ignores these claims and rights is essentially unjust. There is one principle that we need to keep in mind in all our discussion of this question, that no man in any generation is to do anything that shall narrow the range of opportunity or mortgage the inheritance of succeeding generations. "The freedom to do as they like on the part of one set of men may involve the ultimate disqualification of many others, or of a succeeding generation, for the exercise of rights" (Green, "Principles of Political Obligation," Sec. 210). The men of one generation may justly complain if by the action of a preceding generation they are obliged to begin the race of life seriously handicapped. The obverse of this is true, and the men of the present generation should hence take thought for the generations that are to come, and should seek to create conditions which shall make for human equality and social peace. The State and not the individual is the representative of this permanent life of a people, and hence it follows that the State must hold the balance even between the generations and give each its due.

Once more: there are many things that the State can do in a more direct and positive way in promoting human well-being. Removing obstacles is not by any means the only thing. It is becoming an accepted principle among all progressive peoples that the State may exercise its authority in promoting education, in spreading intelligence, and in fostering philanthropy. It must be said, however, that on this question there is a marked difference of opinion among social and political thinkers. Thus we have those who take the extreme position, with Herbert Spencer, that the State has nothing to do with such

matters, and whenever it meddles here it transcends its sphere. There are others who take the opposite extreme and maintain that it is both the right and the duty of the State to provide for the full education of all its members, in both intellectual and moral life. The true course seems to lie between these extremes, and teaches that the State has the right and the duty to maintain for its citizens the conditions under which the free exercise of their faculties is possible (Lilly, "First Principles in Politics," p. 59). But the State may do much more than this and still maintain this middle course; in fact, the more advanced States to-day are doing much more than provide the mere rudiments of an education. The welfare of the people is the chief concern of the just government, and that this welfare may be promoted it is necessary that the material interests of the people be considered. Not only so, but the State needs qualified and trained men for all departments of its life and service in civil affairs, in industrial, and military life. In order that these ends may be fully and generally secured the State may fairly and justly establish departments of forestry and commerce, of labor and education; it may establish and endow normal schools and State universities, and it may create bureaus of charities and corrections, and may print and disseminate literature bearing upon all the questions of national and social welfare.

There are four principles—social axioms they ought to be called—that may be of service: The effort of society should always be greatest where the need is sorest. The State that is under obligation to punish and restrain the criminal is under equal obligation to remove the causes which make the criminal. The State that confesses its obligation to care for its dependent and defective members should confess the equal obligation to prevent the continuous creation of such dependent and

defective classes. The method of prevention is a great deal cheaper and easier than the method of reformation, and it is also more Christian and more hopeful. A few suggestions in application of these principles may be offered.

For one thing, the State must encourage all those investigators who are seeking to know the causes of disease and crime. We must know the causes of these distressful phenomena of society, the criminal, the tramp, the insane, the idiotic; we must seek to remove the causes of these things, and we must labor to secure a larger proportion of sane, healthy, well-endowed, morally disposed people in the community. The State must put its resources in pledge in behalf of its weakest and least promising members that they may be lifted up into strength and fitness. In this work the wise State will co-operate with all the other agencies of man-making, such as the family and the church, that human life may be touched and influenced on all sides. The unfit must not be allowed to remain unfit, but must be transformed. But more important than this, society must take adequate precautions against the needless multiplication of these dependent and defective members. The State must go behind results and must seek to change causes, and this work it cannot evade nor deny. That is, the State must now employ its resources and exert its authority in creating conditions that will prevent the making and multiplying of the weak and the defective. This is a great undertaking, and it may require long generations for the most advanced society to approximate the goal. But it is something to know the direction in which progress lies, and to consider what brings man nearer to the true standard. The progress of man and the perfection of society are the supreme concern of the State.

Growing out of all this is the function of the State in

promoting the moral welfare of its people. All clear thought recognizes that the national character is the resultant and outcome of individual character; for the quality of the elements determines the quality of the mass. Now, since this is true, even to truism, it would seem that the State which has any concern for its own moral character and social stability, must concern itself very intimately with the moral life of its citizens. At the same time it must be remembered that it can do little in a direct way to achieve these results; it can decree moral statutes, but it cannot create the moral will; it can create certain social machinery, but it cannot manufacture moral character. There is no civil enactment and political machinery that can generate moral life and build a righteous society out of unrighteous men. In view of this there are many men who maintain that the State can do nothing whatever to promote human virtue and morality; the machinery of the State is too coarse, they assert, for such delicate work, and hence the State would better limit itself to its true and proper functions. Herbert Spencer was never more clearly in the right than when he said that there is no form of government that can bring golden conduct out of leaden instincts.

But a more careful consideration of all the factors will show that there are many things that the State can do and should do, in behalf of the moral life of its people. No one claims that it is possible to make men good by law; but every one with any discernment knows that it is easily possible for the State to deal with conditions that make it doubly difficult for men to be good at all. The State can make it possible for men to live and labor on the moral plane; the State can remove the artificial barriers which society erects and can equalize opportunity for all; the State can remove the stumbling-blocks that are placed in the way of men and abolish the agencies that

are clearly demoralizing; the State can apply the moral law to the civil organization of society and can seek to prepare every person for full citizenship.

Thus far the primary, defensive, police functions of the State have bulked very large in the thoughts of men, and it has done a great work in these directions. In the more progressive modern States other functions have been recognized also, and much attention has been given to educational matters and to economic questions. But it is becoming more evident every day that there are whole ranges of functions beyond these, and men are beginning to consider what may be called the social and moral functions of the State. Men are beginning to see that the functions of the State are not negative and defensive only, to restrain the evil-doer and to punish crime, but promotive and positive also, to direct social progress and to further human well-being. As time goes by these negative functions will more and more sink into the background, and these positive functions will more and more fill the foreground. Herbert Spencer maintains that the State must prepare for its own decease, and must hasten the day when it will be unnecessary. On the contrary, as humanity advances toward its goal and society becomes more complex, the State will become more and more necessary, and will fulfil other functions that are now unrecognized. "The State," says Bluntschli, "is not an arrangement for the purpose of taming the evil passions. It is not a necessary evil, but a necessary good. Only by the realization of the State can peoples and humanity, taken collectively, manifest their real inward unity and attain to free corporate existence. The State is the fulfilment of the common order, and the organization for the perfection of common life in all public matters" ("The Theory of the State," p. 302). "The true functions and aims of the State," he maintains, "are

the development of the natural capacities, the perfecting of the national life, and finally its completion" (*ibid.*, 321). The time is coming when, in the words of Ruskin, "men may indeed begin to take serious thought whether among national manufactures that of souls of a good quality may not at last turn out a quite leadingly lucrative one" ("Unto This Last," Essay II).

IV

THE IDEAL OF THE STATE

THE conception of the State is one thing, and the ideal of the State is quite another. The conception has to do with the formal nature and essential characteristics of actual States. The ideal of the State, on the other hand, presents a picture in the splendor of imaginary perfection, as not yet realized, but to be striven for (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State," p. 15). Hence, in speaking of the ideal of the State we mean that ideal which men cherish, which they regard as the perfect goal, and which they seek to have realized.

In these later times men are gaining what has been called the sense of humanity, and society is coming to what may be described as social consciousness. In the natural order we find that the process of development below man has gone forward in a more or less unconscious and instinctive way. But with the advent of man a new factor is introduced, and this changes the whole result. Now the process of human progress is more or less subject to the conscious and rational action of man himself. The human race as we know it, is in process of becoming; the lowest members have indeed risen far above the animal stage; but the highest members have not yet attained the final goal. Man, civilized and rational—that is, man moral and self-conscious, stands midway in the process, himself the maker of his own destiny. Man, social and political, as we find him in the more civilized lands to-day, is leaving the things that are behind and is reaching unto the things that are before. His greatest

need is some social ideal and human synthesis which shall give meaning to his life and direction to his efforts.

In the development of political and social thought many attempts have been made to define the relations of man with man, to indicate the goal of the State, and to formulate some ideal of human society. The views and ideals of the State that have prevailed may be classified under four heads: the Anarchical, the Individualistic, the Socialistic, and the Fraternal. These four types have many representatives in the world to-day, and one or more of them lies at the basis of every system of political philosophy and every programme of State action.

I. The Anarchistic Type. This word anarchy in itself is destitute of evil content. It has come to be the synonym of disorder and riot, of lawlessness and crime, but this is reading into the term our own ideas. Used in its primary and literal meaning it denotes merely a state of society without any recognized and authoritative government. As defined by Professor Huxley anarchy is that form of society in which the rule of each individual by himself is the only government recognized ("Col. Essays," I, p. 393). Persons of very different mental and moral worth hold the anarchical theory of society, and these may be divided roughly into two groups.

There are, first, the revolutionary anarchists who avow as their aim the overthrow and annihilation of all governments and States. The exponents of this creed bear different names, but they agree in certain main particulars. In Russia they were known recently as Nihilists, and now as Red Hundreds; in France and Belgium as Red Internationals; in England and the United States as Anarchists. According to Bakunin, the father of nihilism, the first mission of the disciples of this new gospel is the destruction of every lie known to man. The first is God. The second lie is right. Might invented the fiction of right

in order to insure and strengthen her reign: "When you have freed your minds from the fear of a God, and from that childish respect for the fiction of right, then all the remaining chains which bind you, and which are called science, civilization, property, marriage, morality, and justice, will snap asunder like threads. Let your own happiness be your only law. But in order to get this law recognized and to bring about the proper relations which should exist between the majority and the minority of mankind, you must destroy everything that exists in the shape of State or social organization. . . Our first work must be the destruction and annihilation of everything as it now exists. You must accustom yourselves to destroy everything, the good with the bad; for if but an atom of this old world remains the new will never be created" (Speech of Michale Bakunin at Geneva, in 1868).

The nihilists, it may be said, represent the extreme wing of the anarchical party, and throw chief emphasis upon the work of destruction. Other anarchists are not so pronounced in their appeal to force for the destruction and abolition of everything that exists in the form of State institutions and social control. But, none the less, they affirm that all social regulation is wrong in principle and subversive of human welfare, and hence must be ended as speedily as possible. Some anarchists, it ought to be said, regard this negative work of destruction as the clearing of the ground for what they call the new and better order of society. The State, as it now exists, they all claim, is an unnecessary evil, and hence government must be completely destroyed. They insist that some form of social co-operation will be evolved in due time that will be better than the present tyrannical system; but they all insist also that whatever government may exist in the good time coming must be entirely voluntary, and must exert no coercion over the individual.

There are, secondly, what may be called the philosophical anarchists, of whom there are many varieties in the world. They all agree in this particular at least, that all forms of government are unnecessary and evil, and should be repudiated. In this category are to be found some men and women of great literary and artistic power, such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Prince Kropotkin, Maxim Gorky and Count Tolstoy, Karl Marx and Leonid Andriew. Some of these, it may be said, are confessed socialists, but they also believe that the present order of society is wrong and must be ended. They differ, however, from the more destructive anarchists in the main in their contention that this change must come about by more peaceful means. One of the foremost advocates of this view of society is the Russian nobleman, Count Leo Tolstoy. In the name of humanity and Christianity Tolstoy frames his indictment against the State-conception of life, and in the name of Christ and reason he pronounces the State an unnecessary evil. The State may cease to be, he maintains, and man will lose nothing but his chains and his wrongs, while humanity will gain immeasurably in security and happiness.

In many respects this titled Russian, who for the sake of the truth in Jesus as he sees it, has given up his title and is living the life of a peasant, is a standing rebuke to the easy-going and complacent lives of men who call themselves followers of the Son of man. In Russia—in fact, throughout all Europe—this man has millions of disciples, and many of these are preaching his doctrines with an increased emphasis and a terrible persistency. In America also there are many disciples of this doctrine, and in every city there are groups of men who are preaching the new gospel of freedom from the wrongs and usurpations of governments. But with it all one must admit that the writings of Tolstoy are full of crude and

perverted interpretations of Scripture, and are based upon a wrong reading of the facts of life. Society cannot be resolved into an anarchy of good individuals, where each may be left free to do that which is right in his own eyes without any supervision and direction. His objections to the State grow out of a narrow and limited acquaintance with the various governments of the world. Tsarism, which is irresponsible monarchy raised to the last power and maintaining itself by the sanctions of religion, furnishes the ground for his indictment. But there are governments in the world against which hardly one of his objections applies, and where they apply at all the evil grows out of the misuse of government and is not an essential element in government itself. It must be remembered that governments are human institutions and they must partake more or less of the imperfections which are characteristic of the human nature that controls them.

In a simple and select condition of society it might be possible for men to live without government of any kind, but in a complex society the weak and backward members would be left without any adequate safeguards. Tolstoy would probably answer, as others have done, that there should be no weak and backward members; this may be, but they do exist, and some account must be taken of them. One may agree with Tolstoy that much would be gained by giving morality and religion a larger place in human life, but moral and religious appeals are slow and uncertain with many men. "Society is not an open common in which profane feet are left to tread all plants into the mire; it is at liberty to set up suitable safeguards for every good and beautiful thing" (Bascom, "Social Theory," p. 297). The good which is won for the weaker is of greater moment than the liberty which is taken from the bad. Men may complain of governments,

but the fact remains that the best goods of life are found in governed communities.

According to the doctrines of anarchy, of the better sort, the absence of all government does not mean the absence of all association. The more enlightened anarchists, of whom there are many, simply mean the absence of enforced association and compulsory submission. If an individual does not wish to co-operate no restraint shall be employed; he must be left to reap the beneficent or baleful results of his freely chosen course. But society need not suffer because of this, for it is maintained that the more orderly in a community may combine against the disorderly to secure order and justice. For very primitive and simple conditions this might prove satisfactory, but it would fail utterly in an advanced and complex society. The moment a majority began to enforce their decrees against the disorderly minority, that moment we have the beginnings of government. The minority are coerced; they are not free to do as they please, and this compulsion is none the less real though it proceed from a voluntary society rather than a political government.

Again, it is evident that such a voluntary association does not provide adequate safeguards for the weaker and more backward members of society. The confirmed anarchist will at once answer that in this ideal order, there will be no such weak and backward persons. But, we must deal with things as they are. The weak and backward brothers are here, and some account must be taken of them. To leave them to struggle alone in the battle of life, to stand by unconcerned while they are trodden under foot on the plea that they are unfit and should not survive, is to abandon every human instinct and revert to the jungle plane of life. Nay, even in the jungle, as one of these foremost apostles of the anarchical

gospel shows, we find the beginnings of mutual aid and co-operation (Kropotkin, "Mutual Aid").

The sane philosophical anarchists will admit that some voluntary association among individuals is necessary if man is to live in peace and to make progress. Many of them advocate such associations, but maintain that they must be wholly voluntary. But any kind of association will find that it must either resort to compulsion in some cases or go wholly out of business. According to the anarchists' first commandment: Thou shalt not allow any man to interfere with the liberty of any other; every man may mind his conduct or mend his drains as he pleases. Thus the efforts of the good-intentioned many will be negatived by the ignorance or selfishness of the few. It is evident that these associations must possess some compulsory power. But the moment there is association and compulsion there is the beginning of the political State (Huxley, "Administrative Nihilism"). "As a system of rational politics, anarchism is without a logical basis. While it denies the right or utility of political action in general, it opens the way to the introduction of a compulsion that is not to be distinguished from it in essence, and which is in addition arbitrary and incapable of limitation or regulation according to precise principles" (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," 320).

II. The Individualistic Type. In this conception the State is regarded as a necessary evil. This type of State differs from the foregoing in little except in degree, but this difference must be noted.

According to those who advocate this type, men as we find them are more or less imperfect and evil, and hence many of their wayward desires and unsocial impulses must be curbed and repressed by governmental power. Because of the fraud and violence of men a

State which shall control the unruly and ill-disposed becomes necessary. Thus Herbert Spencer shows that through co-operation into which men have gradually risen, benefits have been secured to them which could not be secured in their primitive state; and that as an indispensable means to this co-operation political organization has been and is advantageous" (Spencer, "Principles of Sociology," Sec. 442). But as society develops, as men become more moral and religion is diffused, the importance of the State will diminish till ultimately it will reach the vanishing-point. This view, it may be said, shades off on the one side into anarchism, and on the other into later ideas of State action.

This view has had many advocates in ancient and in modern times, and strangely enough the Christian thinker and the most thoroughgoing agnostic are often found in the same school. In view of the weakness and imperfection of men some form of State protection is necessary, otherwise the strong and vicious will aggress upon the weak and humble. But it is held that the State's use of force while necessary in the present, is itself an evil, and is opposed to the loving and merciful spirit of Christianity. The Christian theologians who hold this view are many and influential. Thus Channing says: "In heaven nothing like what we call government on earth can exist, for government here is founded in human weakness and guilt. The voice of command is never heard among the spirits of the just. Even on earth the most perfect government is that of a family, where parents employ no tone but that of affectionate counsel, where filial affection reads its duty in the mild look, and finds its law and motive in its own pure impulse" ("Works," p. 361). In other writings he takes a somewhat higher view of the functions of government; but none the less he regards it as a questionable good and a necessary evil. It is

maintained by those who hold this conception that Christianity aims to make good individuals, and when this end is secured the State becomes wholly unnecessary. It is a temporary expedient for meeting a temporary need, and it will disappear as the kingdom of God comes.

It is rather significant that the Christian theologians who maintain this view should be supported in their contention by the most thoroughgoing agnostics. Conspicuous among these may be named John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. The former represents the transition from the extreme doctrines of individualism to the more social conception of man. But none the less he throws great emphasis upon the individualistic idea and looks with suspicion upon the State. With him liberty has a negative sense and consists in "being left to one's self." "All restraint qua restraint is an evil" ("On Liberty," Chap. V). The great exponent of this view is Herbert Spencer who, from first to last, has been a defender of the individualistic conception of man. In his "Social Statics" he says: "Have we not shown that government is essentially immoral? . . Does it not exist because crime exists, and must government not cease when crime ceases, for very lack of objects on which to perform its functions?" And again he says, "It is a mistake to consider that government must last forever. . . It is not essential, but incidental. As amongst Bushmen we find a State antecedent to government, so may there be one in which it shall have become extinct." In his "Principles of Sociology" he shows that some temporary benefits accrue from State action, but after all it is an open question whether the disadvantages do not offset the benefits. He shows further that while the political organization facilitates co-operation, "yet the organization formed impedes further growth . . ." ("Principles of Sociology," Vol. II, sec. 447). In "Man versus the State" we have an elabo-

rate attempt to defend the individualistic conception of man by exposing the sins of legislators and the coming slavery.

The same conceptions are set forth also by other writers no less eminent. Thus Professor Freeman says: "As for discussions about an ideal form of government, they are simply idle. The ideal form of government is no government at all. The existence of government in any shape is a sign of man's imperfection" ("Hist. Essays," Fourth Series, p. 353). "The State ought to render itself useless," says M. Jules Simon, "and to prepare for its own decease."

It may be conceded that these criticisms are salutary and should be taken to heart by rash statesmen who hope to hale in the millennium by governmental statutes. It may be admitted also that governments have been guilty of many usurpations, and have committed many colossal blunders. But it is an open question whether the worst evils of bad governments are not immeasurably better than the inevitable evils of no government at all. It may be granted that the State makes many mistakes, and is often guilty of oppression and wrong, and that in a way its administration stands in the way of man's higher progress. But this neither proves that the State in itself is an evil, nor that it will disappear in the course of time.

There are two serious objections to this individualistic view of the State. First, some form of government is found among every people that has made even the beginnings of progress. And it is also found that there is a direct relation between the general condition of the society and the amount of State action. "The history of progress is the record of a gradual diminution of waste. . . When we come to human society, the State is the chief instrument by which waste is prevented. The mere struggle for

existence between individuals means unchecked waste. The State, by its action can, in many cases, consciously and deliberately diminish this fearful loss; in many cases by freeing the individual from the necessity of a perpetual struggle for the mere conditions of life, it can set free individuality and so make culture possible. An ideal State would be one in which there was no waste at all of the lives and intellects and souls of individual men and women" (Ritchie, "Prin. of State Interference," p. 50).

For another reason this conception of the State is defective, as it rests upon a wrong reading of the facts of life. By nature man is a social being, and some form of social organization is natural to him. By nature also man is a political being, and hence some form of political organization is necessary to him. Government would have been necessary had man not sinned; the State is needed for the sake of the good as well as for protection from the bad. They wrong the State who call it an evil, though they may qualify it with the adjective necessary. "Without civil society," says Burke, "man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it" ("Reflect. on Revolution in France"). The atomic and individualistic conception of mankind belongs to a phase of thought that is doomed to pass away. Humanity is a great whole in which the person is but a member, and as in the human body each member is for all and all are for each, so also in human society. The social and political State thus grows out of the very constitution of man, and is the medium through which the social consciousness finds expression and the social welfare is promoted. "There is no such thing as progress, or culture in the isolated individual, but only in the group, in society, in the ethnos. Only by taking and giving, borrowing and lending, can life either improve or

continue" (Brinton, "Basis of Social Relations," XV).

III. The Socialistic Type. It is not too much to say that the remarkable growth of socialism is the most significant sign of the times. In Germany and Russia, in Britain and America, the new doctrines are making their way. In these lands efforts have been made by various parties and from many sides to discount these doctrines and to stay their onrush, but thus far all such efforts have proved utterly vain.

At this stage of its development, as might be expected, men look upon this new movement with very different feelings. Some persons find in socialism a new Messiah and anticipate through it the regeneration of the world. Many others stand in doubt, seeing some good in it, and yet sadly torn by conflicting emotions. They are greatly moved by the socialistic indictment of modern civilization and cannot deny its main counts; they feel the wrongs of the world which socialism dissects with such a merciless hand; but withal they cannot accept the socialistic programme, and fear that they must wait for another Messiah. Not a few both fear and hate socialism and see in it nothing less than the antichrist of Scriptures and the plague of human kind. Both from the side of the Church and the State men fear socialism and see in it the great menace of our times. From the side of the church men view its spread with alarm. Nor is this wholly groundless, for socialism, as preached by some of its apostles, scorns the church and discounts all religion. The leaders of socialism, many of them at least, are avowed enemies of the church, and they do not hesitate to speak their words of scorn. From the side of society also men fear socialism and see in it the beginning of a new slavery; they cannot accept its programmes, and they see in it a leveling down of the race to the status of its lowest members.

Now, whatever one may think of socialism matters little; but it is a force that must be reckoned with in the days to come. The fact is, socialism is something far deeper than a mere surface discontent; it is something more than the dreaming of a lot of wild visionaries; it contains both an indictment and a programme, and these should be considered; it may not be necessary to accept the programme, but it is folly to ignore the indictment. Modern society, as the most careful and conservative students declare, presents some features which may well awaken fear and cause despair. Some years ago Professor Huxley declared that if there is no hope of a large improvement of the condition of the human family, "I should hail the advent of some kindly comet which should sweep the whole affair away, as a desirable consummation."

What then shall we do in such a time as this? It is certain that socialism cannot be met and answered by misrepresentation and denunciation. It is no less certain that it cannot be met by putting on blinders and refusing to see the things that are wrong and unjust in modern society. Fearful churchmen and timid statesmen may try to ignore socialism or they may combine to oppose it. They may pass stringent laws against the socialistic propaganda, and may seek to stay its force by a subtle persecution. But in spite of it all, nay, rather, in a certain sense because of it all, socialistic doctrines will grow among the people, and socialistic programmes will obtain a larger following.

But what then is socialism? This term socialism is one not easily defined, for the reason that there are all shades and degrees of socialistic thought, from the more extreme materialistic socialism of Labriola and Marx, to the moderate Christian socialism of Maurice and Rauschenbusch. Not only so, but the socialistic programme

shades off into the most pronounced communism on the one hand, or into the mild doctrines of the Fabian Society on the other. And once more, among the advocates of socialism are found men who approximate the doctrines of anarchism on the one hand, and others who believe in the widest extension of State action, though it may be an exaggeration to say that socialism is a very Proteus, possessing almost as many aspects as exponents (Lilly, "First Principles in Politics," p. 124). The author named agrees with Professor Luigi Cossa in his complaint that "classification has a hard road to travel when it enters the tangle of jarring socialistic sects." It is not easy to find any one definition that is comprehensive enough to cover the whole doctrine in all its varying views. There are, however, certain constant factors, and these constitute the essential elements.

In a general way it may be said that socialism represents a state of mind and a definite programme. In the first sense it describes a tendency and an aspiration; it includes the views and efforts of those who seek to bring about a gradual betterment in human conditions. Thus a noted advocate of this view (Proudhon) when asked by the magistrate, "What then is socialism?" replied: "Every aspiration after the betterment of mankind." "In that case," said the magistrate, "we are all socialists." "That is what I have always maintained." To this category belongs the definition of Roscher, who says that it includes "those tendencies which demand a greater regard for the common weal than consists with human nature." The avowed aim of the Christian socialists of England, according to their organ, "The Christian Socialist," is "to diffuse the principles of co-operation by the practical application of Christianity to the purposes of trade and industry." The great thinkers in economics and politics have all been socialists in this general sense.

The term socialism, in the latter sense, however, has a much more definite and restricted meaning, and this is quite explicit. "The general tendency is to regard as socialistic any interference with property undertaken by society on behalf of the poor, the limitation of the principle of *laissez faire* in favor of the suffering classes, radical social reform which disturbs the present system of private property as regulated by free competition" (Kirkup, "Encyc. Brit.," Vol. XXII, p. 205). In the midst of the varying theories that go by the name of socialism there is a kernel of principle that is all essential. That principle is of an economic nature, and is most clear and precise. To avoid the evils of the unrestricted concentration of capital in a few hands, with the subjection of the great mass of workers; to prevent the economic anarchy that results, with the degradation of the working-man and his family; to secure a more just and equitable distribution of the means and appliances of happiness, socialists propose that land and capital, which are the requisites of labor and the sources of all wealth and culture, should become the property of society, and be managed by it for the general good (Kirkup, *ibid.*, p. 206). The word thus connotes "an industrial society, which in the main features is sufficiently clear and precise. It is not a theory which embraces all departments of social activity, but is confined to the economic department, dealing with others simply as connected with this and influenced by it" (Ely, "Socialism and Social Reform," p. 8). "The totality of these industrial relations constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which the legal and political superstructure is built, and to which the definite forms of social consciousness correspond" (Labriola, "Materialistic Conception of History," p. 49).

Two distinctive characteristics we find in the socialistic

conception. In the socialist teaching the State is supreme, and the person exists for the sake of society. In the realm of trade and industry this control is absolute, and the person has little or no initiative. Here individual initiative is reduced to the minimum and State action is raised to the maximum. In the socialistic programme the chief emphasis is thrown upon economic and industrial interests, and these are the chief concern of the State. "The essence of the theory consists in this associated production with a collective capital with the view to its equitable distribution. In the words of Schaeffle, 'the Alpha and Omega is the transformation of private capitals into a united collective capital'" (Kirkup, "Encyc. Brit.," Vol. XXII, p. 206). The basis of society, socialists maintain, is economic, and involves a fundamental change in the process of production and distribution.

However, while the leading exponents of socialism admit this, they yet maintain that all the other interests of life will be conserved. "All the other theories so often connected with it and so important in relation to religion, philosophy, marriage, patriotism, etc., are with regard to socialism non-essential. At the same time it will be seen that an economic change, such as that contemplated in socialism, would most powerfully affect every other department of human life" (Kirkup, *ibid.*, p. 220). Socialism, in its more logical forms, insists that the State is a necessary good. It is necessary and is destined to play a much larger part in the drama of social development and human progress. It is good and is destined more and more to fulfil its beneficent functions. In this respect this type of society is in harmony with the last type, the fraternal, though it differs widely from that type in certain essential respects.

This term socialism is a comparatively modern one, but the idea connoted by the term is undoubtedly ancient.

In a brilliant lecture Bernard Bosanquet has shown that socialistic features " in the way of a very positive relation, not a merely protective relation, between the life of the private citizen and the action of the public authority, were for good or for evil essential to ancient communities." In all of the Greek cities, many socialistic elements were to be found, and the claim is made that these were largely responsible for the wonderful progress that was achieved (" Essays and Addresses," chap. iii). This type of society has many illustrations among the nations, though of course it has not always borne its modern name. The empire of Russia and the republic of France, much as they differ in detail, belong to this type of society. In the United States also many socialistic features are to be found, as in the protective tariff and the postal system. In all of these instances we have a maximum of State control and a minimum of individual initiative, and this is characteristic of the type. The State is practically everything, and the individual has value just so far as he serves the State.

Now, it may be said that the most thoughtful students of social affairs are ready to confess that the socialistic indictment of modern economic life in its main counts is essentially just. They also concede that certain elements of the socialistic programme must find illustration in future social changes. Whatever may be its defects or its advantages, it is inspired by a great and wide human sympathy that makes it most acceptable to the modern man. And however materialistic may be its aims and programmes, it does insist that every man shall have a true inheritance in society and the gains that have come to humanity. This ideal has played a large part in the drama of the world's history thus far, and it promises to play a leading rôle in the near future. As a protest against the errors and excesses of the individualistic

type of society it is worthy of all honor. As an effort to solve some of the problems of production and distribution it is engaging the attention of an ever-increasing number of students. It is probable that whatever may be the form of society in the near future, it will more and more approximate the socialistic type. Schaeffle comes to the conclusion that "The future belongs to purified socialism"; and in this conclusion we may heartily concur.

But the socialistic ideal fails in several important respects. For one thing, it does not sufficiently honor the personalities of men, and it makes light of individual initiative. In whatever form it has appeared there is something arbitrary and mechanical about it. The socialistic State is only possible where opposites are denied and extremes are suppressed, and where a certain mechanical and artificial uniformity is maintained. Socialism is a doctrines of averages; and men are human beings, not merely units in an average or atoms in a compound. Socialism means a social levelling and that a levelling down; and the opportunity for untrammeled individual development is the best product of any civilization (Andrews, "Wealth and Moral law," p. 94). The type of society that we seek, the only type that humanity can finally accept, must recognize the distinctions and extremes, and must then unite them in some vital and harmonious whole.

In another respect the socialistic type fails, in that it does not give us a high and human and spiritual conception of man and of society. In this conception man is regarded chiefly as an economic being, whose industrial wants are the basic facts of his life. Marx and Rodbertus, Loria and Labriola, all throw the chief emphasis upon the economic aspects of life. The whole conception of life and society, of welfare and progress, is materialistic; and all other interests and relations of man and

society are construed in terms of material well-being. This conception, as Mazzini pointed out with such acuteness and force, "mutilates man by taking from him both head and heart, and reduces him to a purely physical and fleshly being" ("Thoughts on Democracy in Europe," V). It is evident that the State in this conception is not the whole people organized in a co-operative capacity in the interests of the whole man. It is evident rather that it is the machinery of the State employed in behalf of certain economic and material interests to the complete exclusion of all the higher interests of society.

IV. The Fraternal Type. Before we enter upon a consideration of this type of society it may be permissible to say a word about another that has played a large part in the drama of social development and is now sometimes confused with the fraternal type. The paternal State, as it may be called, has had many representatives among the nations, and strenuous efforts are made even now to establish it in some lands. In this type of society the State is a kind of parent or guardian, whose business it is to govern men, to think for them, and to prescribe their mode of living. It is maintained that the great majority of the people are unable to govern themselves, and so this must be done for them. It is maintained also that the majority are incompetent to solve the problems of thought, and so the State, through its auxiliary, the church, must do their thinking for them. This type of society was the prevalent one in all the great empires of the past—Egypt and Persia, China and Peru. It was the prevailing type in Europe for many centuries, in France and Russia, in Italy and Spain. The Jesuits attempted to found it among the Indians of Paraguay, but with results that were sadly disappointing. It is this type that seems to be the dominant one in the mind of the Emperor of Germany at the

present time. This type seems to be the ideal in the minds of such acute thinkers as Carlyle and Ruskin, who believe in the wisdom of the few but have scant patience with the mistakes of the many. The idea of an infallible church is implied in this conception, a church that shall be all-dominant, that shall have power to enforce its decrees and compel men to keep in the straight and narrow way. We are told there are tendencies at work in society that are creating this type, and in the coming age there will be established a benevolent feudalism in the foremost nations of the world.

We here notice briefly the fraternal type of the State, while later we shall discuss its essential elements more in detail. In this type we find that mankind is conceived of as a great unity and fellowship. Persons therein are brothers who regard each others' interests and cooperate for the common welfare. This bond of brotherhood wrought into the very nature of man and not dependent upon any social contract or human volition, is the ground and guarantee of liberty and equality. In this type the State is a social solidarity with a corporate existence; it is a moral person with a corporate will that is formulated in constitutions and laws; it is a social brotherhood in which each person has a place, and for whose welfare the State is concerned. In this type the government rests upon the consent of the governed; it represents the opinions and the interests of all the citizens, and it is the medium of the mutual sacrifices and services of all the people. The whole being of man is taken into account; in a word, we have a confession of brotherhood in all the relations of human life.

The individualistic type of State recognizes the elements and extremes of humanity, but it has no middle term to combine and harmonize them. The socialistic type denies and excludes the extremes, and in denying

them it denies the distinctions of human kind, and copies only the unity of the middle. The fraternal type recognizes the distinctions and extremes of mankind, and it provides a unifying principle which combines them all into a vital and harmonious whole. This type embodies all that is good and vital in the paternal type in that it teaches those that are strong to bear the infirmities of the weak, and those who possess much to hold their resources in trust for the common good. In a word, the fraternal type of society—which is the Christian type—is the one type that satisfies the demands of reason and conscience and provides a stable and adequate basis for social and political States.

Attempts have been made from time to time to realize this ideal, but thus far all such attempts have been on a small scale, and have been short lived. In the early Jerusalem church there was a partial and transient realization of this ideal: "And all that believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and parted them to all according as any man had need (Acts 2 : 44). The Franciscans and Quakers each in turn sought to realize the fraternal type of society. The Covenanters of Scotland cherished the vision of a consecrated land of saints ruled by a covenanted king loyal to Christ, and pledged to seek the interests of all the people. The Puritans, in their day, hoped the time might speedily come when England might become a land of saints, "a pattern of holiness to the world, and the unmatchable paradise of the earth." Though all of these particular efforts failed in their immediate object, yet the ideal itself has lived, and through all the years it has gained strength and significance. And it still lives to inspire the prophetic soul of the world and to be the architectonic principle of the Christian State that is to be.

V

THE FORMS OF THE STATE

IN our study thus far we have found that while the State is natural and necessary to man, the State itself becomes explicit in and through a process of development, and that the form which the State assumes depends upon many conditioning factors.

The process carried forward in the world, so far as we can read it, is the building up of a society that shall realize the thought of God. The life of God is seeking to get itself reborn into the life of humanity, and men are called to organize life according to this divine purpose. Thus the State, which is implicit in the will of God, takes shape slowly, being hastened or retarded by the will of man and the forces of society. It is possible to view this process of universal history from within or from without, from above or below. Thus we may say human history is the progressive disclosure of the purpose of God in human affairs; or we may say that human progress is the conscious realization of that purpose on the part of man. Thus we find, however, that these two factors meet and blend in the creation of the social and political State.

From the beginning of political thought various efforts have been made to frame a classification of States. Those who are interested in this may consult such writers as Aristotle and Bluntschli, Rousseau and Willoughby, Guizot and Lieber. However, many of these classifications are more or less arbitrary and artificial; they are external and formal, and do not sufficiently consider the

spirit which lies back of the form. Thus, some would classify States according to the degree of governmental action—that is, into despotic and free governments, with their variations. Others again would classify them according to the various powers exercised; that is, legal, paternal, and socialistic. Still others would view them historically; that is, as ancient, classical, medieval, and modern. And still others would divide them according to the possession or non-possession of some selected feature; that is, whether they possess a written or an unwritten constitution, whether the sovereign is hereditary or elective, and whether the executive power is in the hands of one or many. There is, however, as it seems to me, a method of classification that embodies all that is good in all of these systems, and yet deals with the elements that are most distinctive. The classification which we shall adopt is one that is based upon the diffusion of political consciousness with the active participation of the people in the affairs of government. Under four forms it is possible to classify practically every State that has yet appeared in the world. These four classes of States, the theocratic, the monarchical, the aristocratic, and the democratic, are the great historical forms, and they are all deserving of careful study.

This classification in its main details is a very ancient one, and takes us back to the very beginnings of political thought. Thus in Herodotus, the father of history, we find three of these forms described with tolerable accuracy, and their merits appraised with remarkable judgment ("Herodotus," Bk. III, Sec. 82, 83). A century later Aristotle practically adopts the same classification, only with a difference. In his treatise we have four forms of government—monarchy, aristocracy, polity, or free State, and democracy, as the corrupt form of polity. Another form is suggested at a later time by

Josephus, that is theocracy, which is used to describe the Jewish State ("Contra Apion," Bk. II, Sec. 17). These classifications have stood the test, and form the categories of our thought to-day.

I. Theocracy. It is fitting that Josephus, who probably coined the word, should be allowed to define its meaning. By theocracy he means a government whose authority and power are with God, whose will is the sole law of the nation. This law covers the whole range of life, and leaves nothing of the very smallest consequence to the pleasure of the person himself. It is made known to men through legislators and priests who serve as representatives of Jehovah, and consequently never think of speaking on their own authority.

It has often been pointed out that theocracy, as a form of the State, belongs to the early stages of the human race. In every land where it is possible to trace the primitive State we find that this form of government has prevailed. In most cases the gods were regarded as the parents of the people, and hence their authority was supreme. In the most real sense they were honored as the creator of the tribe, or people, and the people hence placed themselves under their protection and government. Among all ancient peoples this same fact is seen, though of course, with wide variations and modifications (De Coulanges, "The Ancient City," *passim*).

Perhaps the most notable illustration of this form of the State is to be found in the history of the people of Israel. In this history we have the conception of Jehovah as the Creator of the heavens and the earth, and as the God and King of the people themselves. He it is who called Abram from Ur of the Chaldees, and gave him the promise of an inheritance in the new land. He it is who led the fathers out of the bondage of Egypt and established them in the land of Canaan. He it is who

raised up Moses to be a deliverer and lawgiver, speaking through him and giving the people the Two Tables of the Law. He it is also who, when the people were troubled and enslaved by neighboring peoples, raised up a deliverer and wrought great wonders, thus proving himself to be their King. "The whole soil of the Promised Land is the property of Jehovah, and the various families only held it as tenants. In recognition of the divine ownership a tenth of the produce of the land and flocks had to be given to the tabernacle for the maintenance of the priests" Bluntschli, Bk. VI, chap. vi). In common with all Semites there were three things which the Israelites asked of their God, and believed themselves to receive—help against their enemies; counsel by oracles or soothsayers in matters of national difficulty; and a sentence of judgment when a case was too hard for human decision (W. Robertson Smith, "The Religion of the Semites," p. 64).

It is easy to see how, under such circumstances, a priesthood should arise which should stand between God and the people. Because of their relation to God on the one hand and the people on the other, they were sacrosanct beings, and their words carried irresistible weight. Thus it came about that the priesthood in nearly every ancient nation was practically supreme, making and unmaking rulers and laws, and dominating thought and life in the minutest details. It is easy, also, to see how, under such circumstances, a kingship should flourish, basing its claims to human loyalty and submission upon its alleged relations to the God of the nation. An appeal to history will show that theocratic governments have usually been the most autocratic and despotic tyrannies; they have been the upholders of caste and slavery, and they have cast a malign spell over thought and life. For this reason theocracy, as a form of government, has not

been highly regarded by students of political science, and one must confess that this suspicion is not without cause.

There is one aspect of this form of government that we may notice as germane to our purpose. In a theocratic State the government is wholly external and formal. It is something that comes down upon men rather than something that rises through men; hence there is little or no political self-consciousness on the part of the people; no man feels any responsibility for the affairs of State. The ruler is regarded as a supernatural being who is raised above men by nature, and they have but one duty in life—to know and do his will.

II. Monarchy. This is probably the most widely recognized form of the State. But it is not easy to frame a satisfactory definition for the reason that a pure form is seldom found. Historically it has shaded off into theocracy on the one hand and into aristocracy on the other. A monarchy is the term usually employed to describe a government in which the sovereign power is in the hands of one man, but as a matter of fact there are States termed monarchical in which the nominal head—as in England—possesses only a semblance of supreme power. Thus also the term is used to describe an autocratic and irresponsible despotism, as in the old empires of Peru and China; and it is likewise applied to the constitutional and limited monarchy of Germany and Japan. Those who are interested in the study of these varying forms of monarchy may find an informing discussion in "The Theory of the State," by Bluntschli, and "Introduction to Political Science," by Seeley.

In a broad sense monarchy describes a form of government in which sovereignty resides in one person. This person may not always be sovereign in the sense that all political power is in his hands, but he represents sover-

eignty in a special sense, and the decrees of government are always issued in his name. This is so in such a constitutional and democratic government as Great Britain, where it is called "The Majesty's government"; and it is true of such an autocratic monarchy as Russia, where the czar claims the final sovereignty. In an autocratic government the one person is supreme, and the authority of a subordinate is delegated and conferred authority. In many of the great empires of the past this form of government prevailed, and we find autocracy raised to the nth power. In the modern world, however, there are few States of this class, since a new spirit is abroad working mighty changes. Thus Russia is sometimes denominated an autocratic State with one man as the supreme and sole authority. But even in Russia there is no such thing as pure monarchy, for the czar is dependent upon the officers of State, and practically at least Russia is a beaurocracy. Still less is Russia an absolute monarchy since the establishment of the third Duma, which has successfully exercised parliamentary rights. In addition, no czar, however strong or despotic, would dare to disregard too far the interests or traverse too rudely the wills of the silent millions. Russia may be described as an autocratic monarchy limited by the patience and loyalty of her people.

In other States the monarchical form of government is found in varying degrees. There is what is called limited and constitutional monarchy, where the dignity and power of the monarch are limited and regulated by constitutions either written or unwritten. In Great Britain we have a constitutional monarchy without any written constitution beyond certain charters and declarations; but none the less there are certain recognized conventions that are binding upon all, sovereign and people alike. We have here also a Parliament composed of two houses, one

hereditary or appointive—the House of Lords and Bishops; and the other the House of Commons, chosen by the direct vote of the people. In the case of disagreement between these two houses the House of Commons may appeal to the people, and if by their votes they sustain it the House of Lords and even the king himself would yield. The king names the prime minister, who selects his own cabinet, and so long as Parliament accepts the policy of the cabinet, all goes well; but in case Parliament refuses to accept this policy and "to uphold the government," that moment the prime minister resigns and another is named by the king, whose policy is more in accord with the will of the people. Parliament is really supreme and can make and unmake cabinets; it can accept or reject the royal counsels; in fact, it can dethrone kings and determine succession. As a matter of fact, while the throne of England is a hereditary monarchy, the sovereign has not so much real authority as the President of the United States.

III. Aristocracy. This is a government of the few and by the best. "The ideal principle of aristocracy is the rule of the nobler elements of the nation over the subordinate masses. The way in which these nobler elements are estimated and exalted varies in different States" (Bluntschli, "The Theory of the State, Bk. VI, chap. xvii). In some instances these so-called nobler elements have based their prerogatives upon the possession of effective power, the masses of the people being held in subjection. In some cases these prerogatives are based upon the ownership of the land, and here a few hold the lives and fortunes of the great mass and use them at their own pleasure. In some cases these prerogatives are based upon nobility of blood and birth.

Aristocracy, as the name implies, is a government by the best, but aristocracy, as it has appeared in history,

has not always merited this high title. Aristotle, in his day, described the perversion of aristocracy, which he calls the rule of the few, the rich, the strong, the self-assertive, and not the rule of the wisest, the noblest, the best. All forms of government are liable to abuse and perversion, but this form is especially prone to degeneration. An aristocracy, however constituted, easily and quickly becomes jealous of its dignities and prerogatives. Aristocracies have usually glorified the past, and thus have always resisted change. They seek to preserve the eternal order and resent the aspirations of the people as an infringement of their special privileges. In every State in which an aristocratic element is found—and it is found in every State in some form or other—this element is always the defender of things as they are, and always the opposer of things as the people think they ought to be. Thus, from one cause and another, it has come about that men have become very suspicious of either aristocracy or oligarchy, and as a result no pure example of this form of the State has survived later than the middle of the nineteenth century.

As a matter of fact, however, the aristocratic element holds a large place in all modern progressive States. As human society becomes more complex the problems of government become more difficult; and the various departments must be manned by experts. Not every man can fill the office of attorney general, or secretary of State; picked men are required for these offices, and for many others. As a matter of fact, even in the most democratic government, large powers must be delegated to special men, the true *aristoi* in the nation. No government, in its executive and judicial departments at least, can be run by a debating society; in all of these positions, and in many others, the best results will come from trained and qualified men. This has been recognized by

all the keenest minds of the ages; and it is emphasized in later times by such men as Carlyle and Mazzini and Ruskin and Emerson. These men, it may be said, had no use for kings and sham aristocrats, but they were clear-sighted enough to see that the many were unprepared for the higher offices of State.

There are many in the world to-day who assert that the governments of the world are becoming increasingly oligarchic; that is, they are falling under the influence and sway of the rich and strong. That this is not wholly without basis we shall see in a later chapter; but that the world will long tolerate any such government all history disproves. The whole tendency of the day is from class government and not toward it.

IV. Democracy. This form of the State has been known for twenty-five centuries at least, and at first sight seems very easy to define. The attempt, however, proves it by no means so simple a matter. The term democracy is an old one, being known to Herodotus, and everything indicates that it was a common term. There were so-called democracies in ancient Greece, but these older conceptions differed widely from our modern ideas. Not only so, but in some of the most democratic countries in the world, as in Switzerland and the United States, there are such restrictions and limitations that in some aspects these governments may be described as aristocracies in both form and spirit. In Switzerland the privileges of citizenship are limited to certain classes of men, and in the United States women are not regarded as full citizens. In Switzerland there is a limitation of the franchise, and in the United States the government is strictly representative. Thus, even in the most modern and democratic States we find certain aristocratic elements. And thus all forms of government shade off into others by imperceptible degrees. The government of

every State in the civilized world possesses some elements of other forms.

There is another thing that should be noted in the use of this term democracy. Aristotle, who gives us the first full and formal classification of States, does not give democracy a very honorable place. He regards it as the perverted and degenerate form of polity, which he defines as a government where the citizens at large direct their policy to the public good ("Politics," Bk. III, chap. vii). With him monarchy, aristocracy, and polity are the three true forms of the State, while despotism, oligarchy, and democracy are the perversions of these. The polity of Aristotle was a constitutional State under the control of the free citizens, who met in *ecclesia* to discuss and frame measures for the public good. But in these States, as he saw them, it happened often that some popular orator and unprincipled demagogue in an adroit and sophistic address appealed to and carried the crowd with him against the better judgment of the more thoughtful citizens. Then the democracy, the common people, overstepped the bounds of polity or public good, and supported only such measures as appealed to individual interests and the passing whim. In consequence of this inevitable tendency in democracy, Xenophon declares that in his native city the lot of the wicked and foolish was better than that of the wise and good.

In later times the term democracy stands for every form of popular government. In the foremost democratic States, written constitutions have been adopted, in many respects conforming to the polity of Aristotle. From one cause and another the term has been cleared of some of its unsavory associations, and has become the accepted title of that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the mass of the people. Perhaps the most familiar and characteristic definition is

that of President Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address, "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

There is one aspect of this general question that is germane to our purpose here, and this may be noted. The man who believes in the rationality of the universe believes that there is some great purpose that is being wrought out in the processes of history. This purpose is nothing less than the coming of God's kingdom in the earth and the building up among men of the City of God. Through the ages man has painfully and slowly apprehended the purpose that is being wrought out in the world, and hence he has imperfectly and haltingly learned the art of self-direction and conscious co-operation. But with it all, through all the generations, man has slowly and surely come to self-consciousness and has progressively learned the art of self-government. As this self-consciousness grows it manifests itself in various ways, and by the nature of the case it creates around itself various forms for its expression and use. In a large sense it may be said that the historic forms in which the State has appeared among men are the revelations and realizations of this political self-consciousness of the people.

In view of this, the various forms of the State considered have a vital significance and a world meaning. In a theocracy there is little or no political self-consciousness on the part of the rank and file of the people, and consequently no man is held responsible for the affairs of State. In a monarchy, where one man is supreme, the average man has no conception of personal freedom, as he has little political self-consciousness. In an aristocracy a few men are free, but the great mass of the people think of themselves as subjects, and not as sovereigns, and so have little sense of political obligation. In a

democracy or free State, the people think of themselves as sovereign, are becoming more or less conscious of political ties, and begin to feel the obligation to co-operate consciously for the common weal. The form of government is the expression of the political self-consciousness of the people, and the growth of this political consciousness is revealed and measured in the institutions of society and the enactments of government. It can readily be seen that the democratic or free State belongs to the advanced stages of human freedom and development, that it is only possible where men are conscious of the political ties that bind them together, and are learning to co-operate and sacrifice for the common weal.

It is just here that we perceive the difference between democracy and the other forms of the State. Why have men, in Western lands at least, learned to call the government of one man a tyranny and the government of all men a blessing? This is why: In the one case the government is something arbitrary and external, something imposed upon the people from without; in the other case it is personal and voluntary, the freely chosen limitation of the people themselves, by themselves, for the sake of the common good. And this gives us the very essence of the democratic conception, and with this we are here content.

There are two things which every student of political affairs needs to keep in mind, whatever may be the form of the State in which men live. The first is this: that in every State, whatever may be its form of government, there are certain tasks and problems that are practically the same. "Understand then, once for all, that no form of government, provided it be a government at all is, as such, to be either condemned or praised, or contested for in anywise, but by fools. But all forms of government are good just so far as they attain this one vital neces-

sity of policy—that the wise and kind, few or many, shall govern the unwise and unkind; and they are evil so far as they miss of this, or reverse it" (Ruskin, "Munera Pulveris," Sec. 125).

The other fact is this: that the form of the government is the expression of the political life and consciousness of the people, and is probably that form for which the people at that stage are best adapted. At any rate it is manifest that the higher and later forms are ill adapted to men in a lower stage of civilization, with a faint social consciousness, and with little experience in self-government and political co-operation. As in nature, so in society; as the life of the tree rises from the ground and pushes out toward the branches, the tree itself changes and grows to adapt itself to the new conditions and to conserve the new life; so in society, as the social consciousness unfolds and men learn the divine art of living together, new forms of society are created and new political institutions are framed as the expression and realization of the new life within.

Book II. Democracy

The idea of legally establishing inalienable, inherent, and sacred rights of the individual is not of political but religious origin. What has been held to be a work of the Revolution was, in reality, a work of the Reformation and its struggles. Its first apostle was not Lafayette, but Roger Williams who, driven by a powerful and deep religious enthusiasm, went into the wilderness in order to found a government of religious liberty, and his name is uttered by Americans even to-day with deepest respect. —*Jellinek, Rights of Man and of Citizens, p. 77.*

The idea of democracy is not, if we look below the surface, so much a form of government as a confession of human brotherhood. It is the equal recognition of mutual obligations. It is the confession of common duties, common aims, common responsibilities. True democracy—and in this lies its abiding strength—substitutes duties for rights. This substitution changes the center of gravity of our whole social system, and brings the promise of stable peace.

—*Brooke Foss Westcott, The Incarnation and Common Life, p. 349.*

When wilt thou save the people?
O God of mercy, when?
The people, Lord! The people!
Not thrones and crowns, but men.
God save the people; thine they are;
Thy children, as thy angels fair,
Save them from bondage and despair.
God save the people!

—*From Ebenezer Elliott.*

It is therefore in the highest degree illogical to argue that the State can never extend its powers. It is the organ of social consciousness, and must ever seek to obey the will of society. Whatever society demands it must and always will endeavor to supply. If it fails at first it will continue to try until success at last crowns its efforts. If it is ignorant it will educate itself, if in no other way by the method of trial and effort.

—*Lester F. Ward, Psychic Factors of Civilization, pp. 302, 303.*

This Bible is for the government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

—*Introduction to Wycliffe's Bible, 1384.*

VI

THE BEGINNINGS OF DEMOCRACY

THE story of democracy is one of the most fascinating that has ever been told. In a large sense it represents the long struggle of the human spirit to emancipate itself and to become its own master. In a true sense also it defines the purpose that is being wrought out in human society and the process by which it is being realized.

The term democracy is an old one, as old at least as the time of Herodotus. And the familiar use of the term by the historian proves that it had behind it a considerable antiquity. It is sometimes said, however, that democracy is a Christian product, and that democracy as a fact is the child of the Reformation. And it is quite possible, indeed, that this contention can be sustained. There is here no contradiction, for the more carefully we study the rise and development of the democratic movement, the more clearly we see that there has been a preparation for the event itself, and this preparation created the atmosphere in which the new movement grew.

There are several lines of investigation that may be followed by any one who would discover the beginnings of democracy. Thus, he may go through history and note where democratic institutions have appeared and seek to correlate these and show their relation to our modern institutions. Again, he may go through the nations and observe the transfer and transit of power and sovereignty from the one to the few, and from the few to the many, noting also the causes and results of these outward po-

litical changes. In this way he may gain a very clear idea of the democratic movement, and may note the many racial contributions toward the one great end. And once more, he may study the process whereby the limitations and restrictions that are upon men, whether political, religious, or social, are removed and they become full free citizens in the State. And last of all, he may follow the progress of mankind, going behind the actual forms and institutions of the hour and watching the self-consciousness of man as it grows and unfolds, and becomes at last the modern social and political consciousness of the foremost peoples. It is possible that the one who would discover the true causes and beginnings of democracy must follow all of these lines, and must then combine their results. The most important factor for our purpose is the last, and we are here concerned primarily with that growing self-consciousness which has produced such great changes in society and has made democracy inevitable.

I. The Foregleams of Democracy. Herodotus records a discussion of three Persians concerning the relative merits of the various kinds of government. While this discussion may be the historian's own invention, it yet indicates that the idea was a somewhat familiar one. A century later Aristotle devotes a large part of his work on "Politics" to a consideration of this form of government, and many things indicate that there were many democratic States in his age. The great days of Grecian life, the times when hope was young and genius flourished, were the days in which democracy was more or less regnant. It is possible to go to the history of several of these Greek States and find a very close relation between the democratic spirit and the productions of human genius. In his "History of European Morals," Lecky considers what he calls one of the anomalies of history

"that within the narrow limits and scanty population of the Greek States should have arisen men who, in almost every conceivable form of genius in philosophy, in epic, dramatic, and lyric poetry, in written and spoken eloquence, in statesmanship, in sculpture, in painting, and probably also in music, should have attained almost or altogether the highest limits of human perfection ("History of European Morals," Vol. I, p. 418). And from his studies in hereditary genius Galton concluded that "the ablest race of which history bears record is unquestionably the ancient Greeks, partly because their masterpieces in the principal departments of intellectual activity are still unsurpassed, and partly because the population which gave birth to the creators of these masterpieces was very small" ("Hereditary Genius," p. 329). And be it remembered that these Greek States at the hour of their greatest greatness were democratic, in the ancient sense of the term at least.

But while the term democracy is an old one, we find that democracy in the modern sense of the term was wholly unknown in the ancient world. Thus Thirlwall says: "The term democracy is used by Aristotle sometimes in a larger sense, so as to include several forms of government, which, notwithstanding their common character, were distinguished from each other by peculiar features; at other times in a narrower, to denote a form essentially vicious, which stands in the same relation to the happy temperament to which he gave the name polity, as oligarchy to aristocracy, or tyranny to royalty" ("Historian's History of the World," Vol. III, p. 179). A study of ancient records will show that no philosopher or statesman in ancient Greece ever conceived of the sovereignty of the people universal and imprescriptible, but one and all based citizenship in the State upon the possession of certain privileges and prerogatives. This

must be said, however, that these Grecian experiments, voicing as they did a splendid aspiration after life and liberty, remained to fructify the thought of man and to produce great results in far-off ages.

The contribution of Rome to the democratic movement is comparatively small, and at best is indirect. It is true that the early life of Rome was more or less democratic, and there were times when this form of government seemed about to be established. This is certain, that in the history of Rome we have repeated illustrations of the transit of power from the one to the few and from the few to the many. Thus, in the early days of the republic, we find that the commons are made an order in the State and have judges of their own ("Historian's History of the World," Vol. V, p. 113). For many generations the plebs complained of the patricians, and at last they revolted against them and gained formal recognition in the State. In the fifth century B. C. the patricians and the Senate yielded, and a new compact was devised which gave the plebeians official representatives and made them an independent body ("Historian's History," *ibid.*, p. 126). Once more, there was a great movement in behalf of popular government in the time of the Gracchi, a movement, be it said, that did much to promote democracy, and that gave birth to some noble appeals from the people. In the time of Sulla the last vestige of democracy disappeared, never more to show itself in Rome till the mighty empire had crumbled into ruins. Thus the history of the Roman republic is the progressive decline of the people from a monarchy through a modified democracy, ending at last in an absolute despotism.

One of the most significant contributions to this movement is made by the Germanic peoples, especially those occupying the portions of the Continent known as Fries-

land and the Rhine land. Julius Cæsar gives a few vivid descriptions of these peoples, but the graphic pages of Tacitus bring them before us with remarkable distinctness. To rebuke the vices of his own age and people it is possible that the historian has added some high colors to the picture, but none the less the picture is a significant one. Motley's summary is followed in its main details. The German system, he says, while nominally regal, was in reality democratic; for with the Germans the sovereignty resided in the great assembly of the people. There were slaves, indeed, but in small numbers, consisting either of prisoners of war, or of those unfortunates who had gambled away their liberty in games of chance. Their chieftains, although called by the Romans kings, were in reality generals, chosen by universal suffrage. The same assembly elected the village magistrates and decided upon all important matters of war and peace. All State affairs were in the hands of this fierce democracy. Any authority that the chieftains possessed was a delegated authority, and it was an authority to persuade rather than to command (Motley, "The Rise of the Dutch Republic," Vol. I, Sec. 2, 5). Thus John Fiske is partially justified in the statement that American history does not begin with the Declaration of Independence or even with the settlement of Jamestown and Plymouth; but it descends in unbroken continuity from the days when stout Arminius, in the forests of northern Germany, successfully defied the might of imperial Rome (Fiske, "American Political Ideas," p. 7). It is true that many of these traits were lost to a degree at least, and in course of time monarchical rule obtained among the various Germanic peoples. But the transfer of these democratic ideas to England in the early times where there was soil for them to grow in and produce results in far-off times is here in point.

It is in England, therefore, that we find those ideas at work which are prophetic of coming changes; and it is in England that we find soil congenial for democratic ideas, at least in the early stages of their growth, for it was in England that we witness what has been fittingly called "The Coming up of the Serfs" (Hosmer, "Hist. of Anglo-Saxon Freedom"). It was in England that we find a transit of power from the one to the few, and from the few to the many. And every step of this double process can be clearly traced in the form of charters and constitutions which admitted the people to a share in government and guaranteed them certain privileges before the law. The constitutional history of England is an important chapter in the progress of democratic government. The history of the English Parliament epitomizes the history of England from the primitive German Assembly to the modern House of Commons. From the earliest times we find that there was some form of representative government. And "never was the government concentrated in the hands of the king alone; under the name of the Wittenagemot, of the Council or the Assembly of the Barons, and after the reign of Henry III of the Parliament, a more or less numerous and influential assembly composed in a particular manner, was always associated with the sovereign" (Guizot, "Rep. Gov.," Par. II, Lec. 1). There were times when this assembly was somewhat subservient to despotism, but withal it had a voice in the government and represented the mass of the people. When men are able to think and when they are free to speak, some form of government is only a question of time. The Great Charter which the barons wrested from King John contained some provisions which had wide application, and which produced far-reaching results. "The rights which the barons claimed for themselves they claimed for the

nation at large." This charter, reaffirmed at various times and interpreted anew in each generation, illustrates the transit of power from the few to the many, and marks the consciousness that is growing in the minds of the people.

There was one other factor that had some influence upon the movement, and in a real way prepared the minds of men for the new ideas. This factor was the various guilds and associations of all sorts that sprang up in Europe all through the Middle Ages. These guilds were of various kinds, religious and social, though many of them seem to have been craft guilds in the strict sense of the term. In early Roman times such guilds were known, and Plutarch enumerates nine functions that they performed ("Encyc. Brit.," "Guilds"). Throughout Europe during all the Middle Ages these guilds flourished, and they did much to develop in men a consciousness of kind and to efface certain artificial distinctions. The great body of the citizens, in many places, were enrolled in these guilds, and as their position and wealth improved they sought to wrest the control of the town's resources from the patricians; thus the common people gained a new sense of humanity, and thus they made their voice heard in the affairs of government (Bax, "German Society of the Middle Ages," pp. 11, 210). Through membership in these guilds men ceased to be mere specimens of the human race, and became instead authorized constituents of human society. Thus Lotze is justified in the conclusion that "the guild marks an undoubted advance of the human race" ("Microcosmus," Vol. II, p. 230). It is possible that, when the full story of democracy is told, the contribution of these guilds will not be an insignificant one. Perhaps the most fateful factors in the whole movement were the associations that were formed among the peasants, and which led to some important results.

Then came the Renaissance, in some respects one of the most splendid and prophetic movements of the Christian centuries. For two hundred years and more, now here, now there, we find many stirrings of the human mind, many indications that man is about to awake to a new life. About the middle of the fifteenth century, following the fall of Constantinople, many men with a wonderful literature, wandered through western Europe to sell their wares and to become teachers of the nations. The words of the great masters of old, those words that burn and throb with a passion for liberty and light, found prepared minds everywhere and produced marvelous results. The Renaissance was in a sense a revival of learning, but it was much more than this. It gave men new thoughts; it stirred their minds and filled them with questionings; it awoke in them new aspirations and turned their attention to wrongs that had too long been neglected. The latter half of the fifteenth century is one of the great creative epochs of the world's life, and there is hardly an age that can compare with it. This brings us to the beginning of the sixteenth century with the world prepared for some great new movements. While we nowhere find democracy in any sense of the word, we yet find that the world is prepared for its appearance, and channels are grooved in which the new streams may run.

II. The Rise of Modern Democracy. At various times and by various men efforts have been made to trace the beginnings of our modern democratic ideas, liberty, equality, and fraternity. It has been claimed by some that these great ideas have been created by skepticism and unbelief, and consequently that we must find their origin in such men as Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau and Paine. Discussion of this position is not needed, were there space. Such specialists as Borgeaud and Jellinek, Oscar

Straus and Professor Ritchie, all agree in this, "that the idea of legally establishing inalienable, inherent, and sacred rights of the individual is not of political, but of religious origin (Jellinek, "Rights of Man and of the Citizen," p. 77). The "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," by the French Assembly in 1789, it is sometimes supposed, is but the formulated exposition of the ideas of Rousseau and his school. But Jellinek has shown most conclusively that the principles of the "*Contrat Social*" are at enmity with every declaration of rights, and consequently that we must look elsewhere, even to America, for the real sources of these declarations. For the high-sounding phrases of the French Declaration are "for the most part copied from the American Declaration or Bills of Rights," of Virginia and other States (Jellinek, chap. iii). And in America the ideas that find expression in these Declarations and Bills can be traced back in an unbroken line to the great ideas of the Reformation. In the truest sense of the term modern democracy is the product of the Reformation, and it cannot be understood apart from this great movement.

The Reformation, viewed from every point of view, is one of the most remarkable movements of all the ages. In a real sense it was a movement by man and of man, a movement that has its causes definite and definable, a movement that can be described and followed from generation to generation. And yet the Reformation in a no less real sense is a movement that cannot be fully explained by any of the formulas and factors known to man, and must be regarded as one of the signal manifestations of God. D'Aubigné shows that the same movement was seen everywhere, and that many of these movements had no human connection and communication of any kind. "It was not Germany that communicated the light of

truth to Switzerland, Switzerland to France, and France to England; all these countries received it from God . . . One sole and same doctrine was suddenly established in the sixteenth century at the hearths and altars of the most distant and dissimilar nations; it was everywhere the same spirit, everywhere producing the same faith" ("History of the Reformation," Bk. VIII, chap. i). This illustrates two things that for our purpose are all-important: an atmosphere has been created in which certain great, new ideas may grow; and certain great ideas sown in the minds of men are beginning to develop.

There were many causes that contributed to the Reformation movement, but beyond question the all-determining factor was the Christian Scriptures, which were found in the hands of men. To understand this movement, to know the real beginnings of democracy, we must know how it came about that the Scriptures were placed in the hands of the people. Since the time of Constantine the power of the Roman Catholic Church had grown by leaps and bounds until by the time of Boniface VIII it claimed dominion over all human affairs. During all this time the Church has diverged more and ever more widely from the apostolic form, until it lost nearly all of its original character. For one thing, the Church became more and more formal and institutional and gave less and less attention to Scriptural instruction and spiritual functions. Not only so, but the Church became allied with the civil powers and aided and abetted them in their tyrannous treatment of the people. It is not surprising, therefore, that various revolts against the corrupt doctrines and oppressive measures of Church and State should appear with ever-growing frequency and ever-increasing boldness. It is significant, however, that nearly all of these revolts had their source and inspiration in the Scriptures which men insisted on reading. A splendid

roll of heroes are the leaders of these revolts, from Peter of Bruys and Arnold da Brescia, with Peter Waldo and John Huss, to John Wycliffe and Jerome of Prague. Through the zeal of Peter Waldo, one of the morning stars of the new day, the Gospels were translated into the language of the common people, and the long-lost words of Holy Writ were studied with a wonderful activity. The people listened to Waldo and his teachers, and turned away from the Church in disgust and despair. The Church of Rome, through its alliance with the State, made a determined effort to exterminate this new movement, and the story of that persecution is one of the blackest pages of all history. So thoroughly was this work done, that Sismondi says: "Simon stamped out not only a people, but a literature." But though the fire was put out in the Canton of Vaud, yet many smoldering brands remained, and these were scattered all over central Europe. The forbidden Book made its silent way everywhere, and everywhere men were inspired by its truths to new ideas of religious and social life.

In 1380 John Wycliffe finished his translation of the Scriptures, and then went to his quiet grave at Lutterworth. But the fire that he had lighted blazed ever more and more brightly and aroused the fear of the papal authorities. Thirty years after his death his bones were dragged from the grave to be burned with the Bible that he had loved and had given to the people. Wycliffe's translation was known in Germany and was studied by many men who, in course of time, became reformers themselves. Then, about the middle of the fifteenth century, one of the most important inventions of the world was given to men, and the printing press was set to work multiplying copies of the Scriptures. It is prophetic of many things to come, that the first book—according to tradition—to issue from the press was the Bible itself.

It was translated again and again, and all through Germany the people were reading the Scriptures in their own tongue. In course of time, in the very communities where the Waldenses had preached and the Taborites had suffered, a new body arose with the Scriptures in hand to continue and broaden the work of reform. In 1518, about the time that Luther nailed his theses to the church door at Wittenberg, it is reckoned that there were fourteen complete translations of the Bible in High German and five in Low German in general circulation (Heath, "Anabaptism," p. 13). This fact explains in part, at least, how it happened that the new movement seemed to spring into life in a hundred places at once.

There is one other factor in this Reformation movement that is all important for our study, and without this factor before us the Reformation itself cannot be understood either in its sources or its consequences. The Reformation was not primarily theological, but social. For long years the peasants in all parts of Europe had felt the yoke of oppression grow heavier and heavier upon their necks. In course of time this yoke became simply unbearable, and here and there the people rose in revolt. "The people, bowed down by civil and ecclesiastical oppression, bound in many countries to the seignorial estates and transferred from hand to hand along with them, threatened to rise in fury and at last to break their chains. This agitation had shown itself long before the Reformation by many symptoms, and even then the religious element was blended with the political; in the sixteenth century it was impossible to separate these two principles, so closely associated in the existence of nations. In Holland, at the close of the preceding century, the peasants had revolted, placing on their banners by way of arms, a loaf and a cheese, the two great blessings of the people" ("Historian's History," Vol. XIV, pp. 259,

260). In Alsace a general uprising took place, and burghers as well as peasants marched side by side under the sign of the Bundschuh, a peasant's shoe laced from the ankle to the knee with leathern thongs. This League of the Bundschuh appeared again and again in various parts of the Rhine country making everywhere the same demands. In many lands the governments rose against these disturbing elements, and everywhere these peasants' revolts were quenched in torrents of blood. But while the conflagration was suppressed, many brands were left smoldering and it was not long before a blaze was burning in a dozen different places. It had become very evident that a political and social revolution was needed no less than a religious and ecclesiastical reformation, and it was not strange that such a movement should begin. Thus all the various lines of preparation seem to converge in the early decades of the sixteenth century and the Reformation, so called, is the result. The Scriptures are in the hands of the people, and these are studied with a wonderful interest as being the very word of God to men. The great mass of the people are in protest against the corruptions of the Roman Catholic Church and are in revolt against the abuses of the civil power. The tinder is prepared, the spark is struck, and the Reformation follows.

The men of that time, with the Scriptures in hand, and with such protests in their hearts, discover or re-discover certain great central Christian truths that were all-potent in their meaning. It is not easy for us of to-day to understand how these truths could have dropped so completely out of the current of Christian thought and life; but the fact remains that for many centuries some of the central truths of Christianity were almost wholly unknown. It must be said, however, that there were little groups of inquirers and mystics here and there who cherished some

of the vital truths of the gospel, and Luther himself acknowledges his indebtedness to the little book "Theologica Germanica," which saw the light about the beginning of the fourteenth century. But with it all the great truths of the Scriptures came to men almost as a new revelation from heaven. The Reformation, it has been said, was projected on two great lines and inspired by two great ideas, justification by faith, and the priesthood of all believers. The doctrine of justification by faith gave man a new conception of his worth and made him see that he was called to the privilege of direct access to God. It was his privilege to stand upon his feet, with the light of heaven in his face, and to call himself the child of the Most High. The truth of the priesthood of believers abolished all the false distinctions that men had made, and emphasized the equality of all men in the kingdom. The words of the Apostle Peter: "Ye are a royal priesthood," with other texts of similar import, Luther called "thunderbolts of God, against which neither all the Fathers, nor all the councils, though they were innumerable, nor all the world combined, shall be able to prevail." These great truths carried with them certain corollaries, and these, in a way, were hardly less important than the propositions themselves.

It is true that these great truths of Christianity were seen from different angles and were expressed in various terms, but none the less, they were the determining ideas of the whole movement. In the hands of Luther these ideas were developed mainly in their theological bearings, and this was a work that needed to be done. He came to the conviction that the authority in man's life was within, and not without, the soul, and he held that "every faithful believer in Christ was superior to the pope, if he could show better proofs and grounds of his belief" (Köstlin, "Life of Luther," p. 116). He developed the

doctrine of justification by faith and made it the corner-stone of a theological system that had great practical value in the world. In the hands of Calvin these ideas found expression in various theological and political forms which have had an extraordinary influence upon human thought.

In all of these Christian ideas it appears that man is sacred, that he holds certain relations to God which are neither created nor affected by Church or State action, that there are certain rights and prerogatives that belong to him by nature, that these rights he must claim and this nature he must fulfil, and that whatever institutions may exist, whether ecclesiastical or civil, must recognize these rights, and must rest upon them. These ideas may have been religious in their origin, but by their very nature they must be political in their application. In the great truths of Scripture men found not only religious truth and spiritual food, but social and political ideals that determined the whole structure of their ecclesiastical and social life. These great ideas, falling upon the prepared hearts of men in the sixteenth century, were received with wonderful avidity, and were affirmed with a new power. Given such ideas in religion, and democracy in the State is only a matter of time and application. It is not long before we find men beginning to apply these ideas in various directions and to claim rights which were revolutionary. It is not long before we find a group of people, mainly peasants, dubbed by their enemies Anabaptists, who are cherishing these Christian ideas and are beginning to put them into practice. In 1524 the peasants of Germany issued a manifesto in Twelve Articles which, in a way, voiced the new spirit, and are prophetic of great things to come. These articles, it is now pretty definitely settled, were written by Balthasar Hübmaier; at any rate he confessed under torture at Vienna, in 1528, that he

had revised and commented on these articles which were sent to him for that purpose (Vedder, "Hübmaier," p. 96). These Twelve Articles are to be ranked among the great documents of the ages, and they are worthy of careful study. There is not a trace of fanaticism in them, and they are in accord with the best modern religious and democratic principles. Thus:

Article 1. Every commune has the right to choose its own pastor, who ought to teach the true faith without human additions.

Article 2. For his maintenance let there be a tithe on corn, but none on cattle.

Article 3. Every man being redeemed by Christ's blood is a Freeman. We are therefore free and will be free. But this is no reason we should refuse to obey magistrates.

Article 5. Woods and forests taken possession of by any means except fair purchase must be returned to their original owner, the commune.

Article 9. Justice must be impartially administered.

In the earlier years of his career, from 1517 to 1523, Luther gave expression to many noble sentiments in favor of religious liberty. "No one can command or ought to command the soul, except God, who alone can show it the way to heaven. It is futile to compel any man's belief. Heresy is a spiritual thing which no iron can hew down, no fire burn, no water drown" (Luther's Tract, *Von Weltlichen Obrigheit*). These new ideas, thrown out among the people with great boldness and force, naturally produced a great commotion, and it is not strange perhaps that many men should be carried off their feet.

Among the peasants these ideas spread like wildfire, and by these people they were given a much wider application than Luther himself had intended. Thus we find that the words of the Reformer, harsh and defiant as they had been against the usurpations of the Roman Church, are taken up by the people and turned against their po-

litical oppressors. It was not the religious movement that gave birth to the political agitations; but in many places it was carried away by their impetuous waves. Perhaps we should even go farther and acknowledge that the movement communicated to the people by the Reformation gave fresh strength to the discontent fermenting in the nation. The violence of Luther's writings, the intrepidity of his actions and language, the harsh truths he spoke, not only to the pope and prelates, but also to the princes themselves, must all have contributed to inflame minds that were already in a state of excitement. Accordingly, Erasmus did not fail to tell him: "We are now reaping the fruits that you have sown." At this time the reform in religion was received with joy, both by princes and by people, and had the principles of the Reformation been limited to the sphere of religion alone, little difficulty might have arisen. But in this time the reformation in political and social matters was confined almost wholly to the peasants, and so had against it the most powerful part of the nation. In all parts of the land, movements of one kind and another sprang up and aligned men in different parties. Could all of these movements have had a leadership as wise as the one under Hübmaier and Denck in Swabia and Alsace, the story of the times might have had a different ending. But unfortunately there were other movements, as at Münster under Münzer and Pfeiffer, that awakened the fears of men and caused the whole movement to be discredited. In this time Luther's feelings underwent a terrible conflict. Should he side with the people and apply the principles of the gospel to political wrongs? But to do that would be to lose the support of the princes. Would not the whole movement fail if he should forfeit the favor of the civil powers? And yet the cause of the people was the cause of God, and there were great wrongs in social life.

The Reformer's voice that had been so potent in its protest against spiritual tyranny was suddenly hushed on the appearance of the Anabaptists. He was shocked at some of the excesses he saw, and was fearful lest they should check the progress of the gospel. To him these Anabaptists threatened disorder and anarchy, and he believed that the whole cause of truth was in danger. Then he hesitated no longer, but welcomed the strong arm of the civil power in seeking their suppression. He inveighed against the insurgents with all the energy of his being, and worse than all he roused the princes to draw the sword against the common people. One wing of this movement did run to excesses at Münster and elsewhere; but the other groups of peasants were moderate and Christian in their demands, and one of these was the movement under Hübmaier and Denck whose pronouncement we have noticed. They all did protest, however, against the wrongs endured both from Church and State; they all did ask that their rights be respected and their liberties assured; they did affirm that democracy in religion meant democracy in State, and in a way they sought to make their belief effective. One can readily see that such ideas were wholly unacceptable to the leaders in Church and State, and it is not strange that they should unite against the people.

The Reformation, as we have seen, was general and not local, and in England many of its most characteristic results were achieved. The Reformation, we have also seen, was no less political than religious, and in England both of these struggles went on side by side. "Episcopacy was abolished by the Presbyterians; monarchy by the Independents" (Borgeaud, "Rise of Modern Democracy," p. 28). Knox and Melville, the leaders of the Presbyterians, brought from Geneva the system of Calvin, which they endeavored to establish in Scotland; and

Presbyterianism is Calvinism tempered by the aristocratic tendencies of Calvin (Borgeaud, *ibid.*, p. 31). The Presbyterians did much to break the power of Catholicism and Episcopacy, but they never became democrats in any sense of the term. "The Independents or Congregationalists, were Puritans, but Puritans of an essentially English type, and they went much farther along the road toward democracy than the Presbyterians. They accepted Calvinism as a system of doctrine, but rejected it as a system of church organization. Independency, or as it was first called, Congregationalism, is Calvinism without Calvin" (Borgeaud, *ibid.*, pp. 30, 31).

In course of time this independent movement divaricated, one branch fighting for liberty in England, and the other seeking its fortunes in the new world. At home Cromwell felt the need of men whom he could trust in his armies, and the Independents appealed to him by the enthusiasm of their religion and the purity of their lives. By degrees the army became the stronghold of independency and the independent party was able to control Parliament. Then, in 1648, these English democrats proclaimed their principles in a manifesto presented to Parliament for adoption. This document, entitled "An Agreement of the People of England," lays down principles fully democratic in nature; it recognizes the sovereignty of the people and the toleration of all forms of Christianity; it asks for the suppression of State interference in church government, and provides for a Constitution for the State in which the fundamental laws were embodied and defined (Borgeaud, "Rise of Mod. Dem.," p. 39). This document was in reality a constitutional charter, and provided for a purely democratic government in the best sense of the term. But for some reason not fully known this document was never put into execution (Borgeaud, *ibid.*, chap. ii). Once more a petition was

presented to Parliament, January 20, 1649, in the name of the army, by the general-in-chief and his council of officers. But other matters engaged the attention of Parliament—the trial of the king—and action on the Agreement was put off for a more convenient season. This more convenient season never came, for soon the democratic party fell, and Cromwell became sole dictator. Thus the principles of democracy never came to full fruitage in England (Jellinek, "Rights of Man and of the Citizen," pp. 62, 63).

At the beginning of the seventeenth century a number of Independents had left England and had taken refuge in Holland. In course of time they formed the bold project of leaving the Old World and crossing the sea where they might find refuge and freedom. Finally, a little company, one hundred and two souls in all, on September 6, 1620, set sail from Delft Haven and turned their faces toward the setting sun. Their pastor, John Robinson, gave them some good advice which, alas, they too soon forgot. When nearing the shores of the New World they drew up and signed a document that must be ranked among the great papers of the human race. The historian Bancroft grows eloquent over this paper and says: "This was the birth of popular constitutional liberty. . . In the cabin of the Mayflower humanity recovered its rights and instituted government on the basis of equal laws enacted by all for the general good" ("History of the United States," Vol. I, p. 207). This is partially true, but it is not by any means all of the truth. For, no sooner were these men landed and settled than they refused to accept the full meaning of their agreement and to accord to all men an equal share in the government. Other colonies were founded in due time by the Puritans in Massachusetts Bay, but in none did democracy become an actual experience.

This brings us face to face with the one man to whom the modern world owes the full development of the democratic idea. Roger Williams must forever rank as one of the great epoch-makers of the world, and to him impartial historians accord the honor of being the first democrat. It was not until his expulsion from Salem Colony that he became a Baptist, but the evidence is indisputable that he had long been a Baptist at heart. He had spent much time among the Baptists of England and was familiar with their doctrines and writings. No sooner had Williams set foot in America than he found himself in conflict with the authorities, both civil and religious. He found a strange thing existing: "It was not a union of Church and State," says Straus, "for that signifies some equality at least of authority; but it was a Church dominating the State and using it as an instrument to carry out its will. The consequence was that every civil question had its religious bearing, and every religious question its civil bearing, but in all questions the religious aspect preponderated" (Straus, "Roger Williams," p. 20). The principle of soul liberty had taken possession of Williams' very being, and he was not willing to have his conscience ruled by any magistrate. He could not believe that a man's citizenship in the State should be determined by his subscription to a church creed, and as he was a man who could not entertain such convictions in silence he soon fell under the suspicion of the theocratic authorities. After four years of discussion and trouble Williams was banished from the colony by the peremptory orders of the General Court as a disturber of the peace. In course of time he settled in what was afterward known as Rhode Island, in a place which, out of gratitude to God, he named Providence. Williams finally went back to England, and having the powerful aid of Sir Henry Vane, he secured a charter in which democracy is first

made a corner-stone. Among the provisions of the covenant based upon this charter are the following:

> And now sith our charter gives us powre to governe ourselves and such others as come among us, and by such forme of civill government as by the voluntary consente, shall be found most suitable to our estate and condition,
>
> It is agreed, by this present Assembly thus incorporate, and by this present act declared, that the forme of government established in Providence Plantations is Democraticall; that is to say a Government, held by the free and voluntary consent of all, or the greater part of the free inhabitants (Borgeaud, "Rise of Modern Democracy," pp. 160, 161).

"It became his glory to found a State upon that principle, and to stamp himself upon its rising institutions, in characters so deep that the impress has remained to the present day, and can never be erased without the total destruction of the work. . . He was the first man in modern Christendom to establish civil government on the doctrine of the liberty of conscience, the equality of opinions before the law, and in its defense he was the harbinger of Milton, the precursor and the superior of Jeremy Taylor. . . Let then the name of Roger Williams be preserved in universal history as one who advanced moral and political science, and made himself a benefactor of his race" (Bancroft, "History of U. S., Vol. I, chap. xv).

III. Democracy at Last Appears. From what has been said it is evident that modern democracy is the child of the Reformation. It is also evident that various streams began to flow in many places at once, all moving in the one general direction. The main stream of this new movement we may trace from its rise among the Anabaptists of Germany, through the Netherlands to England, and from England to the Providence Plantations. This brings us to the middle of the seventeenth century

with the democratic idea finding recognition in the Rhode Island Colony.

The colony of Rhode Island was destined to have a marked influence upon the other colonies; and yet it must be confessed that for a time this influence is not easily traced. From the founding of the colony, for a hundred years and more, the course of democracy seems to have made little progress in America, and the Providence Plantation stands almost alone in its democratic ideals. That the soil of the colonies, however, was being prepared for the democratic ideal is plain even to the most cursory observer. The colonists who came to America were in the main religious and civil refugees, men too progressive to be satisfied with conditions in the home country, and men too much in love with liberty to bow the servile knee at the command of king or prelate. Here, in the New World, the people were obliged to begin at the beginning and lay foundations for a new political order. The settlers were in the main farmers living far apart, with each man the architect of his own fate and fortune, compelled by the exigencies of the case to depend largely upon his own initiative and judgment. These settlers were accustomed to unite for mutual defense against the Indians, but for the ordinary purposes of life each man was sufficient unto himself, being in a large sense his own ruler and priest. These colonists were in the main men with strong religious convictions, dissenters and come-outers of one kind and another, men who loved truth and were very sure of God, believing in the accountability of each man to God, and cherishing the highest estimate of the sacredness of each man's personality. Such ideas cherished by such men living in such conditions, must perforce produce extraordinary and far-reaching results.

In the various colonies, each with its own type of re-

ligion and life, we find that the government is approximately democratic in spirit if not in form. In Maryland and Pennsylvania, in Virginia and New York, the government is practically democratic and the people are being trained in the art of self-government. From the founding of the Providence Plantations to the Declaration of Independence the cause of democracy seems to make little progress; and there is not much that can be told. But in reality the great democratic ideas are working themselves deep into the very life of the people, and men are slowly coming to political self-consciousness. How soon or how far these ideas would have produced their full results, without some opposition that forced them into the foreground, we cannot say; for human progress is achieved through action and reaction of opposing forces, and human ideas are shaped and defined in the furnace of antagonism and struggle. But at any rate the arbitrary action of the British crown furnished this very element of antagonism and forced men to take their stand and define their ideas. In 1776 Virginia adopted a Declaration of Rights, which must be regarded as one of the epoch-making papers of the world, in some respects outranking Magna Charta and the Mayflower Compact. This Declaration of Rights, made by the representatives of the good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention, defined and asserted certain rights, which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and foundation of government. In this remarkable declaration it is affirmed that all men are by nature equal, free, and independent, and have certain inherent rights of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to

them; that government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; that no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services, which not being descendible, neither ought the office of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary. This declaration was adopted June twelfth, thus antedating by nearly a month the Declaration of Independence signed in Philadelphia by representatives of all the colonies.

It required eight years of struggle and sacrifice for the colonies to make good their faith, but they fought on and fought out the war to its successful conclusion at Yorktown. Some years later delegates from all the States met at Philadelphia to consider the present condition of the colonies and to take measures for their future security. In the debates of this Convention one sees that all kinds of ideas are struggling for expression and supremacy, but with it all a constitution is framed which Gladstone has declared is the most remarkable document ever produced by the mind of man in a given time. In this constitution certain great principles of democracy are affirmed and are made the fundamental law of the land. But this constitution, remarkable as it was, many men felt was defective at some points; more than one patriot denounced it for its monarchical squint; and many Baptists protested that it did not safeguard their rights and privileges. This latter defect was remedied by the adoption of the first amendment, and with this article modern democracy may be said to have made a beginning.

But one other factor remains to be noticed before the story is fully told. In the Declaration of Rights of Virginia, as well as in the Declaration of Independence of the Colonies, there are many high-sounding phrases about

the rights of men and the freedom of all by nature; but the fact remains that these phrases must be taken with a qualification. In the constitution also are many provisions guaranteeing the rights of men and providing for the privilege of the franchise; but these provisions also must be taken with some limitations. For it appears that neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution of the United States, applied to the man with a black skin. It may be said that some of the men who framed these documents did not regard the black man as a brother; and it must be said also that some of the men who signed these documents saw how illogical was their course on this question. But the problem remained to vex the nation and finally to become the occasion of the most bloody war of all the ages. Then, as the result of this war, through the arbitrament of the sword, the new right is defined and the black man is recognized as a human being. The last word of this story of the beginnings of democracy is written in the new amendment which is now adopted, Article XV: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

Summing up, we find several things that may be noted. Thus we find that democracy, in the modern sense of the term, as a principle, and not merely as a privilege, is a comparatively recent thing, and can be traced back to its beginnings in the Reformation of religion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That is, while democracy may have been more or less a fact here and there in the past, yet democracy as a principle belongs wholly to later times. There were so-called democracies in the old world, but democracy based upon simple manhood and growing out of the recognition of the imprescriptible rights of men cannot be traced back beyond the Reformation. Again,

it is in the great truths of Christianity that we must find the real fountain-head of the new streams that are flowing through the world. Many of the ideas of the gospel as preached by the reformers were developed and applied by irreligious thinkers and skeptical writers, but the fact is writ large upon the page of history that the real fathers of democracy were pronounced Christian men (Fairbairn, "Religion in History and Modern Life, pp. 224, 225). And the other fact to be noted is this: that the progress of democracy can be read in the growing recognition of the worth of man and the removal of restrictions of one kind and another. One by one these limitations have been swept away—limitations of class, of religion, of condition and color; and thus government of the people, by the people, and for the people has begun to appear.

VII

THE DRIFT TOWARD DEMOCRACY

IN these latter times one of the most fateful movements of all the ages is gaining direction and momentum. The rank and file of the people are more and more denying the divine right of kings, not only to govern well or ill, but to govern at all, and they are claiming that all just governments rest upon the consent of the governed. In view of this, it is well that we know something of the forces and factors that give power and direction to this movement. For by knowing the things that make for democracy we may know something of the trend of this movement, and may learn something of its prospects.

The past four centuries have witnessed a great and significant change in social and civil affairs, the transit and transfer of power and authority, first from the monarch to an aristocracy, and then from the few to the many. In former times, when the king failed, as he often did, there were the few nobles to act as a last resource, to conserve the prerogatives of authority and to uphold the power of the State. But in these times the right of both kings and nobles is questioned and denied, and all these safeguards are removed. Now the political power, in the leading nations at least, is lodged with the people, and the last reserves are called into the field. Thus, democracy is in a way a final thing, for beyond the people there are no reserves. Many things indicate that the age of kings is passing and the age of the people is coming, and hence the drift toward democracy. In a large sense it may be said that the progress of a people, its degree of political de-

velopment, its growing consciousness of social brotherhood, is measured by the place which the people themselves occupy in the affairs of government. The race is gaining what has been called the sense of humanity, and men are coming to social self-consciousness. Men are growing into the consciousness of human brotherhood and are beginning to revalue the life of the common man. And this is the inner spirit and moving power of democracy. Many things indicate that the drift toward democracy is as inevitable as gravitation and as certain as the daybreak. We mention a few of these:

I. The Growing Conception of Human Brotherhood. It is sometimes said that the conception of human brotherhood was first brought into the world by the Son of man; but this is not strictly the case. There were adumbrations of this great truth in the life and teaching of many men before the Christian era. And yet it was the Son of man who brought this great truth out into the daylight and made it the possession of the whole human race.

We find a few adumbrations of the truth of human brotherhood in Greece and Rome, in Persia and China, and these, though faint, are worthy of careful study. Thus Plutarch records the saying of Alexander "that God is the common father of men, but more particularly of the good and virtuous" (Plutarch, "Lives": Alexander). And Xenophon states that Cyrus, when dying, charged his son to have regard for the good of the human race (Xenophon, "Cyropædia"). In Rome we find an approximation to this idea in the teaching of the philosophers mainly of the Stoic school. Thus Cicero declares that "the whole world should be considered as one State, the common home of gods and men; by nature we incline to love men, which fact is the foundation of law. A wise man does not regard himself as the inhabitant of any one place, but as a citizen of the whole world, counting it but one

city" ("De Legibus," Bk. I). In his "De Officiis" he is even more explicit, declaring his belief in the universal brotherhood of man. But this was a kind of amiable and abstract philosophy which the writer himself never thought of putting into practice. In Epictetus there is a much clearer vision of the truth, and this man is feeling his way toward the light. He speaks of the master who is angry with his slave because he has misunderstood his orders, and is about to beat him. "Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son of the same seed, and of the same descent from above? . . . Will you not remember who you are and whom you rule, that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?" ("Epictetus," Bk. I, chap. 13.) In China, Confucius confesses that the good man loves all within the four seas as his brothers, but the sage limits this brotherhood to his own people. The idea of brotherhood in a narrow and partial sense, had taken hold of the best and noblest souls in antiquity, and no man can say when the idea first found its way into human thought. And this is precisely what we might expect in view of the fact that God loves all men and is ever seeking his own. It was a favorite saying of some of the early church fathers, as Origen, and Augustine in his "Retractations," that Christianity was as old as creation, and they endeavored not in vain to find traces of Christianity before Christ.

Among the Jews we find a partial approximation to this great idea of human brotherhood, with its application in human equality. The Jews all traced their descent from Abraham, the father of the people, and thus they cherished the idea of brotherhood within national lines. In later times we find that the conception of the divine Fatherhood is growing in clearness and power, and here

and there it finds a voice in the words of a prophet. But not until we come to the later times and to Jesus Christ do we behold this truth in all its scope. Many writers, it is true, have shown that many of the moral precepts and spiritual ideas of Jesus of Nazareth can be met and matched in the early writers of the world. Be it so: yet it was the Son of man who first made these ideas current coin; he was the first to translate these ideas into life, and give them spiritual force; he it was "who wrought with human hands the creed of creeds," and gave that creed its vital power.

One or two elements in his life and teaching may be noted. For one thing his manner of life and his station in society are revelations of some great truth of God and man. This One, whom men have agreed to call the Son of God, who came from God and went to God, lived a lowly life among the children of men. All his life he lived as a man among men making no differences of any kind in his attitude toward men, and never recognizing any of the distinctions of the society of his day. He grew up in little humble Nazareth, and was content to be known as the carpenter's son. He chose his disciples from the various walks of life with the most complete indifference to all the conventionalities of society. He, the Son of God, lived as the Son of man, allowing nothing to separate him from his fellows, and claiming kinship with all mankind.

Not only so, but he lived in the full consciousness of the divine Fatherhood and his own Sonship, and this consciousness determined his whole life and thought. His first recorded words breathe the name of Father, and upon the cross he stays his soul upon this same blessed name. So full and potent is this consciousness in his life that it colors all his thought and determines all his teaching.

His one name for God is Father, and everything he said must be construed in the categories of that name. The Sermon on the Mount, which has been called the Magna Charta of the kingdom of God, has, as its great idea and fundamental basis, its regulative idea and its ruling note, this conception of divine Fatherhood and human brotherhood. In the hearing of the people he charges men to "call no man father on the earth; for one is your Father who is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters; for one is your Master, even the Christ" (Matt. 23 : 9, 10). The sweep and significance of these words we have hardly begun as yet to see. But we have here the doctrine of human brotherhood set forth in the most unequivocal terms, and with the most unlimited application. The fact is, the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen, the Proclamation of Emancipation, are all implied here, and are only a matter of definition.

Growing out of all this there is another element that has special significance for our purpose, and that is the worth of the human soul. In that Old World men set a very slight value upon the soul of the common man. Men believed, indeed, that some souls had value, the souls of the great and the rich, the soul of the king and the priest, but it never entered into the thought of man that the soul of the common man, the slave, the peasant, the unlearned, had any real and intrinsic worth. But Jesus taught the world to believe in the worth of man, the common man, the child, the woman, the outcast, the no-caste, the publican, the sinner. In fact, it is far within the truth to say that this was his supreme and immortal discovery. He does not say very much directly upon this high theme, but this truth runs as a golden thread through all his teaching and appears as the moving impulse of his life.

He assumes that the best things of life are for all men, whatever may be their station or previous condition; then he seeks to bring all men into the possession and appreciation of these good things. Thus it is that Jesus marks the transition from the old to the new, from the old age to the new time.

These great ideas of Jesus were no doubt slow in getting themselves inwrought into the life and thought of the world, but they are all implicit in Christianity, and soon or late they must become explicit and potent. The great ideas of Christianity as illustrated in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, and interpreted by the life and order of the early church, led by a straight course to democracy in government. So long as Christianity abides, so long as its central ideas are cherished by men, so long autocracies of all kinds are challenged and democracy is only a question of application. The great ideas of Christianity, when fully understood and faithfully practised, must lead by an inevitable logic to the democracy of all life. Where the Christianity of Christ is known and honored, democracy is only a question of time and definition.

The whole meaning of Christianity is spelled out in democracy, and the whole vitality of Christianity is implicated in the democratic movement. However it may be with any other factors that may be named, as contributing to the democratic drift, it is certain that the Christian idea is a pledge and prophecy of ultimate democracy. While it is true that Christianity is not primarily concerned with forms of government, it is yet true that it must create a form that shall express its essential spirit. While it is also true that Christianity has no commission to change one form of government for another, it yet remains true that it is inherently a democratic religion. It began among the common people,

and has as its Founder one who toiled at the carpenter's bench. It comes to men with the central truth of the Fatherhood of God, which carries with it the correlated truth of the brotherhood of man. Thus the democratic idea is woven into the very warp and woof of Christianity, and no papal ingenuity or imperial authority can tear it out without destroying the whole fabric. The great ideas of the gospel have given birth to this modern democratic movement, and they are the potent forces that are behind this drift. Not until these Christian ideas become old and effete and are cast aside forever will the struggle in behalf of democracy cease. So long as these ideas remain as the common inheritance of man, that long will this democratic movement continue.

II. The Growing Dominance of the Democratic Idea in Literature. In his lectures on "Heroes and Hero Worship," Carlyle accords a high place to the man of letters, and assigns him a most potent function in social progress. He quotes with approval the saying of Fichte, that the man of letters is a prophet, or, as he prefers to phrase it, a priest, continually unfolding the godlike to men. Men of letters are a perpetual priesthood, from age to age teaching all men that a God is still present in their life. With prophetic insight they enter into that purpose which God is working out in our humanity, and like a true guide they show men the way in which they should direct their march. In all times the poet and the writer, the seer and the sayer, have been held in high honor and have fulfilled an important function in human society. With the coming of Christianity into the world there have been given to man some great, vital, and vitalizing ideas, and these have slowly made their way among men. The men of letters, the prophets and priests of humanity, have more and more entered into these ideas, and have sought to interpret and enforce their meaning.

We can do no more than suggest a few items in this story of the democratic idea in English literature, and refer any person who is interested in this subject to the illuminating volumes of Professor Vida Scudder on "The Life of the Spirit in the Modern English Poets," and "Social Ideals in English Letters."

Democracy, we are told, entered Great Britain with the church of Christ (Scudder, "Social Ideals," p. 7). But the great ideas of Christianity make their way very slowly, and it is centuries before they find even an approximate expression. In course of time, however, these ideas make their power felt, and in the lapse of generations they find self-expression among the people. The Middle Ages were dying and a new age is in the birth-throes. It was a time of social change and upheaval, and men are everywhere groping for the light. The people are coming to self-consciousness, and are seeking self-expression. Two great poets belong to this time, Langland and Chaucer, but only one of these has special significance for our theme.

The poem of Langland, "The Vision of Piers the Plowman," belongs to one of the saddest periods of English history. In it the very heart-cries of the English people find expression, and throbbing through it are some great new aspirations which are truly prophetic. The ruling motif of the poem is indicative of the new thought that is finding its way among the people. Men are in sorrow and distress, they are oppressed and wronged, they are scattered and torn, with no one to help and deliver. Piers feels that this cannot be God's will for men, and so he looks for help to the priest and the knight; and at last, when these fail, he himself becomes the deliverer of the people. Toward the close the plowman seems to disappear, and in his stead we see one like unto the Son of man. The dreamer is in church, and in the midst of the mass

he suddenly sleeps, and beholds in vision Piers the plowman coming in with a cross before the common people, marked with bloody wounds, and "like in all limbs to our Lord Jesus." "It would be a mistake to suppose that by this extraordinary image Langland meant exactly to identify Piers with the Saviour of the world. To him the working man is simply the best embodiment of the Christian idea" (Scudder, "Social Ideals," p. 36). Thus, under the figure of the peasant, in his sufferings and humiliation, Christ appears as the friend of the people and the Great Emancipator:

> For our joy and our health Jesus Christ of heaven,
> In a poor man's apparel pursueth us ever,
> And looketh upon us in the likeness and that with lovely cheer,
> To know us by our kind heart and casting our eyes
> Whether we love the Lord here before our Lord in bliss.
> For we are all Christ's creatures, and of his coffers rich
> And brethren as of one blood, as well beggars as earls.

For nearly four centuries English poetry has no successor to "Piers the Plowman," though there were great poets who used the language. Shakespeare, universal genius as he was, had little of the seer's vision, and cannot be called a prophet of the social gospel. Milton the poet sings "his deathless unfathomable song" of paradise and hell, but in his poetry he shows little interest in the struggles of the people for political emancipation. But Milton the prose writer speaks some of the bravest and boldest words in protest against tyranny and inequality, and in favor of liberty and democracy. About the middle of the eighteenth century several writers appeared whose words were carried far and wide, and produced vast results. Rousseau was not a great man, measured by any of the standards of true greatness, but his influence has been most marked, not alone in

France, but in England as well. There is reason to believe that both Burns and Shelley were familiar with his writings, and, as some one has said, it is not every mediocre writer of prose who is honored by having his words set to music by such a poet as Burns.

During the later decades of the eighteenth century the new ideas found expression in the songs of several poets, but first among these must be named the Ayrshire plowman. Through all the poems and songs of Burns there breathes a vast contempt for pretense and sham, and scorn for the belted knight and the self-important squire. Through all his words there runs the one clear note of equality and brotherhood. These prophetic lines throb with a passion for fraternity among all:

What though on hamely fare we dine,
  Wear hodden gray, and a' that;
Gie fools their silks, and knaves their wine,
  A man's a man for a' that.
For a' that and a' that,
  Their tinsel show, and a' that;
The honest man, though e'er sae poor,
  Is king of men, for a' that.

Then let us pray, that come it may—
  As come it will, for a' that—
That sense and worth, o'er all the earth,
  May bear the gree, and a' that;
For a' that and a' that
  It's comin' yet, for a' that,
That man to man, the warld o'er,
  Shall brothers be for a' that.

The heroes of Burns are plain, simple folk, like the rest of us, farmers and mechanics, men who honor their manhood and have scant regard for "dignities and a' that." No man had a higher love for honesty and sincerity, with independence and worth, and no man brings us nearer to the great heart of humanity. In Edinburgh,

nearly a hundred years after his death, working men going home from work have begged for a sight of his statue, and then have turned home with a tear in the eye and a deeper respect for their manhood.

With the coming of the nineteenth century we find a group of poets who may be called almost by preeminence the poets of democracy. Beginning with Wordsworth and Shelley we have a pretty unbroken succession down to the present day, in both England and America, in Tennyson and Browning, in Lowell and Whittier, in Arnold and Whitman. To these men, with many other minor poets may be given the high honor of being called the poets of the people and the prophets of democracy. In his earlier years Wordsworth's faith in the new democracy gives his poems their highest aspirations and their fullest power; in fact, it may be said that Wordsworth did not enter upon his poetic career till he had won his way to this new and splendid faith. All through his life he clung to the belief that "in God's pure sight" monarch and peasant are equal. All through his life he belonged—to use Lincoln's fine phrase—to the plain people, and he not only believed in poverty, but he practised it (Scudder, "The Life of the Spirit," p. 75). He asked that education be made general that all might have a fair chance for the best things in life; he had nothing but scorn for a social system that allowed men to be robbed of their birthright, and this was done wherever men were made the means and money the end. All his life he sorrowed at

> The injustice which hath made
> So wide a barrier between man and man.

Shelley was a younger contemporary of Wordsworth, but he went far beyond his predecessor in his protest against tyranny and his passion for liberty. His passion

was even more vehement than Wordsworth's, though it must be confessed it was also less sane and balanced. The love of liberty and the hope of democracy glowed luminous and entrancing before the sensitive soul of the poet, and inspired some of his finest and greatest work. Through his "Prometheus Unbound" there rings a new and modern cry:

> I would fain
> Be what it is my destiny to be,
> The savior and the strength of suffering man,
> Or sink into the original gulf of things.—*Act I.*

Shelley went so far in his hatred of tyranny that he almost despises all government, and so comes dangerously near to the praise of anarchy. With piercing insight his thought finds its way into the evils and wrongs of the systems of his day, yet he can see no way out except by the destruction of all governmental order and ecclesiastical institutions.

Tennyson and Browning, in a sense, belong to the same school of thought, and both are prophets of the age that is to be. Yet never were there two men more unlike, and in a way also more unlike their forerunners. Tennyson, as did Browning, struck many notes, and compassed nearly the whole gamut of human experience. In a way he was always an aristocrat, though he would have said that it was a government of the best that he desired and not a government by birth and rank alone.

In Locksley Hall we hear this well-founded and vehement note of protest:

> Cursed be the social wants that sin against the strength of youth!
> Cursed be the social lies that warp us from the living truth!
>
> Cursed be the sickly forms that err from honest nature's rule!
> Cursed be the gold that gilds the straiten'd forehead of the fool!

Later on in the poem he passes from negative protests to positive hopes, and now he sings of the time when

> The war drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd,
> In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

But in Browning the century comes to its fullest self-consciousness and self-expression. Browning, of all the poets of the century, may be called by easy preeminence. the prophet of man. Persons of all classes and ranks, of all ages and characters, move across his pages and play their little part, and moral worth is not by any means confined to any class or condition. The poet does not attempt to construct a philosophy of life; rather he shows us human life from all sides and angles, and allows us to draw our own conclusions. But no one can long read his virile lines without finding that he has an unchanging hatred of shams and delusions, and that he has a burning passion for human brotherhood and equality.

The other poets that are named, Lowell, Whittier, Emerson, and Whitman, in their verse reflect something of the life and passion and liberty of the New World. In a very true sense these four may all be called the poets of human brotherhood and the prophets of democracy. Never do they strike their highest notes till they are protesting against human injustice of some kind and are pleading for liberty for all mankind. Then their words glow and throb with the fire and force and passion of a Hebrew prophet, and we are moved in spite of ourselves. Where so many of their poems are filled with this new spirit it is needless to specify examples. They all kept their early faith undimmed to the very end of life, and never wavered in their allegiance to the people's cause. Lowell's "Three Memorial Poems" are in full harmony with "The Present Crisis," "On the Capture of Fugitive Slaves," and "The Search." Whittier's "Voices of Free-

dom" still throb with their early fire, and no one can read these words unmoved. In democracy the poet confesses his abiding faith in the ideal of his boyhood's time, and sees in it the

> Bearer of freedom's holy light,
> Breaker of Slavery's chain and rod;
> The foe of all which pains the sight,
> Or wounds the generous ear of God.

Emerson is no less pronounced in his love of freedom, and on this high theme his words gain a new fire and passion. No one can easily forget those words read in Faneuil Hall, Boston:

> The word of the Lord by night
> To the waiting Pilgrims came,
> As they sat by the seaside,
> And filled their heart with flame.
>
> God said, I am tired of kings;
> I suffer them no more;
> Up to my ears the morning brings
> The outcry of the poor.
>
> Think ye I made this ball
> A field of havoc and woe,
> Where tyrants great and tyrants small
> Might harry the weak and poor?

There are many other singers, sometimes called the lesser poets—though the distinction is hardly a fair one—who stand close to the people and strike the notes of democracy. Be they lesser poets or not, they are no less important, for they are read by the people, even more than some of the greater poets, and thus give voice to the common aspiration. Charles Mackay and Gerald Massey, Matthew Arnold and Algernon Swinburne, Sidney Lanier and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry N. Dodge and Richard Watson Gilder, Edwin Markham and Helen

Hunt Jackson are in the line of the true succession, and are voices of the coming dawn. These, and many others, are making the songs of the nations, and these democratic songs are harbingers of the democratic age.

There is space only to name the great writers of prose who are in this true democratic succession, and are prophets of the advancing day. But beginning with Dickens and Carlyle we have a noble succession of men, both in fiction and in criticism, who at once profess this new faith and interpret it in many of its applications. The influence of these men, with Ruskin and Arnold, Maurice and Kingsley, George Eliot and Sir Walter Besant, Mrs. Humphry Ward and Richard Whiting, is simply immeasurable in its depth and potency. But no account of the growing dominance of the democratic ideal in literature would be complete which did not mention the great service of the many great writers of the Continent who are all laborers together in this one great cause. Lamennais and Mazzini, Victor Hugo and George Sand, in the earlier time, and Tolstoy and Sienkiewicz, Gorky and Nietzsche in the later time, are among the potent influences in the world to-day who all profess the new faith and hail the new day. From one cause and another, literature is coming very close to man, and is dealing with life as we find it; men are finding romance and poetry, not in far-away times and chivalric adventures, but in the common life of the people and in the aspirations of the plain working man. They who can best interpret

> the prophetic soul
> Of the great world, dreaming on things to come,

are being hailed as the friends of man, and their writings are speaking home to the common heart with peculiar fascination. The fact that this democratic ideal is finding a voice in other lands shows plainly that it appeals to

the universal human heart. And it shows also that the great seers and prophets of humanity, whatever may be their speech or their nationality, all cherish the same hope and voice the same aspiration. In a large sense it may be said that the rank of an author to-day depends largely upon his passion for this social faith and his interest in the common people.

III. A third factor that may be named is what may be called The General Diffusion of Education. It is not easy for the man of this modern world in a democratic land, to appreciate the conditions in the Old World, nor to realize how recent this educational movement is. What we call universal education is a very new thing in the world. It is true, as a suggestive writer has brought out, that in the great empires of antiquity there was a general and very high degree of mental development. In the Greek States education was widely diffused, and Kidd is no doubt justified in his contention that in Athens, in the time of Pericles, there was a higher and finer culture than has ever existed among an equal number of people in any land in the world (Kidd, "Social Evolution," chap. ix). But we must note one fact—that in all the Greek States there was a large slave class who were entirely shut out from all culture. This is the fact, however, that has significance for our purpose—among the free citizens there was a generous culture of both mind and body, and this culture may be considered both as the cause and the effect of this free citizenship.

"The modern age began with the invention of powder and printing," says Dean Hodges. "Before that the man with the book and the man on horseback directed the creed and the conduct of the neighborhood." The cavalier was so named from his chief characteristic—he rode a horse. This man, sitting in his saddle as upon a throne, clad in stout armor which protected him from fists and clubs

and gave him some defense even against the sharp arrows of the time, this man on horseback was the natural ruler of his fellow-men. Beside the knight stood the priest with book in hand, who represented a greater kingdom and a mightier power—the kingdom of heaven and the power of God. This man, with his weird power and wizard learning controlled the everlasting destiny of men, and could open or shut the doors of the celestial world. "Then came powder and printing, and the whole world was turned upside down." The man on horseback found himself confronted by the man with the gun, and the old inequality vanished. The man with the book found himself faced by a people with books in hand, and his old power was gone. Added to all this the people began to study the Bible, that, thanks to the printing-press, had been placed in their hands, and they found some remarkable things. These people studied the words of the Prophet of Nazareth, and they found that he did not favor a class but was the friend of man. "The Bible became the placard of a revolution whose Marseillaise was the Magnificat" (Hodges, "Faith and Social Service," pp. 10-13).

This diffusion of education shows itself in several ways, all of which are significant in their relation to democracy. The system of free public schools has done much to promote equality and good-fellowship. Under the beneficent shadow of this system provision is made for the equal education of all classes and conditions of children. Boys and girls from the homes of the rich and the homes of the poor sit side by side in the schoolroom, and not infrequently it happens that the child of the mechanic and the farmer outdistances the child of the banker and the manufacturer. Such children learn to respect one another and cliques and castes do not make much headway. The public-school system, which grew out of the democratic

idea, is now one of the agencies that is making for democracy and is guaranteeing its perpetuity.

Then the free press which, in a way, is an effect of the new enfranchisement, is also a potent force in the democratic drift. So long as Milton's "Areopagitica" remains in the language of men, that long the printing-press will be free and unlicensed. And so long as it remains free and unlicensed so long democracy is safe, and tyranny can never be undisturbed. This free press, with its varied information and world-wide outlook, appeals to all classes of people, and challenges them to think, to consider great problems, and to know what is going on in the world. The old order of prophets may appear no more, but as Carlyle suggests, "we have a new order of preaching friars. One of these preaching friars settles himself in every village and builds himself a pulpit, which he calls a newspaper. Therefrom he preaches what most momentous doctrine is in him for man's salvation; and dost not thou look and listen?" (Carlyle, "Sartor Resartus").

Along with this goes the wide and ever-widening diffusion of periodical literature of a more ambitious character. In these magazines and reviews the great questions of current interest are debated, sometimes with real insight, often with specious arguments, but withal contributing to the general inquiry and investigation. A reading people may be a fickle and superficial people, subject to sudden changes of opinion and likely to form judgments without due deliberation, but it is inconceivable that such a people should ever be contented slaves and political underlings. Autocracies of all kinds are doomed where thought is free. Democracy is inevitable where the people read and think.

And one other factor may be noted here that has direct relation to this democratic drift. In all times the

order of prophets has ever been the foe of tyrants. It was so in ancient Israel, and it was so in modern Europe. The fact is, what we call the great Reformation grew out of an order of prophets who, with a passion for truth and with the Scriptures in hand, denounced the corruptions in the Church and pleaded for liberty in the State. Carlyle has said that Luther's words, rough and rude as they were, were half-battles and caused the pope to tremble and the ruler to give heed. Queen Mary, in Scotland, declared that she feared John Knox more than a whole battalion of soldiers. It is a matter of historical record that the free ministers of the free churches in Virginia and Massachusetts were the most outspoken foes of autocracy and the most consistent exponents of democracy. A free ministry recruited from the ranks of the people, with the gospel of Christ in hand, with the passion for souls, and with the fear of God before their eyes, constitutes one of the most potent forces of democracy and forever makes autocracy impossible.

IV. There is one other force and factor that may be noted, and that is The Momentum of the Democratic Idea. There are some ideas so congenial to human nature that they need only be promulgated to be accepted. The moment the worth of the common man is admitted, that moment the common man begins to respect himself. The moment it is admitted that all men possess certain inalienable rights, that moment privileges begin to tremble.

The history of the democratic movement during the past six hundred years is one long illustration of this principle. About the beginning of the thirteenth century we find that certain classes of the people in England are coming to self-consciousness and are beginning to claim their rights in the State. At Runnymede they make their claims heard and exact from an unwilling

king that great document the Magna Charta. "These are our claims," the barons said, "and if they are not instantly granted, our arms shall do us justice." King John, who was keen-sighted enough to know what the parchment implied, exclaimed in a fury: "And why do they not demand my crown also? By God's teeth I will not grant them liberties which will make me a slave" ("Historian's History," Vol. XVIII, chap. ix). This charter wrote out the consciousness that was developing among the people, but even more important than all it marked the transit of power from the one to the many. Certain rights are defined, a principle is recognized, a movement is begun, and history will write the conclusion of the story.

It is true that this movement has not followed a straight course, ever upward and onward, for at times there have been many deflections and eddies. And sometimes, indeed, the stream seems to disappear like the river flowing into the desert. Yet the stream, though hidden for a time, is not really lost, but it soon bursts forth again with renewed volume and purified by its subterranean discipline. In fact, the democratic movement seems to gain in volume and intensity as time goes on by thus illustrating the principle of physics that the momentum is the velocity multiplied by the weight. The history of the extension of the franchise in England is the best illustration of this principle. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the franchise was narrowly restricted, and two-thirds of the House of Commons were appointed by peers or other influential persons. One by one, however, the rights of the people are recognized, little by little the restrictions are removed; the franchise passes into new hands, and the transit of power from the few to the many proceeds apace. Thenceforward the movement is onward. The moment the franchise is granted to any

class of persons in the State, that moment the hour of the people is beginning to strike. The tendency is ever toward an extension of the franchise and not toward its restriction, and the momentum of the movement is carrying it ever forward.

The same process may be traced in the history of popular government in America. At first in the American colonies the privilege of suffrage was limited to the members of the recognized churches, and certain persons were thus disfranchised. But in these colonies the worth of man was recognized, and the freedom of the soul was fundamental. Where such principles are current the fully democratic State is only a matter of time and application. At the time of the Revolution the most of the States restricted the privilege of public office by certain property and religious qualifications. "No atheists, no free-thinkers, no Jews, no Roman Catholics; no man, in short, who was not a believer in some form of the Protestant faith, could ever be governor of New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, or Vermont" ("MacMaster's History," Vol. III, p. 148). But one by one all the restrictions upon the people and their officials have been removed, and to-day there is no religious or property test of any kind in any American State. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that a respectable and increasing proportion of the people in all of the States are contending for the removal of all restrictions on account of sex. The history of popular government during the last six hundred years shows that when once the rights of man are recognized and the franchise is granted to any class, it is only a question of time and definition when the last restriction will be removed and the franchise will become universal. And when once the people have entered into this privilege they are never likely to surrender it. In fact, in America, this right of the people is embodied in

the fundamental law of the land, and it can only be changed by the vote of the people themselves. As the people are never likely to pass a self-denying ordinance shutting themselves out from this privilege, there is little probability that universal sovereignty will perish from the earth.

The empire of Russia—to take an illustration from contemporary history—is passing through this same process, and is repeating the history of England and America. It may be many generations before the process works out to its full conclusions, but there can be no doubt about the result. The things that make for democracy are at work in that mighty land, and these things are far more likely to increase than diminish. The democratic drift is seen in Russia, and no efforts of czar and reactionaries can long delay it.

Then the presence of a democratic State in any part of the world is a continual witness for democracy. The American republic, as Sir Henry Maine points out in his "Popular Government," has greatly influenced the favor into which popular government grew. It disproved the once universal assumption that no republic could govern a large territory, and that no strictly republican government could be stable. The success of popular government in America, as John Morley points out, has been the strongest incentive to the extension of popular government at home. And added to all this is the remarkable success of popular government in the thriving colonies in Australia and New Zealand, where so many democratic experiments have had such a successful termination. In brief, the democratic movement is gaining direction and momentum because of its very quality and power, and its extension throughout the globe is only a question of time and application.

There are two things growing out of all this, which

may be noted here for our guidance and our encouragement. For one thing, as we have seen, democracy is not alone a form of government, but it is also a confession of faith. It is a spirit in the hearts of the people before it is an institution of the State. It has its origin and its vitality in certain great conceptions and convictions in the rank and file of the people, and it can neither be hastened by statutes nor delayed by denials. It is not possible without these convictions and conceptions; but with these its coming is only a matter of time and application. This being so, the believer in democracy can readily perceive the work that he must do in order to extend this movement among the people. The one who believes in liberty for himself must believe in liberty for all mankind. The best way to hasten on the advent of democracy in any land is to make the people ready for it. And when the people are ready for it democracy is as inevitable as the sunrise.

For another thing, we see that the democratic movement is in line of the great purpose of God for his human children. The great purpose which God is carrying forward in the world, so far as we can read that purpose in revelation and in history, is the creation of a kingdom of free spirits in which men live together in righteousness and each one lives for the common life. The State, which is the people organized in a political capacity in behalf of certain great and vital human ends, is an important agency through which men can apprehend and realize the purpose of God in their social and political life. The State is the medium through which the people can co-operate in their search after liberty and justice and brotherhood. But this is not all, for the one conception of man which science accepts and history indorses, implies that every man shall learn to live for the purpose of God and shall co-operate for the common good. The Christian conception of man, which conception it may be

said is in full harmony with the scientific conception, demands that every man shall honor the relations of his life and shall make his own voluntary contribution to the social life. But these conceptions, when realized and applied, are nothing less than the democratic idea of the State. This means that the democratic or free State, the people organized in a political capacity and voluntary co-operation in behalf of the common welfare, is the one form of the State which the Christian conception of man creates and allows. There is a right deeper than the right of kings to rule, and that is the right of our humanity to be the medium through which the law of humanity, coming from the unseen source of law, is published (Nash, "Ethics and Revelation," p. 87). There is a necessity as deep as life and as urgent as gravitation in favor of the democratic State, a necessity that is grounded in the very task of humanity and the very nature of man. Democracy is the principle of Christian brotherhood in political relations. Democracy is the one idea of human society that is befriended by the universe, legitimated in history, in accord with the Christian spirit, and inevitable in the future. Democracy is inevitable where Christianity is regnant and men know one another as brothers. The whole process of history and the whole meaning of revelation show that the age of kings is passing and the age of the people is coming. The shoulder of God is behind the rising tide, and the child can sweep back the ocean with a broom more easily than the autocrat can stay this rising flood. However it may be with the other factors that we have named, it is certain that the presence of Christianity anywhere in the world is a sufficient guarantee of the ultimate establishment of a democratic society among men.

VIII

THE ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRACY

IN these modern times what we call democracy is fast becoming a fact in the life of the foremost nations. The time has come, in view of this, for men to pause and consider what this movement means and whither it tends. This inquiry is especially needed in view of the divergent and conflicting estimates which are held concerning the meaning and the merit of democracy. Thus it appears that the estimates of democracy range through the whole scale, from the most enthusiastic praises of the movement to the most dismal forecasts for the future of mankind. Some men regard this movement as little else than the coming of the kingdom of God on earth, while others, with certain popes, look upon it as little better than Antichrist.

In view of all this, it is worth our while to consider some of the advantages and the meaning of democracy, and then to note some of the dangers and disadvantages of the movement.

I. The Personal Meaning of Democracy. The idea of democracy, if we go behind forms to realities, is not so much a mode of government as a confession of human equality. It is the confession that the downmost man of society has an infinite worth. It is the recognition by all that the least and lowliest man is entitled to fair consideration.

At first sight it must be confessed that the facts of life seem to pronounce a decided negative to our conception of human equality and worth. That men are not equal

in physical and mental endowments, that there are vast natural differences among them which no one can minimize, that there are some men on whom nature seems to have set the stamp of superior merit from birth, as there are others who bear the marks of inferiority written all over their bodies—these are facts which are patent to all observers. Nothing is gained for the cause of truth or democracy by trying to deny facts which are to be seen in every society and land. But much is gained both for democracy and man when we distinguish between the things that are incidental and the things that are essential in man's life. It is sufficient at this point to say that we must make a distinction between the things that belong to the essence and quality of man's life, and those which have to do merely with its form and conditions.

And this is precisely what the democratic creed does. It affirms in the most direct and positive way the essential equality and native worthfulness of all men; it affirms that the differences and inequalities among men belong to the form and surface of life and do not affect its inner quality and essence. This is the fundamental affirmation of democracy, and the denial of this is the denial of the first article of its faith. This doctrine does not mean that all men are equally endowed with intellectual powers or that they all are of equal moral worth, for this is a thesis which no one would seriously undertake to maintain. It does not mean that all men are capable of the same results, or that one man is worth as much to society as another. But it does mean that every man has his place and his value, and this place society is bound to grant and this value society is bound to recognize. It does mean that all men are capable of intelligence, and the differences that exist among them are due less to natural endowments than to later conditions. It does mean that intellectual inequality, so far as it exists, is common to all classes, and

is as great among the completely emerged tenth as in the completely submerged tenth (Ward, "Applied Sociology," p. 100). This creed affirms that moral worth and dignity belong to all men as men, and hence they are in no sense dependent upon the kind of work they do or the station they hold in society. All truth, Helvetius maintained, is within the reach of all men, and this, says Ward, is certainly true for all practical truth. The democratic creed accepts this doctrine and endeavors to put it into practice and to establish it in social institutions. It rests upon the idea that every man has worth, and that his personality is entitled to as much honor as the personality of any other man. It rests upon the conviction that the downmost man has some meaning in the total meaning of the State, and this meaning is entitled to expression. It rests upon the affirmation that his interests are entitled to equal consideration with the interests of the most conspicuous man in society. And it assumes that the highest goods of life are for all men, and it insists that the downmost man shall be lifted up into the possession and appreciation of these goods. In a word, it assumes that the personality and the interest of the common man are as much entitled to consideration and expression as those of the topmost man.

1. It is just here that we come in sight of the first great advantage of democracy. It awakens in men a sense of their worth and possibilities; and it summons men to honor this worth and to realize their possibilities. Matthew Arnold has shown in his essay on democracy that the chief value of aristocratism thus far has been the creation in men of what may be called "the grand style." But the time has come when the people themselves are coming to appreciate their worth and dignity, and are beginning to realize that there are high values in their lives and upward possibilities before them. This sense of

worth, this outlook upward, has a remarkable power of sobering men and filling them with a sense of their dignity; it has a strange power of uplifting the common man and developing in him a sense of his social worth. In a word, the first advantage of democracy is found in this, that it recognizes the worth and dignity of the average man and that it creates in this man a new honor for his personality and a new consciousness of his responsibility.

2. Again, democracy means a great gain to man in that it summons each man to play a man's part in society. It throws a responsibility on each man and gives him a stake in the State's struggle for life and progress.

Mazzini, one of the great prophets of democracy, has given us a noble conception of the mission of humanity, and has shown the work of man in this task of humanity. Humanity, which he calls the living word of God, the collective and continuous being, is the only interpreter of God's law. Humanity, said another thinker of the last century, is a man ever learning; and so, says Mazzini, it is a man whose education is ever progressing, a being whose task is never ended (Mazzini, by Bolton King, p. 242). This task of humanity is the task of all its members, and it demands the co-operation of all with all, for the sake of all. "Herein in this necessity lies the legitimacy of democracy, of its aspirations after the emancipation, the elevation, the co-operation of all; herein also lies the secret of its inevitable power, inevitable as the accomplishment of the designs of God." "For democracy is not the mere liberty of all, but government freely consented to by all and acting for all" (Mazzini, "Life and Writings," Vol. VI, pp. 225, 117, 115).

In a monarchy the field of struggle for the common man is greatly restricted, and his interest in the social welfare is almost zero. His interest in life is largely confined to the effort to secure food and raiment for him-

self and his family; as he has no part in the government he feels no responsibility for the social welfare. Whole ranges of possible human interest and activity lie entirely beyond his ken and conscience. He has little to do beyond the acceptance of his place in the social order with a dutiful submission to the will of superiors. Considerations of social and national welfare do not disturb him, for the reason that he has no responsibility for the social order.

In a democracy, however, all this is changed. Now the average man is called to wear the toga of citizenship and is summoned to take thought for the common life. The responsibility for the State is laid upon the minds and hearts of the people themselves, and every one has a part in the total task of the State. The people themselves must face and solve all the problems of the State; they must conserve the social welfare and must co-operate for the common good; they must frame legislation and must form the nation's conscience; in a word, in a democracy every citizen is called to bear the burden and heat of the State's struggle for life and progress. Two things grow out of all this which have vital relation to the moral worth and progress of man. For one thing, the moral worth or worthlessness of each man is revealed and registered in the way he fulfils his social and political duties and learns to take thought for the common welfare. That is to say, no man's moral life is complete, no one is a man in all the reach and meaning of the divine ideal, till he has become a citizen and has learned to play a man's part in the life of the world.

And for another thing this life of citizenship is itself a training school for man in social life and moral progress. Since each man is a citizen in the State he must prepare himself for citizenship, and must do a citizen's work. This very work of preparation for citizenship is

one of the best parts of his moral discipline, as his devotion to the public welfare is the best expression of his moral worth. This advantage of democracy is not often considered, and yet it is fundamental and vital. Carlyle objected to popular government for the reason that it imposed burdens upon men which they were ill prepared to bear. He was shrewd enough to see that many men in the most favored land are entirely unfitted for citizenship, and to give them a voice in the affairs of State is simply to invite disaster.

The creation of a moral world, however, implies a moral process. The art of life is learned by the process of living. Every child learns how to walk by actually walking. Swimming is not learned in a parlor by a text-book, but by actual practice in the water. Men achieve a moral character by passing through a moral discipline. Men are most fully trained for citizenship by actually meeting the duties of a citizen. Men who are free to choose their religion will often make mistakes, but it is plain that every man's religion has vitality and value just so far as it is a personal choice. An inherited religion is about as artificial and external as inherited wealth or title. The Reformers did a bold thing when they gave the Bible into the hands of men, but their action has made for true religion. The Creator of all did a bolder thing when he entrusted to man the making of his own destiny, but in so doing he showed what were the things he most highly prized. If the creation of a kingdom of free spirits is the purpose which God is carrying forward in the world, then the time must come when men must take into their own hands the process of social development. Life from beginning to end is a discipline, and the discipline of living is the best preparation for life. Men are trained for citizenship by attempting to fulfil the duties of a citizen.

Thus, a democracy is a school of citizenship, and this is one of its chief values. Wendell Phillips, in his notable oration on "The Scholar in a Republic," has declared that when we trust the people, the wise and the ignorant, the good and the bad, with the gravest questions, in the end we educate the race. And in the end you secure, not perfect institutions, not necessarily good ones, but the best institutions possible while human nature is the basis and the only material to build with. Phillips had the most unwavering faith in the people, and he showed his faith by his works. He believed that the free discussion of public questions was the best education the people could have, both in citizenship and in life. It has been pointed out by Gibbon that we have two educations, one that is derived from teachers, and the other that we give ourselves. The latter is the only real education the great majority of mankind receive, and withal it is the best possible education. It is better to think wrongly than not to think at all. Intelligence can only be trained by use; conscience can only be made by bringing moral and political questions before its bar for adjudication; life can only be learned by living. If the creation of intelligence, conscientiousness, and self-control in the people is any part of the meaning of the world and the discipline of life, then a democracy abundantly justifies itself.

The best friend of democracy will probably admit that it has some serious defects, and that it does not always produce the results that were anticipated. In a democracy it often happens that there is much social friction, and sometimes the machinery of government seems to creak wofully. But before we pass an adverse judgment upon democracy and extol monarchy or aristocracy, it may be well to pause and ask what is the real work of the State. The real work of the State, the one

task which explains all other tasks, is the union of all in behalf of all through the socialization of their life and their voluntary co-operation for the common life. That is, the State is the medium of the mutual sacrifices and services of the people, and in so far as it is such a medium it is fulfilling its end. The smooth and quiet working of the machinery of government in a monarchy is an interesting sight, and to those who see nothing beyond the machinery, monarchy is an ideal form of government. But the discipline of men in moral will, the training of men in the art of living together, after all are the real concerns of the world, and as these results are achieved the real purpose of the State is subserved.

3. There is one other advantage in democracy that may be named under the head of the personal advantages. Democracy means freedom of self-expression, and it means equality of opportunity; it means that every man's personality is honored and every man's contribution to society is desired.

In the nations of the Old World society was divided into castes and classes, with impassable barriers between. In a monarchical and aristocratic State society is still divided into classes built upon blood or property with social lines sharply drawn. All this means limitation of the area of aspiration and opportunity for the average man. The range of opportunity before the common man under such circumstances is strictly limited, and the demand that is made upon the average man is likewise limited. Each man is expected to remain in his class and to follow the calling of his fathers. By the very nature of the case a society with a rigid system of castes and classes is an unprogressive society, even where it is not entirely stationary. In an aristocratic society change is always difficult and progress is always slow; in fact, aristocratic societies dread change, and do not believe in progress.

But even more significant than this is the fact that in an aristocratic and stratified society very little is expected of the common man. He is required, of course, "to know his betters," and is charged to be "content with the station in life assigned him by providence." He is regarded as the divinely appointed hewer of wood and drawer of water, and for this little education is needed. By walls that are real, though they may not be of stone, he is shut out of many regions of life and opportunity. By the necessities of the case he is denied opportunity for self-expression beyond a narrow range, and has thus little scope for any talents he may possess. An aristocratic society rests upon the assumption that the so-called lower classes are composed of inferior people with little natural ability, people of whom nothing much is expected and on whom the gift of opportunity would simply be wasted.

But in a democracy all this is changed, and the assumption is different. According to the first article of the democratic faith men are entitled to liberty, and should have equal opportunity for self-expression. Democracy assumes that every man's life has worth; it assumes that he has some endowment which is of social value; it demands that each man shall have opportunity for the full expression of his personality, and it insists that each man shall have scope for all of his powers. It is sometimes supposed that democracy means the widening of the way into political life, thus enabling the child of lowly birth to rise to the highest office. It means this but it means immeasurably more than this. It means that the life of the average man has high possibilities, and it asks that the door of opportunity shall be opened for him. Thus in democratic America it has happened that many of the men who have achieved truest success and have made the largest contribution to the national wel-

fare have been men from the so-called humbler walks in life. Napoleon boasted that he had opened a career for all talents, and this boast of the dictator is the achievement of democracy.

II. The Social Benefits of Democracy. According to democracy the people are sovereign, and each man must live a royal life. According to democracy the government, which is of the people, is also by the people, and thus the quality of the government depends upon the quality of the people. This means that the State has an interest in every one of its citizens, and that no one can live an unintelligent and unsocial life without danger by so much to the State. And it means also that the whole life and worth of the State are under bonds to take thought for its more backward members and to create in them a fitness for citizenship. Some aspects of this principle will become plain as we proceed with our inquiry.

In these latter times a great new fateful term has come into human speech, and in the word solidarity is implied one of the most vital principles of social thought. "The crowning discovery of modern physical science is the unity of the universe, the oneness of all things visible and invisible in this great universal system of matter and force and law" (Moss, in "Missionary Centenary Addresses," p. 173). The world is an organic totality, and all things move together because all things are linked together. The very conception of an individual implies a larger whole, of which the individual is but a part. The individual is nothing apart from the life of the race, and the life of the race finds expression in and through the human individual. Thus we are compelled to think of humanity not as a series of disconnected and isolated individuals and fragments, but as the interrelated and interdependent members of an organic whole.

Each man is the richer or the poorer, the stronger or the weaker for the virtues and the vices, the diseases or the health, the industry or the indolence of the people who perished before the dawn of history. The sins and mistakes of long-dead empires cast their shadows over our civilization, and we must pay the penalty of crimes committed by the men who built the pyramids. Society may draw its imaginary lines of national and social distinctions, and may resolve that Jews shall have no dealings with Samaritans, and the East Side shall have no part in Fifth Avenue. But the facts of solidarity take no account of these imaginary lines, and make us see that after all we are all one. Never again can the man who thinks in the categories of Christianity and sociology think of humanity as a series of individuals each complete in himself; rather, he must think of it as an organism in which the co-operations of the parts maketh the increase of the whole, a body in which each but subserves the other's gain. In the spirit of Cain one class in the community may deny the bond of brotherhood and may ask, "Am I my brother's keeper?" but in a hundred ways the dishonored bond will assert itself and hard necessity will compel man to take thought for the things of others. The plague and the pestilence are sometimes the most effective preachers of brotherhood, and teach in emphatic and undeniable terms that God hath made of one blood all nations and classes of men. The misery, the poverty, and the crime of the East Side affect the health, the security, and the taxation of Fifth Avenue; and Fifth Avenue cannot be perfect till the East Side is changed. "There will be no pure air for the correctest Levite to breathe till the laws of sanitation have been applied to the moral slums" (Jones, "Browning," p. 63).

All this serves to bring out the relation of this law of solidarity to the democratic State. For one thing, in

a democracy the vote of the scholar and saint counts for no more than the vote of the ignoramus and the hoodlum. What shall we do under these circumstances? Shall we take the ballot away from the hoodlum and give it to the scholar? We cannot do that, and what is more, we ought not attempt to do it. The thing for the scholar to do is to transform the hoodlum into a full-rounded man, and to provide that there shall be no such unworthy members in the State. Thus democracy with its universal suffrage puts every man under bonds to take thought for the common welfare and to help his less fortunate brother. Democracy puts the resources and the intelligence of all in pledge in behalf of the weaker and more backward members of society.

There are those who bewail the fact of universal suffrage, and see in it nothing but a leveling down. Others have a chronic distrust of the people, and believe the affairs of State have fallen into incompetent hands. But much of this distrust of the people on the part of the educated and cultured portion of the community grows out of an utter ignorance of the great heart of the people themselves. And some of it also grows out of the subtle hope that in some way the bond of human brotherhood and social obligation may be annulled. The cultured and ease-loving class who find life a pleasant affair find that the social obligations of human brotherhood are irksome and heavy. Many are not willing to do their whole duty toward their less fortunate fellows, and are not willing to use their advantages in life as so many levers for uplifting their degraded brothers. They object to democracy for the reason that it puts the strong and competent under bonds to take thought for the weak and defective. They see clearly enough that no democratic State is safe and satisfactory so long as one-half of the voters are ignorant and venal. But many are not

willing to accept their full share of social responsibility and seek to make such voters impossible. The easiest way out, to their minds, is to deny the full privileges of citizenship to their less qualified brothers. Wendell Phillips has said, and his words should be carefully pondered, "No democracy ever claimed that the vote of ignorance and crime was as good in any sense as that of wisdom and virtue. It only asserts that crime and ignorance have the same right to vote that virtue has. Only by allowing that right, and so appealing to their sense of justice and throwing upon them the burden of their full responsibility, can we hope ever to raise crime and ignorance to the level of self-respect" (Martyn, "Life of Phillips," p. 581). Men are naturally so selfish, so exclusive in their interest, that only by some such concern for themselves can they be induced to consider their brothers' welfare. Democracy emphasizes this bond of brotherhood and lays upon each citizen the burden of his social obligation.

The idea of democracy, we have seen, is less a form of government than a confession of human brotherhood. Its fundamental principle is equality, its inner spirit is confidence in one another, and its supreme concern is interest in the other man. Thus democracy, when true to its source and its ideal, is inspired by the Christian spirit, as Christianity when true to its ideal and aim creates the democratic State. Christianity, in its first article, is confidence in men; it is a passion for the downmost man; it is a missionary enterprise seeking to help the other man and to create in him a full consciousness of his worth. Democracy in so far as it is true to its source and spirit, believes in the possibilities of the most backward man; it holds its resources in pledge for his uplifting, and it seeks to create in him the full consciousness of a citizen. The believer in democracy, who has

even a touch of the Christian spirit, can never rest content so long as a single soul in the State is unfit for citizenship, and is living an unprivileged life.

And this means that the whole worth of the people is held in pledge for the uplifting of the downmost man in the State. The spirit of democracy is not only a confession of faith, but it is also a principle of action. Democracy means that men are brothers, and that each is responsible for his brother's keeping. It means that all men are under bonds to help all other men who need help. Men are very slow in learning that each is his brother's keeper, and that all are under obligations to each. In view of their social results in the education of man, we may thank God for microbes and bacilli, for they have been the great promoters of human sympathy and of the sense of social responsibility. "They preach the gospel of brotherhood far and wide, saying in such tones that people are bound to sit up and listen: We are all members one of another; if one neglected member suffer, all the other members may, by reason of these very germs, be called upon to suffer with it" (Brown, "The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit," p. 162). Thus democracy, which is a confession of human brotherhood, is also a missionary principle which impels men to go forth in an effort to uplift the downmost man and to give him a true inheritance in the State.

III. The Political Advantages of Democracy. Democracy in the words of its best representative, means a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. That a democratic form of government has advantages not possessed by any other government is obvious for several reasons.

1. In a democratic government the interests of all of the people are most likely to be subserved. In a democracy government is largely a government by public

opinion, and public opinion is made up of the interests, the sentiments, the convictions, and the demands of the people. For this reason the government is ever in close and vital touch with the people, and in the most real sense it reflects the common judgment. The voice of the people can easily make itself heard, and when heard it is likely to be heeded.

In a monarchy or an aristocracy this is not by any means the case. The throne is far removed from the people, and so many functionaries stand between sovereign and subjects, that an echo from the great world outside can hardly reach the throne room of the monarch. In a democracy, however, the people must be heard and heeded. As a rule, whatever can be shown to be advantageous to the people, is sure to be adopted sooner or later. Democracy provides an opportunity for the full and free discussion of platforms and programmes. By a process of natural selection the bad measures will finally be rejected and the good will be retained.

It has been claimed, not without reason, that the democratic State provides the best machinery for social progress. Prof. N. P. Gilman, in a book of much insight, has shown that the democratic idea, as embodied in the American government, furnishes the best answer to the demands of the social radicals. Every advantage which the most ardent Socialist finds implied in socialism may be realized, and must be realized in a democracy when the people are ready to give such a scheme a chance to work. Thus, whatever advantage may accrue to society, will be secured through the intellectual growth of the people, coupled with their elevation in moral character. As it is not necessary to burn down the barn in order to get rid of the rats, so neither is it necessary to destroy the existing social system in order to secure any needed reform. Names count for little; whatever can be shown

to be advantageous to the higher and better interests of the people, be it socialistic or individualistic in spirit and form, is sure to be tried sooner or later in a democracy.

The building of ideal commonwealths is an easy and delightful task, and such dreams have done much to show the way of human progress. But then theory must be supplemented by practical experience, and millenniums cannot be made to order. The dream of the most alluring Utopia must be submitted to the people for final adjudication. Before they leave the woes they have and fly to others they know not of, they must be persuaded that the move will be advantageous all around. At any rate—and this is the point of the whole contention—a democratic form of government furnishes an open field for the discussion of all social and political questions, and it is the guarantee that whatever commends itself to the informed and convinced judgment of the people will finally be adopted.

2. The very idea of democracy means mutual aims and common responsibilities. In a democracy the men of culture and ideals are under bonds to take thought for the less cultured, and to put forth effort to help the laggards in the march. But a democracy not only lays this obligation upon men, but it also provides a free field for the trial of any experiments. We may be sure that, so long as there are men with large ideas and the social spirit, that long there will be proposed many plans to hasten the social progress. And so long as men are open to persuasion and are anxious to try new experiments, so long all kinds of social programmes will be tried. Thus a democracy makes constant demands upon the more progressive portion of the community to formulate plans for social betterment. It compels men to subject all these plans to the final test of their social efficiency. And so it is that democracy at once conserves

the good of the past, yet furnishes opportunity for wider good in the future and all this without revolution or bloodshed.

> There is a weapon swifter still,
> And surer than the bayonet,
> That executes a freeman's will
> As lightning does the will of God.

3. There is one other advantage that may be mentioned, and it is in a way significant of the whole democratic movement. In a monarchy or an aristocracy, the ruling upper class is quite fixed and stable; members are born into this class, and they take their place with no one to challenge their right. In such a society, also, the lower subject classes are no less fixed and permanent; the members of these classes may look upward with admiration upon their betters, but it seldom occurs to them to aspire to those heights of noble privilege. Thus such a society is usually quite peaceful and moves along with little friction between the classes. But in a democracy all this is changed. There is no hereditary class of rulers and nobles, but all belong to the common class of "people." And yet no society can long endure without rulers and leaders, and least of all can a democracy live without such. Every believer in democracy will agree with Mazzini that the ideal democracy is that in which we have a government of all the people under the guidance of the best and bravest. But how shall we find out who are the best and bravest people in the State, and give them the place that is theirs by natural right? A monarchy has its own method of selection, and this is in the main selection by the accident of birth and blood. A democracy has a different method of selection, and in the main this is selection by fitness and worth. In this process of selection great mistakes may be made, and

there may be much confusion, but, after all, the results fully justify the process. A democracy that could bring Abraham Lincoln from the rail-splitter's cabin and seat him in the presidential chair will have no difficulty in justifying itself at the bar of history.

And beyond all a democracy differs very widely from a monarchy, not only in its method of selection, but in its definition of the marks of fitness. From the point of view of nature and history fitness is not measured by such external and artificial signs as blood and culture, or even strength and self-assertiveness, for these are purely arbitrary and accidental signs, and count for little in the real progress of society. The marks of fitness in a truly human and moral society are rather such things as inner worth and social sympathy, nearness to the people, and appreciation of their needs. The democratic method of selecting leaders is quite as satisfactory as can be found at this stage of human progress. It may score some signal failures, but then it is pretty sure to score a lower percentage of failures than any other method yet devised. At any rate, poor old humanity, after the bitter experiences of the past, is not likely soon to repudiate this method in favor of either the monarchical or the aristocratic method. The presidents of the United States, during the century and a quarter of its existence have not all possessed all the marks of greatness, but then these men will bear comparison with the hereditary monarchs of the world during the same period.

In all our thought of the State it is important that we keep in mind one fact—that it exists for the sake of man, and not merely for itself. We may grant that in a democracy there is much blundering on the part of the people, and government may at times be diverted from its true aims. But, after all, in a democracy there is the

desire of the people to put their faith into practice, and to build up in the earth a human society which shall be the human realization of the divine ideal. Democracy may have its dangers and disadvantages, but it has its advantages that are most real and manifest, advantages at once personal, social, and political.

IX

THE DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY is an accepted fact in many lands to-day, and a marked tendency in all lands. For good or for ill, for weal or for woe, the great nations are launching forth on the rising tide of popular government. It is too late in the day for men to debate whether or not democracy shall exist at all in the world. And it is perhaps too early for men to appraise this movement at its true value and forecast its future development. For the present it rather remains for them to understand this universal tendency, to emphasize its good features, and to eliminate its evil elements.

As might be expected, opinion is divided with respect to this new phenomenon we call democracy. Some persons take a very gloomy view of the situation, and tremble for the future of the world. The full coming of democracy in their fears is equivalent to the return of chaos and old night. Others never tire of singing the praises of democracy, and look upon it as the one step preceding the millennium. The realization of the democratic State is to their rosy hopes the kingdom of God come among men. These are extreme views, and by the nature of the case each ignores certain necessary features in the other. But all students and statesmen recognize in democracy a new and potent force which is destined in time to effect radical changes in the structure of society and in men's views of life. And all students and statesmen who are not blinded by prejudice or fear, see also that there are both good and evil possi-

bilities in this movement. The universal tendency is one thing, and some of the incidental results of that tendency are quite different things. The universal tendency, we may assume in view of what has been said in earlier chapters, is good and is part of the nature of things. The evil results that accompany it, and these evils as we shall see are neither few nor trifling, are the incidental results and grow out of the imperfect will of man.

The consideration of the advantages of democracy must not blind us to perils, both great and grave. To say that democracy possesses more advantages than any other form of government is not enough. The world wants to know whether it possesses the means whereby man may attain the highest results in social and political development. We want to know whether democracy is the ideal form of government, or whether men must still look for another. For the presence of democracy by no means implies and guarantees the production of the best results in life or in society. In fact, democracy may easily become the curse of man, and instead of diffusing blessing, may become a blight. The experience of the past avails us little at this point, for democracy at best is a modern experiment. The fact is, popular government since its beginnings in the world has proved itself to be exceedingly fragile and uncertain, and the appeal to history is not reassuring. Thus, Aristotle, in his lost book on Republics, gave the history of two hundred and fifty attempts at popular government, and all were failures. Plato is distrustful of liberty, and declares that "while the Persians may lose their liberty in absolute slavery, we have lost it in absolute freedom" ("The Laws," Bk. II). In this experiment of popular government the people are launching forth upon an uncharted sea, in which no shoals are indicated on the maps and no danger buoys are set, and withal a sea whose shores are

strewn with numerous wrecks. The perils of democracy are most real, and it is folly to ignore them; and it may be fatal to misread them. Some of these perils we now consider:

I. The Peril of an Incompetent Citizenship. Democracy means the participation of all the people in the affairs of government. It implies the equality of all men before the law. It gives every man a voice in the choice of leaders, and the enactment of laws. And thus it implies the competency of all to play a part in the drama of progress. But one does not need any extended observation to discover that all men are not by any means equal in mental and moral endowment. He does not have to go very far before he finds that all men have neither the general nor the special fitness for good citizenship. He will find also that many men who possess these general and special qualifications are practically disbarred from public life by causes which it is hard to overcome. And thus he is brought face to face with one of the gravest dangers that besets the democratic State, a danger so grave as to imperil the very experiment itself. Two or three elements of this problem may be briefly noted.

That all men as we find them in the most democratic State are not fully qualified for the privilege of citizenship is manifest. The number of illiterate persons in the American commonwealths is comparatively small. But the ability to read and write does not by any means imply the ability to understand the functions of government. Not only so, but one may possess a general education without having any of the special qualifications of citizenship. One may know much about the history of Rome and yet be grossly ignorant of the life of his own community. One may be well trained in science and literature without a trace of civic intelligence or public

spirit. The fact is, the number of people, even in the most advanced community who possess this civic intelligence and special training, is comparatively small. And this means that the number of persons who are qualified by education and training for the exercise of an intelligent citizenship is not large.

Then, the conditions of modern life make heavy demands upon the time and strength of all the people. That we are living in a strenuous age, with many things to engage our interest and distract our attention, is confessed by all. But this stress and strain are felt most acutely by the more intelligent and competent portion of the community. The demands that are made upon the time and energy of the professional and business man are very heavy, and when these are satisfied there is little time or energy remaining for other matters. Thus the men who are best qualified both mentally and morally for the privileges of citizenship are the very men who find it difficult to fulfil these privileges. It is easy for one to denounce all this indifference of the people as treason against the State; and it is treason of the most subtle and fatal kind. For the most dangerous people in a democracy are not the anarchists who seek to overthrow all existing government, or the politicians who seek to use government for their own ends; they are rather the so-called good men who neglect their public duties because of their engrossment in private affairs, and will not take the time or the trouble to protest against wrong.

It must be conceded that the average citizen does not possess either the training or the time to make a first-hand study of public questions. Nor does he possess either the time or the strength to play the part of a good citizen, and devote himself to the public good. The struggle for existence is so real to many people that it is

all they can do—so they say—to manage their own affairs. It is quite possible that there are some false excuses hidden in the common reasons; but none the less there is a difficulty here which no one can overlook. It is quite possible also that certain misconceptions of the Christian life are responsible for some of this indifference to political matters. Our citizenship is in heaven, men have said, and we cannot allow ourselves to be distracted by the politics of earth. Thus it has come about that many men, and these among the most earnest and conscientious, have looked forth upon the world of politics as upon an alien realm, and have had as little to do as possible with such secular matters. This means on the one side that the more conscientious men have abjured politics as an alien interest, and the more active politicians have abjured conscience as an alien factor. It is easy to see that the State must suffer under such conditions and, in fact, the State does suffer.

II. The Danger of False Leadership. Akin to the danger just considered, in a way its corollary and in a sense its result, is another danger no less real—that of false leadership. Democracy means the rule of the people, but democracy does not mean the absence of all leadership. This is not all, but as society becomes more complex the problems of society become more intricate. And expert leadership is demanded for the comprehension and interpretation of these problems. It is all very well to say—in a Fourth of July oration—that the people are sovereign and are all called to be leaders. But the hard fact remains that all the people are not qualified to lead, and not all have the sovereign's spirit.

The truth is, democracy is impatient of leadership, and scouts the intimation that the people are not qualified to decide offhand all questions. Do not the people rule? And do not the people know? The many are ready

to resent the insinuation that they do not know and are not qualified to lead. But now comes a difficulty that constitutes a real peril—the difficulty of obtaining this qualified leadership.

In a democracy a qualified leadership is demanded, and if a true leadership is not found a false leadership is forthcoming. This false leadership manifests itself in two ways, in the demagogue and the boss.

In his time Aristotle described the demagogue and analyzed the conditions which produced him, and his picture is as fresh as when first limned in old Athens. In every State there are always some men who are dissatisfied with the existing order of things, and eager for a change of some kind. Beyond the settled polity of the State there are many questions open to discussion and adjudication by the people. In every society, be it large or small, there are some men—soldiers of fortune—watching for every opportunity of promoting their own interests and of winning a little renown. When true leaders are wanting—men who combine a knowledge of the past with a belief in progress—false leaders are sure to arise—men whose only qualifications are a brazen effrontery and a bold self-assertiveness—who play the demagogue and appeal to the lowest motives of the people. They raise false issues and becloud the real issues. They appeal to passion and prejudice and sneer at higher motives. They make a god of expediency and look no farther than the present hour. They live by compromise and flout high ideals as idle dreams. Such men soon gather around themselves a group of disciples and claquers, ready to catch the nod and applaud every utterance. For men are like sheep, ever ready to follow a leader be he false or true; and men are like sheep in that they will follow a leader in a foolish as in a wise course. And lo, the demagogue ap-

pears; and alas the people follow him; and unfortunately the State pays the forfeit. Aristotle's description of the demagogue is true to life; his fears of the demagogue are well founded, and his forecast of the results is fully realized. What Aristotle so clearly foresaw is a real and serious danger in these modern times. A democracy without expert guides presents an open field for demagogues, and history shows that wherever the opportunity is offered and the conditions are favorable such phenomena have appeared.

It is a far cry from Aristotle to our modern times, but the Stagirite's words are as significant to-day as when first written. All later students of democracy have had to deal with this phenomenon, and all have seen in it a grave danger. Thus Macaulay, in his celebrated letter on "Democracy in America," clearly points out the peril. To entrust the supreme authority in the State to a majority of the voters, told by the head, was to entrust it to the poorest and most ignorant portion of society. He declared his conviction that institutions purely democratic must sooner or later destroy liberty or civilization, or both. "Distress everywhere makes the laborer mutinous and discontented, and inclines him to listen with eagerness to agitators, who tell him that it is a monstrous iniquity that one man should have a million while another cannot get a full meal." Government, under such conditions, would never be able to restrain the distressed and discontented majority; for in a democracy the majority are the government, and this majority have the minority absolutely at their mercy. The time will come when we shall see on one side "a statesman preaching patience, respect for vested rights, strict observance of public faith; on the other, a demagogue ranting about the tyranny of capitalists and usurers, and asking why anybody should be permitted to drink

champagne and to ride in a carriage while thousands of honest folks are in want of necessaries. Which of the two candidates," he asks, "is likely to be preferred by a workingman who hears his children cry for more bread?" (Macaulay, letter to H. S. Randall, 1857).

The discovery of the men most fitted to lead is one of the most difficult problems of every society. Take two men and let them enter the race for public office.. One is a thinker and a statesman, who knows something of history and does not expect the millennium to be haled in by any legislation; a man who knows something of human nature and sees that there are no panaceas; one who takes a broad view of great questions and looks beyond the merely low self-interests involved and contemplates all questions in terms of the general welfare, and withal a man of real moral worth who respects himself too highly to parade his own excellencies and to employ meretricious arguments. The other is a self-seeker and demagogue who, because he knows nothing of history, never raises a question concerning any of his grandiloquent schemes; one who ignores the general welfare and construes all questions in terms of personal interest, and withal a man of popular address, with the gift of pleasing the gallery gods, with that shallow logic that can make the worse appear the better reason. One needs little experience of actual life to guess which of the two men is more likely to please the multitude and secure their support at the polls. The science of politics, it may be said, is something more than the ignorance of science; and the art of politics, it may also be said, is something better than skill in vote catching.

Under this head of False Leadership is another danger, very much akin to the one just named, and no less serious than it. The demagogue and the boss together constitute two grave dangers that beset democracy.

In modern society the struggle for existence is keen, and few men have either the time or the strength for any interests off the line of their necessary tasks. From one cause and another their time and attention are engaged elsewhere, and they have little strength for impersonal and public questions. For this reason they are all too willing to delegate this work to the men who have the time for such matters and make a business of politics. In a democracy, government works through the party organization, and this is more or less inevitable and necessary. That there may be unity of effort and continuity of purpose there must be a compact organization with its platforms and its managers. By an almost inevitable gravitation the management of this party organization falls more and more into the hands of a few men. And in the final result the party management usually narrows down to one man. These conditions, more or less natural, and yet more or less unforeseen, have produced a profession whose only occupation is politics. Where the conditions are thus prepared in advance for the party leader and political manager, it would be strange indeed if this personage did not appear.

There are, however, certain other influences and conditions which combine to give this manager added power, and then tempt him to its misuse. One is the selfish desire of men to gain power, either through the control of men or the possession of wealth. That this position as party manager or political boss gives men power is known to all. In many American cities and States there are such leaders and bosses who possess more absolute autocratic power than was ever enjoyed by any feudal baron or medieval king. That this position of leader or boss enables men to accumulate vast fortunes is also known to all. In these same cities and States there are many rich men, sometimes millionaires, whose only oc-

cupation for years has been politics. With two such powerful subjective motives at work it is not strange that some men should yield to the pressure and climb into the chair of political czardom. The other influences and conditions are found in the presence of great corporation and special interests that have some franchise to seek or some favor to secure. These corporations and interests have found that public franchises of one kind and another are priceless assets, and so they are interested in securing these exclusive privileges for themselves on the most advantageous terms.

There are bosses in the cities and States of America who control the nominal officers, and determine what policies shall prevail and what franchises shall be granted. They dictate nominations and determine platforms; they control legislation, and say what laws shall be enforced; they set the keynote for the press and make and unmake candidates. There are bosses who are dictators and rulers in everything except name; and while the people go through the forms of ratifying the bosses' wishes the nominal officers of the State make effective the bosses' demands. These bosses, the feudal barons of the modern age, the virtual rulers of the people, lay heavy tribute upon society and distribute favors with a free hand; they are the political middle men for the lawless and criminal classes, whether members of vice combinations or managers of grasping corporations. And they have ways of making their power felt in business and social circles. Sometimes brave men fear to arouse their enmity and good men hesitate to oppose their schemes.

It is true that the people have the means in their own hands whereby all this, which is a travesty on true democracy, may be ended. It is true also that now and again the people assert themselves and use these means. Now and again it happens that, stung to madness by

a long train of abuses pursuing invariably the same end, the people arise in their might and depose their tyrants. Sometimes the particular boss in power is driven from the throne forever, and sometimes he goes through the form of an abdication and bides his time. But the causes and conditions which produced the one, not being changed or removed, soon produce another and then the old system goes on its way pursuing the same methods and reaching the same results. In many cases it is found that nothing less than a moral earthquake is sufficient to dislodge the boss; and as such earthquakes cannot be produced every year, the tyrant's rule is practically unbroken. Democracy, in its actual working, may be described as boss rule tempered by the fear of revolt.

And so pronounced and so persistent is the tendency to bossism that many thoughtful men are becoming distrustful of democracy. The people are not ready for free institutions, and they are too easily misled by demagogues. They must have leaders, and they will have leaders. The men who can rule are presumably the men most fitted to lead; what is the use in having leaders who cannot rule? Thus Lord Macaulay's forecast seems only too truly to be fulfilling itself and democratic government is passing into eclipse. He was shrewd enough to see that for a long time to come the vast majority of the people would not be competent to pass an intelligent judgment on the great and intricate questions of public moment. He saw also that leadership was both necessary and inevitable, and that all too patiently the people would accept the self-appointed leadership of the strong man who came to the front. Thus all unconsciously the people would lose their democratic faith and spirit, and thus all unconsciously democratic government would become a mere name.

All this brings before us one of those difficulties that

is almost impassable. No government can long prosper without intelligent leadership, and least of all can a democracy. But as such leadership becomes more necessary its selection becomes more difficult. In every generation, as Carlyle reminds us, Providence sends the men who are the ordained leaders of their fellows. But how shall we discover these leaders? How shall we discern the true from the false? We cannot accept the claims of every self-appointed leader, for such men are pretty sure to be demagogues or bosses. It is a day of ill omen for any nation when the best people eschew politics and refuse to seek public office. Government that means the reign of mediocrity and the rule of incompetency cannot be pronounced a great success. But democracy is exposed to danger at this point, and no one can blink this danger. This is one of the perils of democracy.

III. The Abuse of the Party System. It is easy for one who is so disposed to frame an indictment against the entire system of political parties. For every intelligent man knows that political parties are often guilty of great abuses and commit gross tyrannies. But the wiser course is to understand the party system and then point out the dangers that result from its common abuse. It may be observed that what we call political parties are found only in free States. In an autocracy there may be various classes and factions more or less opposed to one another, and more or less compact; these classes and factions may possess a certain autonomy in action, and may wage a constant struggle for supremacy. But they are not political parties in the fullest sense of the term, and so they do not concern us here. The fact is, political parties exist only where there is a certain measure of political freedom on the part of the people. The presence of political parties in a State shows that the people are

coming to political self-consciousness, that they are beginning to think on political questions and are beginning to trust one another; and even beyond this it shows that the people have some political judgments and are seeking to make their judgments effective.

It has been pointed out by Lieber that not only are political parties possible in the free State, but they are always found in every such State. "I avow that, as far as my knowledge goes, I know of no instance of a free State without parties. . . At first sight it may seem otherwise, but I believe there never existed a free country actively developing within its bosom constitutional law, and feeling deeply interested in the great problems of right and public justice, in which there were not also parties" (Lieber, "Political Ethics," Vol. II, p. 254). In the free State where men have begun to have some voice in the affairs of government, they have begun to take some thought for the common good. When any great questions arise in political life, men take sides as by a kind of natural gravitation. Some men will be progressive and some conservative; some will fear centralization and others favor it; many will believe in tariffs, while others will oppose them; some will plead for a wider social control and some will fear it as a new slavery. It is natural and necessary for those who think alike on important political questions to seek one another out and form themselves into a party. Wherever there is free action of whatever sort, political, scientific, religious, social, and wherever men have some common ends in view and are interested in seeking those ends, there we find those who will unite in some degree and combine their efforts. Without such unions, as Lieber shows, it would be as impossible in many cases to remove some impediments in the course of civilization as without a union of forces it would be to remove some physical obstacle.

And once more, not only is it natural for parties to exist in the free State, but it is desirable. The larger the State and the greater the number of citizens, the less individual action counts and the more concerted action weighs. It is only by collective action that the one man can make the most of himself. It is only by a kind of united voice that men can make themselves heard in the great mass. This is not all, for "without parties there could be no loyal, steady, lasting, and effective opposition, one of the surest safeguards of public peace" (Lieber, *ibid.*, p. 254, 255). In the light of all the facts we may conclude that political parties are not only possible in the free State, but they are necessary and desirable.

It must, however, be admitted that the party system is liable to great abuses, and political parties expose themselves and subject others to grave dangers. In fact, the abuses of the party system are so grievous and so common that the system itself may be considered as one of the serious dangers of the democratic State. Several of these are too patent and too potent to pass unnoticed.

There is first of all the danger of faction and narrowness. A party represents a part, and not the whole; its members may believe most implicitly in its creed, but they do not profess to compass all truth. A party to maintain itself must build party fences, and it must have its platforms and its programmes. All this exposes men to the danger of narrowness. The man who builds a fence fences out a great deal more than he fences in. A party, by the nature of the case, is an opportunist; it cannot pretend to represent all issues and to push all reforms. And in so doing it runs the danger of becoming exclusive and of building party fences. The issues it advocates are believed to be important, and all other

issues are either non-existent or are wholly negligible. It follows that all who are found within a particular fold are regarded as being in the right, while all other people are flouted as being in the wrong. The party that makes its own success and honor the supreme concern has degenerated from a party into a faction. The fact that a thing is done solely for the sake of a party is a reason for not doing it at all.

Akin to this, and growing out of it, is the danger of excessive party zeal. In his farewell address, President Washington, in prophetic words, confessed his solicitude for the future of his country, and one of the chief dangers that he foresaw was this very danger of the partisan spirit. Several counts in the indictment of the party system may be noted, for time has justified the fear of Washington. The unity of government he saw was necessary to the success of the democratic experiment; "it is the main pillar in the edifice of real independence; it is the support of your tranquillity at home and your peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, of that liberty which you so highly prize." The name American belongs to the people in their national capacity, and it must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. Since this is so, nothing could be more unfortunate and calamitous than for the people to divide along the lines of section or of class. To do this is to be faithless to the common good and to jeopardize the very republic itself. United the people stand, but divided they must fall.

Through excessive zeal for party the party out of power for the time takes up the attitude of opposition to the party in power, and does everything possible to discount and hinder it. This opposition party seeks to make the government as inefficient as possible, and blocks the

way for much remedial legislation. When any important measure is brought forward, its probable effect upon the party's success is the first consideration. Of course, there are times when men forget that they are partisans and remember that they are citizens, but too often men are partisans first and citizens afterward. In view of the marked and manifest tendencies of the party spirit to run to excess, an effort should be made by force of public opinion to mitigate and assuage it. "A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest instead of warming it should consume."

The other danger that may be mentioned is what may be called the tyranny of party, and this is one of the most flagrant abuses conceivable. Self-preservation, according to the party creed, is the first law of life. Regularity and obedience are the chief virtues, while independence and unsubmissiveness are the fatal vices. Men are discouraged to think for themselves, and are bidden to think within the circle of the party's creed. Men who will not accept this dictation are regarded with suspicion, and are often made to feel the heavy hand of the party's displeasure. There are communities in America where political independence is almost equivalent to commercial suicide. The average newspaper is more or less the organ of a political party, and all goes well with that paper so long as its editor is regular and submissive. But everything goes ill the moment it shows any independence. The public printing is a big item, and since the party managers control the government, the favors of the government go to the men who are in the favor of the party. Then the government has a financial side, and thus comes into close contact with the banks of the State. This public business is a valuable item to many bankers, and this gives the party managers a means of

control that is most subtle and yet most potent. In some of the American States this party control is most rigid; so rigid in fact that the official in any bank who is politically insubordinate may endanger the very prosperity of the bank itself. In actual working the party machine is a kind of political inquisition for suppressing independence of thought and for preserving a peaceful uniformity.

From one cause and another it has come about that the party system has imperiled democratic government and nullified its essential principles. In the most democratic lands the party system is most developed, and everywhere its pernicious influence is felt. For a century and more the government in America has been little else than a government by party; and while democracy in America has not by any means failed, it has not yet fully succeeded. Through the excesses of the party spirit, class has been pitted against class and section has been arrayed against section. Because of this system of government by party representatives, government has not had its perfect working, and men have become distrustful of their legislatures. De Laveleye has said that the parliamentary system is working defectively everywhere; and more than once, as we know, there have been deadlocks in Congress and in legislatures that have been little else than national scandals.

IV. The Tyranny of the Multitude. Democracy has often been called government by public opinion, and in a way the title is an accurate description. Public opinion in a democracy decides many issues, and law itself is little else than such opinion formulated. What then is this public opinion, and what are its effects?

In a letter written in 1820, Sir Robert Peel speaks in a doubtful way of "that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy,

and newspaper paragraphs, which is called public opinion" (Quoted by Bryce, "American Commonwealth," Vol II, p. 217). The formation of this public opinion is so well described by James Bryce in his great study that one need do little more than merely summarize his argument. All the time in a free State public questions are coming into notice as part and parcel of the natural order of things. Through the newspapers, in the news columns, and in the editorial pages, these things are discussed, and certain opinions are expressed. Back and forth these questions are debated in the newspapers and by the citizens generally, and in course of time men come to some more or less definite conclusions with respect to these issues. But since men are in the habit of viewing all things in the light of their previous opinions, it follows that their conclusions with respect to these questions are determined, often unconsciously enough, by their present views and their party affiliations. Thus men's conclusions arrange themselves into groups and circles in pretty close agreement with their party doctrines and their settled views. Last of all we come to the stage of action when men are called to put their opinions into votes and crystallize them in public policies. But the average man is a member of a party, and being such, he falls in with his party's platform and stifles any doubt or repulsions he may feel. This platform, it may be said, represents the resultant opinion, and from it all individual opinion has been rigidly excluded. The men whose opinions are thus formed are then taken to the polls, and "Bringing men up to the polls is like passing a steam roller over stones newly laid on a road; the angularities are pressed down, and an appearance of smoothness and even uniformity is given which did not exist before. When a man has voted, he is committed; he has therefore an interest in backing the view which

he has sought to make prevail. Moreover, opinion, which may have been manifold till the polling, is thereafter generally twofold only. There is a view which has triumphed, and a view which has been vanquished" (Bryce, *ibid.*, p. 211).

On the surface this process seems natural and harmless enough, but it has another side which is less innocent and auspicious. In fact, in this whole process, both in its methods and its results, there are dangers that are most subtle and serious; in fact, they are dangers that threaten the higher life of the people and make democracy little else than a name. The forms of liberty may not by any means insure the essence of liberty; government by public opinion may easily mean the suppression of each man's higher personality, and the policies made by public opinion may be a kind of Procrustes' bed that seeks to reduce all men to the same stature. Careful thinkers in political science have seen this danger and have expressed their fears in no uncertain way. There are several angles at which this tyranny of the multitude may affect men.

For one thing the fear of the multitude may so affect men in public office as to destroy their own initiative. According to the theory of representative government, men are chosen to public office that they may represent the people and may take thought for the common welfare. These men are representatives, it is true, but they are also men, and are supposed always to use their own best judgment in the determination of all policies. These men are to act as experts, to consider all questions in the light of truth, and then to frame their conclusions into statutes. But, as every one knows who is at all acquainted with the tendencies in democratic lands, representative government is breaking down at this point, and the representative is dwindling from a human representative into an impersonal agent. In practically every

case he is nominated and elected as the exponent of his party, and he is supposed to have just one mission, and that the execution of the party's will. To be nominated and elected he must often suppress his own convictions and must voice the party's opinion; in fact, the average candidate finds that strong convictions are a handicap, and mediocre views are most acceptable. It is easy to see that under such conditions honest convictions are at a discount, expert knowledge receives scant consideration, and men who should be brave and far-sighted leaders become timid and abject followers. There are many ways in which man may be enchained, as there are many ways in which his manhood may be dishonored. There are chains for the body and there are fetters for the mind, and while the latter may be less heavy than the former, they may be even more tyrannous. The fear of the tyrant's whip may be dreadful enough, but the fear of the mob's frown may be more dreadful still. Just here we see one of the most subtle dangers of democracy.

In his splendid plea for liberty John Stuart Mill expressed the fear that democracy may come to mean the suppression of the finer and higher qualities of mankind. The will of the people may not mean self-government by each for the sake of all, but it may mean the government of each by all the rest. "The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power" (Mill, "On Liberty," Introductory). This tyranny of the majority may operate through public authorities, but it is not by any means

confined to such means. Society has its own ways of executing its mandates, and "if it issues wrong mandates instead of right or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself."

This is not all, but in a democracy where the will of the people decides all issues there is a temptation to make the voice of the majority the arbiter of all questions and the master of all consciences. The person is made to believe that what the majority wills is legal, and he is tempted to believe that it is also right and its decision is the end of all controversy. Thus the one man is made distrustful of his own thought and is constrained to accept the common opinion as final truth. This begets in the individual a sense of helplessness. Feeling his isolation, the man is tempted to abandon his cause as hopeless and submit quietly to the dictum of the majority. He may be persuaded that he is right and the majority are wrong, but the fatalistic idea that the majority makes right and hence cannot be withstood, proves too strong, and he drifts with the crowd. He is but one among ten million, a drop in the ocean, a mote in the breeze; and at best his influence is small, though his horizon may be wide. After all what can one man do? There is thus a pressure upon the individual to yield to the decree of fate—the decision of the majority—and either abandon his convictions or hold them as a purely personal matter—which is the usual course.

But this is not all, for in a democracy men work on the assumption that what the majority decrees is right and must be obeyed. The majority may so believe in its

power and in its right to do as it pleases as to ignore the rights of the minority and to tyrannize over them. The sovereign people may become the worst kind of a tyrant. The majority may ride rough-shod over the minority, and may traverse some of their most sacred rights. The voice of the people may decide the fate of a man or an issue, but the voice of the people may not always be the voice of God. The decree of the multitude that does not represent the reasoned judgment and rational will of men may be as tyrannical and brutal as the arbitrary preference and irrational will of the most irresponsible autocrat. Numbers do not make right, though democracies are prone to this belief. The fact is, minorities have rights which must be considered and conserved no less than those of the majority. Wendell Phillips has declared in vigorous language that the State which does not protect the weakest and lowliest member against the assumptions and aggressions of the many and the strong is no better than a gang of robbers. The one great end of government is the protection of the weak against the strong, and the government that fails here fails in its first function. Governments, whether monarchical or democratic, become a plague and a curse when they override the person of any and sacrifice the rights and sanctities of the minorities to the wishes or the interests of the majority.

There is a still lower and more brutal form of this tyranny of the multitude that is seen in what may be called the mob mind. This phenomenon has been so well described by my friend, Prof. E. A. Ross, that I summarize his argument. "In observing social life among animals one is struck by the contagion of feeling in a herd or flock. Whatever the feeling called up, whether terror, hostility to a stranger, rage at hereditary enemies, or sympathy for a stricken fellow, all the members of the

group feel it, and feel it at once. . . The human analogue to the agitated herd is the mob." And the human analogue to this contagion of feeling in the flock is what may be called the mob mind. "For purposes of social psychology a mob may be defined as a 'crowd of people showing a unanimity due to mental contagion.'" Analyzing the characteristics of this mob we find that it shows a one-mindedness, the result not of reasoning or discussion or coming together of the like-minded, but of *imitation*. That it is excited goes almost without saying, and that it is both fickle and irrational naturally follows. In this mob the mass is all potent and the individual contracts to a mere point of contagion, and all that he can do is to go with the crowd and add to its momentum. Changing the figure we may say that the leader is like the bellweather of the flock: when he stamps and shows excitement the flock does the same; when he runs and leaps at something or nothing every sheep follows. (Ross, "The Foundations of Sociology," chap. v).

There are certain tendencies and conditions in modern society which expose government to dangers from this mob mind. One is the marked drift cityward, which is so characteristic of recent times. This massing of men in cities has a peculiar danger for democracy in that it has a peculiar tendency to develop the mob mind. In the city people are brought close together, and where elbows touch heat is soon generated. Then the intense life of the city tends to produce nervous disorders, the peculiar malady of city dwellers. All this furnishes the very conditions that produce all the qualities of the mob mind. "In fact, if we translate these qualities into public policy, we have the chief counts in the indictment which historians have drawn against the city democracies of old Greece, and medieval Italy" (Ross, *ibid.*, p. 106).

The other condition that may be named as exposing

government to danger at this point is the possession of the franchise by the least intelligent portion of the people. All students of political history have recognized a distinction between true and false democracy, and the distinction is a vital one. The true democracy really represents the people, but it recognizes that there are other elements than numbers alone. It is true democracy because it recognizes the natural inequalities of men and accords to worth its natural leadership in the State. The false democracy with its equal voting, we are warned is in principle wrong, and it has dangers which cannot be minimized. There is grave danger to the State when government is exposed to the caprice and contagion of the least intelligent but most numerous portion of the community. There is a serious menace to real democracy when the people most subject to the sway of the mob mind exist in great number. Thus Professor von Seybel, in his "History of the Revolutionary Period," is well warranted in his distrust of the Rousseau theory, which is incarnate in false democracy, and which "raises to the throne, not the reason which is common to all men, but the aggregate of universal passions."

These dangers in their various forms of manifestation are most real and subtle, and their menace to the very idea and ideal of democracy can hardly be exaggerated. In a society where the political temper prevails and opinions are settled by a show of hands, a continual pressure of temptation is upon men. In such a society the suppression of one's true opinions and the profession of the popular false opinion is hardly counted a vice at all; not seldom, indeed, it passes for solid wisdom and high virtue. The art of politics, which is one of the highest of all arts when honestly pursued, but the meanest of all arts when selfishly perverted, is thus in danger of

becoming one of the meanest and most unworthy. In a society where the political temper prevails it is so easy to go with the crowd and accept the verdict of the majority as the final word. In such a society "thoroughness is a mistake, and nailing your flag to the mast a bit of delusive heroics. Think wholly of the day and not at all of to-morrow. Beware the high and hold fast to the safe. Dismiss conviction and study general consensus. No zeal, no faith, no intellectual trenchancy, but as much low-minded geniality and trivial complaisance as you please" (Morley, "On Compromise," p. 21). It is always very difficult, and often it is dangerous to rise above the dust of the caravan and direct one's course by the unchanging stars; and it is sometimes doubly difficult and dangerous in a democratic society. It requires nothing less than a superb moral courage for a man to be loyal to his best ideals and to speak his own convictions; for it is so easy and often so popular to go with the crowd and shout the common faith. And such moral courage is especially needed in a democratic government; for without such superb courage the unpopular protest may not be spoken and the new ideal may not be uplifted.

It is needless, perhaps, to say that in speaking in this way of the dangers of democracy we are not by any means distrustful of the democracy itself, and have no desire to exchange it for some other form of government. The fact is, if such an exchange were even contemplated one does not know what form of government he could possibly choose in preference. And yet it may be well for us to consider these dangers of democracy, that we may be on our guard against them. It is but fair that in a discussion of democracy its perils and disadvantages should be set side by side with some of its advantages and blessings. For the forms of liberty may not by any means guarantee the essence of liberty; the tyranny of the

many may be but the tyranny of one writ large. Under the appeals of the demagogue and the sway of passion the people may be aroused to action, and a majority may easily be found in favor of certain proposed measures; and thus government may utterly fail to protect the one against the many, and to guarantee to each citizen the full exercise of his rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the privilege of thought.

V. A False Conception of the State. A danger more real and more subtle than any thus far considered is the danger that grows out of a false conception of the State itself. That is, in a democratic State, there is a danger lest the State be regarded as a mere human contrivance, to be honored when it serves men's purposes and to be set aside when it does not suit their wishes. And there is a danger lest law, which represents the will of the majority, shall lose all high meaning and majesty and shall become the mere plaything of opposing interests.

The social contract theory of the State has played a large part in the political thinking of the last century and a half, and its course is not by any means fully run. This theory teaches that the individual is by nature free and independent, possessed of rights which are older than society and anterior to government. By his own voluntary consent this man contracts himself out of this condition of freedom into political relations, and this compact of the original members must be renewed from generation to generation. The government that is created possesses no higher validity and authority than this social compact; it exists for the sake of individuals, and they who create the government and make its laws, can unmake the State and repeal its laws. In theory this means that the people are the source of law, and whatever the people decide is both legal and right. "Political philosophy," said M. Gambetta, in a famous speech, "demands that the people

be considered as the exclusive, the perennial source of all powers, of all rights. The will of the people must have the last word. All must bow before it." This doctrine, that the evershifting will of the masses is the very source and fount of right, of law, of justice, is the expression in the public order of the agnostic theory of the State. Napoleon was but voicing this theory in his own way when he declared: "With the armies of France at my back I shall always be in the right."

The social contract theory of the State has been abandoned by every political thinker of any note. But, though utterly discounted by philosophers, it is the practical working principle in the political life of many nations. The political faith of democratic nations teaches that what the majority wills is right; that right and wrong are determined by counting ballots; that government is here to serve the interests of its individual members, and that each man is free to use government in whatever way will best serve his own personal interests. The people have repudiated the idea of a Lawmaker, whose will is supreme; they have denied the old fiction of the divine right of kings; they have cast off all human headship over the State and have assumed the sovereignty themselves. The throne, the scepter, the crown have been swept away, and the people have declared that they are the exclusive and perennial source of all powers and all rights.

This theory, though discounted in theory and followed in practice, is most baleful in its effects and most dangerous to the State. For one thing, the effect of this theory in practice is to derationalize, to demoralize, to dissolve, and to destroy society itself. "It derationalizes, for it is fatal to the belief that reason pervades the universe; reason means something self-identical and independent. It demoralizes, for morality if not absolute, is nothing.

It dissolves, for the bonds of society are ethical. It destroys, for if those bonds are loosed, fall the social system must" (Lilly, "The Ethics of Politics," "The Forum," June, 1889). "For practical purposes," says Bluntschli, "this doctrine is in the highest degree dangerous, since it makes the State and its institutions the product of individual caprice, and declares it to be changeable according to the will of the individuals then living. It is to be considered, therefore, a theory of anarchy, rather than a political doctrine" ("The Theory of the State," Bk. IV, chap. ix). And another acute thinker has said: "The modern State is founded on the philosophy of atomism. Nationality, public spirit, tradition, national manners, disappear like so many hollow and worn-out entities; nothing remains to create movement but the action of molecular forces and of dead weight. In such a theory liberty is identified with caprice, and the collective reason and age-long tradition of an old society are nothing more than soap bubbles which the smallest urchin may shiver with a snap of the fingers" (Amiel, "Journal," March 20, 1865). No wonder that Carlyle should call all this a doctrine of atheism, and should fear it for its practical effects.

To-day the democratic State is most seriously threatened by this agnostic theory of the State. This theory has done much to mislead the minds of men, and it is doing much to-day to undermine the whole meaning of law. In this theory right and wrong are the product of ballot boxes. Civil law is the generalization of experience and the will of the majority. Right is the balancing of expediencies and the compromise of interests. Now right and wrong, it is perhaps needless to say, cannot be created in any ballot boxes. Woe unto that people who have no infinite standard of right. Woe to that people who regard law as the mere will of the ma-

jority. Woe to that people who see behind the officer of State no higher authority than a written statute. Such a people are on the high road to political corruption and tyranny; worse still, they are drifting on the rocks of anarchy and chaos. To regard law in this low way, to see back of the civil statute nothing but the interests of a class or the will of the majority—than this nothing can be more ominous to the eye of truth or more offensive to heaven. If men are free to make what laws they please, why may they not be free to break what laws they do not like? Thus the democratic State is being undermined in its very foundations, and the very life of the State is endangered.

In view of all this it may be well to heed the admonition of Carlyle, and remind ourselves that there is an eternal and divine regulation of the universe, and our safety consists in our harmony with the nature of things. "A divine message or regulation of the universe, there verily is, in regard to every conceivable procedure of man; faithfully following this, said procedure or affair will prosper, and have the full universe to second it, and carry it across the fluctuating contradictions, toward a victorious goal; not following this, mistaking this, disregarding this, destruction and wreck are certain for every affair." "How find this divine message of regulation?" he asks. And all the world answers: "Count heads, ask universal suffrage; that will tell." No wonder he grows scornful at this way of attempting to read the will of God. To make the will of the majority binding upon all or upon any is tyranny. Man as man has no claim upon my will; not one man, not ten million of men. The only submission we dare acknowledge is submission to the law of right and the acceptance of its obligations.

To-day this agnostic theory of the State in its practical workings is doing much to undermine men's respect for

law. Let any plain citizen consider the manner in which the majority of laws are framed in a democracy and the result will not prove edifying. Many people see in the laws of the State little else than the intrigues of politicians and the interests of a class. Many men have gone behind the scenes, and they know how laws are framed in caucus and lobbied through the legislature. It is not difficult to see why men have such little respect for the laws of the land. It is not easy to see how laws framed in this way can command much reverence or speak with a divine authority. In this way men are indifferent to law because they have no respect for law. How much higher and worthier is the conception of the master of modern law:

"For as God, when he created matter and endued it with the principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so when he created man and endued him with free will to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature whereby that free will is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws. . . These are the eternal and immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator himself, in all his dispensations conforms, and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human action" (Blackstone, "Cooley," Vol. I, Marg., 40).

Carlyle has told us that democracy is near akin to atheism, and we now see that it is near akin to anarchy. It is a day of ill omen for any State when self-interest is the lord of life and expedience is the god of conscience. It is a day of ill omen for a people when the will of the majority is made the standard of right and there is no *vox Dei* behind the *vox populi*. Democracy is organized

self-control; and "It is evident that self-control means conscience and honor. And it is these qualities which a democracy preeminently needs. Here is the lack of our age. Democracy means individualism. And that has too fatefully come to mean yielding to the individual desire. It is what I want—or what I think I want—not what I ought, which determines my action (President Harry Pratt Judson, in "American Journal of Sociology," July, 1895). Just so far as democracy means the enthronement of self-interest and the apotheosis of individual desire; just so far as it means the dominance of human wishes without respect to the immutable laws of right, so far it becomes an iniquitous and dangerous thing, a thing with which the throne of God can have no fellowship, and a thing that can have no potent influence upon the real progress of man.

X

THE UNFINISHED TASKS OF DEMOCRACY

IN Western lands, democracy as a form of government is fast becoming a reality. In America and Switzerland, in Britain and New Zealand, the hindrances that impeded man's progress one by one have been swept away, and democracy is in fact now beginning to appear. In other lands there is such a pronounced drift toward democracy that government of the people is only a question of time. In past generations men dreamed of the blessings which we now enjoy, but died without entering the promised land. Now, after the long and weary wilderness march, we seem at last to have entered into our promised inheritance. Now, at last, the rights of the people have been so asserted and defined that the liberties which the men of old saw in a far-off vision have become the common heritage of their children. It seems that humanity is ready to turn the page and write a new chapter of human progress.

But now what do we find? How shall this new chapter be written? Has the political millennium come, and are the people satisfied? Is democracy an accomplished fact? On all sides and by all classes of people it is discounted, and men are distrustful of popular government. Thus, a well-known writer, in a well-known review, declares that our age is befooled by democracy; and he further says that if we could get rid of our notions about liberty and equality, and could lay aside this eighteenth century philosophy, according to which human society is to be brought into a state of blessedness, we might get some

insight into the might of the societary organization. And Professor Giddings, one of the best informed sociologists, writes: "We are witnessing to-day beyond question, the decay—perhaps not permanent—but at any rate the decay of republican institutions. No man in his right mind can deny it." And still another man, a careful student of history, writes a book on democracy and liberty, in which we have one long indictment of our modern democratic institutions.

That such things are thought and written, and are justified by facts, indicates that democracy has not yet had its perfect work; at any rate they compel one to believe that it has some great tasks yet to fulfil. Some of these unfinished tasks we may briefly note.

I. The Yea and Nay of Liberty. The story of liberty is one of the most glorious and fascinating stories in all the world. That men might be free they have counted not their lives dear unto themselves. That they might be free they have crossed trackless deserts and stormy oceans, preferring thirst and starvation to servile subjection. And their faith and toil have not been in vain, for one by one the limitations upon men have been removed, and little by little the soul has gained its freedom and stood in its own right.

But the enjoyment of these privileges has not by any means solved the problems of society or brought the golden age of man. In fact, we are distinctly told that the very possession of these privileges has complicated the problems and has multiplied the dangers that beset our humanity. The story of liberty thus far written reads like an unfinished tale, and we turn to the next chapter.

When we review this story of the struggle for liberty we see that it is almost wholly a story of negatives. Thus, two of the great charters of human liberty, the Magna Charta and the American Declaration of Independence,

are both negative in form, and assert the right of man to be free from certain arbitrary and unjust exactions. Thus too, nearly all the great formulas of liberty that have been written have largely been negative in form and substance. No king or noble can extract arbitrary sums from the people under the name of taxes. No man can produce a bill of sale and claim another as his chattel. No man shall be deprived of the privileges of citizenship on account of the color of his skin or his status in society. No measures shall become law without the expressed approval of a majority of the free electors. Suppose now we stop here as many seem inclined to do? Suppose this were the final word in the story of human liberty? In that case we fall far short of the goal, and misplace the whole emphasis of life. No man may dictate my religious belief. Does this mean that I am therefore absolved from all the obligations and claims of religion; that religion is a matter of pure indifference to the State, and that the State can prosper where the people are irreligious? Many people so interpret the formula, and so they claim what Brownson calls the freedom of denial rather than the freedom of worship. No king or parliament may use my person and property for his own advantage and according to his own pleasure. Does this mean that my own interests are supreme and that the State has no claims upon my life but such as I am willing to concede? Does this mean that I am free to direct my life in my own way? Many people so suppose, and in doing so they pervert the whole meaning of liberty and misplace the emphasis of thought. Thus far we see that in the history of humanity liberty has appeared as a negative thing in form and spirit. Thus far liberty has appeared as the deliverance of man from the tyranny of unjust and arbitrary restraint that he might be free to pursue his own way in peace and happiness. All this is

something, but all this is not all. If we stopped here we should fall far short of the full-orbed truth.

For true liberty is a positive thing, and to consider its negative aspects alone is to miss its high and divine significance. The Apostle Paul—to take an illustration from religious history—makes it very clear that Jesus Christ has come to emancipate men from the bondage of a sacrificial and ceremonial system which pressed hard upon them. But he makes it no less clear that this emancipation does not absolve them from all moral and religious obligations; on the contrary, he means the direct opposite of this, and he declares that all this is simply to abuse the grace of God. By freedom, the apostle means that man is placed in a position where he may truly and fully serve God out of his own heart's choice and devotion. He is freed from the external and arbitrary restraints that were upon him that he may serve God in sincerity and truth. By political freedom we do not mean that each man is freed from all law and authority that he may do what is right in his own eyes. The direct opposite is the fact, for democracy means not less law but more, but with this difference: the man is delivered from the tyranny of one man's will that he may order his life according to the authority of law and reason. The man is not free to do his own will and follow his own devices; nay, he is less free than before. But now his submission is wholly voluntary and spontaneous, and is the unforced and genuine expression of his own heart's love and loyalty.

Again, true liberty means the voluntary sacrifice of self for the common life. In the last analysis a man's conception of liberty is part and parcel of his total conception of man and his meaning. The man who makes self the center of his system and interprets all things in term of self-interest will be

a tyrant when he has the power, and an anarchist when he is in subjection. But the man who believes in the solidarity of the race and realizes that all are for each and each is for all, will construe all things in the light of the common good. To him government represents the common welfare, and the object of government is to discover and administer that law which shall decide all questions between man and man. The man who has entered into the true and Christian conception of life sees that he is called to seek the good of others in the confidence that his own good will be secured. The Christian law pledges each man to seek his own life in and through the life of all. Liberty, it is evident does not mean the deliverance of the soul from law; it does not mean the privilege of making self the center; above all it does not mean self-sufficiency and self-assertion. Liberty, in its inner meaning, is rather the privilege of choosing the right and of voluntarily submitting one's self to the common good; it is the power of sacrificing self without constraint for the common life. The highest expression of liberty is found wherever "the strong yield up a measure of personal liberty for the sake of those to whom such liberty is full of irresistible peril" ("The Outlook," Aug. 31, 1907). The State, in the last analysis, is the medium of the mutual sacrifices and services of the people, and no society can exist without a degree of self-sacrifice and social service. The free State is possible where the citizens take thought for the common welfare, and freely sacrifice themselves for the common good. Thus true liberty is life in and through the life of all.

True liberty is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. That end is the fulfilment of one's personality and the welfare of all. John Stuart Mill has defined liberty as the power of pursuing one's own way, with the limi-

tation that in so doing he is not to interfere with others who may be pursuing their own good in their own way. But this is an entirely negative conception, and neither satisfies the moral law nor solves the problems of society. In general, the formula means getting all you can of the world's goods without getting yourself into the police court. This really makes self the center, and puts the emphasis upon one's own wishes. And this also makes liberty an end in itself, and gives us no great synthesis which shall include all lesser ends. But the man who has entered into the true conception of things sees that he is called to seek the good of all in the assurance that his own good will thereby be secured. And he also sees that liberty, to have any real meaning and social value, signifies the power of choosing the highest ends and of making his life a part of the common life.

Hence it follows that democracy will not fulfil its task till it has taught men the full meaning of liberty and has trained them in the art of living together. It is the recognition of the fact that all men are brothers, with common interests, common rights, and common duties. Liberty, on its negative side, means deliverance from arbitrary and external rule. Liberty in its positive aspect means the voluntary submission to law, with voluntary self-sacrifice for the common good. It is just here that we discover a danger that is as real in a democracy as in an autocracy. In a monarchy the world has often beheld the spectacle of one man making himself supreme and compelling the service and obedience of his fellows. And in a democracy we may behold the same spectacle under other forms, in the free and independent citizen who makes his own interests and preferences supreme. That man who in the democratic State regards the machinery of government as the agent of his own interests and desires, differs in no essential respect from the autocrat

who imposes his will upon his fellows. Liberty that means self-assertion and self-seeking is death; liberty that means self-sacrifice and social service is life. We never shall have a real liberty or a true democracy till this principle is recognized and honored.

It is evident that liberty alone can never truly serve mankind. It is evident that the nay of liberty can never carry man very far along the upward way. Sin at bottom is selfishness, the enthronement of self-interest as the final law of life. And selfishness is ever and forever a principle of confusion and disunion, the eternal enemy of progress. The State that is founded upon the philosophy of atomism, of selfishness, cannot long endure. Love and self-sacrifice are the real foundations of society; it is only through the fulfilment of these principles that man has risen out of the mire and the State has become possible at all. It is evident that only through the yea of liberty can society really advance along its upward way and democracy reveal its higher meaning.

Thus far democracy has taught men the nay of liberty, and it has taught it well. But it must now go forward and teach men the yea of liberty, and its task will not be finished till this is done. In the yea of liberty a man says: I am free from all other lesser and lower masters that I may come under the mastership of the King Eternal. In the yea of liberty a man says: The other man is as good as I, and in every way I shall seek his good. In the yea of liberty he says: I am a man with a man's freedom and manhood that I may do a man's work and may live for the common weal. In the yea of liberty he says: The common good is the supreme concern, and I shall seek and find my good in and through the good of all. This defines the first great unfinished task of democracy.

II. The New Social Tyranny. In the more progres-

sive lands of the world, religious liberty and political democracy have been gained, and it is not likely that they will ever be lost. There is the expression of the great principles of democracy—liberty, equality, and brotherhood, in religious and political relations. The fathers agreed among themselves that the authority of government should never be used in propagating any form of religion or even in compelling men to worship God at all. They agreed among themselves that no man and no set or class or caste of men should ever possess any privileges in the State which were not equally open to all. They agreed among themselves further, that no patent of nobility should ever be issued to any man, but that the way to honor must be kept open to all. They wrote out these agreements in a constitution which they made the fundamental law of the land, to be changed only by the express consent of a majority of the voters. They decreed that the government which exists shall derive its just powers from the consent of the governed. And more important than all, they declared that the State is the co-operation of all for the sake of each.

But we have discovered that not everything has been done that needs to be done. There are whole classes of rights which are not yet defined and secured. The citizen possesses the ballot, but he is not content. He lives under a written constitution, but his rights are not all therein defined. He possesses the political franchise, but the golden age has not yet dawned. He is a free citizen, and yet he feels himself defrauded of some of his dearest rights. In a word, man has gained religious and political democracy, but he has come to see that the democratic task is not finished till he has gained industrial and social democracy. Perhaps we can best describe this new task before democracy by applying some of the democratic principles to man's social and industrial life.

1. In a free and just society every man is entitled to the products of his own industry. That which a man creates belongs to him. This right is natural and inherent, and society neither creates this right nor destroys it. For this reason, all forms of slavery, in which one man controls the life and claims the labor of another, are wrong in principle and indefensible in practice. For this reason also, all kinds of exploitation that manipulate the labor of others and take from the workers an unjust portion of their product, are no less wrong in method and unjust in results. For this reason any governmental regulation or commercial system that interferes in any way with this right of possession contravenes some of the great and sacred rights of man. There are various ways in which this process of filching may be carried on, but these in nowise affect its essential injustice. Thus, it matters nothing whether this process is illustrated in some feudal system where a few nobles own all the land and compel all the people to toil as serfs; or in some colonial system where the home government exploits the colony for its own advantages and exacts taxation without representation; or in some industrial system where a few men control the means of production and distribution and compel all the people to pay tribute. The particular method or system is of no moment and does not affect the essential injustice of the transaction or modify its undemocratic spirit.

And once more, in a free and fraternal society all men are entitled to a fair inheritance in the natural resources of the earth. In a way this is recognized by all just governments, and so they provide that the rivers and seas cannot become private property, but must be held as common carriers. In a way, also, society recognizes this principle with respect to land, for the right of eminent domain as it is called is generally admitted. But this

principle is of wide application, and in a fair and free society it must be universally honored. Suppose now the time should come when the various conditions that sustain life should fall into the control of a few men. Suppose these men by the use of great skill or vast capital should gain control of the means of production and distribution and should use these means primarily for their own enrichment. And suppose that these few men should give every man in the land who may be engaged in the same line of trade the hard option of selling out to them at their own price or being crushed out of business. In all these cases some of the inherent and imprescriptible rights of man are violated and trampled under foot; and in all of them society is essentially unjust and tyrannical whatever may be the form of its government. (See Abbott, "The Rights of Man," chap. iv.)

That some of these rights are endangered even in the most democratic lands, is a matter of common knowledge. In all lands to-day there is a marked tendency toward co-operation of forces and combination of interests, and in a large sense this tendency is natural and right and cannot be resisted. Pure individualism is inconceivable, and simple independence is impossible. "You must unite and combine and co-operate"—this is the mandate of the universe to the children of men. "Competition is wasteful, individualism is wicked, and self-seeking is suicide." But just here arises a danger that cannot be ignored and must not be minimized. This tendency toward unity and co-operation in production and distribution is making possible an industrial autocracy the most despotic and undemocratic the world has ever seen.

2. In democratic America it is found that a few men control the coal industry, and determine how much shall be mined, what wages the miners shall receive, and what prices the people shall pay. In this land the iron and steel

industry is in the hands of a few men, and these determine at once the output for a year and the prices to be paid; they decide also who may be permitted to engage in this line of business, and no man can long manufacture steel without their permission. In this land a few men control the railroads, and they determine what rates shall prevail, what communities shall prosper, and all this with little regard to the interests of the people. In this land a few men control the petroleum industry, and determine how much oil shall be refined, what shall be paid for the crude oil to the producer, and what shall be paid for the refined oil by the consumer. The simple facts of the case are that a few men, by the use of great skill and large capital, are getting control of the means of production and distribution, and are fastening upon the necks of the people an industrial autocracy more irresponsible and tyrannical than the world has yet known. Whether men know it or not, "our vision of freedom is passing into the eclipse of universal corporate compulsion in the interest of capitalism" (Small, "The Outlook," June 17, 1899). And Professor Howerth shows how "there has been growing up in modern times an institution which, as a means of control and privilege, has become more potent than Church or State. That institution is capitalism, or speaking generally, the industrial institution. . . This is but to say that power has concentrated in the hands of those who have secured possession of the instruments of production, and in some cases that power is greater than that formerly wielded by kings and emperors. It would be a miracle if this power were not abused. That it has been, no one will deny" ("American Journal of Sociology," Sept., 1906). In sober truth it may be said that no political autocrat of the past ever possessed more than a tithe of the real power of these modern industrial and social autocrats.

In all the States and cities we find an outside institution known as a corporation exercising a general control over the whole life of the people. The masters of these corporations decide who shall be nominated for mayors in the cities and governors in the States; they dictate platforms and determine policies; they make and unmake congressmen and senators; they keep from public life strong and worthy and noble men and allow their own agents to be chosen; they exact certain charges for public services with little reference to the real value of the service; they tax the people at every turn, and all this without representation or redress on their part. "We have abolished kings and have substituted railway kings; we have abolished lords and have substituted coal barons" (Lyman Abbott, "The Outlook," Nov. 17, 1906). We have agreed to call no man master in political relations and to pay no tax without representation, but we have permitted commercial masters to gain control of trade and tax the people according to their own pleasure. We may call this what we will, but we cannot call it democracy.

3. Then, for another thing, we find that the industrial and social forces of society are more and more being exploited for the disproportionate advantage and enrichment of the few. This result grows out of the tendency just described and its effects are most marked. In the older economics it was taught that competition was allpotent and would regulate everything; it would speedily right any wrongs that might be committed, and would keep the books well balanced. Be all this as it may, the fact is, free and fair competition no longer exists in modern society, but practically everything is determined by combination. In the older economics it was also taught that the law of supply and demand regulated everything and automatically determined the wage of the worker and the prices of commodities. This law, however, has little

to do with the price of commodities in these times. "The prices of most of the staple commodities consumed by mankind have no necessary relation to the cost of producing them and placing them in the hands of the consumer" (Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 327). All this is made possible by the vast industrial power that is concentrated in the hands of a few men.

And in this process it may also be observed that the gains which accrue to the few have little relation to the real service which they render. The incomes of some of these modern captains of industry are simply colossal. Thus the salary paid the average minister of the gospel will barely reach eight hundred dollars. The salary of a university president rarely exceeds ten thousand dollars, while many serve for far less; and the salary of the President of the United State is but fifty thousand dollars a year. Yet some of these captains of industry have incomes from ten to a hundred times as great as the salary of the President of the United States. Surely no sane man would care to defend the thesis that the services of these men to society are so many times greater than the services of the Chief Executive of the nation or the presidents of great universities or even those of many pastors of our churches.

It may be admitted that the methods that are employed to secure these results differ widely from the methods that were once in vogue, while the results differ little if at all. Once, men aggressed upon their fellows by waylaying them by the roadside and persuading them with a club to empty their purses; now they aggress upon their fellows by forming an industrial combination and filching their earnings. Once the knights rode booted and spurred across the country and plundered the hapless wayfarer; now these barons of the market obtain special privileges and plunder the people. Under such

circumstances, as Lloyd suggests, prices paid to these overlords of industry and these intercepters of trade are not an exchange of services; they are the ransom paid by the people for their lives ("Wealth Against Commonwealth," 502). Thus while the means that are used to-day differ widely from the means that were used of old, at heart the new oligarchy is not one whit better than the old autocracy.

It may be said that many plausible pleas are advanced in justification of this present system. Thus it is claimed that these combinations prevent wasteful competition and thus cheapen products. And it is also claimed that these great combinations are necessary in order that the commercial interests of the world may be developed. Now, even if this were the case, the answer is yet wide of the mark. But this is not true, and therefore it is but a subterfuge. It may be said in justification of absolute monarchy that it has many advantages and makes for human welfare; for even a bad government is better than no government at all. No doubt many incidental advantages accrue to the people in a monarchical government, and if incidental advantages were the whole of life even monarchy might be endured. From the groundling's point of view nothing was more foolish than the Pilgrims' adventure—to leave ease and comfort behind and cross the wintry sea all for the sake of a few sentimental notions. From the point of view of the social Tory nothing was more unreasonable than the Revolutionary fathers—the tax on paper and tea was a mere trifle; and then these articles were cheaper in Boston than in London. But the question at issue with the Pilgrims was not ease and self-interest, but truth and soul liberty; the question at issue in the Revolutionary War was not the price of paper and tea, but *taxed* paper and tea. Going behind all incidental advantages that may accrue

from such industrial control we may say that the real question at issue is not the price of commodities, but the one fact of monopoly taxes. It is not a question whether steel and coal, oil and beef are cheaper or dearer than they otherwise would be; the real question is whether these commodities are controlled by a few industrial overlords who fix prices and control the markets of the country. This monopoly control may cheapen prices, but this monopoly control is not democracy.

It must be said also that many of these industrial managers are men of clean lives and religious disposition. To those who cannot distinguish between a man's personal life and his public conduct this indictment of them may seem harsh and unfair. But the personal characters of these men are not the real questions at stake. It is not so much a question of men as of systems. Monarchy, we have agreed, is bad whoever the particular incumbent of the throne may be. Industrial autocracy is intolerable in a free State, without any reference to the character of the autocrats. For these reasons the question must be considered in an impersonal way, and the characters of men must not becloud the real issue.

4. Then, for a fourth thing, we find as the result of these tendencies now in operation, that the range of opportunity and initiative in social and industrial life is steadily narrowing for the great majority of men. Some of this it may be is inevitable, but much of it is unnecessary, and some of it is unjust. The time has been when the manufacturer wrought with his own hands, sitting or standing side by side with his helpers and apprentices. In his own home he installed a few looms, as the case might be, and though his capital was small, he maintained himself in comfort and was happy. And his apprentice looked forward to the time when he might be his own master, and might set up in life for

himself—and possibly might marry his early master's daughter. The time has now come when great factories are built wherein thousands of employees labor at the command of another, and with no real stake in the business. These undertakings represent a colossal investment, and are only possible where men possess unlimited capital. As a result of it all the man of small means is placed at a disadvantage, and fair competition is out of the question.

It is true that there is always room at the top for the few men of force and talent, but the average man has no hope of being anything else than a "hand" toiling under the direction of another. Thus far it may be this process is inevitable; and much farther it may be this tendency will continue. But be the process inevitable or not, the State must carefully watch it and must faithfully safeguard the interests of the weaker man; it must see to it that every person has free opportunity and fair privilege, and is not placed at a total disadvantage by his stronger competitor.

But much of this narrowing of opportunity for the average man is wholly unnecessary, and is only possible where gross injustice is done. Thus we have seen how through the concentration of vast wealth the elimination of free competition has resulted and the one man is handicapped or put out of the race. In many lines of manufacture and trade it is impossible for one with limited capital—who is not a member of the combination and will not adopt its methods—to maintain himself for any length of time. The moment his competition becomes in any wise effective he is given the hard option of joining the combination or being driven out of business. This means that the great mass of men are being reduced to a condition of industrial dependence and serfdom. They are being reduced to the position of employees in a vast corporation, and the range of their initiative in life is thereby nar-

rowed. Democracy means fair opportunity for all; and where such opportunity does not exist there democracy is but an empty name. Under the present growing tendency toward industrial autocracy the range of life of the average man is rapidly narrowing, and equality of opportunity is fast disappearing. In modern democratic lands political feudalism has disappeared forever; but in the most democratic lands a new industrial feudalism is being established. And this feudalism, it may be said, is even more absolute and more arrogant and all-dominant than any political feudalism the world has ever experienced.

5. And for another thing, we find as the result of this whole process, that government is in danger of becoming less and less democratic, and of becoming more and more commercial. There are several causes that contribute in a special way toward this plutocratic control, and these are all deserving of careful study. Thus, for one thing, in America the wealth of the nation has multiplied at an almost miraculous rate; and this has done much to dazzle the eyes of the people and to lead them to rate all progress in terms of money values. Then, with this increase of wealth, there has come an increase of luxury, with its false standards in social life. The old simplicity of life, the democratic simplicity as it was called, has disappeared, and with it have gone many salutary customs. We have grown literally afraid of being poor; and we have come to measure success by one's bank account. And with this has come a change in the standards of public life and official propriety; and these changes make it practically impossible for a poor man to hold high office in either State or nation. A great change has passed over American public life since the days when Jefferson was inaugurated president; for history records how this man rode on horseback to the capitol, and in great sim-

plicity advanced to take the oath of office. Because of all these changes, which cannot all be called changes for the better, public office is more and more passing into the hands of the wealthy members of society.

But this is not all, and this is not the worst. So long as *things* are prized above *men* that long money will be potent in human affairs. Money has been known the world over and in all ages for its power to blind the eyes and influence the wills of men. It is not strange, therefore, that the vast money interests of the country should have an undue weight in the affairs of government and should exert a baleful influence upon legislation. But it was hardly to be expected that in a professedly democratic land the power of money should become so potent and the reign of the dollar should be so manifest. That this is the fact, that the people of America are in danger of a plutocracy, is the calm judgment of many students of our public life. And this plutocratic government, we are also told, is giving us the most despotic masters the world has ever known, and the most irresponsible. Now, whatever this may be, it is not democracy.

6. Thus far there is quite general agreement among students of all shades of opinion and all schools of thought. When, however, we consider the remedies that may be applied we find men breaking up into groups and even arraying themselves in hostile camps. It is not necessary, and it is not possible to consider the various remedies that may be proposed; but we may note two of the conditions that must be observed in every fair discussion of the problem, and may indicate the direction along which the State must move in the fulfilment of this unfinished task.

For one thing, it is too late to consider seriously the proposition of suppressing all forms of industrial combination and co-operation. This tendency toward combi-

nation of forces and solidarity of interests is too fundamental and potent to be successfully resisted. In all departments of life men are learning that co-operation is cheaper and better than competition; and when once they have tasted the advantages of combination they are never likely to throw them away. Thus, the railroads of the country are more and more being unified into one great system, and the time may come in the near future when they will practically compose one united system. Thus also the steel industries are more and more becoming welded into one. The same is true of a hundred other interests. A world that has learned the advantages of combination and co-operation is not likely to abandon them; and it may be said that such a course would retard progress and work injury. In all our thought of modern society and its wrongs we must take this fact into account and must adjust ourselves to its necessity. There will be more and not less consolidation of industries and solidarity of interests and co-operation of efforts as time goes by and men become more wise.

As the result of this natural process this is what we find: On the one hand the great industries of the world are coming more and more under one management. On the other hand the whole life and welfare of society are vitally dependent upon each of these great consolidated industries. The coal industry is practically complete within itself, and practically within the control of a single combination; and the life and peace of the people in the remotest village are conditioned upon the operation and order in this one industry. The same is true of the railroads of the land which have come under the virtual control of a few men. This means two things: that the people are vitally concerned in the methods and management of every great industry; and it means that the whole people must suffer when any disturbance or stoppage

occurs. This means also that these great industries, through this natural and inevitable process of development, have gained an almost absolute power over the lives and destinies of men; for they can fix wages, determine output, regulate prices, and compel all the people to pay a tax in the form of monopoly prices; nay, they can even decide whether men shall have fuel and heat in their homes and whether the wheels of a hundred industries shall turn. And it means that the welfare of the whole people is vitally related to the orderly working of any one industry; and the stoppage of its wheels from any cause may cause widespread disaster and suffering.

This brings us face to face with the unfinished task of democracy, a task that must be fulfilled before it can be fully a reality. It is plain that all efforts in behalf of this democracy must move along certain lines. There must be such control over all the forces and factors of man's social and industrial life as shall—on the one hand—prevent the evils of monopoly and safeguard society against suffering and injustice; or—on the other hand—the people must themselves assume the ownership and operation of these forces and factors to the extent at least of ensuring domestic tranquillity, promoting the general welfare, and enabling each person to have a fair standing in society. Which course the State shall finally adopt we need not attempt to determine, but one or the other course must be taken by the State that is even approximately democratic. There are many who fear the latter course and denounce the mention of such a contingency as an advocacy of socialism; but the men who resist the effective regulation of all industry and trade are the very men who are promoting the socialistic propaganda. And after all, while such a governmental régime, which means the ownership and operation of the chief means of production and distribution, might have some disadvantages

and dangers, these are but trifles compared with the injustice and discontent that will follow in a monopoly control. The time has gone by when we can seriously ask that the State seek to negative this tendency toward combination and co-operation, for its advantages are too manifest and too real. They who demand that the State shall suppress all combinations know not what they do; and all unthinkingly they would turn the hands backward upon the dial of progress. But the State must accomplish the more necessary and yet more difficult task of *securing the benefits of combination without suffering any of its evils.* The whole development of modern society is making necessary an extension of State action into man's economic life. And the great principle of democracy is demanding such a democratization of industry as shall equalize social opportunity and give every person a fair standing in society.

The things that have been named are in flagrant contradiction of the democratic ideal, and democracy will never be more than a name till it has vindicated the social rights of the people. In some lands as, *e. g.,* America and Switzerland, the old battle for human rights has been fought out to a successful issue, and the political rights of men are now defined and safeguarded. The fathers discovered that the political liberties of men were not safe in the hands of any political autocrat be he personally good or bad. The time has come for the children to declare that the social rights of the people are not safe in the hands of any social autocrat and industrial oligarchy, and all this without reference to their character. The time has come for the people to agree among themselves that no special privileges of any kind shall be granted to any man, and they must preserve these free institutions by writing out certain guarantees of equality. "Liberty and democracy," said Aristotle, "are not pos-

sible without equality of condition." "Give a man power over my subsistence," said Alexander Hamilton, "and he has power over the whole of my moral being."

III. The Direct Participation of the People in the Affairs of Government. Democracy, in the words of one of its best representatives, is government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." In the last analysis this defines the difference between democracy and all other forms of the State. In so far as we have this direct participation of the people we have democracy, and no farther. But from various causes, only two of which need be mentioned here, this direct participation is denied, and democracy even in America is at best only an approximation.

The first set of causes is the number of obstacles that are placed between the people and the government. It is sometimes said that the men of the convention which framed the American Constitution were convinced believers in democracy. It is sometimes supposed that this constitution provides for a fully democratic system of government, and that the people have a direct voice in the affairs of State. But neither supposition is more than approximately true. There were men in the State at that time who believed in democracy, but such men were in reality few. And significantly enough, some of these men, such as Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, were not members of the convention. There were some men in the convention itself who were believers in democracy, such as Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and George Washington, but not all the members shared the same spirit. In fact, the proceedings of the convention, not published till years afterward, show that some of the men in that convention cherished a profound distrust of the people and tried to keep the government as far away from their meddling as possible. In all of the colonies a sys-

tem of popular government in local matters had prevailed, and on the whole it worked remarkably well. But in all parts of the convention there were serious doubts whether this principle of popular elections could safely be applied to national affairs. After long debate it was resolved that the national legislature should consist of two branches; and then arose the question how the members should be chosen. Some were of the opinion that they should be chosen directly by the people, but this was stoutly opposed by others. Out of this conflict of opinion came the compromise which provided for a lower house elected by the people, and an upper house or senate chosen by the States. This distrust was shown not alone in the representative character of the government, but also in the number of checks and balances that were placed upon the people and their representatives. Throughout there was a studied effort on the part of some to exclude the people from direct participation in the government and to keep the government as far away from them as possible. Out of it all has come a system of representative government which nominally is a government of the people but is only remotely a government by the people, and consequently is not always a government for the people.

In a small community it is possible to have all the affairs of government under the direct control of a popular assembly. But in a large State or in a federal nation this is wholly out of the question. By the necessities of the case there must be some form of representative government. This being so, the people must depend for the wise control of public affairs on some human agency; and no authority in the State has ever been found so worthy of entire public confidence as a deliberative assembly composed of reputable representative men. We must recognize this fact fully and finally, we are told.

"We must comprehend, fully and finally, that our security for a wise and upright administration of public affairs is to be found, not in the restriction of power, but in its enlargement; not in distrust, but in confidence" (Stickney, "Organized Democracy," pp. 68, 69).

The second set of causes which stands between the people and the government and makes a fully democratic government impossible is the party system. It may be said that political parties of some kind are more or less inevitable in every government; and it may even be said that they are necessary. It is natural, possibly, and it is desirable certainly, that there should be differences of opinion on many questions of public policy. It is natural as it is inevitable for men who hold the same views in common to drift together and find some means of making their views effective. "The greatest discovery ever made in the art of war was when men began to perceive that organization and discipline count for more than numbers. This discovery gave the Spartan infantry a long career of victory in Greece, and the Swiss infantry a not less brilliant renown in the later Middle Ages. The Americans made a similar discovery in politics fifty or sixty years ago" (Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, p. 44). Thus by degrees there has grown up in America a system of party government the most complete and perfect the world has known; and out of this party government there have come results that have made popular government little else than a name. It is easy to frame an indictment the most sweeping and severe against the American party system; but only one or two counts in this indictment can be specified. For one thing, this party government means machine politics; and this is irresponsible action raised to the nth power. This constitutes a tyranny the most subtle and far-reaching; and it is as brutal as it is

undemocratic. There are probably no autocratic governments in the world, outside of Turkey, that exert as subtle and silent a tyranny over men as the party system in democratic America. Party government at its best means stagnation; it means commonplace ideas and past issues; its platform represents the age that is passing, and it seldom voices the aspirations that are to be. Party government at its worst spells compromise and not principle; its leaders have their ears to the ground and never their eyes upon the stars; it means mediocrity and inferiority where it does not mean cowardice and corruption. The good partisan cannot be a good citizen.

Then the party government might be called a system for keeping the best men out of public life. Under every form of government we must depend in the last analysis upon the capacity and honesty of the men who hold public office. That system of government cannot be wholly bad which enables the best men to serve the people in any civic capacity; and that system of government cannot be even remotely good which disbars the best men from public life. That the party system in its actual working accomplishes this latter result is a fact known to all. Not ability, but availability is the one qualification which the party managers demand. Not candidates who cherish ideals, but men who will take advice are the kind of men wanted. The party machine stands between the people and the government and arrogates to itself the most amazing functions. Thus this system of party government makes a popular government little else than a name.

Two things, we thus see, have contributed to bring about this separation of the people from their government. The first is the system of representative government which removes it as far as possible from the people themselves. And the second is the American party sys-

tem which provides the very means for designing men to use the government for their own ends. And thus we are brought face to face with another unfinished task of democracy, and one of the most difficult of all. That democracy may be in fact as in name it is necessary that there be a direct participation of the people in the affairs of government. It is not necessary to discuss all of the measures that may contribute to this end; but two are worthy of a full trial.

The first is what may be called direct legislation by the people. The power to enact laws may be exercised by the people directly or through their chosen representatives. The latter method is the one that prevails generally in democratic lands. Under this system there is often a complete divergence between the will of the people and the action of their representatives, and hence the legislation does not represent the consent of the governed. To remedy these evils and to give the people a direct voice in the affairs of government is the one object of the system known as the initiative and referendum.

There are many aspects of this system as seen in operation in Switzerland and Australasia, and as expounded by its advocates in Britain and America; but none the less there are several constants and these are the essentials of the system. There are differences of opinion with reference to the origination and formulation of measures to be submitted to the people. Shall these measures originate with the people and be wrought into shape by a legislative assembly and then be submitted to the people? Or shall these measures be formulated by the petitioners themselves and then be submitted to the people by the proper election boards? These are minor details and do not affect the central principle which provides that the people shall have the means whereby

they can express themselves directly upon all measures in the State. The people in this system can put a direct veto upon any legislative measures proposed by any body in city or State; and the people can propose new measures and express their will with reference to any measures that they may deem vital. This makes for simplicity and straightforwardness in legislation on the one hand, and on the other it trains the people in the art of government and makes them know their stake in the life of the State. It corrects some of the evils of democracy with more democracy.

The second measure that must be adopted in some form if democracy is to be more than a name, is that of direct popular nomination of candidates. Through the system of party government with delegated conventions it has come about that the people have no direct voice in the nomination of candidates and the making of platforms. Because of all this the average citizen now takes little interest in political matters. Thus the control of the party machine, and consequently the direction of the affairs of government, have fallen into the hands of the few active and interested men who are able to manipulate the party machinery and dictate the government's policy. To obviate this, and to give the people a direct voice in the selection of candidates some such method as the direct primary has been devised. According to the provisions of this system any man may announce himself as a candidate for any office; or his friends may announce his name and submit it to the people. This system may be extended indefinitely, and provision may be made whereby the voters can express themselves with reference to the issues that they believe should be brought to the front in any given campaign. To make possible such participation in the affairs of government and then train the people in its exercise is one of the unfinished tasks of democracy.

By the methods named and by many others that may be considered it is believed that democracy may become more nearly an approximation and reality.

IV. The Democracy of All Life. Implied in all the problems named, growing out of the tasks thus far defined, at once the sum of all and the fulfilment of all, is the one great task that yet remains to be considered. Some elements of this unfinished task may be here mentioned.

Thus far democracy has not spoken its full message. There are three great ideas that in a way have become articles of the democratic faith, and these must have their due place in the full-orbed truth. One of these fundamental ideas is liberty; and to gain this boon men have struggled long and have counted not their lives dear unto themselves. Another great watchword is equality; and after long struggle and delay this principle has been asserted in political relations at least. The other great ideal is fraternity, and after all these centuries of delay and effort this ideal has begun to find expression at least in political manifestoes and social utopias. But the recognition of this ideal has been partial at best, and its realization in its fulness lies yet in the unexplored future. The message of democracy will not be fully uttered till these great principles are fully understood, and these great ideals are fully realized. Thus democracy, like the kingdom of God, is always here, and yet it is always to come.

Thus far democracy in its spirit and method has been largely negative and individualistic. It has emphasized individualism and has overlooked solidarity. It has been suspicious of government, and has been resentful of social control. It has cleared the ground but it has not built the temple. It has outlined the new society, but it has not created the society itself. To complete its task, to ful-

fil its mission, democracy must become positive and constructive. It must learn the meaning of government and must teach men how to use it for the whole welfare of all. It must create a human society in which the person shall be accorded all of his rights, and must insure a liberty that means the highest solidarity. In a word, it must complete itself in fraternity, which is the democracy of all life. Four elements in this final task may be mentioned.

1. For one thing, democracy must become positive and constructive. Thus far it has been almost wholly negative and preparatory. The time has now come for democracy to become a positive and constructive thing, and to build up a righteous and fraternal society. Nothing can live upon mere negatives; only positive truth can ever be the food of men and nations. No great society can be built out of discrete and suspicious atoms; in a great society the principles of fraternity and solidarity must be harmonized in some all-inclusive synthesis. The world has heard the nay of democracy and a great and glorious word it has been. The time has come for the world to hear the yea of democracy, the still more glorious and wonderful word. Democracy has trampled upon crowns and scepters and has called them nothings; it has repudiated titles of nobility and privileges of estates; it has razed temples and palaces that man might be free to live his own life in his own way; it has spelled out the rights of man and has defined those rights in written constitutions. Democracy must now begin to build new temples and palaces for all the people; it must now declare what are the things that are truly honorable and authoritative; it must now define and illustrate the true titles of nobility and worth; it must now spell out the duties of man and must inspire him to fulfil those duties. Democracy has told us what are the things that are worthless and

wrong, and humanity is grateful for this message. It must now demonstrate that the common man is a kingly soul and the voice of the people is the voice of God. Democracy must now teach man to walk in love as the child of the Father and as the brother of his fellows. The democracy of blank negations and narrow individualism is worn out and is passing away; the world awaits a democracy of human brotherhood and divine righteousness. Democracy, when interpreted in a narrow individualistic and suspicious spirit is a principle of confusion and disunion and anarchy. Democracy, to be stable and potent, to fulfil its high mission and truly bless the world, must become a principle of faith and brotherhood and must find its guarantees in the mutual sacrifices and services of mankind.

2. Again, democracy must maintain liberty and equality and fraternity through social control. Life is full of paradoxes, and here is a paradox that cannot be evaded. Personal freedom can come only through social regulation. The one man finds his largest liberty in the fullest social solidarity (Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 275). We have learned in the earlier chapters of this study that liberty by itself and of itself is no boon; we have learned also that the individual comes to his best estate only in and through society. A state of society, if such were possible, in which each man is free to do what he pleases and to regard only his own preferences, would be the least free and the most intolerable condition imaginable. The fact is, such condition would mean the lowest savagery, and would be destitute of one worthful and human quality.

In its earlier stages, the struggle for democracy has been a struggle against governmental usurpation with an emphasis upon the individual and his rights. All this has been inevitable, in view of the kinds of governments that

have existed, and soon or late such struggle was necessary. At any rate, it is in and through this process of struggle and denial that the individual has come to self-consciousness and his rights have been defined. But the time has come for men to learn the real meaning of government and to consider the real nature of society; the time has come for men to honor the great principle of solidarity and come to what may be called social consciousness. Under the reign of these earlier ideas of democracy men have lived in a fear of government, and have hesitated to take any step forward for fear of limiting some right of man. Because of this distrust of government, it has come about that it has been shorn of its power, and its usefulness in promoting progress has been weakened. Under the reign of these ideas of individualism men have denied the authority of government over their private and business affairs, and have demanded that they be left free to follow what they call the natural laws of trade. Thus, to mark the result of this fear in one realm of life, there has grown up an industrial system that in many respects is more unjust and oppressive than any political autocracy the world has ever known. But progress means social integration, and personal liberty comes only through social control. Progress has never been secured merely by the making of good individuals; in fact, the good individual is himself only possible through the moralization of society. The one life lives and flourishes in and through the lives and fortunes of all; and in and through the prosperity of all the one life is preserved and enriched. In a word, it is in and through social integration and control that the one life comes to its best estate, and it is in and through the general will that the individual finds his own will enlarged and fulfilled.

3. And once more, democracy must perfect itself in a social control and solidarity that protect the rights of

each and give all a fair inheritance in society. The doctrine of individualism and atomism we have seen is a doctrine of anarchy and confusion, and can never bring social peace and progress. The progress of man and the peace of society can come only in and through a political integration and social solidarity that conserve the personality of each and yet insure the welfare of all. This means not less government, but more; but it is a government *by* all and *for* all, and not a government by each and for each. As time goes by and men become more socialized they will learn that government is the medium of the mutual sacrifices and services of the people, and they will learn how to use it "as a positive progressive instrument for the conscious creation of public welfare."

This new democracy will be a people's government in the best sense of the word. The difference between autocracy and democracy is not in the amount of governmental regulation, for in a democracy there may be more social control than in an autocracy. The real difference between the two is found in the nature and incidence of this control. That is, in an autocracy the government is one imposed upon the people, a government from above and over their heads, a government that in no sense represents the conscience and will of the people. But in a democracy we have a government of the people and by the people, a government that is in the people and through the people, a government that represents the conscience and will of the citizens themselves. The integration and control thus represented are inevitable, but the individual must not be crushed, and his own initiative must not be overridden. There is one power and only one that can save the person and bless society, and that is society itself. "There is one form of government that is stronger than autocracy, or aristocracy, or democracy, or even plutocracy, and that is sociocracy" (Ward, "Psychic Factors,"

p. 323). Thus the solution of the problems of this age and the fulfilment of the tasks of democracy are to be found in the establishment of a genuine people's government—"a government that is the effective expression of the public will, the active agency by which society consciously and intelligently governs its own conduct" (Ward, *ibid.*, p. 329).

In view of what was said in the second section of this chapter, it is evident that the democratic principle must be extended and applied in what may be called the social and industrial realms of life. It is impossible here to enter upon the discussion of this task in all its breadth of meaning, but it is one of the most insistent and difficult of modern times. The fate of democracy itself as a religious principle and a political doctrine is at stake here; for in the long run we must either abandon the democratic faith in political affairs or we must realize it in all life. We cannot permanently maintain a civic State based on democratic principles while living in an industrial society that is oligarchic both in form and spirit. "No man," said Abraham Lincoln, "is good enough to rule his fellows." If this saying is true at all, it is as true in economic and industrial affairs as it is in ecclesiastical and political relations. Equality of political rights must lead to equality of social conditions; that is, the apportioning of well-being according to the work done. "Universal suffrage almost demands that every one shall be a proprietor. It is a contradiction that the people should be at once sovereign and miserable" (De Laveleye, "Contemporary Review," 1883). Man cannot be a sovereign in one part of life and an underling in another. We cannot have a government of the people and by the people where wealth, which is the necessary basis of life, is by the few and for the few. Wealth, like government, springs from all the people, and therefore

wealth like government, must be for all the people. If manhood is dishonored and certain inalienable rights are traversed when men are ruled from above and are taxed without their consent, manhood is no less dishonored, and man's rights no less overridden when a few men control the industries of a land and determine the conditions of trade. Democracy, then, is little else than a name in an economic and industrial oligarchy. This means that the democratic principle shall be so extended as to insure a social and industrial democracy. It means that wealth which is created by all shall be administered for all. It means that every man shall have a share in the control of the world's industries, and that the gains to each shall be adjusted according to the measure of his contribution. It means that there shall be such a combination of labor and capital in the same hands as shall give every man a stake in the enterprise and a voice in its management. It means that man is something more than a cog in a machine and a hand in a factory, and that he shall have a voice in determining the conditions of his work and a fair share in the profits of the industry. It means that the system of co-operation and profit-sharing in both production and distribution shall be so extended as to provide for the eventual democratization of industrial life. It means that an effort shall be made to lift the burden of poverty from every man and to make it possible for him to have a true inheritance in the State. It means that every man shall be free to choose his work in life, and that no man shall be compelled to do another man's bidding. It means that a limit will be set to the amount of wealth which a man can inherit, and that wealth which, in the last analysis is a social product, shall recognize its obligations and shall be held in trust for the public weal. It means that in modern society as in ancient Rome, where there is a testamentary disposition of

property, this power conferred on the heir shall always be coupled with duties to be performed and trusts to be discharged. It does not mean an equal distribution of the wealth of the nation, nor does it mean that the profits of those who toil shall be expended by those who are idle. It does not mean that all men have equal capacity, but it does mean that capacity shall be honored wherever found, and that an effort will be made to develop capacity in all. It does not mean that any man shall have less than his share in the total product, but it does mean that no other man shall have more than his just share.

This democracy of industry is necessary if democracy in politics is to be more than a name. In this democracy of industry the interests of all will be considered, and it will not be necessary for men to organize an *imperium in imperio* in order to secure, sometimes by threat of force, their rights against aggression by another class. Thus, we have labor unions wherein men unite for mutual advantage to secure themselves against aggression of employers. These unions are no doubt serving a most useful purpose in the world, and are training men in what has been called industrial democracy. Such unions and co-operative enterprises are preparing the world to understand the meaning of co-operation and are teaching them to appreciate the need of social democracy. But such unions and enterprises are themselves a confession that government does not yet either understand or fulfil its true functions. If government did its full duty by all its members and were fully conscious of its mission, such unions and combinations would be wholly unnecessary. The fact is such things are in themselves an impeachment of government and show plainly that it is not yet fully rational or consciously democratic. One may deplore the blunders of these labor unions, but none the less these unions are absolutely the only thing at

present that stands between the working man and the killing pace of modern industrialism. They are the only agency that is working with steady aim to change the often intolerable conditions as to hours and wage which impersonal employing corporations make inevitable. "If in any far future democracy becomes a fact with all its man-made inequalities removed—all the present mockeries gone out—the long struggle of trade unions will be written down among the heroisms of history" (J. G. Brooks, "The Outlook," Nov. 17, 1906).

We have gone so far in the political history of man as to declare that all men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; we have affirmed that government rests upon the consent of the governed and is organized to secure certain great ends. But thus far we have given this doctrine of equality a political significance, and have limited this affirmation of rights to civil relations. The time is coming—it is now here—when we must declare our allegiance to the principle of social equality. The work of establishing this industrial and social democracy is the greatest work that has yet been undertaken by the political State, but this is the task that lies fairly before the State that would be democratic and rational.

4. And last of all, and as the sum of all, democracy must fulfil and complete itself in a democracy of all life. For nearly four hundred years there has been a dropped thread in the loom of history, and as a consequence the fabric of society has not reached its full beauty and perfection. The whole movement at first, as embodied in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, was a struggle after liberty in the State no less than purity in the Church. Out of this movement came results that are world-wide and far-reaching, and we of to-day feel their ground swell. Out of this struggle came the separation of

Church and State with the whole product known as political democracy. But the Reformation movement soon lost some of its early enthusiasm and power, and as Macaulay shows in his famous "Essay on Von Ranke," it failed to achieve the highest and largest results. It is true that out of this great movement, in one of its minor streams at the time, came far-reaching results, which led directly to political freedom and democracy in government. But those ideas which meant social justice were strangely overlooked by the leading reformers, and the men who pleaded for social democracy were harried and slain.

In these later times a new aspiration after social freedom and industrial democracy has made itself manifest and is growing more insistent from year to year. And one of the most significant things about this modern movement is the vital relation that exists between it and the early ideas of the Reformation. Balfort Bax, in his notable studies on "The Social Side of the Reformation in Germany," has shown that the early movement was as much a social as a religious revolt. So also in a suggestive book on the Anabaptist movement, Richard Heath has emphasized the social aspect of the struggle of the peasants for justice and democracy. The reform before the Reformation was in the truest sense a movement in behalf of social justice and universal democracy. In this meaning at least, those who are in any religious sense the descendants of this earlier Reformation, are the people who should be vitally interested in this struggle for social democracy. At any rate—and this is the fact that may be emphasized—there are many indications that the great movement for human freedom and social justice, begun in the Reformation, is about to take on new life and complete itself in what may be called the democracy of all life. There are many indications that the demo-

cratic spirit that has wrought in the centuries producing ecclesiastical liberty and political democracy is at work in these later times creating a new aspiration for social justice and finding a new incarnation in social democracy. There are many indications—to change the figure—that this dropped thread in the loom of history is about to be taken up again and is to be given its fitting place in the web of life and human progress. And this is one aspect at least of the new task that now confronts democracy, a task to which the providences of God and the development of society have fairly committed all confessors of the democratic creed.

For there is much more implied in the idea of democracy itself than men have thus far recognized. There are implications of the idea that men thus far have hardly begun to suspect. In human thought and life there are several great vital architectonic principles that are as fundamental as life and as wide-reaching as the nature of man. And the principle of democracy is one of these. For democracy, we have begun to realize, is less a form of government than a confession of faith; it is the confession of human brotherhood based upon the divine Fatherhood; it is the recognition of common aims and common hopes; it is an effort to realize in life and society the great fundamental truths of man-liberty, equality, and fraternity; in the truest sense, it is the statement of the Christian truth that one is your Father who is in heaven, and all ye are brothers. Since this is so the democratic idea is a universal principle; it cannot be limited to any one sphere and relation of life; it can only become real as it finds expression in all the realms and institutions of society; to limit it in any way is treason against the very idea itself. Since this is so democracy will never be more than a name and an approximation till it is thus universalized in scope and

applied all along the line. The name of democracy, we see, is one thing, and the fact of democracy is quite another thing. In the long run a people has just as much democracy as it practises and no more. And in the long run a people must either abandon its democratic faith or it must practise that faith in the whole of life. To confess this faith against the world, to follow this ideal, will require a brave spirit and may bring misunderstanding. For some will regard all this discussion of the democracy of all life as the vain fancies of an idle dreamer and will dismiss the whole subject with a smile and a shrug; others will no doubt denounce all this as socialism and may try to warn the world against such doctrines; others, it may be, will rejoice in all this as the commonwealth of man, and may regard it as the kingdom of God come to earth. The making of such a democracy is the best evidence that man can give that he is working in line with the great purpose of God in the world. The confession of any faith less democratic and universal than this is unworthy of the men who profess to believe in the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.

Book III. Christianity

Look almost where you will in the wide field of history, you find religion, wherever it works freely and mightily, either giving birth to and sustaining States, or else raising them up to a second life after their destruction. . . The truth is that religion is and always has been the basis of societies and States. It is no mere philosophy, but a practical view of life which whole communities live by.

—J. R. Seeley, Natural Religion, pp. 188, 201.

Christianity is essentially a political principle and a political power. It is constructive of the State, and bears in itself the power of forming the State and of developing it to its full completeness.

—Rothe, Theologische Ethik, Vol. III, Sec. 2.

There is every reason to believe that the growing self-consciousness of nations and other social organisms will play a greater and greater part in history, and that what we call progress will be more and more determined in pace and character by the capacity which a nation displays for the conscious rational ordering of its resources.

—John Hobson, The Social Problem, p. 261.

The attempt to establish the social and political relations on a religious basis is the most divine work given to man. It is an attempt in which to fail is better than to succeed in any other. It is an attempt which must be renewed again and again, each time, let us hope, under better conditions, until it succeeds; for it is the attempt to give effect to the redemption of the world.

—Fremantle, The World as the Subject of Redemption, p. 208.

These two things—the infinite or ideal worth of every man, and the sense of duty that comes from the recognition of it—together lay the ethical foundations of democracy. A democratic society exists quite as much to make new rights as to secure the old ones. Within it no privilege should be allowed to gain a foothold, unless it looks to the widening of the area of privilege. The fittest to survive in this field is he who is efficient in creating his peers.

—Henry S. Nash, Genesis of the Social Conscience, p. 222.

And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.

And the gates thereof shall in no wise be shut by day—for there shall be no night there; and they shall bring the glory and honor of the nations into it.

—The Apocalypse, XXI, 2, 25.

XI

THE RELATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

THERE is probably no question of political thought more full of difficulties than that of this chapter. Light, rather than heat, is the one desideratum in all clear thinking; but heat, rather than light, too often has characterized the discussion of this theme. On this we have views the most divergent, from the assumptions of the churchman who affirms that the church is the vicegerent of Christ, and hence must be supreme over all interests and spheres, to the views of those reformers who assert that Christ has nothing to do with political matters, and hence the State and the Church are alien realms. The former seek to unite Church and State in function and administration; the latter endeavor to keep the two entirely apart and maintain that the State is best governed without any reference to religion.

A brief outline of the question may supply us with certain principles for the guidance of our thought:

I. The Conception of Church and State. In the ancient world the conception of Church and State as separate institutions did not exist. The idea of a Church apart from the State never entered into the mind of man. "With the peoples of the ancient world the State was the Church, and the Church was the State; the priest was a magistrate and the magistrate was a priest (Blackie, "What Does History Teach?" chap. ii). The gods were believed to be the progenitors of men and nations, and hence they had a personal interest in the welfare of the nation. But not all men were fitted by nature or

experience for direct and personal intercourse with the gods; and so the priest became necessary. In this way, by a natural process, he came to hold supreme rank and to have a commanding control. In some cases the priests ruled directly in the name of the gods; in others kings were the representatives of the gods, and either themselves were priests or were under their influence and control (Bluntschli, "The Theory of State," Bk. VI, chap. vi). In these circumstances the priest and king might be separate personalities, but both alike were officers of the State.

In some lands, as in India and Persia, there was a priestly class which more or less dominated the entire life of the people, and even kings and rulers were dependent upon it. In other lands, as in Greece and Rome, no clear distinction was made between the king and the priest, and all through the early times the king was the ruler of the people and had the supervision of the worship. This means that in all of these lands no distinction was made between the religious and civil institutions; in all cases the government was as much concerned with religious as with civil affairs; and no one conceived of the Church as distinct from the State.

Among the Semitic peoples we find much the same order of things, though with some signal variations. In the early times there was little or no differentiation of the religious ceremonial from the other ceremonies of man's life. There was a priestly class, but there was no religious fellowship as distinguished from the political State. The institutions of religion appear as part and parcel of the general political and social life of the people, and hence the distinction between Church and State is wholly unknown. This is not all, but "Religion was a part of the organized social life into which a man was born, and to which he conformed through life in the

same unconscious way in which men fall into any habitual practice of the society in which they live. Men took the gods and their worship for granted, and if they reasoned or speculated about them, they did so on the presupposition that the traditional usages were fixed things, behind which their reasonings must not go, and which no reasoning could be allowed to overturn. Religious nonconformity was an offense against the State; for if sacred tradition was tampered with the bases of society were undermined, and the favor of the gods was forfeited" (W. Robertson Smith, "Religion of Semites," p. 21).

In that branch of the Semitic race known as the Jewish people, we find all of these customs and ideas, though with some differences that are quite characteristic. In the early days of Israel's life the one unit of society was the nation, and that included the whole life of man. The laws of the State rested upon the decrees of religion, and the ordinances of religion were enforced by the power of the State. In all the earlier times, "The form of the Jewish State was inseparable from the idea of the kingdom of God. And on the other hand, the idea of this kingdom of God was inseparable from the form of the Jewish State" (A. B. Davidson, "O. T. Prophecy," p. 164). This order of things continued down to the time of the great prophets, and in fact was never wholly abandoned. The author quoted is no doubt right in saying that "it may be questioned if the prophets had any idea of a church abstractly, *i. e.*, distinct in place and form from the Jewish commonwealth, or a thing of no place or form" (*ibid.*, p. 164).

As time goes by several sets of influence are at work which are destined to produce far-reaching results. For one thing, the failure of the nation to become the people of Jehovah and to fulfil his purpose has made men see

that the true Israel is not all Israel. Then, in the course of time, through the unfaithfulness of the kings and the collapse of the Jewish national State, the ground is gradually cleared for another structure. And now, out of the ruins of the old commonwealth, there emerges an entirely new conception, which changes the whole outlook. It begins to appear even to the prophet Isaiah of Jerusalem that the whole people of Israel cannot be the kingdom of God. It begins to appear that there must be another Israel within the old Israel, a community of faithful and spiritual men in whom God can dwell, and through whom he can work. "The circle that gathered round Isaiah and his household in these evil days, holding themselves apart from their countrymen, treasuring the word of revelation and waiting for Jehovah, were indeed, as Isaiah describes them, 'signs and tokens in Israel from Jehovah of hosts that dwelleth in Mount Zion.' The formation of this little community was a new thing in the history of religion. Till then no one had dreamed of a fellowship of faith dissociated from all national forms, maintained without the exercise of ritual services, bound together by faith in the divine word alone. It was the birth of a new era in the Old Testament religion, for it was the birth of the conception of the church, the first step in the emancipation of spiritual religion from the forms of political life—a step not less significant that all its consequences were not seen till centuries had passed (W. Robertson Smith, "Prophets of Israel," pp. 274, 275).

There is one other factor that must be noted in the development of the idea of the church. The Babylonian captivity had many direct and indirect influences upon Israel's life, and one effect is seen in the realm of religion. From this time forward Israel is in subjection to foreign powers, one after the other, with only an occasional

flash of liberty in the time of the Maccabean revolt. Civil government was represented by a hostile and hated foreign power, and this drove the people back upon their religious and national hopes and ideals. In a way, religion was represented by the people of Israel, Jehovah's people; in a marked way, political power was represented by the foreign ruler, the alien to the commonwealth of Israel. It is true that the Hebrews did not appreciate the full significance of all this at the time, and did not formally think out the idea of the worshiping congregation as distinguished from the civil community. But, none the less, the germs of the idea are there, and this very fact furnished the first interpreters of Christ with a set of terms in which to set forth the new truths of Christianity.

II. The Formation of the Christian Church. With the rise of Christianity in the world a new set of ideas developed, and a new order of life resulted. The Son of man came and lived his life in the world, gathering around himself a company of disciples who entered into his purposes and hopes. The Master plainly intimates that great changes are before men, and twice at least he indicates that new associations will be formed among them. But so far as we can see he drew up no constitution for the future society, and he gave no systematic teaching concerning its officers and their functions. No rules of order are framed for the coming assembly, and no rubrics are outlined for the guidance of its worship. At length the leaders of the nation conspired against the Master and secured his condemnation by the Roman governor.

1. For a while after the crucifixion of Jesus it seemed that the company of disciples was about to disperse and return each to his home with the memory of a lost cause, but no plans for the future. But the good news of the

resurrection, with Jesus' appearances, recalled the despondent ones, and brought them to Jerusalem again. In due time the promised Spirit came upon the company of waiting disciples, and they began to magnify the name of Christ. It was not long before this enthusiasm made these men bold witnesses for Christ, and caused allegiance to him to rank higher than obedience to the Jerusalem authorities. In a short time "all the feelings of love and reverence for the nation, for the family, for friends, cherished in each individual soul, were now uprooted and transferred to Jesus and his followers" (Wernle, "Beginnings of Christianity," Vol. I, p. 128).

It is interesting but useless to conjecture what might have been the fortunes of the church and the developments of Christianity if the Jewish authorities had been more favorable to the new movement. At first the disciples of Christ were regarded by them as sectaries; but before long they regarded them with grave suspicion; as time went on this suspicion deepened into open hostility and hostility led to bitter persecution. This hostility drove the Christians together and intensified their bond of union. The very efforts put forth to break up this new movement were the very causes needed to develop the church and to complete and compact its organization. Very early the Jewish authorities resented the plain declarations of the apostolic preaching, and the time soon came when they forbade men to speak in the name of Jesus of Nazareth. The time came when these converts were compelled to decide in their allegiance between Jesus Christ and the Jewish State; nor did they long hesitate. Bound together by a common devotion, and moved by a common hope for the kingdom, they found that this new bond took precedence over all other ties, and constituted them a new community.

There was one other factor that deepened this cor-

porate consciousness and forced the Christians to become separate. The time came when men outside the pale of Judaism knocked at the door of the church, and this brought a whole set of new problems. These men had received the seal of the Spirit—the token of God's favor—and as they were accepted of God, they must be approved of men. It is not easy for us to realize the full gravity of this problem and to appreciate its whole significance. In its negative results it implied that the new bond of faith was stronger than the old bond of race, and this was revolutionary. In its positive results it made these believers into what we may call the Christian church. The early Christians who passed through these changes felt something of their significance, but one man, the most intensely Jewish in his upbringing and sympathies, the Apostle Paul, most clearly foresaw the outcome, and was the leader in the movement. In the most natural, and yet in the most inevitable, way the new organization was created. The logic of events brought the disciples face to face with new problems and opportunities, and the wisdom of the Spirit enabled them to appoint new officers and to meet the demands as they emerged. Thus, by slow degrees, the new body was built up with a conscience and consciousness of its own, and with an organization and life distinct and definite. Little by little the new community assumed form and shape, and more and more it differentiated itself from the old civil community. More and more a corporate consciousness was unfolded, and by degrees the church assumed visible form and organic structure.

2. In the course of time the church arose in the world and began its long process of historical development. There are some elements that are never found in a pure state in nature, but always in combination with some other substances. They have such an affinity for these

other substances that it is with difficulty they can be separated at all. What we call Christianity is so vital that it can never be found apart from life itself; it comes to us in life and it expresses itself through life, and it cannot be separated from its human media. This being so, it is more or less subject to the chances and changes of our human thought and social development. It does not fall within the scope of my purpose to follow the development of that great ecclesiastical system bearing the name of Christ and claiming the exclusive privileges of his name. We are concerned with the relations between this catholic church and the political State. "The most interesting side of the Christian consciousness of being a people is what may be termed, in the narrowest sense of the word, the political" (Harnack, p. 322). There are several items in this political consciousness of the Christian church that may be noticed.

At first the early Christians took up a more or less negative attitude toward the State, and never sought to define the relations between themselves and it. They lived in the bright hope of the coming of the Lord when the world and all its institutions would pass away to give place to the kingdom of God and the reign of the Messiah. For the sake of peace and a good conscience they paid their taxes and obeyed magistrates, but beyond this they regarded the State with indifference. This attitude is marked all through the first century and far on into the second. On the part of the leaders of the church during all this time there was a careful effort to maintain friendly relations toward the State, and to urge one another as Christians to be in subjection to civil rulers. Thus, Paul charges men to be subject to the powers that be, on the ground that they are ordained of God. The Apostle Peter expresses the same thought, and he makes honor paid the emperor

a part of one's duty to God (1 Peter 2 : 13). The First Epistle of Clement marks a new era in that it contains the first petition known to us "for all that are in authority upon earth; that God may grant them health and wealth, and peace and concord." Other teachers charge Christians to pray for the rulers, because it is only as there is peace and order in the State that Christians can practise their religion in tranquillity. With all this, however, the rank and file of the people took up a negative attitude toward the State regarding it as at best a temporary and passing institution.

3. But the time came when the State assumed the offensive and drew the sword of persecution. It is needless, nor is there space, to enter upon a consideration of the causes of this persecution, but they were many and they were not all groundless. After a short panic in Nero's reign that was more personal than civil, the State settled down into a bitter warfare against the new religion, and for generations Christians had to endure its avowed and deadly hostility. With this changed attitude of the State toward the Church we may mark a change of attitude on the part of the church toward the Roman government. This is seen in the various apocalyptic writings which appeared from time to time, and which voiced an intense and yet concealed hostility to the civil powers. "The politics of the Jewish apocalyptic viewed the world-State as a diabolical State, and consequently took up a purely negative attitude toward it. This political view is plainly put in the Apocalypse of John, where it was corroborated by the Neronic persecution, the imperial claim for worship, and the Domitianic reign of terror" (Harnack, "Expansion of Christianity," Vol. I, p. 323). It is not strange therefore that many of the leaders and members of the church should take up a suspicious attitude toward the

State, and should even regard it as the empire of Satan. In various other writings of the first centuries we find divergent views, reflecting the local sentiment and the ever-changing attitude with reference to the State. The official attitude of many of the Christian leaders and apologetes was conciliatory and deferential, and an effort was made to show that Christians are not hostile to the powers that be. It must be said, however, that many of the great leaders and apologetes were not always consistent, and in their writings we find words which show a more pronounced suspicion of the State. This is seen in such a writing as the Epistle to Diognetus, belonging to the early decades of the second century, which declares that while Christians dwell in their own countries, yet they are simply as sojourners. "As citizens they share in all things with others, and yet endure all things as if foreigners." Thus also the Synod of Elvira a little later ruled that "whoever held the office of duumvir must, during his period of office, remain away from church." But this, it may be said, does not represent the better statesmanship of the church, which rather stood on the platform of conciliation. It is possible to accuse some of these leaders and members of insincerity and contradiction on account of their different views from time to time, but it is more just to say that their divergent views reflect rather their changing and manifold moods.

And yet, withal, during these early centuries, we can detect a deeper note that is prophetic of great things to come. In Origen we find the beginning of a doctrine that is destined to reverse the Christian hope and give men a new conception of the State. In his reply to Celsus he asserts that the church, the universe of the universe, is the future kingdom of God, destined to embrace the Roman empire and all humanity itself, to amalgamate and replace the various realms of this world.

"The word of God will win its way, and all religions will vanish leaving that of Christ alone to reign. And reign it will one day, as the word never ceases to gain soul after soul" ("Against Celsus," Bk. VIII, chap. lxviii).

It may be—who can say?—that some of the opposition and persecution encountered was necessary in order that the church might develop a self-consciousness and might compact its life; at any rate, so far as we can see, Christianity would have failed utterly in its higher mission if too early it had won the favor of rulers and had come under the patronage of the State.

4. The time came when the church, once an outlawed body, became a great compact organization with numbers, wealth, and influence. From this time forth it is an organization that must be reckoned with, and even emperors begin to treat it with respect. With the rise of the church to prominence and power there grew up the ambition to make it supreme over all human affairs. And this ambition has behind it two very different motives: one is the honor of Christ, the Head over all things; and the other is the natural desire of men for place and power. The fortunes of the church are changed, and with this change in outward fortune there comes a change over the inner life as well.

With the conversion of Constantine, as it may be called, the tendencies that were at work came to the surface, and we see the drift of things. The historian Gibbon is inclined to make light of this conversion, and does not hesitate to attribute Constantine's change of attitude to motives of public policy. Whatever may have been his motives his conduct was fraught with far-reaching consequences and produced very questionable results. Thomas Arnold does not hesitate to say that the pretended conversion of the kingdoms of the world to the

kingdom of Christ in the fourth and fifth centuries "I look upon as one of the greatest *tours d'adresse* that Satan ever played" (Life and Corres.," Vol. I, p. 59). And Doctor Boardman says, "The most ominous day the church ever saw was the day when Constantine the Great, having renounced heathenism, at least in part, proclaimed himself the imperial patron of Christianity and defender of the faith. That alliance of Church and State set back the church for centuries, and to this day she is reeling beneath the satanic stab she then received" (Boardman, "The Kingdom," p. 214).

It was reserved for a later age, however, to follow out these tendencies to their full results, and then to seek to justify the new relation of Church and State. In course of time there grew up in the medieval world the theory that Christendom forms one great whole, and that there are two chief functionaries, the pope and the emperor, each in a different way its head. Each power is instituted by God, the one to rule over men's bodily, the other over their spiritual interests. "The pope, as God's vicar in matters spiritual, is to lead men to eternal life; the emperor, as vicar in matters temporal, must so control them in their dealings with one another, that they may be able to pursue undisturbed the spiritual life, and thereby attain the same supreme and common end of everlasting happiness" (Bryce, "Holy Roman Empire," p. 102). "This is the one perfect and self-consistent scheme of the union of Church and State. . . It is also the scheme which, granting the possibility of their harmonious action, places the two powers in that relation which gives each of them its maximum of strength" (Bryce, *ibid.*, p. 104). But it is evident that when two rulers exist side by side, one or the other must have higher authority and final precedence. There were great minds in the church, such as Hildebrand and Alexander, who were content

to have the State yield obedience to the Church and fulfil its behests. "It was reserved for Boniface VIII, whose extravagant pretensions betrayed the decay that was already at work within, to show himself to the crowding pilgrims at the jubilee of A. D. 1300, seated on the throne of Constantine, arrayed with sword and crown and scepter, shouting aloud: 'I am Cæsar; I am emperor'" (Bryce, *ibid.*, p. 106).

As might be expected, there was vigorous discussion over these growing claims, and while the advantage was now with the temporal power and now with the papacy, in the end the victory was usually with the Church. Pope Innocent IV claimed that, inasmuch as the Lord had committed to St. Peter the power of the keys, the apostle and his successors in office had control over all the spiritual and temporal affairs of the world. Not all the popes went to this length, but they one and all regarded the political sovereign as the right arm of their will, and they never hesitated to use that arm to put down opposition and to promote their own interests. The baleful effects of this alliance, both to the Church and the State, are writ large on the pages of history for all the world to read.

III. The Separation of the Church From the State. To tell the whole story of the separation of Church and State, both in theory and in fact, would require a volume, and cannot be here attempted. However, to understand this whole question, we must keep in mind some of the principles of the Reformation, as defined in a previous chapter.

From the time of Constantine, Church and State are in more or less close league and friendship, and each is found upholding the other in its projects. It must be said that many beneficent results grew out of this alliance, and the Church moved the State to issue many decrees

that made for human betterment and social progress. But with it all, as Bryce shows, as the State became milder and more Christian, the Church, which had assumed a worldly form to work out its purposes, became more worldly and grew less regardful of the interests of the people. Throughout the Middle Ages the State was generally autocratic and irresponsible, and was used by the powerful and unjust to exploit the people and to further their own schemes. Little by little the governments grew away from the people; one by one their privileges were taken from them; by degrees they were reduced to the condition of virtual vassalage and slavery. In Germany, in France, in Italy, in England, the same story is told—the commons claimed by the nobles and enclosed, the people reduced to serfdom, the rights of the people ignored, and their cries for redress scorned. Throughout the Middle Ages the Church itself became unspiritual and worldly, and the leaders of the Church, with few exceptions, vied with the rulers of the State in measures of oppression and spoliation. During all this time, with hardly an exception, the Church rulers sided with the civil rulers against the people, and employed the machinery of religion to keep them in submission. During the latter ages, when the power of the Catholic Church became supreme, the civil rulers lent their aid to suppress heresy and to compel the people to keep in the Church fold.

1. At various times, from the twelfth century onward, men and movements arise, now here, now there, in protest against all this. These movements have been looked upon as religious in spirit and aim, but while they were this they were no less political in the truest sense. The Waldensian movement in the Canton of the Vaud, the Wycliffe movement in England, the protest of Savonarola in Florence, the Hussite movement in Bohemia, the

Jacquerie in France, and the Peasants' war in Germany, were quite as much political as religious, for they, one and all, voiced a protest against the corruptions of the Church and the usurpations of the State. And in all of these movements men sought relief from the wrongs they suffered at the hands of both these institutions.

There were several causes that contributed to stir up the people to protest and revolt. For one thing, the wrongs endured had become unendurable and men felt that they had nothing to lose but their chains. Then, through the revival of learning, a new spirit of inquiry was abroad in the world, and many old forms and ideas began to be questioned and denied. Added to all this, and perhaps the most potent of all, the Scriptures were being translated into the language of the people, and men everywhere were beginning to sigh for that freedom which Christ had promised. The seed of the new age was sown in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and in the fifteenth and sixteenth the fruit began to appear. Two or three of the ancillary movements, making for the emancipation of both Church and State from the other's control, may be noted before we trace the main stream that flows ever onward.

It is sometimes supposed that Protestantism means the separation of Church and State, but this is very far from the truth. Protestantism is the one force that has made for this end, and its service to human emancipation is simply incalculable. But while Protestantism has done much to break the alliance between the Roman Church and the political State, it has not always been true to its fundamental principles. The great Reformers, Luther and Calvin, Knox and Erasmus, denied the right of the Roman Church to employ the civil power to compel faith or to punish dissent, but these men never came out into the full light of the complete separation of

Church and State. The fact is Luther did not hesitate to appeal to the secular arm against the Anabaptists and others. Lutheranism has ever been associated with monarchy and civil government; in no land has it ever meant political democracy; where it prevails Church and State are in firm alliance to-day. The name of Calvin is generally associated with a great system of theology; but the fact is Calvin was no less a statesman than a theologian. Calvinism, wherever it has appeared, whether in Switzerland or Scotland, has a theocratic tinge, and means the union, in part at least, of Church and State. Thus Calvin himself sought to establish a Christian commonwealth at Geneva, and for years he was its chief director. He drew up a Confession of Faith, which every citizen was required to sign, and thus Church and State were identical in their component members. In Scotland, since the time of Knox, Church and State have been more or less in union. The General Assembly asserted its "right to treat in an ecclesiastical way of greatest and smallest affairs, from the king's throne that should be established in righteousness, to the merchant's balance that should be used in faithfulness." In this land the free church movement has assumed large proportions, but it has not yet effected complete separation. In France an interesting chapter of history is being written. Here the various Churches are placed on an equal footing, so far as the State is concerned, and they can no longer impose civil disabilities upon men. From the side of the State separation is a fact both in theory and in practice; but from the side of the Roman Catholic Church this separation is denounced and the papacy is in conspiracy against the republic. For a long time to come there is likely to be friction between Church and State in France.

In the New England colonies the separation of Church and State was first achieved. But these colonies, with

hardly an exception, were for a long time essentially theocratic, with Church and State in closest union. In the Massachusetts colonies, both Puritan and Pilgrim, none but members of the churches could be citizens of the State. The Puritans were less tolerant than the Pilgrims, and sought to exercise a virtual control over man's whole inner and outer life. The Puritan commonwealth was cast in an ecclesiastical mold, and was designed to uphold the framework of the Church. The Church framed the legislation of the State and the State enforced the discipline of the Church. "There never was a government where the civil power was more completely under the sway of the Church than in Massachusetts Bay" (Straus, "Roger Williams," p. 45). In 1632 it was ordered that "To the end that the body of the commons be preserved of honest and good men. . . for the time to come no man shall be admitted to the freedom of the body politic but such as are members of some of the churches within the bounds of the same." The Pilgrims, while nonconformists like the Puritans, had gone much farther, and had separated themselves from the Established Church of England. Their varied experiences had carried them a long way toward religious toleration, and in their colony at Plymouth they showed a more tolerant spirit than their Puritan neighbors. In 1645 a majority of the House of Delegates were in favor of "an act to allow and maintain full and free toleration to all men who would preserve the civil peace and submit unto government; and there were no limitations or exceptions against, Turk, Jew, Papist, Arian, Socinian, Nicolaitan, Familist, or any other"; but the governor refused to put the question, and so stifled the law (Bancroft, "History of U. S.," Vol. I, p. 214). In all of these colonies Dissenters suffered some disabilities, and this condition of things continued down to a late date in

many of the American States; in fact, it was generations before the last trace of union was removed and Church and State were finally separated.

We must now turn back to follow the main stream that makes for the complete separation of Church and State in theory and in practice.

2. As we have seen, among the peoples of Germany and the Tyrol, there began a splendid movement in behalf of religious liberty. In 1524 the Anabaptists of Swabia drew up a declaration of principles that are prophetic of great things to come. These articles, which Hübmaier admitted under torture he had revised, declare that "Every commune has the right to choose its own pastor, who ought to teach the truth of God without human additions." In these significant articles there is the beginning of the doctrine of the complete separation of Church and State. These Anabaptists were ruthlessly suppressed throughout Germany, and many of the leaders, such as Hübmaier and Denck, suffered at the hands of the civil rulers. In the Netherlands, however, these people found somewhat more congenial conditions, and William of Orange openly defended them (Motley, "The United Netherlands," Vol. I, chap ii). Some of these Anabaptists sought refuge in England, and settled in the southern and eastern counties. In 1611 some English Baptists who had returned to Amsterdam promulgated a Confession, or declaration of faith, in which this article occurs:

"The magistrate is not to meddle with religion or matters of conscience, nor to compel men to this or that form of religion; because Christ is the King and Lawgiver of the church and conscience."

"It is believed that this is the first expression of the absolute principle of liberty of conscience in the public articles of any body of Christians" (Masson, "Life of

Milton," Vol. III, p. 101). This principle, it may be said, was the common heritage of the Baptists, whether on the continent or in England. For, in 1614, Leonard Busher, citizen of London, put forth a little tract on "Religious Peace, or a Plea for Liberty of Conscience." This, says Masson, is the earliest known English publication in which full liberty of conscience is openly advocated, and no one can read it even now without an inspiring thrill (*ibid.*, p. 102). This was followed the next year by a dialogue, "wherein it is proved by the law of God, by the law of our land, and by his majesty's many testimonies, that no man ought to be persecuted for his religion, so he testifie his allegiance by the oath appointed by law." This treatise by Murton was doubtless familiar to Roger Williams before going to America, but it was well known to him at a later time, for in his "Bloudy Tenent," he quotes largely from it. Thus Masson, than whom there is no more authoritative writer, declares: "Not to the Church of England, nor to Scottish Presbyterianism, nor to English Puritanism at large, does the honor of the first perception of the full liberty of conscience and its first assertion in English speech belong. That honor has to be assigned, I believe, to the independents generally, and to the Baptists in particular (Masson, "Life of Milton," Vol. III, p. 99).

In 1631 Roger Williams came to America to take charge of the Puritan church in Boston. He came to Massachusetts expecting to find the largest liberty in matters of religion, but he soon discovered that the government of the colony was most rigidly theocratic, with the civil government strictly subordinate to the ecclesiastical. Williams, though not yet a Baptist, held the Baptist idea with reference to the separation of Church and State, and he could hence ill brook this religious despotism. "I came from England to escape the

tyranny of the Lords Bishops, he said, and I do not intend to subject myself to the tyranny of the Lords Brethren." Church and State, he maintained, should be separate and independent, and the magistrate has nothing to do with matters of conscience. In July, 1635, he was summoned to Boston to answer the charges brought against him at the general court, which was then in session. He was accused of maintaining the dangerous opinion,

"That the magistrate ought not to punish the breach of the first table, otherwise than in such cases as disturb the civil peace" (Straus, "Roger Williams," p. 49). But Williams utterly refused to recant, and stoutly maintained his ground. In October he was again summoned, not to be retried, but to be sentenced, unless he would retract. Failing to move him, the general court then pronounced the sentence of banishment, and ordered him to leave the colony. In the dead of winter, in January, 1636, Williams secretly and in haste departed from Salem, leaving behind him his wife and children, and began his perilous exile alone, to seek a refuge from the tyranny of the church brethren. Some months later he was joined by a few companions, and together they sought an abode beyond the Massachusetts colony. Coasting along the shore they entered the Mooshausick River and landed at a place to which, in gratitude to "God's merciful providence to him in his distress," he gave the name of Providence. Here Williams founded a colony, in whose original compact, as Jellinek says, "for the first time was recognized the most unrestricted liberty of religious conviction." Some years afterward a more definite guarantee was given, and it was provided: "We agree, as formerly hath been the liberties of the town, so still, to hold forth liberty of conscience" (Staple's "Annals," p. 40). Thus, the first apostle of the

inherent and sacred rights of the individual conscience was "not Lafayette, but Roger Williams, who, driven by a powerful but deep religious enthusiasm, went into the wilderness in order to frame a government of religious liberty" (Jellinek, "Rights of Man and the Citizen," p. 77). The city of Providence, in recent times, has erected a statue to the memory of Roger Williams in grateful acknowledgment of his services to the cause of humanity. Williams, who is represented as about to speak in an assembly of the people, holds in his left arm a book, which he presses against his breast; on the cover may be read a date and two words, "Soul liberty." In this date and in these words we may sum up the glory of Providence and of the republic of which he was the founder.

3. The principle of soul liberty with the entire separation of Church and State, yet made its way very slowly in the other colonies. In many of them, however, there were men who believed most firmly in liberty of conscience, and were willing to endure affliction for truth's sake. In 1770 the Baptists of Virginia presented a petition to the house of burgesses remonstrating against the wrongs to which they were subjected, and praying for relief. James Madison and Patrick Henry defended the petitioners and did all in their power to secure them consideration and justice. It is also a matter of record that Thomas Jefferson was friendly to the Baptists. In 1774, James Madison, writing to a friend in Philadelphia, said: "That diabolical, hell-conceived principle of persecution rages among some, and to their eternal infamy the clergy can furnish their quota of imps for such purposes. There are at the present time in the adjacent county not less than five or six well-meaning men in close jail for proclaiming their religious sentiments, which are in the main quite orthodox."

But the Massachusetts colony was not one whit behind Virginia in its severity toward dissenters, and the early annals of that State record how Baptists and Quakers were flogged and distrained and imprisoned for conscience' sake. In 1774 the Baptists of New England drew up a memorial praying for relief from the oppressive measures to which they were subjected. This memorial contains a ringing manifesto of the doctrine of soul liberty, and opens with these memorable words: "It has been said by a celebrated writer in politics that but two things are worth contending for—religion and liberty. For the latter we are at present nobly exerting ourselves through all this extensive continent; and surely no one whose bosom feels the patriotic glow in behalf of civil liberty can remain torpid to the more ennobling flame of religious liberty." Then follows the statement that the inalienable rights of conscience are too high and sacred to be subjected to fallible legislators inasmuch as "this dignity belongs to God alone." Then follows also an account of the disabilities they have endured throughout the colony, with an appeal for relief and justice. This memorial, signed by John Gano, moderator, and Hezekiah Smith, clerk, was sent by the hand of Isaac Backus to be presented to the Continental Congress then meeting in Philadelphia. Then the war of the Revolution came on, and for a time all such questions were in abeyance.

After the Revolution came what has been called the critical period of United States history. The old articles of federation were found unsatisfactory, and a convention assembled in Philadelphia to take thought for the common safety. After weeks of debate and delay a constitution was framed that must be regarded as one of the great documents of the world. But many of the Baptist leaders who had all along been so insistent on soul liberty felt that it did not sufficiently guarantee this.

Patrick Henry even denounced the Constitution in that it had a monarchical squint and contained no guarantee of religious liberty. The Baptists generally accepted the Constitution, but none the less they felt that it should be amended in one respect at least; and throughout the country organizations were formed for the purpose of so amending it as to provide complete religious liberty. On Madison's election to the lower House he was consulted by a deputation of Baptists wanting to know what they must do in order to obtain some action on this question. Madison advised them to consult General Washington, which they did in an address entitled, "An Address of the Commissioners of the United Baptist Churches of Virginia, Assembled in the City of Richmond, August 8, 1789, to the President of the United States of America." In President Washington's reply he assured the petitioners of his sincere appreciation of their expression of confidence and promised to use his best endeavors to promote their prosperity (James, "The Struggle for Religious Liberty," pp. 173, 174). Within a month of this time James Madison, with the approval and concurrence of President Washington, brought in several amendments to the Constitution, and himself moved the adoption of "Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

For a century and more the United States stood practically alone in its assertion of this principle; but France has recently taken the final step to ensure the total separation of Church and State. In many lands a practical toleration of all faiths is permitted, but none the less there is some kind of union. In all enlightened lands,

however, the drift is plain, and the separation of Church and State is only a matter of time.

IV. The Relation of Church and State. Many attempts have been made, first and last, to define their relations, to find some *modus vivendi,* and to effect some compromise between these two great powers. No inquiry could be more fundamental and practical than this, for upon its right solution depend not only the peace and prosperity of the Church, but the life and perpetuity of the State. The time has come surely for men to consider the essential elements in the relations between these two powers, and then to adjust these relations in reason and right. It may be said that the attempted solutions of this question of the relation of Church and State have not by any means proved fully satisfactory, and this leads us to believe that there are certain factors that have been more or less ignored. There must be some positive relation that is both conceivable and possible, and this positive relation we must endeavor to find. A few considerations in behalf of this is all that can be here offered.

There are several possible relations that may exist between the Church and the State, and all of these find illustration in whole or in part in some age or place. There is first, the sovereignty of the one over the other, with the subordination of the one to the other. There is the union of the two in some form, with certain legal and formal conventions and agreements. There is the complete separation of the two, both in form and in spirit, with each keeping to its own province and making no formal recognition of the other. There is what may be called the higher unity of the two, with both cooperating, each in its own way toward a common end, and with the most friendly relations. And there is another possible conception, the gradual merging of the two in some larger whole, in which each shall lose its identity

and both shall find fulfilment in the perfected kingdom of humanity. The first three views are more or less historical and actual; the last two represent the goal toward which our humanity is making.

1. Sovereignty and subordination. There are those, as Hobbes, who maintain that the State should be sovereign in religion no less than in civil matters, and so far as there is any church at all, it should be under State control. This is State Cæsarism and, while it may have been possible under ancient forms of religion, it is simply impossible where Christianity is known. A church that is organized upon Christian principles, a church that acknowledges Jesus Christ as its Lord and life, cannot concede the sovereignty of the State in matters of faith and conscience; this far at least it must be independent.

The reverse of this view is found in the Roman Catholic conception, which asserts the virtual sovereignty of the Church over the State. The Romanist upholds this relation on the plea that the Lord Jesus is the one sole and supreme head over all things in heaven and on earth. But the church is created to represent him, and the pope as the head of the church is his vicar to govern in his name. Hence it follows that the church must be supreme and must have some headship over the State. This position of the Catholic Church is made plain in various declarations, in bulls and encyclicals. Thus Pope Pius IX, in his encyclical letter, December 8, 1864, anathematized "Those who assert the liberty of conscience and of religious worship"; also "All such as maintain that the Church may not use force." In a sermon preached when he was archbishop, Cardinal Manning puts into the mouth of the pope these significant words: "I acknowledge no civil power; I am the subject of no prince; and I claim more than this: I claim to be the supreme judge and director of the consciences of men; of the peasant

that tills the field, and of the prince that sits upon the throne; of the household that lives in the shade of privacy, and the legislator that makes laws for kingdoms. I am the sole, last, supreme judge of what is right and wrong." The Catholic claim, it is evident, is really the subordination of the State to the Church, rather than a union of Church and State.

In this Catholic view the church and the kingdom of God are practically synonomous terms and conterminous realms. They who are in the church are in the kingdom, and *vice versa*. *Nullus salus extra Ecclesiam.* There is no salvation outside of the Church. The kingdom of God is supreme over all human affairs, and as the church is the kingdom, at least in its human form, the church should be supreme over all human relations. The Catholic is logical at least in his argument, and granting his premises there is no escape from his conclusion.

2. The union of Church and State. The various Protestant bodies that advocate the union of Church and State adduce other reasons, and these are worthy of careful consideration. It is not an easy question to decide who shall be spokesmen, for many clear-sighted thinkers have dealt with this question, and while they agree in the main they differ widely in details. Perhaps no better representatives of the more moderate Protestant view can be found than Thomas Arnold and Bishop Martensen, though in saying this one seems to ignore such men as Hooker and Whately, Coleridge and Gladstone, Maurice and Westcott. But with it all these two may be taken as representatives of the higher and more Christian view of union. Thus Arnold saw, what many others have seen, that no State can long prosper and endure without religion; he protested also and most vigorously against the false distinction between secular and sacred things, as this distinction is accentuated by those who advocate the

separation of Church and State; and he counseled all sovereigns, magistrates, and legislators to regard themselves as functionaries of the Christian church. Further, he saw that there must be some sovereign power in society, and by the nature of the case there cannot be two sovereign powers; in so far as there are two powers each claiming to be sovereign, that far we have conflict. And so he pleaded for the identification of Christian with political society as the only mode of reconciling their differences and of bringing society to its true goal ("Fragments on Church and State; Life," Vol. I, p. 204).

Martensen believed very strongly in the Christian State, and no less strongly that the Christian Church is necessary for the existence, and the perfection of the State. He protested against the false notions of individualism and found in them the destruction of both religion and society. "They who advocate a free church, by desiring only a flock of awakened and regenerate men, abandon the great multitude of the young and ignorant who, unless some one takes them up, fall a prey to irreligion and all kinds of error." He would therefore have a State Church, which should represent all, which should claim all for the kingdom of right and truth, which should place all under the influence of tradition and authority, and should represent the kingdom of God on earth (Martensen, "Ethics, Social," Sec. 152-156).

The verdict of history upon the union of Church and State in any form or fashion does not speak in its favor. The more fully we study its historical aspects the more clearly do we see that it has resulted disastrously for both. It has meant the perversion of government from its rightful ends and its employment in behalf of measures that lay beyond its real purpose. It has meant the secularization of the church and its pursuit of ends

that lie beyond its true scope. The day the State became allied with the Church, that day it began to proscribe men for their opinions and to use its civil authority to guide their faith. In course of time inquisitions are built and prisons are filled with the best and bravest; through all the Middle Ages we find Church and State in league to suppress free thought and to forbid all dissent. "Half the wars of Europe, half the internal troubles that have vexed European States, from the Monophysite controversies in the Roman empire of the fifth century down to the Kulturkampf in the German empire of the nineteenth, have arisen from theological differences, or from the rival claims of Church and State" (Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, p. 554).

This is not all. The day that the Church became allied with the State, that day the State began to exert a repressive influence upon the Church, and that day the Church began to lower its standards to suit the convenience of the State. The Church was dependent upon the State for favors, and these favors were conditioned upon the Church's friendliness toward the powers that be. Under such circumstances the Church became the defender of the State. It became a silent witness of grave oppression where it did not openly defend it. Through all the Middle Ages there runs the same monotonous and doleful tale—the churches uniting with the nobility against the poor and defenseless and employing the machinery of religion to keep them submissive. The clergy admitted to a share of the wealth of the nobles, too often became the supporters of the nobles against the wronged and oppressed. It matters little what qualifying word is used, whether Romanist, Lutheran, Greek, or English Church, the same condition obtains and the same charge may be preferred. To-day in all lands where these Churches have long held sway,

we behold the same sad spectacle of the deep and bitter alienation of the people from the State Church. In Italy, in Spain, in France, in Russia, in Germany, and in England, we are confronted with the same momentous result. Because of this alliance with the State the Church has lost its power of testifying for God's kingdom and its righteousness, and has too often become the subsidized defender of the government in its schemes of spoliation and oppression. In view of the facts one is justified in saying that this union of Church and State is little else than the crime and blunder of the ages.

And the very argument that is advanced in favor of the alliance of Church and State breaks down in face of the actual facts. Thus, in lands where there is an Established Church, it is found that the Church is not at all conspicuous for its fidelity in shepherding the common people; indeed, quite the reverse is the case. For a thousand years and more the Church has been dominant in Italy, Spain, France, and Russia, and the amount of illiteracy in these countries is alarmingly great, while the moral life of the people is deplorably low. The condition of things, even in England and Germany, is not such as to admit of much boasting on the part of churchmen. From every point of view the union of Church and State has been attended with unfortunate consequences to both. It has not by any means made for the welfare of man or the progress of society, and contains little promise for the future.

3. The separation of the Church and the State. In modern times we find a large body of men who oppose the union of Church and State in any form. They maintain that either the subordination of the one to the other or the union of the two in any form is wholly unsatisfactory, in theory and application. They hence demand the entire separation of Church and State, and insist that there

shall be no alliance between them. Since we find different classes of persons demanding this separation, though from very different motives and with very different reasons, it is not easy to give a brief statement of this view. Thus Christians and unbelievers both advocate the same theory; and the agreement of parties so diverse is well calculated to occasion serious thought on the part of Christians themselves. Irreligious men demand the separation of the Church from the State on the ground that religion is a private matter, and that the State is best governed without any religious interference. In the name of religion men demand this separation on the plea that the union of the Church with the State is hurtful to the cause of true religion, and that it diverts the State from its proper functions.

It may be said that many of those Christians who advocate the separation of Church and State, do so on the ground that the church and the kingdom of God are practically synonymous terms. But they go farther than either the Romanist or the Protestant in their conception of the kingdom, and construe the term in its narrowest significance. With many of them the church, which is equivalent to the kingdom of God, is the one sacred realm of life, and all the other interests that lie beyond this realm lie practically outside of the kingdom. That sacred and divine things may be kept apart from secular and human things the church must be separated from the State. Not all Christians who advocate complete separation would agree to this statement; and many of those who believe most strongly in this separation have never thought their view through in all its bearings and implications. But the time has come for men to give a reason for their views, and to advocate the separation of Church and State for Christian reasons. Not one of the views thus far considered is wholly satisfactory, and not

yet have we found the real Christian reason for separation, nor the true relation between these two great divine institutions.

4. The Kingdom, the Church, and the State. We have seen that the subordination of the Church to the State is objectionable from every point of view, and cannot be admitted for a moment. The subordination of the State to the Church is no less objectionable, and impossible in these latter days. We have seen that the union of Church and State, in any form, is not satisfactory, and more and more men are growing away from this conception. We have seen also that the separation of Church and State, where such separation means suspicion and friction, where two great institutions exist side by side without any recognition on the part of either of the other's presence, is no less unsatisfactory and unchristian. It is admitted that the dualistic conception of life is not satisfactory, with the Church and the State each claiming authority over separate spheres; for life cannot be broken up in this fashion, and humanity cannot live under such a divided kingship without suffering irreparable loss in moral and spiritual power. Nor can it be claimed that we have found the final solution of the problem when we have established the free Church in the free State, for in such cases the boundaries of the two institutions are never clearly delimited and a hundred and one questions of jurisdiction are certain to arise. What we need, therefore, it is evident, is some conception of human society which shall include both the Church and the State, some great synthesis which shall show the relation of the one to the other and bring them into harmony. The controversies and conflicts between the two can never be ended by the conquest of the one by the other, but the submission of both to the whole of which they are only parts.

This larger whole, this great synthesis, Christians believe, is given to men in the great ideal of the kingdom of God. In these latter times they have begun to consider, as never before, this master thought of Jesus' teaching, and it is breaking upon them almost as a new revelation. It has become plain that the idea of the kingdom of God is a great all-comprehensive idea that defines the whole purpose of God for this world; it has become plain also, that the kingdom of God is a great social synthesis that includes within its scope the whole life of man. In this kingdom are included all his relations and institutions; and in it every man and every institution have their appropriate place and work. The three great institutions of men's life, the family, the Church, and the State, are all so many realms in which the life of the kingdom seeks expression and realization. These cover the entire range of human life, and their perfection implies the perfection of mankind. Each has its own functions to fulfil, though all co-operate toward the one common end. The kingdom of God, the divine ideal and human synthesis, includes all of these institutions; and these institutions are created and designed that they may seek the kingdom of God. Of each the life of the kingdom is the vitalizing and creative life; of each the principles of the kingdom are the great informing, constitutive, and architectonic ideas. Through each of these institutions some aspect of the kingdom is revealed and some interest of the kingdom is served; through all of these institutions together the whole life of man is blessed and the whole purpose of God is fulfilled.

The Church and the State are both institutions of the kingdom, and as such each has a work to do, and both sustain a vital relation to one another. The most stupendous and tragic blunder of the ages has been the confounding of the kingdom and the church, with the

claim of the church to be the kingdom of God. The kingdom is the larger category, and it alone is the final and eternal thing. All of the meaning of this great truth we cannot here consider, but in the conception of the kingdom of God, we are confident, is to be found the determination of the relation of Church and State.

5. The unity of the Church and the State in the kingdom. In the light of this great synthesis we find several things for our guidance.

The relations of the Church and the State are suggested by the very nature of the institutions themselves. The Church differs from the State in its nature and constitution. The church is a voluntary society made up of those who freely and fully make choice of Christ and accept membership in it. No man is a member of any church by virtue of his natural birth; in every church membership in the body is a matter of profession or of faith. Thus membership in the church is voluntary from beginning to end; continuance in the church and obedience to its teachings are matters of personal choice. The State, however, is a more or less natural institution, whose citizens are born within its territory and are subject to its jurisdiction. Citizenship in the State and obedience to its laws are thus in nowise dependent upon the voluntary act of man. By virtue of his birth one may claim his place; and by virtue of its nature the State may claim authority in all things that affect its life.

Again, the relations of Church and State are made evident by considering them with reference to their spheres and aims. The church has to do primarily with thoughts, motives, and affections, the moral and spiritual nature of man, and it accomplishes its best results by the use of moral and spiritual means. The State has to do primarily with external conditions; with the civil and social life of man; and may employ means to further

these interests. The reign of God includes the rule of Cæsar, and the rule of Cæsar should recognize the reign of God. With the things of God, with matters of conscience and questions of belief, Cæsar has nothing to do except so far as they lead to outward acts and unsocial conduct. The citizen whose outward life is above reproach may say to the civil ruler who would constrain in such matters: Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye; but we cannot but think and speak the things we deem true. Into the inner sanctuary of conscience where God and man meet, the civil magistrate dares not enter; there alone with God the soul must decide its course. The very nature of religion is travestied when Church or State seeks to enforce its opinions to compel the conscience and overpower the will. The very nature of the moral and spiritual life implies the soul's freedom. In all the world, says Kant, there is nothing that can be called unconditionally good except the good will; and the will is good in so far as it is free.

The Church and the State can best serve mankind and help one another by each being true to its own mission and each following its own method. Thus, with the particular policies of the churches, with their internal administration and discipline, the State has nothing to do. With questions of doctrine and worship, with the organization of the churches, with their officers and their succession, the State has no concern. For these matters lie wholly within the range of the individual conscience and spiritual administration, and the government as such has no obligation in such spheres. And on the other hand, with the particular policies of the State, with questions of administration and method, the churches have nothing to do. With political platforms and reform programmes the churches have no concern. But with the conscience

back of platforms, with the spirit finding expression in reforms, the churches have everything to do, and they neglect a large part of their mission when they neglect these things. The peculiar province of the church is the moral and spiritual nature of man; its special sphere is the conscience and the will; its method of work is instruction and persuasion; and its crown of glory is fallen into the dust when it descends from its throne and contemns its own methods.

6. Thus in the relation of each institution to the kingdom of God we see the relation between these institutions themselves. It is evident that both Church and State are subordinate to the kingdom, and so neither can be subordinate to the other without disloyalty to the great ideal for which they both exist. They who have claimed the subordination of the State to the Church have done so in the name of Jesus Christ. But it is strange that they have not seen the arrogance of their claim. Jesus Christ, the Christian believes, is head over all things, both principalities and powers, and it is a colossal assumption for any man or institution to claim headship for him. We could as easily tolerate a State supremacy over the Church as a Church supremacy over the State. The fact is the church itself is subordinate to Christ, and has no warrant for assuming lordship over the other spheres of life. The Romanist is eternally right when he claims that the State must be subordinate to Christ, and must seek his kingdom in the world; but he is as eternally wrong when he claims that Christ has delegated his authority to another, be that a man or an institution. The Protestant is eternally right when he demands the separation of Church and State in the interests of both, but he is as eternally wrong when he construes this separation to mean the divorce of religion from civil affairs and the abandonment of the State as a secular institution. The

fact is the age-long conflict between these institutions will cease and they will learn to live together in peace in the unity of the spirit, when each learns that it is here to serve the common life, and both begin to co-operate in behalf of man's social progress. In administration each is independent of the other, and neither should seek to control the other's machinery. The subordination of the Church to the State means the loss of spiritual freedom and authority on the part of the church; and the soul loses the sense of accountability to God in its subjection to the human power. The subordination of the State to the Church leads invariably to the secularization of the church, and means grave danger to the higher liberties of conscience. The devotion of each institution to the one great ideal of the kingdom of God on earth—though they may seek that kingdom by different methods—unites both institutions in many common enterprises and promotes a feeling of friendship between them. It may be that the time is coming when the Church and the State will gradually merge into each other, and that each will lose its identity in the perfected kingdom of humanity. The seer foretells the time when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our God and of his Christ. And the same seer beholds the city of God that comes down to earth, and declares that he saw no temple therein.

In conclusion, we find that the State, in order to be free, to make progress and fulfil its true functions, has had to separate itself from the church. And the church, in order to live its true life, to do its work and serve the higher interests of man, has had to free itself from the State and its dominion. But Church and State have become thus differentiated in form and function that they may become truly complementary institutions and may attain the higher unity of the spirit. In a word Church and

State attain a separate and distinct life, with each realizing its true functions in the world, yet with both cooperating toward the one end, in order that both may find their higher unity in the spirit and may together seek the kingdom of God.

XII

THE STATE AND ITS RELIGION

IN all ages and lands religion has been the potent factor in human life, and the central feature of human history. The chief fact with regard to a man, says Carlyle, is his religion. A comparison of beliefs and laws, says Fustel De Coulanges, will show that religion constituted not alone the Greek and Roman family, but formed a still larger association, the city, and reigned in that as it had reigned in the family. From it came all the institutions as well as all the private law of the ancients. It was from this that the city received all its principles, its rules, its usages, and its magistracies ("The Ancient City," p. 12). In religion, says Benjamin Kidd, we have the characteristic feature of social evolution; and the history of our Western civilization is largely but the life-history of a particular form of religion, and of wide-extending and deep-seated social movements connected therewith ("Social Evolution," chap. iv). "The truth is," says Professor Seeley, "that religion is and always has been, the basis of societies and States. It is no mere philosophy, but a practical view of life which whole communities live by. . . From history we learn that the great function of religion has been the founding and sustaining of States. And at this moment we are threatened with a general dissolution of States from the decay of religion" ("Natural Religion," pp. 201, 202). This means that the kind and quality of a people's religion will both create and determine their social and political institutions. And this means that the decay and degeneration of a people's

social and civil life can be traced back to the decline and decay of their religion. In view of all this the question of this chapter is probably the most vital that can engage our attention.

It is unfortunate that this larger question of the State and its religion has, in these Western lands in modern times, been narrowed down to the smaller one of the relation of Church and State. This latter question has played an important part in the history of political thought; and it promises to play an even more important part in the drama of the future. In the United States and France a temporary solution and a working *modus vivendi* have been discovered. But it is evident to all careful observers that the present relation is not by any means the solution of the problem, and the last word on the question has not been spoken.

It is unfortunate also that this smaller question of the relation of Church and State has had such a variety of answers in Western Christendom. For one thing, this whole movement in behalf of liberty of conscience and the separation of Church and State, has been largely negative in character. In fact, the entire democratic movement, as we have seen, has been in a marked degree a negative movement, and being such it has not had its perfect work. In this struggle for emancipation, liberty has appeared rather as a pioneer than as a builder; and though it has voiced a protest, it has not preached a gospel. For liberty that means simply the assertion of one's rights against another man's claims is only a half-truth, and must be supplemented by the other truth of the recognition of one's duties to man and to society. So also the principle of the separation of Church and State has had a negative application, and hence falls short of the Christian ideal. Too often it has meant suspicion and protest on the part of these two institutions as against

each other. Such an attitude is both misleading and dangerous, and cannot be the final thing. In protest against the evils and errors of the union of Church and State—evils that cannot be exaggerated, and errors the most pernicious—men are in danger of going to extremes and of living by negatives.

For another thing, the separation of Church and State, with many, has meant the divorce of religion from civil and social affairs. From the side of religion and from that of politics men have taken this view. They have said that religion is wholly a personal matter, and has to do with the inward and spiritual life; at least, it is concerned with the relation between God and man, and has nothing to do with secular concerns. Others have said that the State is wholly a secular institution with its own life and work; and it can best fulfil its mission and promote social well-being without any reference to religion. No mistake, it may be said, could be more fatal than this, both from the side of religion and from the side of the State; and no policy could lead to more disastrous results both in State and in Church.

For a third thing, this question of the separation of Church and State, with all its incidental questions, has brought us face to face with one of the most serious dangers that can threaten a people. In the lands where this separation has been effected it is found that the religious world is broken into different Churches and organizations. These bodies have their own views of truth and their own interests to serve, and each is more or less suspicious of the others. On this account it is found impossible to secure any unity of action in religious education and social reform. There is an imminent danger, as Sir Oliver Lodge shows, lest the nation in despair of any happier settlement of this question, should consent to a system of *compulsory* secularism, and forbid in the

schools any mention of a Supreme Being. And "if so ghastly a negation is brought about by the warfare of denominationalism, it will be a most lamentable result" ("The Substance of Faith," p. iv). In view of all this it is necessary that men deal with this larger question involved in the problem, and consider the place of religion in the life of the State. But in order to do this we must know something of the nature of religion itself, and especially of that form known as the religion of Christ. In much of the discussion of this mooted question there lurks a serious error, due largely to the fact that neither party understands the other's terms.

I. The Nature and Function of Religion. It is not possible here to enter upon a full discussion of the nature of Christianity or to attempt to define its sphere. It may be said, however, that Christianity does not mean many of the things that men have tried to make it mean. It is a serious question whether the men who have tried to delimit the Christian spirit have not done the very thing against which Jesus protested with his life.

1. It is needless here to give the varied definitions of religion that have been framed. In all of these definitions there are certain elements in common, and these are the essential and constant qualities. Religion, in one aspect at least, is the sense of man's relation to the Divine Ruler of the world, with the sense of dependence upon, and obligation to him. Religion, in another aspect, is the sense of the ideal in human life, with an earnest direction of the affections and will toward that ideal and the abiding effort to realize it in daily life. And thus it is that religion comprehends the highest ideals, the deepest emotions, the strongest obligations, and the most potent efforts of the human heart and will. In fine, it may be said that religion is the apprehension of the divine ideal by man, with his emotions in presence of this ideal.

This is religion in general, but the Christian religion means this with one element added, and this is the personal element. The religion of Christ is the sense of one's relation to the heavenly Father, with the sense of dependence upon him and the filial desire to do his will. In the other aspect it is the apprehension of the ideal of Christ, both for man and for society, with a whole-hearted devotion to him and an all-controlling desire to realize his ideal in life and in society.

2. For a second thing, we find that religion ever tends to become organic and to express itself in forms and institutions of some kind. This is true of all religions, and it is peculiarly true of the Christian religion. Always and everywhere the Christian spirit tends to incarnate itself in forms and institutions that express its life and become identified with its fortune. And yet it is evident that religion is one thing, and the institutions of religion are quite another thing. For this reason they wholly misunderstand the nature of Christianity who would identify it with any of the forms and formulas which it has created. It is a serious error to think of Christianity as a vague, abstract, indefinite spirit that can live in the air and subsist without any form or habitation. But it is a no less serious error to limit Christianity to certain definite and specific institutions, and to bind up its fate and fortune with any of the institutions that may bear its name. The ideal is one, but the ideals are many. Religion is one, but religions are diverse.

3. Again, to know the sphere of Christian manifestation we must know what is the essential idea of Christianity. It has become evident that the idea of the kingdom of God is the very center and circumference of the Christian system. This idea is woven into the warp and woof of the Christian Scriptures. It is the master-thought of Jesus' life and teaching. It is the central

truth of Christianity around which all other truths stand, and from which they derive their meaning. This kingdom is nothing less than the inner and essential meaning of the world.

The kingdom of God, for the present at least, is an ideal hovering high over the actual life of the world. But every ideal with vitality seeks embodiment in some man or society or institution, and this is peculiarly so of the ideal of the kingdom. In the lives of men this life of the kingdom is seen, and there are men who stand forth as living representatives of the kingdom of God. But the kingdom is not only a personal ideal, but a social ideal as well; in fact, our whole humanity is designed to be the habitation of God through the Spirit (Eph. 2 : 22). In what is called the church we have one of the institutions of the kingdom and one of the agencies for its extension in the world. But a natural and inevitable question meets us at this point: Is the church the sole institution of Christianity? When the Christian spirit has created the Christian church, has it fulfilled its whole mission in the world? The very conception of the religion of Christ, the very ideal of the kingdom of God, forbids such a conclusion. And so we must widen the boundaries of the kingdom till they have included all the relations and institutions of man's life, the family, and the State, no less than the church. The kingdom of God is not an institution, and it never can be wholly contained in one. Yet it is designed to be the vitalizing, informing, constitutive principle of every institution on earth or in heaven. In the kingdom of God are found those necessary social, architectonic principles which are at once the fundamental basis, the regulative ideal, and the constitutive power of all human relations, interests, and institutions. The church is thus one of the institutions of the kingdom, but the church and the kingdom are not by any means iden-

tical and conterminous. The kingdom is the larger category and includes not alone the church, but all the other institutions and relations of man's life.

4. This enables us to see the relation of the religion of Christ to the life of the State. By the very nature of the case the principles of Christ cannot be limited to any one sphere of life, but must apply to all life and must color all relations. The religion of Christ, which is the religion of the kingdom of God, must have to do with civic and social affairs no less than with personal and ecclesiastical matters. By the nature of the case it must create and determine all the institutions of man's being. The church is one of the institutions of the Christian spirit, an important one indeed; the one institution that is in a way especially charged with the task of propagating religion. But this does not mean that the other institutions of man's life, such as the family and the State, are non-religious realms, and that with them religion has consequently little or nothing to do. The religion of Christ is as free as the air and as universal as the sunshine, and it can no more be limited to the church than the sunlight can be confined in one room, or the air can be claimed by one person. By its very nature it is diffusive and universal, and is designed to include all life and to determine all relations.

For this reason they who would exclude religion from political affairs show an utter misconception of the nature of religion and the work of the church. It matters not whether this divorce is pronounced in the name of religion or of politics, it is wrong in principle and pernicious in results. They who say that the church is the one sole institution of religion, and that religion has nothing to do with social and political affairs, utterly misconceive the work of the church and the nature of religion. They who say that the State is a non-religious realm, and

with it Christianity has nothing to do, misunderstand the nature of Christianity and the meaning of the State. Religion is a universal principle and has to do with all life. The church is one of the institutions of religion, but the State needs religion as much as the church.

5. The modern argument in favor of the separation of Church and State has too often been based on wrong premises. For one thing, it has been assumed that the Church has to do with sacred things and the State with secular interests, and inasmuch as these realms are separate and isolated, Church and State must be separate. And so it has come about that life has been parceled out between these different institutions and life itself has become a dualism. Under the dominion of this false conception it has come about that the separation of Church and State has meant about the same thing as the exclusion of religion from political affairs. Thus, as illustration, we find a careful writer saying: "It is, in fact, quite superfluous to show in this age that from their own inherent nature divine and moral sanctions can have no application to political matters." Again: "The two domains of political and divine obligations are thus not only exclusive (not necessarily exclusive as relating to particular acts, but only as to the character of the sanction applied) but, from the individual standpoint, often contradictory" (Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," pp. 52, 53). A more ominous implication, a more unfortunate confusion of terms, it is hard to find in any thoughtful writer. The writer's meaning, it must be confessed, is not quite clear. If he means that the will of God, to the man who believes in God, has no application to political matters, he is guilty of political atheism. If he means that divine sanctions, as men conceive those sanctions, have no relation to political matters, he is guilty of hopeless confusion of thought. The writer cannot mean that the great

world of political interests is non-moral and that political relations have no moral quality. The writer, we must feel, has fallen into the error of so many theorists in our time who attempt to make economic and political questions matters of pure science without any relation to moral content or religious quality. The great sciences of man and society, it is needless to say, cannot thus be divided off from the great worlds of morality and religion. The fact is, ethical principles cannot work in a vacuum and the Christian spirit cannot be separated from human life. The field of manifestation of both ethics and religion is human life and society with all their varied interests and relations. The religion that is occasional is no religion at all.

The fact is, the faith of the Christian is a principle of action, and the religion of Christ is a social gospel. Christianity teaches that the whole of life is to be lived in all its interests and relations under the direct dominion of the Christian ideal; and that the present sphere of manifestation of the Christian principle is this present life with its families, its churches, and its States. "It is a shallow and unworthy view of religion that would so etherealize and spiritualize it, as to dissever it from all interference with a man's secular trade, his political activities, or his very amusements" (Williams, in "Madison Ave. Lectures," p. 439). No error could be more fatal to true religion than the attempt to make it a private matter, to isolate it from the wider interests of life, to consider it as limited wholly to certain so-called sacred and religious provinces of life. And, on the other hand, they wrong the State and undermine its very foundations and destroy the very hope of progress, who would exclude religion from it, and would build political institutions upon a purely secular basis. The fact is, they who hold this view of things have the whole verdict of history

and the whole testimony of life against them. To rule religion out of politics is therefore as impossible as it is erroneous; in fact, it dishonors religion by making it appear not as the friend, but as the foe of man; and it dishonors the State by making it appear as a godless realm, with which religion has nothing to do. The fact is, as Bascom reminds us, when religion separates its duties from those we owe to men, it easily becomes fanciful and fanatical, and misses the forces which are promoting spiritual progress in the world. But when religion takes as its own this very field of the moral relations which hold between men—and between men and God—it adds the highest incentives to those already present; it has before it an urgent and definite work, and the largest inspiration for its accomplishment (Bascom, "The Words of Christ," pp. 133, 134).

II. The Ideal of the Christian Religion and of the Political State. The writer is not unaware of the charge that may be brought against him at this point by some who call themselves practical men. When a man begins to talk of ideals in political matters, they say, it is time for practical people to part company with him and leave him to his dreams. At the risk, therefore, of being set down as a dreamer, the author yet ventures to consider the relation of the ideal of the Christian religion to the political State.

There is no term that is more sadly misunderstood than this term ideal, or one more generally overworked than the term practical. For we soon find that he who talks so much of the real and the practical is the true visionary and the wholly impractical man. He has seen but a part of life, he has no standard of measurement, and does not know real values. There are others, calling themselves politicians and sometimes statesmen, who affect an indifference to ideals and dreams on the plea that the things

which really concern mankind are tariff schedules and civil statutes. Practical men have no time for trifles and for trifling; and statesmen have no strength to spend in chasing rainbows. Here, again, it is evident that the really practical man is wiser and clearer-visioned than all this. The really practical statesman knows his age and his people; but he looks out upon the world, and he knows both the end to be attained and the road that must be traveled; he knows the best policy for to-day because he knows the true direction of human progress. The ideal is the truly real. The real never finds firm foundations till it rests upon the ideal. "The only effective realists are the idealists."

1. The first thing that men need is some conception of man, some ideal of human society, some sense of direction in human progress, some great synthesis that shall give life unity and meaning. "That which gives life its keynote," says a suggestive writer, "is not what men think good, but what they think best. . . Not the criminal code, but the counsel of perfection shows us what a nation is becoming" (Wedgewood, "The Moral Ideal," p. 373). "Virtuous conduct," Socrates used to say, "that is ignorant of its end is purely accidental." To the man with no harbor in view one port is as good as another. The history of progress will show that mankind has risen in the scale of life as it has recognized ideals and has sought to follow them. "Take man as you find him," Lilly suggests, "in London, in Bagdad, in Pekin, in Ava. Follow him through his twenty-four hours of work or amusement, of eating and sleeping. What is it that makes him something more than matter in movement? The influence of some great idea, some true thought coming to him from Jesus Christ, from Mohammed, from Confucius, from Gotama, that has mainly formed the spiritual atmosphere which he breathes and by which, uncon-

sciously, his moral being lives" (Lilly, "Contemporary Review," 1885). The fact is, man's conduct is moral and rational in so far as it is shot through and through with intelligence and purpose.

"Where there is no vision the people perish." Some conception of life men must have if they are to live worthy lives. Some ideal they must cherish if they are to live with forethought and hope. Some sense of direction there must be if they are to march with vigor and purpose. Some great synthesis must obtain if men are to unify their efforts and marshal their forces into one army. Reason tells man that there must be some meaning to life, some ideal for society, some goal for the world, some synthesis large enough to comprehend all lower aims and give them meaning. And hence it follows that man is but obeying the deepest and strongest imperative of his nature when he seeks to know this meaning and to discover this ideal, to discover this goal and to formulate this synthesis. Well then may Frederic Harrison, in a plaintive way, expostulate with men because they are not more eager in seeking to know the meaning of life and to define the ideal of society. "Strange," he says, "that we do not all day and night incessantly seek for an answer to this of all questions the most vital. Is there anything by which our nature can gain its unity? our race acknowledge its brotherhood?" ("Nineteenth Century," March, 1881). If the religion of Christ can help man at this point, it will help him at the point of his deepest need.

This is not all; for not only do men need an ideal, but they must have a right ideal. If they have false ideals they may lose themselves in the wilderness. If they have right ideals they will march with confidence and will gain the promised land. About the middle of the eighteenth century a brilliant Frenchman put forth a couple of books, one dealing with education and the

other with politics. There is much in these books that is true, but there is much also that is vicious and misleading. Yet these books of the speculative Rousseau had far-reaching results, and his "Social Contract" was probably one of the most potent factors in causing the French Revolution. At any rate it is a matter of history, as Carlyle reminds us, that the books of this sentimentalist were, during the Reign of Terror, bound in the tanned skins of French noblemen.

On the other hand, some nineteen centuries ago, in a little out of-the-way Roman province, a young man, known as the Carpenter of Nazareth, came forth from his shop with a great vision. He gathered around himself a few disciples, simple-minded men and peasants most of them, and they lived with him long enough to catch that vision and to lift their eyes with him toward the far horizon. Then, before many months had passed, the poor blind world, impatient with this visionary who wanted a better world—a kingdom of God on earth he called it—conspired against him and crucified him between two malefactors. But to-day the ideal of the Galilean is leading the upward march of the world, and the spirit of his life is the most potent force in our civilization. Not the least service of Christianity to the world is the high ideal of man which it brings, and the true direction of progress which it points out. It is just here that religion meets man and proves its worth; just here that Christianity proves its claim to be the final religion.

This is so, for the reason that religion represents man's highest conception of the world and his loftiest ideal of God. "In the truest sense God is the summit of each of our consciences taken one by one, and overshadows every transient life with an eternal and sacred authority" (Martineau, "Study of Religion," Vol. II, p. 49). Re-

ligion rests upon this conception of God and his relation to man, and every religion contains some conception of God's being and defines some aspect of his purpose in the world. Hence it follows that religion is the highest and best conception that man can form of the world and its meaning, and contains his largest and most comprehensive ideal for life and for society. And that particular form of religion known as Christianity is especially important both in its personal and its social aspect, for the reason that it is the highest and purest form of religion in the world, and contains the highest and purest conception of man and society.

2. In all right political thought there must be some metapolitical element. That is, there must be some conception over and above the present order that shall give man a sense of direction and shall furnish a standard against which to measure present policies. It will be granted that the State exists for the promotion of human welfare and good life. But what is human welfare? And when can we say that good life is attained? The Declaration of Independence affirms that men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But why are such things good? The utilitarian view of the State affirms that we must seek the greatest good of the greatest number. Be it so; but what then is the greatest good? It is said that those things are good for man which tend to promote fulness of life, as those things are evil which tend to detract from that fulness. Be it so; but then we must ask, what is meant by this fulness of life? Before we can answer any of these questions it is evident that we must have some conception of man in his nature and his possibilities. And the same questions may be asked with reference to human society and to social programmes. What is the true goal of

society? What movements may be classed as progress, and what must be considered as loss? When human interests conflict, as they do in every society, which shall have the supremacy? We cannot know whether a certain measure makes for the welfare of society till we know what man is and have brought all of his interests into consideration. The fact is, man has interests that can neither be measured by the foot rule of expediency, nor fully defined in any statistical tables.

The relation of religion to the State is important, whatever may be the type of that religion, but it is doubly important when that religion is Christianity. For "its far-reaching importance lies not so much in its directly political assertions, as in that suprapolitical or metapolitical element which it introduced into the world, by which we mean that which precedes the political as its presupposition, that which lies outside and beyond it as its aim and object, and by which the political element is to be pervaded as by its soul, its intellectually vivifying principle. The metapolitical element consists in the duly proportioned view of man, of human nature, and of the ultimate object of human life; and the true metapolitic is in our opinion that Christian view of the world and of life which throws an entirely new light upon the State, by placing it in relation with a kingdom which is not of this world, and thus forcing it to recognize its own position as a mere medium, as destined to subserve this more exalted kingdom" (Martensen, "Christian Ethics, Social," sec. 45). In the Christian conception of the kingdom of God on earth we have a great social ideal which includes the lives of men and the societies of earth, and in this ideal we see the relation between the progress of the State and that great purpose which is being worked out in the world. In the last analysis politics is faith in action, and progress is applied religion.

3. In this true metapolitic we find those great principles which shall guide the State in its efforts to promote social welfare. The State that is true to itself is seeking to promote life and is seeking to create conditions which shall make for the development of society. No institution, no power on earth so holds in its grasp the weal or woe of mankind as the State. The social order, the national sentiments, the governmental regulations, the social environment influence immeasurably for good or ill every soul within their reach. The State is the nursery of men, and unless noble men are being produced every great end of the State is thwarted. Politics is the science of social welfare, and has at heart the achievement of a social order in which the person shall be developed and the ideals of humanity shall be realized. In the last analysis the true wealth of States is to be measured, not in terms of material resources, but in the growth of moral ideals. And in the last analysis it will appear that all material resources, such as wealth, property, and food, have value in so far as they minister to the spiritual life of man. In themselves these things have no value, but for what they will accomplish in man and for society they acquire an infinite value. Even economics go out at last into theology. There is a gospel ring in the words of Ruskin: "The wealth of a man consists in the number of things he loves and blesses, and in the number of things he is loved and blessed by." The true use of material resources is found in their power of ministering to the mental and moral and spiritual life of man. In the final count government is essentially a moral and spiritual process; and in the ultimate analysis it is directed not to material, but to spiritual ends.

4. Again, in this true Christian metapolitic, we find those great principles which shall guide men in the framing of laws. We shall assume at this stage of our study

that the State has some great end to serve, and that this end is the development of man and the promotion of human welfare. That the State may fulfil its end, laws must be enacted and executed, and in the last analysis these laws are but the definition and interpretation of the social ideal. What now is the source of authority in the State? This question lies at the foundation of all law. What is the standard of social right? There must be some standard of right, otherwise we are turned adrift on the wide sea of moral uncertainty. There must be some reason why the members of a State should submit to the law that is over them, if they are to be rational creatures, and the State is other than an absolute autocracy. There must be for man some supreme rule of right, some supreme standard of conduct, both for men and for States. Our preferences are no standard, and our interests create no right. No number of personal preferences can ever add themselves up into an adequate and satisfactory public standard, as no amount of compromise and expediency can ever formulate itself into a final and authoritative will. There can be nothing in the mass that was not in the elements. By no transmutations and manipulations of interests and preferences can we bring out the product of a human right and a political authority. Always and everywhere the men who have opposed tyranny have appealed to an authority and standard beyond the will of man and higher than his preference. If we deny this right of appeal by denying the existence of an Appellate Court, we have made way for usurpation and tyranny. If we admit this right of appeal, we thereby admit that there is a right and will higher than the will of one man or of any number of men. Not one man, not one million of men can make a right or constitute a final authority. The decision and decree of the million, if freely expressed and fairly registered, may establish a

strong presumption in favor of right, and may be accepted as a working standard of right. And this means that there must be something over and above us all which we all accept and to which we all may appeal. Thus we are driven by the most inexorable logic to declare our allegiance to the Christian metapolitic.

5. Finally, in this Christian conception of the State, we find those principles that can adjust the competing interests of men and bring them into social peace. The one who may endeavor to harmonize these clashing interests and decide some of the questions at issue will find himself handicapped by the fact that the parties to the controversy have each a different standard of ethics, and neither litigant will recognize the validity of the other's code. It is needless to say that these conflicts of men, these clashings of interests can never be adjusted by the power of one interest to assert itself against all competitors; neither can they be adjudicated by any patched-up truce or temporary compromise. It is evident that we never can have social peace till some way can be found of harmonizing all of these interests and of giving each its due.

The one need of society is a great central tribunal of moral judgment to which all may appeal, and where each may receive due consideration. This means that there must be some conception of man, some ideal of society, some standard of right, some supreme synthesis that shall include all lower ideals and be the final authority. No one has more clearly stated the difficulties that arise because of these conflicting interests than Mazzini, and no man has more clearly shown the service which Christianity can render to society by providing men with this human ideal and social synthesis. "Suppose the interests of one individual temporarily opposed to those of another, how will you reconcile them, except by appealing

to something superior to all rights? . . Suppose an individual revolting against the bonds of society; he feels himself strong; his inclinations, his faculties, call him to a path other than the common; he has a right to develop them, and he wages war against the community. Consider well what argument can you oppose to him consistently with the doctrine of rights?" ("Democracy in Europe," II). Considerations of utility, he justly shows, are not sufficient, for appeals to enlightened self-interest only add to the confusion. Repudiating his opinions or suppressing them by force is foolish and tyrannical. It may be said that each man should desire not alone his own well-being, but the well-being of society; each man should learn to subordinate his own wishes to the rational will of all. "Should? And why? Do you not see that you are appealing to another principle —to a religious principle? Do you not see that you have invoked something superior to all the individualities that constitute your society; something superior to all laws that you can promulgate in the name of utility?" (*ibid.*). The one principle which is superior to all other principles is the religious principle. Thus "to attain our object we must go back to principles; must reattach the nations which now go about groping their way in empty space to the laws of progress; to humanity; to God." And this is the very thing that Christianity aims to do; this is the very service that it renders society. In a word, it provides us with an ideal and synthesis large and comprehensive enough to include all the lesser ideals and interests of man; it contains those great principles of social right and justice which can harmonize the conflicting interests of society and can adjust the relations of the one and the many.

III. Religion and the Social Forces. It is evident that some power or influence is needed which shall unite men

in social fellowship, which shall induce them to take thought for the common life and to subordinate their preferences to the common welfare. In view of the large place that the average man is called to occupy in the democratic State, it is evident that the need of this power and influence is greatly accentuated. Democracy, we have agreed, is the confession of human brotherhood; it is the recognition of common aims and the confession of mutual obligations; and democracy is hence simply impossible without faith and fraternity and self-sacrifice.

1. Various attempts have been made to define and classify these social forces and influences. A brief consideration of the difference between the social machinery involved and the social forces operative through that machinery may enable us to appreciate the problem before us.

In all times men have placed great reliance upon such purely external and material means as the sword and the machinery of government. This study is concerned with the State in its relation to man's life and to social progress. To set a low estimate upon government —the organized agency of the State—is to deny our very thesis and convict ourselves of solemn trifling. The State, we believe, is one of the most important agencies of man's life, and has a most marked influence upon social welfare. It is the only institution that represents the whole people, and is the only agency through which they can co-operate in their search after progress. But we need to keep in mind a distinction which is vital, a distinction which, if heeded now, will save us from much confusion in the end. The State is the people organized in a political capacity in behalf of the common good; and this means the co-operation of all in behalf of the common welfare. The government is the machinery of the State; and government is thus a *means* and not a *source* of power.

Government, as such, is wholly ineffective and impotent; it invents nothing, and never has invented anything; like all other machinery, it produces results that bear a direct relation to the power communicated. Organization is necessary that the best results may be achieved, and the machinery of the State is of untold value. But the real function of government is transmissive, and not originative. When used as a transmitter and distributor of power, it is capable of immeasurable results. The machinery of government of itself and by itself is weak and impotent, and its real power depends upon those social forces which use it as an agency and work through it as a means. The real forces of society we see lie behind the machinery of government and work through it.

Efforts have been made to analyze and define the nature of these forces that operate in society and work through the State. What are the motives that determine men's conduct? What are the forces that mold society? It has been assumed that knowledge of the right, intellectual ideas, enlightened self-interest, the greatest good of the greatest number, are the great desiderata; and given these, all other things will follow. The best sociological thought is thrown fairly against these assumptions. In his "Psychic Factors of Civilization," Professor Ward has shown that the intellect is not a social force at all, but simply a directing agency, and that the real forces are psychic, being such things as desires and emotions of various kinds and degrees ("Psychic Factors," pp. 222, 55). With these conclusions agree such investigators as Professor Ross, who declares that sociology is chiefly a psychical science. "Its causes are to be sought in mental processes, its forces are psychic forces, and no non-psychic factors should be recognized until it is shown just how they are able to affect motive and choice" ("Foundations of Sociology," p. 161); and Professor

Small, who says that "the sociologists have done their part to show that the most significant factors of life are the work of mind, and not the grinding of machinery." "At the same time we must protest against the tendency to accept interpretations in terms of mental action, which is merely a process analogous with a mechanical process. The real explanation must be found in the spiritual initiative, which is superior to mechanical causation" ("Gen. Sociology," p. 639).

In like manner all attempts to find the moving forces of society in such considerations as self-interest and utility signally fail at the crucial point. We may grant that man is a being susceptible to pleasure and pain; we may admit that a constant effort on his part is to seek the one and to avoid the other; we may say that true wisdom is shown in the pursuit of useful and pleasurable things both for self and for others, and we may also affirm that nothing is really good for society that is bad for the individual. But when we watch the principle of utility as a power of social action we find that it fatally breaks down and refuses to work. As Mazzini has said in such eloquent words, "there are no arguments that can convince a man that his utility consists in sacrificing a part of his enjoyments for the common enjoyment. In the name of utility who will say to a people, 'In the name of thy own advantage, sacrifice thyself! In the name of thy well-being, die!'" ("Democracy in Europe," III). There was at the bottom of the cup of hemlock which Socrates drank, something more than a calculation of pleasure or disappointed expectation.

We speak sometimes of the power of ideas, and place great reliance upon their dissemination among the people. There is a grave danger here, and error at this point leads to bitter disappointment in the end. Professor Ward has shown with keen insight that ideas alone are not suffi-

cient, and that the *soul* is the great transforming agent, the power behind the throne of reason in the evolution of man ("Psychic Factors," p. 49). Long ago other teachers recognized this; thus Confucius writes: "I have made vain efforts to put men who wish to walk in it, on the way to wisdom; not succeeding, I have no recourse but tears." And Marcus Aurelius cries, "Protest till you burst, men will go on all the same." Right ideas, correct principles are important, yea, they are necessary, but when standing alone they are wholly impotent and ineffective. But let them be filled with conviction and emotion, let them be thrilling and throbbing with moral and spiritual fervor, and they are the mightiest forces beneath the sun and become the potency of world-wide results.

The more closely we study the facts of life, and the less we are misled by symbols, the more clearly do we see that the real forces that move men and operate in society are psychic and spiritual forces. Man, in the last analysis, is a psychic and spiritual being, and not a mechanical and physical being. External pressure and material conditions may have much to do with his life, but they influence him just so far as they affect his thought and persuade his will. The ideas of others, the commands of his masters, may have much to do with the color of his thought and the bent of his life, but in and of themselves they have no power over him. The common assumption that there are some mystic and objective powers in the world that in some strange and occult way exert a kind of external and irresistible pressure upon men, controlling their wills and shaping their lives without their knowledge or consent, is one that cannot stand for a moment in the light of modern psychology. The fact is, the real powers that work in man and in society, the powers that are potent and effective, are not abstract

and objective powers, but psychic and spiritual. They are such powers as work in men and through men; that is, such powers as can inform the mind and quicken the conscience, that can enchain the affections and arouse the will; they are such forces as reside in the brave heart, the steady purpose, and the unflinching hand; in a word, they are psychic, moral, spiritual, religious forces. In the last analysis it thus appears that the real powers of life and society are those very powers that find their highest and fullest expression in what we call religion.

2. The moment we consider the essential nature of religion, that moment we see its great potency as a social force. By religion, as we have seen, we mean the sense of man's relation to the invisible and divine Ruler of the world. Religion may or may not be concerned primarily with the belief in another life; thus we find that the religion of the ancient Hebrews was almost wholly destitute of this belief; at least it was not by any means a primary and commanding feature of their religion. But religion always rests upon a belief in God, and is inspired with a sense of obligation to do his will; and religion always represents man's highest conception of the world and his highest conviction of duty. In the purest form of religion, as we believe—that represented by the religion of Jesus of Nazareth—the central place is given to the great conception of God as Father and man as child. And implied and involved in it all, woven into the very warp and woof of the Christian system, we find the conception of a divine society on earth, fashioned according to the will of God and filled with the spirit of Christ. In its essence, as Fairbairn shows, it is a mighty plan, splendid in its efficiency for the construction from the base upward, of a humanity or a society, that shall in all its parts, through all its members, and in all their relations, express and articulate the righteous will of God (Fair-

bairn, "Religion in His. and Mod. Life," p. 141). Thus the various lines of investigation converge at the one point, and we see that religion is the most potent force that can work in man and in society. The forces that are needed in society are psychic and spiritual forces, and in religion we find the very forces that are required to make men social beings and to inspire them to labor for the common welfare.

3. The study of history shows that religion is the chief factor in human life and social progress. In saying this we are not blind to the evils and miseries that have been caused by religion, nor do we forget that it has been one of the chief instruments in man's oppression and enslavement. We do not refuse to read those pages which tell how religion has been used to suppress men's aspirations and to make them satisfied with their masters. We do not forget either how religion has been associated with the most gross and cruel superstitions, and has filled the mind of man with named and nameless terrors. The fact is, there are no wrongs and cruelties that cannot be traced back either directly or indirectly to religion.

But this story of the perversion of religion, black as that story is, bears testimony to the potency of religion in the life of man. The perversion of the greatest good is the worst evil, and the very abuses of religion testify to its immeasurable potency. In the highest form of religion, that represented by Christianity, we find few of these negative and objectionable features, while it is filled with those that are positive and inspiring. Of course, the social and political value of any religion will depend in the last analysis upon the character of the religion itself. In this respect Christianity has an immeasurable advantage over all the other religions of the world, for the reason that it is unique in several aspects. For one thing, it gives us the highest and worthiest con-

ception of man; for "There is no religion which regards with such respect the individuality of man, and seeks so sympathetically to guide, foster, and develop it, and eventually assigns to it a destiny so glorious" (Dennis, "Christian Missions and Social Progress," Vol. I, p. 419). Not only so, but Christianity gives in the clearest and most positive terms the conception of human brotherhood. Beneath the shadow of the name of Father there is no place for caste and class, with all the pernicious and divisive influences that flow from these things. In addition to all this, it embodies the highest and purest conceptions of human life and duty, and sets before men great ethical principles which are both essentially rational and sufficiently authoritative. And as the consummation and culmination of all, it is a fountain of great and conquering motives, a reservoir of fertilizing and fructifying streams of impulse and aspiration. It is the fountain of those impulses and imperatives which lead men to unselfish service and to social self-sacrifice, and in this respect it is worthy of all honor.

An appeal to history, with reference to the influence of religion, will yield some suggestive results. Among all the great nations of the past the religious factor is the most prominent in the people's life. That of the peoples of old, Greece, Rome, Egypt, Israel, cannot be understood either in its beginnings or in its development with religion ignored. Look where you will in the wide field of history, says Prof. J. R. Seeley, you find religion, whenever it works freely and mightily, either giving birth to and sustaining States, or else raising them up to a second life after their destruction. It is not too much to say that it has been the chief State-builder, and national character is the result of its influences ("Natural Religion," pp. 188-201).

4. This is not all. Society at bottom rests upon self-

sacrifice, and the degree of self-sacrifice is the degree of social stability. Progress in the last analysis is self-sacrifice, and the degree of self-sacrifice is the degree of progress. That society may endure and progress it is necessary that men begin to subordinate self to the common interest, and to learn to take thought for the common good. It is evident that the principles of self-interest cannot help men here and can never move them to this needful sacrifice. This is becoming very plain, and is the ruling note of many modern volumes. Thus Benjamin Kidd, in his "Social Evolution," a book of clear insight in spite of its gross misreading of the basis of religion, shows very conclusively that there is no power in the mere conflict of interests to yield the product of social progress. It is in religion alone that we can find any clear warrant for social progress, as it is in religion alone that we find the dominating motives to social service. Society is founded upon friendliness and co-operation and self-sacrifice, and when these are lost society is at an end.

The other forces named may have some influence upon social life, but at best they are weak and uncertain when compared with this supreme and masterful force. It is in religion alone that we can find those motives and incentives which can lift men out of themselves and can transform them into self-respecting and self-sacrificing members of society. Considerations of utility and enlightened self-interest may have some influence upon men, but they cannot furnish those inspirations that renew men and makes States. Mere knowledge does not convert the will from bad to good. Lombroso, in his "*L'Uomo Delinquente*," testifies that the number of malefactors is greatest, relatively, in the liberal professions (Lilly, "First Principles," p. 297). Considerations of self-interest cannot lift men out of themselves and con-

strain them to spend and be spent for the common good. Society will perish when friendliness and love and self-sacrifice, the very elements of religion, die out of human associations.

5. And for another thing this religious spirit will create and guide the social conscience of the people, and will rouse them to strive for social and moral improvement. From the beginning religion has been present, and as the centuries have gone it has produced ever new forms of social life. The religion of Christ has been at work during the Christian era, and it has caused many significant changes. It has given men a new ideal of life, the highest and noblest; it has taken form in the Christian church, an achievement of no small meaning, and it has created a conscience that has moved men to take thought for others and to bear their brothers' burdens. It has given birth to many missionary and philanthropic enterprises, and has quickened men to proclaim good news to all. It has brought man to social and political self-consciousness, and has created in him a sense of humanity. That there may be progress, men must realize the evils that exist, and must be moved to unite their forces against these evils. "The history of mankind is the growth of one new conscience after another" (Henry D. Lloyd, "Man the Social Creator," p. 208).

There is nothing like Christianity to make and arouse conscience, to disclose and unmask evil, to challenge the accepted custom, and to brand with scorn habitual wrongs. It is a kind of index finger which, in all human history, has pointed the way toward a better and more perfect social order. It brings men under the sway of the loftiest incentives, and it places them under the influence of great convictions. The Christian spirit has not wrought in vain during the centuries past. One evil after another has been seen and felt, and men have taken up arms against

it. Now it has convicted men of the sin of infanticide and laws have been framed against it; now it has given testimony against gladiatorial shows, and in time edicts have forbidden these; now it has made men see the evil of slavery, and the old evil has disappeared. Now it has felt the iniquity of war, and nations have begun to take thought for the things of peace. One new blush after another has come to the cheeks of mankind, and they have begun to feel a sense of shame in presence of some abuse. The new conviction has found expression in new laws, and these have conserved the gains that have been made.

All this enables us to appraise at something near its true value that form of religion which we have agreed to call Christian. For one thing, it gives us a conception of God the highest and the purest that man has ever known; it gives us the conception of God who, in his very essence, is righteousness and love, a God who is at once Father and King. It gives us also a conception of God's purpose in the world that is the most splendid that has ever enriched human thought; it gives us the conception of a kingdom of God on earth, a pure, righteous, and loving society of intelligent and moral beings, a conception that is at once a great constitutive idea and architectonic principle of human society. It gives a conception of man that is at once the noblest and richest the world has ever known; it shows us that man is made to be the child of God, and hence his life has an infinite meaning and value; and it gives us the conception of humanity as a family of brothers in which each man is entitled to all respect, and is worthy of all honor. Thus in the religion of Christ we have everything that the State can need, both to ensure its perpetuity and to promote its progress. We have in it the supreme ideal which shines before men to lure them upward and onward. We have

the spirit which is to determine the lives and activities of men. We have the gospel message that life is a service and each man is to find his own life as he loses it in the life of all. And we have a uniting and unifying spirit that draws men together and constrains them to live as brothers in a family.

All this brings us face to face with the special need of religion in a democratic State. For one thing, democracy is, as we have seen, a confession of brotherhood in social and political relations. But human brotherhood has no meaning or vitality apart from the common divine Fatherhood. It is in the Christian truth of the Fatherhood of God that we find at once the source and the warrant of the democratic assumption of the brotherhood of man. Suppose that men should lose out of their lives the belief in this divine Fatherhood; suppose that in the lapse of time this great truth should dissolve into thin air? In that case the belief in human brotherhood will die out of men's hearts and will lose all power in society; the old terms may still be used, but they will be utterly impotent for the reason that they are wholly empty. With the passing of the conviction of human brotherhood based upon divine Fatherhood, the great truths that are at once the constitutive basis and the inspiring motive of democracy will also pass away. With the passing of the conception of fraternity, liberty has no vitality and equality has no basis, and this means the passing away of democracy itself. The Christian spirit has created modern democracy, and modern democracy will run its course and end in dismal night when the Christian spirit no longer animates and inspires it.

And for another thing, all this enables us to see the relation of religion to the progress of the democratic State. In every form of the State a certain amount of friendliness and co-operation, justice and self-sacrifice—

the inner principles of religion—are necessary in order that men may live together and may labor for the common good; but in a democratic State these factors are simply indispensable. For democracy is a confession of mutual aims and obligations, with a conscious and voluntary co-operation in behalf of the common welfare. The great difference between the democratic State and all other forms is not in the amount of social subordination and self-sacrifice, for a democracy may impose more limitations upon men than a monarchy. In every form of the State men must submit to laws and must make sacrifices for the sake of the common life. But in a monarchy the laws are imposed upon men from without, and the sacrifices made are more or less compulsory. In a democracy, however, this social service and self-sacrifice are almost wholly voluntary and conscious on the part of all. There is no force or factor that has one-half the social efficiency of religion, and there is no factor or force that can take its place. Appeals to self-interest are well enough in their way; compromise may adjust many difficulties for the time, and compulsion may even preserve a certain semblance of peace; but the highest and broadest interests of society can never be promoted without a large amount of mutual aid, social co-operation, and self-sacrifice. It is just here that we discover the real relation of the Christian religion to the democratic State. For Christianity in its inner essence and fundamental principles is a religion of brotherhood and equality, of love and self-sacrifice; the law of Christ is the law of brotherly kindness and social helpfulness, of fair dealing and friendliness; in a word, in its very essence and quality it is a love of righteousness and a struggle for the life of others. In a democracy the people rule; but unless God lives in the people and rules through them, the State will crumble into dust and chaos will come again.

No one has seen all this more clearly than James Bryce, in his great study of "The American Commonwealth." In democratic America the whole system of government seems to rest, not on armed force, but on the will of the numerical majority. "So, sometimes, standing in the midst of a great American city, and watching the throngs of eager figures streaming hither and thither, marking the sharp contrasts of poverty and wealth, an increasing mass of wretchedness and an increasing display of luxury, . . one is startled by the thought of what might befall this huge, yet delicate fabric of laws and commerce and social institutions were the foundations it has rested on to crumble away. Suppose all these men ceased to believe that there was any power above them, any future before them, anything in heaven or earth but what their senses told them of; suppose that their consciousness of individual force and responsibility, already dwarfed by the overwhelming power of the multitude, and the fatalistic submission it engenders, were further weakened by the feeling that their swiftly fleeting life was rounded by a perpetual sleep?

Soles occidere et redire possunt
Nobis, quum semel occidit brevis lux
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.

"Would the moral code stand unshaken, and with it the reverence for law, the sense of duty toward the community, and even toward the generations yet to come? Would men say 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?' . . History, if she cannot give a complete answer to this question, tells us that hitherto civilized society has rested on religion, and that a free government has prospered best among religious peoples" ("The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, pp. 582, 583).

In the last analysis the State is the organized faith of a people, and where there is no faith—faith in God and faith in man—society is impossible, and the State crumbles into dust. And in the last analysis the real faith of a people finds expression in their politics, and thus the political life of a people is the final revelation of their religion, and their religion is the chief factor in their political programme. The religion of a people expresses that which they regard as the best and truest, and the State is the sphere in which the religion of a people finds its full and final expression. The real religion of a people shows itself in their politics more faithfully than in their theologies, and their politics is the best illustration of the inner quality of their religion.

In fine, as the conclusion of this study, we find that religion is the most potent and pervasive power in human life and human society. We find that the forces which generate and sustain States are not material but spiritual. We find that the great standards against which all the laws and actions of men are measured are not physical but spiritual. And we find likewise that the goal toward which the State is moving and the great end which it subserves in the economy of life, is not temporal but spiritual. In a word, the State is the social sphere of religion, and religion is the real life of the State. "If you go through the world you may find cities without walls, without letters, without rulers, without houses, without money, without theaters and games: but there was never yet seen, nor shall be seen by man, a single city without temples and gods, or without oaths, prophecies, and sacrifices . . .; nay, I am of opinion that a city might be sooner built without any ground beneath it than a commonwealth could be constituted altogether destitute of belief in the gods; or being constituted, could be preserved" (Plutarch, "Against Colotes," C. XXXI).

XIII

THE PROBLEMS OF THE MODERN STATE

IN the generations past men have faced great problems and have made great sacrifices. They have done this that their children might have an inheritance glorious and unencumbered. During the progress of the centuries one problem after another has arisen and has been met; and men believed that with the fulfilment of this task the way for humanity's march might be smoothed. Abolish autocracy, they have said, and let government rest upon the consent of the governed, and the golden age will dawn. Make an end of slavery and humanity can breathe more freely. Break the unholy alliance between Church and State and both will speed toward their goal with new hope. Give every person, whether male or female, an equal vote, and the new time will be at our very doors. One by one these demands have been met, here or there, but somehow the people are not content. In fact, it is with the modern State as with the desert-wandering Israelites; to them the promised land meant the fruition of all their hopes and the solution of all their problems. But no sooner were they settled in the new land than a whole troop of new problems arose, and life became as strenuous as before.

In all ages and conditions the problem of the State's existence is an insistent one, and every State has fallen far enough below its ideal. In all times, and under the best leadership, it has had a hard struggle to maintain itself and perform the minimum of its functions. But in modern times, the State, in these Western lands at least,

is becoming democratic, and the sovereignty of the people has been formally declared. Now, one need not make any extended investigations to discover that the rank and file of the people do not possess the high qualifications that are required of such sovereign citizens. In fact, one finds that the affairs of State are falling into hands that are poorly prepared to meet the difficulties and to bear the burdens.

Then another factor enters the field to complicate the whole problem, viz., the presence of Christianity. For nineteen centuries it has wrought among men, but it is only in recent times that its political bearings have been fully seen and its social ideal plainly recognized. In these democratic Western lands the affairs of State are more and more falling into the hands of men who have the Christian aim and motive. Now, since the Christian ideal is absolute in its requirements, and the Christian law is universal in its sweep, it follows that Christian citizenship is confronted with the task of creating a truly Christian civilization. Thus, to the minimum aims and functions of the State are now added the maximum aims and functions of the Christian democracy. They who suppose that the mere fact of democracy is sufficient to solve all problems are blind leaders of the blind. The truth is, the fact of democracy in itself says little about the real life of the people, and does not demonstrate their fitness for self-government. They who imagine that the mere presence of Christian men in a State will bring in the millennium are no less blind leaders of the blind. The truth is, the mere making of good individuals has meant very little in the life of the State; for not until religion becomes socialized does it become fully potent.

This means that there are certain problems that are common to all States, simply as States, without regard to their form of government. There are others that in a

way are characteristic of the democratic State, and the more pure the democracy the more numerous these problems are. Moreover, there are problems that, in a sense, belong only to the State that is approximately Christian. The special difficulties themselves may be old, but they are not felt as problems till the State possesses a certain Christian self-consciousness. The State that is democratic must face all the problems of every State, and many more besides, only with this difference: where in other forms of the State the solution is more or less optional, in a democracy their solution is imperative; for the very life of the State is at stake. We may carry this one step farther and may apply it to the Christian State, which is called to solve all the problems of every other form, with the added problems that grow out of the Christian conception of man; and whereas their solution is vital in all other types of States, their solution is here imperative for the reason that the whole legitimacy and power of Christianity are at stake in their solution. Something will be gained if we can secure a clear vision of the problems before us and can learn how vital they are to the life of the State.

I. The Problem of Public Service. The fundamental fact in a democratic State is the participation of the people in the affairs of government. The time will never come when men can go away and leave their government to take care of itself. Governments always and everywhere, De Tocqueville reminds us, will be as rascally as people permit them to be: and this is especially true in a democracy. It is hence almost needless to say that the successful working of a democratic government depends upon the direct participation and active interest of the people in its affairs. Without this direct participation of the people in government there can be no democracy. Without this intelligent, courageous, and unselfish devo-

tion to the public good, there can be no successful democracy. Just here we come face to face with one of the most serious problems of the modern State. For alas! the people are not all intelligent in civic matters; they are not all courageous; and too few are willing to make any sacrifices for the public good.

In the chapter on "The Dangers of Democracy," we have considered some of the difficulties that beset the democratic State; and the dangers we there considered define some of the problems that are most insistent and troublesome. We may simply refer to what was there said and pass on to notice some other elements entering into the problem. For one thing, the democratic idea implies and demands an independent and courageous spirit in the rank and file of the citizens. It means the independence to think for one's self and the courage to put one's convictions into effect. Now, the simple fact is, there is a large number of people in every community who refuse themselves the sacrament of thought and are content to allow some one else to think for them. Popular government proceeds on the theory that the people are sovereign, and that each sovereign will respect his manhood; that is, that he will form his own conclusions with respect to men and measures, and will have sufficient independence and initiative to make his judgments effective.

Then, in the modern democratic State, we find the party system in full operation, and as the success of the party depends upon the suppression of dissent, independence, and courage are studiously discouraged. Regularity —the willingness to abide by the party platform—is lauded, while irregularity—the refusal to stand by the party principles—is denounced. It must be admitted that in the average community it costs something for the average citizen to do his own thinking and to follow his

own convictions. In fact, it means petty persecution that is not less trying because it is so insidious. "The republic will perish," Lowell used to say, "when men cease to protest." But many things combine and conspire to make such protest difficult and dangerous in the modern State.

In the more advanced modern States the number of scholarly and educated men is rapidly increasing. It must be admitted, however, that this very culture of the few in a way unfits them for the rough and tumble work of practical citizenship. Their culture has so separated them from their fellows that they live in a world apart. The moment one of these men takes an interest in public affairs and speaks his protest, he is likely to be sneered at by the politicians and suspected by the people. Thus it comes about that only men of marked ability and strong individuality have the courage to do their own political thinking and to put their own conclusions into action ("The Real Problems of Democracy," by E. L. Godkin, "Atlantic Monthly," July, 1896).

Further, democracy implies and demands a spirit of self-sacrifice in the rank and file of the people. It means the willingness to serve the common good and to bear the burden and heat of the State's struggle for life and progress. One need not spend much time in trying to show that not all men who are members of the democratic State have this spirit of self-sacrifice and social service. It is not my purpose to apportion blame for this condition of things, and it is possible that the blame must be generally distributed. It is possible that many of the exponents of democracy are to blame in part, at least, for this condition, for too long they have thrown great emphasis upon the doctrine of rights and have charged the people to consider their own interests. And it is probable that the church is somewhat to blame in that it has not

explained the universality of the Christian law and has not inspired men to make sacrifice for the common welfare. At any rate, be the causes what they may, the fact remains that the number of men in the State who take large views of public questions, who look not every one upon his own things but every one also upon the things of others, who are willing to subordinate self-interest to the common welfare, and to endure hardship without hope of gain or honor is, unfortunately, not large.

This lack of the altruistic spirit is seen, on the one side, in the tendency to construe all public questions in terms of personal advantage. This is not all, but too many show a disposition to use the machinery of government for their own interests, with little or no regard to the common welfare. Mayor Jones, of Toledo, stated one day that he had been trying to find out the life principle of a number of so-called successful men. One man, when asked what was his principle in life, said with some emphasis: "My principle in life? Well, I do not care what happens to any man in the world so long as it does not happen to me." Too many are like the New York business man who, when importuned to lend his aid and influence in behalf of a necessary but unpopular reform, said with some impatience: "This is all very well, but I do not see how it concerns me." It has come to this, that men do not expect altruistic service, and when they find a man who is showing unusual interest in public matters, they at once suspect him of ulterior motives. Many men are concerned with the question of making a living and getting rich, and they are quite ready to turn over to the politicians the selection of proper candidates for public office and the settlement of questions of public moment. Such men, it may be said, are among the most discouraging and dangerous men in the land; they are the very people who are jeopardizing free institutions and are

casting popular government under a cloud. Society is possible only where there are many altruistic and self-sacrificing people who look not alone on their own things, but also on the things of others. Social progress is possible only where there are many people who are willing to subordinate self-interest and to live for the common life.

Finally, democracy demands from every citizen unceasing vigilance and a public spirit. How to secure these is one of the primary problems that confront the modern State. In the republic of Athens no important law could be passed unless six thousand votes in its favor were deposited in the urns. To secure an audience of necessary size, servants of the State were sent through the market-place with a rope chalked red; and whosoever received from that a stain on his toga was fined as an enemy of the State. Charles Sumner often affirmed that the citizen who neglects his political duties is a public enemy. A law of Pythagoras pronounced every man "infamous who, in questions of public moment, did not take sides" (Cook, "On Conscience," p. 255). To go into politics to serve selfish ends may be culpable, but it is still more culpable to stay out of politics for selfish reasons. The modern State must create such a public sentiment that every self-respecting man will be ashamed to shirk his public duties. No one can be a good man and a bad citizen. Does a man possess culture, and wealth, and the Christian spirit? Then there is every reason why he should take an active interest in public affairs, why he should accept the leadership of the social faith. Democracy does not mean equality in ability, and it does not mean the absence of all leadership. The fact is, leadership is more necessary in a democracy than in autocracy, but it is a leadership of a different kind. In a democracy it must be a leadership of intelligence and character, and

it must find its warrant in the confidence of the people. How to secure this public service from qualified men is one of the most abiding and difficult problems of the democratic State. In a way it lies at the basis of all other problems, and in a real sense its solution means the solution of the other problems of society. Some, indeed, because of this lack of public spirit in the rank and file of the people take a gloomy view of the democratic experiment.

II. The Problem of Political Corruption. It does not lie within the scope of our purpose to institute any comparison between the past and the present condition of the world. It does not change the problem before us to say that there was more political corruption and fraud in other lands and generations than is found to-day in democratic lands. And it does not demonstrate the success of the democratic experiment to prove that in a democracy men are more honest than in an autocracy. Such comparisons are wide of the mark for these reasons: democracy itself is a comparatively recent thing, and hence such a moral comparison is out of the question; and the amount of corruption and fraud that may little affect the stability of government in autocracy may undermine the very foundations of a democracy. And yet the long study of history will show that the great monarchies of the past came to their downfall because of the corruption and injustice that prevailed.

Not only so, but in all the democratic experiments of the past corruption and injustice have been the chief causes of death. In brief, the history of every democratic experiment in the past can be told in a few words: First, poverty and struggle, with honesty and justice; then success and progress, with growing pride and increasing wealth; then luxury and corruption, with suspicion and division ending in dissolution and desolation. There is

one lesson that comes to us from every nation of the past, that the principles of honesty and fair dealing and justice are principles of unity, peace, and strength, while the vices of chicane, and corruption, and oppression, are the vices that spell suspicion, conflict, and ruin.

One form of corruption to be mentioned is what is known as vote-buying. Careful investigations have been made in various States concerning the extent of this evil, and the figures are not reassuring. In some communities the proportion of venal voters is placed as high as twenty-five per cent.; and this means that by the use of money men are able to turn elections pretty much as they please. It is certain that the men who gain office by such means are not careful to use that office for the public good alone; in fact, men are willing to make such expenditures of money because they hope to recoup themselves in some way. The use of money in elections is a matter of public shame and open scandal. Some of the highest offices in the United States are believed to have been secured by the use of money. The fact is, many have come to look upon membership in the United States Senate as the purchase of millionaires or the reward of politicians.

Then, in many of the cities and States of America, popular government is under a cloud because of the notorious frauds that are perpetrated. Special privileges and franchises are a marketable asset, and hence many men are anxious to obtain them. Not only so, but the corporations holding these privileges do not always find it convenient and profitable to observe the laws and ordinances; and hence they are interested in securing the election of manageable men and keeping government as inefficient as possible. In all the cities and States where corruption reigns it is usually found that the head and front of the offending are the great corporations which

hold special privileges that have vast money value. And it is invariably found that these special interests join hands with the lawless and depraved members of society in securing the election of corrupt and compliant men.

Akin to this is the corrupt use of money in social and political affairs. The way in which many great railroads, street railways, gas, and water companies have obtained valuable franchises is a matter of public scandal. The power of organized money in city and State and national elections is tremendous, and every legislative body has felt its baleful and dangerous touch. Hon. Wayne MacVeagh has said that the black flag of the corruptionist is more to be feared than the red flag of the anarchist. A recent writer, who is utterly opposed to socialism, and cannot be accused of any antipathy to wealth, writes: "It is not the existence of inherited wealth, even on a very large scale, that is likely to shake seriously the respect for property: it is the many examples which the conditions of modern society present, of vast wealth acquired by shameful means, employed for shameful purposes, and exercising an altogether undue influence in society and in the State. When triumphant robbery is found among the rich, subversive doctrines will grow among the poor. When democracy turns, as it often does, into a corrupt plutocracy, both national decadence and social revolution are being prepared" (Lecky, "Democracy and Liberty," Vol. II, pp. 501, 502).

It may be admitted that some of this corruption is more or less inevitable while human nature is as it is. Some there are who tell us that these questions of corruption are at bottom individual questions; the character of the mass depends upon the character of the units; and so long as you have depraved men to deal with, so long you will have corruption in the State. All this is trite enough, but it is too trite to touch the real heart of the

difficulty. In his autobiography, John Stuart Mill has indicated some of the convictions that grew in his life and determined his conduct. He saw that interest in the common good is now so weak a motive in the generality of men, not because it never can be otherwise, but because the mind is not accustomed to dwell on it as it dwells from morning to night on the things that tend only to personal advantage. "The deep-rooted selfishness which forms the general character of the existing state of society, is so deeply rooted, only because the whole course of existing institutions tends to foster it; and modern institutions, in some respects more than ancient, since the occasions on which the individual is called to do anything for the public without receiving its pay, are far less frequent in modern life, than in the smaller commonwealths of antiquity" (Mill, "Autobiography," p. 233).

This problem of corruption is a real one, and be its sources personal or social, due to wrong ways of thought or defective institutions in society, the very existence of the State and its progress in moral life depend upon its solution. This corruption in society threatens the very life of the State, for a democratic and Christian State must be both honest and pure.

III. The Problem of Intemperance. One of the chief concerns of every State is its own preservation. One of the prime means to this end is the self-control and sobriety of the people. This is important under every form of government, but is absolutely essential in a democratic government. Democracy is organized self-control, and democracy is but a name when self-control is lost.

In the democratic State it is absolutely necessary that men be sober and practise self-control. That men may fulfil the duties of their citizenship they must be calm and rational; they must possess the ability to view all public questions without passion and prejudice; and with

it all they must learn to subordinate self to the common life, and must take thought for the common safety. That the use of intoxicants of all kinds unfits men for the discharge of these duties; that the common use of such intoxicants injures them mentally and physically, and their excessive use wholly unfits them for citizenship in the State, is known to all. That intoxicants have a peculiar power over the kingliest powers of the soul; that they weaken the rational and volitional faculties of man is known to all students of psychology and common life. And hence it is that intemperance is one of the life and death problems of the democratic State.

The more intelligently one studies this problem the more difficult does its solution appear. It is not by any means the simple problem that some suppose, and there is no patent panacea that will effect an immediate cure. For, the moment we study this evil of intemperance in its sources, we find that three of the strongest and most constant passions of the human heart are at its roots. First, we have the love of gain. There are great financial interests at stake in this traffic. There are vast profits both in the manufacture and sale of intoxicants, and some of the great fortunes on both sides of the Atlantic have been made in this business. In all ages and lands moralists and legislators have recognized the fatal power of gold to warp the judgment and bias the mind; for the sake of money it is found that men will sell their manhood and will place stumbling-blocks before their fellows; for the sake of money men will seek to create the appetite for intoxicants in every new generation; for the sake of increasing their revenues they will persuade men to drink beyond the safety line, and will evade and counteract the laws wherever possible. Secondly, we have the appetite for stimulants. The craving for stimulants is a strong instinct in human beings. In all ages and lands

men have found that alcoholic beverages possess the peculiar power of producing temporary stimulation of their mental and physical being. In addition to the common craving for stimulants, there is an abnormal craving that is induced by the struggle and stress of modern industrial and social life. At any rate, from one cause and another, this appetite is created in men; and when once developed it is imperious in its demands. The appetite for alcoholic stimulants is an abnormal one, but it is a common craving; and the appetite, when once formed, is most potent in its sway. Thirdly, the instinct for social fellowship. Man is by nature a social being, and the desire for fellowship is one of the strongest instincts of his nature. The saloon is the most democratic institution in the world, and all men are made welcome and no questions asked. In the saloon men find brilliant lights and good cheer; here they find social fellowship and free conversation. The modern saloon has such a strong hold because it supplies a social need. It supplies that need in a very questionable and unsatisfactory way, but it supplies it as no other existing institution does.

In veriest truth it may be said that this traffic is a stumbling-block that lies right across the path of the State, and the State cannot truly advance till this stumbling-block is removed. The liquor traffic is a standing menace to popular government, and intemperance is one of the most urgent problems of the modern State.

IV. The Problem of the Disinherited. In these modern times some wholly new problems have come into the foreground and are clamoring for solution. We do not mean that these new problems are new things in society. There is probably not an evil in modern life that is not as old as the pyramids and as threadbare as the beggar's coat. But, and this is significant, these evils have never been felt before as they are felt to-day. For men are coming to

social self-consciousness and are becoming sensitive, and as a consequence many evils, almost unnoticed heretofore, are regarded as problems. One of these clamant modern problems is what we may call the problem of the disinherited.

1. That there is a large class of persons in modern society who may be so called is known to all. By the term we do not mean that there is a large class who are legally disfranchised or formally disinherited, for in the foremost nations of the world no such class is found. In this respect the modern world is far in advance of the ancient. In the republics of Greece, even in their palmiest days, there was a large slave population that had no political rights and no legal standing. In the empire of Rome there was an enormous number of slaves who had no recognized rights, and toward whom none had any recognized duties. All through the Middle Ages much the same conditions obtained. In all these respects a great change has come, and slavery and serfdom are no longer found in any recognized and legal form. On the other hand, there is some recognition, in a formal way, at least, of every person in the State, and some definition of his rights.

It remains true, however, that in the best of modern States there is a large class of persons who have no fair and real inheritance in society. That this is so is made very evident by a study of conditions in our modern cities. Thus, in Britain and America—to go no further—we find that there is a large class who compose what is called the "Submerged Tenth." Above this is a larger class in poverty, who are unable to obtain those necessaries which will permit them to maintain a state of physical efficiency. This latter class, according to the careful investigations of Charles Booth, numbers thirty and seven-tenths per cent. in London" (Hunter, "Pov-

erty," pp. 5, 18). And it appears from these investigations that fifty-five per cent. of the very poor and sixty-eight per cent. of the other poor are so, not through any fault of their own, but simply because they lack employment. In London this investigator found that over two and a half million people, singly or in companies, live in one room—sleeping, cooking, eating, and bathing within the same four walls. In Scotland, according to official figures, over one-third of the families live in a single room, and more than two-thirds in only two rooms. The one who walks through the wynds and closes of Edinburgh and Glasgow with open eyes is tempted at times to call for the crack of doom to come and end all.

But the United States is not entirely above reproach in these respects. It is true that economic conditions here are very much better than in the Old World, but none the less the facts are appalling. In 1890, according to Bishop Huntington, "recent certified revelations have laid bare the multiplied horrors and depravities of the tenement population in great cities, where forty-one out of every hundred families live in a single room, and where the poorest pay more rent than the richest for each cubic foot of space and air" ("The Forum," October, 1890). New York is one of the richest States in the Union, and yet the reports of the State Board of Charities show that from year to year about twenty-four per cent. of the people apply for relief of some kind. In the year 1903 fourteen per cent. of the families in Manhattan were evicted for various causes. And more tragic than all, from year to year ten per cent. of those who die in New York are buried in potter's field ("Report of Department of Corrections," N. Y., 1902). In 1900, in New York State, a commission was created to investigate tenement conditions in New York City. After several days' investigation in silent amazement, the Buffalo members of the

commission declared: "New York ought to be abolished."

The figures given suggest a problem that they do not fully define. For, while poverty is a sign and cause of this social disinheritance, it is not by any means the only sign or cause. Along with this must be named the sickness that weakens and makes impossible the highest attainments. This problem of sickness and disease is one that has been with man from the beginning, and may remain with him for some time to come. But to-day we are coming to see ever more clearly that many of these forms of disease are due to social causes, and no longer must be accepted as a matter of course. Not only so, but in all of our cities, large or small, there is a slum district which is a kind of moral maelstrom. In these slum districts thousands of children are born, who by the very circumstances of their lives are doomed from the start. Many of them grow up ignorant and morally undeveloped; the tender bloom of virtue is rubbed off the soul before the girl has learned the meaning of purity, and the high possibilities of manhood are blighted before the tendrils of the soul have unfolded.

2. Another aspect of this problem is seen in what may be called the industrial exploitation of childhood. That this evil of child labor is a very real one, even in the life of the foremost nations, is too manifest to require any extended proof. It is possible to quote the figures showing the number of children under fifteen years of age toiling in fields and factories, in mines and workshops; but figures do not mean very much. Census returns of government and reports of industrial commissions show, however, that in many parts of the land, in many lines of industry and trade, children of tender years are employed at tasks that are often hazardous and usually mechanical, for long hours, and in conditions that are unsanitary and

depressing. Not only are the children deprived of the right to play and the privilege of an education, but their very occupation tends inevitably to weaken the body and stunt the mind, and thus unfit them for full life and large usefulness in the State. The child is made old before he is young, and he is early cast aside as so much worn-out machinery that is no longer profitable.

By this system of child labor, society really disinherits a large proportion of its members, and forever debars them from the best things of life. By it society also loses a large fraction of its most valuable asset. There may be some industrial gain from this labor of the children; but the losses far outbalance the gain. The fact is, from every point of view, child labor is an evil without one valid argument in its support or extenuation. It is a waste of the nation's most valuable asset, the manhood of its people. It is economic suicide, for it produces an inert, inefficient mass of laborers. It is wholly unnecessary, for the nations where this evil is most prevalent are no longer in need of calling all hands to work. It is impossible for a people to tolerate this evil and preserve its self-respect while professing faith in the democratic creed and maintaining allegiance to the Christian ideal. One of the gladdest things that the prophet can say of the city that is coming in the new time is this: "The streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in the broad places thereof" (Zech. 8 : 5).

3. A third aspect of this problem is seen in the inadequate provision that is made, even in the most progressive nations, for the full training of each life and its fitness for service in the commonwealth. This is too large a problem for treatment here, and we can only notice one element that makes it so real. Thus, the number of persons who receive what may be called an adequate education, that is a training that shall unfold their powers and

prepare them to co-operate with society in perfecting its own life, is comparatively small, even in the most advanced and intelligent State. It is true that in some lands that are most democratic and Christian, a system of public education has been created which aims to provide for every child the rudiments of an education. And it is also true that in some of these States provision is made for the advanced education of many. No one who is familiar with the aims and achievements of this system of State education can make light of it; in fact, he must see in it one of the most auspicious omens for the betterment of man. And yet when this has been said, the whole story has not been told; for the fact yet remains that this system of education, in its most elementary stages, is not accomplishing the results that might be expected, while a large proportion of the people are practically debarred by circumstances over which they have no control from the advantages of a higher education. All this shows that even in the most advanced and intelligent society there is a large class that is practically disinherited; that is, they begin life under a heavy handicap; all through life, owing to the lack of opportunity and adequate training, they are denied access to the best things in life. They are wholly unable to rise into better conditions; the natural powers and latent resources of their souls are never nourished into life; they are what may be called the disinherited classes in society.

These facts have a double significance, a personal and a social, and each is deserving of careful consideration. In its personal aspect the saddest thing about all this ignorance and poverty is not the suffering and ignorance themselves, though these are often sad enough; the most tragic thing about it all is the waste of human life, the fact that the possibilities of many lives are never unfolded. In its social aspects the most tragic fact about it all is

this: that in every generation there is a heavy loss of so much social possibility; that is, so few persons make any real and adequate contribution to the total wealth of society. The number of persons born in a generation may represent the total latent powers and potential resources of that generation. But thus far no generation in any land has as yet succeeded in developing and garnering for the use of society more than one-fifth of the total powers and resources of mankind. Through poverty and crime, through want of training and lack of opportunity, at least four-fifths of the total possibility of any one generation is practically undeveloped. Could these handicaps be removed, could every person receive an adequate education, could the latent powers of all men be developed, and could every person receive a fair inheritance in society, the present working forces of society could be centupled (Ward "Applied Sociology," 234). These people so held back are men and women of normal minds and human souls, and susceptible, if surrounded by the same influences as the educated and moral, of becoming as capable and intelligent as they (Ward, *ibid.*, p. 313). They possess the same human nature as their more successful brothers, and under different circumstances they also might stand upon their feet and become agents of civilization and contribute their share to human achievement.

In all times men have observed these facts, but it is only in recent times that they have become a problem to society itself. In all the earlier times men accepted these differences of fortune as a matter of course, and consequently they felt little responsibility for their removal. Thus, in practically every nation in the ancient world, it was believed that mankind was composed of several varieties of human beings, made of different kinds of clay; the best things in life were for the few, while the

great mass of the people were made to be underlings and servants, hewers of wood and drawers of water, and wholly unfitted for culture and progress. At different times, in the name of theology, men have defended the existing inequalities of society as a part of the decree of God, and consequently these differences among men were neither to be questioned nor changed. It is a matter of record also that the time has been when an English bishop actually defended poverty on the ground that it is necessary that there be a certain amount of misery in the world in order that good people may have some objects on which to exercise the grace of charity. It is a matter of common knowledge that there are some sociologists, even in the most enlightened lands, who regard poverty and drink shops as more or less necessary and inevitable. For the relentless suppression of the weak and unfit through such means, we are told, is nature's method of eliminating the unfit and improving the human breed. In later times the impression has gained currency that the law of nature is struggle for existence with the survival of the fittest, with the corollary law that those who do not survive are the unfittest and deserve to perish.

The formal criticism of these views is here impossible, and it is not necessary. But it may be said that they one and all rest upon what may be called the aristocratic view of human nature; that is, they all assume that there are certain differences among men which are natural and necessary which can never be wholly eradicated and ought never to be ignored.

Some of these views frankly charge up these differences to the decrees of God, and men have not hesitated to misapply the words of Scripture and talk about the vessels made for dishonor. Other of these views assume that there are natural and essential differences in human lives, and we have great systems of caste based upon this be-

lief. Whatever may be their basis and reason, such views all rest, in the last analysis, upon what we have called the aristocratic view of human nature.

But to the modern man these views have become intolerable, and he can no longer rest under their burden. A new spirit, the Christian democratic spirit, has arisen and challenges every one of these views. According to this, men are all brothers in one family because children of one Father; they are all made of the same clay, and hence they all have the same nature and capabilities. Men are different in mental endowments and talents, but these are merely incidental and external; in essence they are alike and equal, and each has the same value and meaning as the other. Every child in the State has his place in the State, and his life has some meaning in the total meaning of society. There is no reason in the nature of things why a few should have a large fraction of this heritage while the great majority are practically disinherited. The Father has made provision for all his children, and his bounties are for all alike. This defines the problem that modern society must solve, if it would be Christian in spirit and democratic in form. And this defines a task which we shall consider in another chapter, "The Programme of the Christian Society."

V. The Problem of the Unfit. Akin to the problem just named, and related to the problem next to be considered, is another which is no less vital and significant. In a way it may be regarded as the problem of all problems, the one problem that has the most intimate relation to the progress and the welfare of man. This is what we may call the problem of the unfit.

The history of progress, it has been said, is the record of the gradual diminution of waste. In all the lower stages of life the amount of waste is enormous, and comparatively few living creatures reach maturity. As we

rise in the scale we find that the amount of waste is diminishing, and fewer creatures perish in the struggle. In the higher stages, among civilized men, this waste is reduced to the minimum, and life has a higher value. The history of civilization, as Professor Huxley assures us, is the record of the attempts which the human race has made to escape from the unchecked sway of the principle of the struggle for existence with the destruction of the unfittest.

But this struggle for existence is not by any means the meaningless and cruel thing that it may at first sight appear to be. It is nature's way of detecting superiority and of declaring the qualities that are worthful in life. In the jungle, where life is little else than a free fight, only those creatures who are possessed of full vitality and alert senses have any chance of surviving; the weak and crippled, the dull-eyed and heavy-footed are doomed, and inevitably perish. In a savage society, where the struggle is little modified by intelligent and moral action, the number who fail to survive is quite large, for the weak and defective, the diseased and crippled soon perish. There are no mental and physical weaklings; the diseased and malformed receive no care, and they unfailingly die. The struggle is severe, and the results are tragic, but by this process the blood of the tribe is kept comparatively pure, and the highest efficiency of the clan is maintained. It is easy, of course, for one to condemn all this as a mark of human depravity, and in a higher stage of society it would be worthy of all condemnation. But behind it all there is the effort on the part of the tribe to maintain its own existence and to preserve the highest standard. The struggle for a bare existence is hard, and the tribe cannot afford to carry any superfluous impediments without endangering its own life.

But in a civilized and moral society all this is changed,

and emphasis is now thrown upon the factors of altruism and social philanthropy. The Christian spirit has created many types of eleemosynary effort, and a studied desire is shown to minister to the less endowed and keep every human infant alive. Not only so, but in the progress of society there has been evolved various methods of medical practice which result in lessening disease and lengthening human life. To-day medical science that is motived by the spirit of Christ declares that no single life in the community shall live uncared for or shall die if its life can be prolonged. In a large way it may be said that society is intelligent and civilized and Christian in the degree that its members practise mutual aid and live for the common life. In a large way, also, it may be said that a society is uncivilized and barbarous in the degree in which its members neglect the weak and permit them to perish. This concern for the weak, this effort to help the helpless, is proper and right, and every lover of his kind must rejoice in this triumph of love and science over disease and death.

But all this raises a problem that is one of the most real and fateful that society has to meet. Is all this a real benefit to the race, or is it a fatal injury? We may grant that the principle of natural selection is ruthless so far as its results are concerned, but it must be admitted that this principle is of great service in detecting the unfit and eliminating them. To set aside this principle, and to carry the other principle of social aid to its full conclusions, we are told, will produce results that are disastrous; in fact, to do this, we are assured, will mean the steady weakening and inevitable deterioration of the human race. Thus the scientist and the sociologist tell us in solemn language that the modern methods of philanthropy are a mistaken and suicidal policy, for they mean the poisoning of the blood, and will result in the retardation rather than the

acceleration of progress. Thus, Herbert Spencer finds fault with modern governmental and social organizations on the ground that they are interfering with the beneficial operation of the universal law of natural selection. "Inconvenience, suffering, and death are the penalties attached by nature to ignorance, as well as incompetence—are also means of remedying these. Partly by breeding out those of lowest development, and partly by subjecting those who remain to the never-ceasing discipline of experience, nature secures the growth of a race who shall both understand the conditions of existence, and be able to act up to them. It is best to let the foolish man suffer the penalty of his foolishness. . . A sad population of imbeciles would our schemers fill the world with could their plans last. Why, the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them and make room for better" ("Social Statics. Sanitary Supervision"). "Will any one contend that no mischief will result," he asks, "if the lowly endowed are enabled to thrive and multiply as much as, or more than, the highly endowed?" To the same purport speaks the sociologist. Thus Prof. E. A. Ross says, "The shortest way to make this world a heaven is to let those so inclined hurry hellward at their own pace." Hence he deduces the social canon: "Social interference should not be so paternal as to check the self-extinction of the morally ill-constituted" (Ross, "Social Control," p. 425). He maintains that many of our so-called charitable and philanthropic efforts and methods are simply preserving the unfit, and are thus poisoning the blood of the race.

It is easy, of course, for one to grow piously indignant and to denounce all this as brutal indifference and scientific hard-heartedness. But none the less there is here a grave danger, one that must be recognized and avoided, or the race will pay the forfeit. The universe sets a

premium upon efficiency and fitness, and any method that enables the unfit and defective to survive and perpetuate their kind is a gross and fatal violation of the order of things. Modern society, however, being more and more motived by the spirit of Christ, will never again allow the defective and unfit to live uncared for and to die unpitied. In fact, as time goes on, the Christian spirit will more and more summon to its aid scientific knowledge to keep the weakest and unfittest from perishing in the struggle. And modern society, having an intelligent concern for its own interests, will not be willing to allow the unfit and defective to survive and perpetuate their kind to the disadvantage and detriment of the race. Is there any way out of this dilemma? Or must the Christian spirit and the scientific mind work at cross purposes? This, at least, states one of the most puzzling problems of modern society—the problem of the unfit.

Modern society motived by the Christian spirit must declare that there shall be no unfit and defective members in the State. This means several things that are worth a moment's consideration. For one thing, it means that modern society must put all its resources in pledge in behalf of the weakest and least promising member, that he may be lifted up into strength and fitness. Modern science and Christian philanthropy must direct their energies toward the creation of conditions that will prevent the making of the unfit and defective. The unfit must not be allowed to remain the unfit, but must be transformed into the fit. The science of medicine and the practice of charity have put into our hands certain systems of moral splints and braces, certain remedies and appliances, which enable us to keep the unfit and defective alive. The Christian spirit is here, and is becoming the moving power in men's lives; they hold in their hands a vast system of prophylactic and moral remedies and braces; the scien-

tific and sociological spirit must show society what to do in order to provide for its future welfare; and society itself must then put its resources in pledge in behalf of the proposition that there shall be no unfit. This is a great undertaking, and it may require long generations for man to reach the goal. But this is a task that society must undertake in a brave and hopeful spirit, in the conviction that though everything may not be done at once, something may be done that will bring it nearer the goal. It is worth something to know the problem before us; and we have gained much when we know the direction of true progress.[1]

VI. The Social Problem. In human progress some political problems have been solved and their solution has been formulated in written constitutions. In the meantime, however, other problems have come to the front and are now clamoring for solution. Progress may mean the solution of problems, but progress no less means the multiplication of problems. Three generations ago De Tocqueville declared that the problems before men at the beginning of the nineteenth century were political; then, with remarkable prescience, he foretold that the problems at the beginning of the twentieth century would be social. And this prophecy suggests the sphinx riddle that is now propounded to men and must be solved by society. We cannot pass this social problem by, for the reason that it is vitally related to the very existence of democracy and the honor of Christianity. Those who are interested in this problem will consult the careful studies that have been made by John Hobson in "The Social Problem," and Lester F. Ward, in his various books; by Robert Hunter, in "Poverty," and John Graham Brooks, in "The

[1] For a fuller discussion of this problem, with the suggestion of some remedies, the reader is referred to an article, "The Redemption of the Unfit," in "The American Journal of Sociology," September, 1908.

Social Unrest"; by Prof. R. T. Ely and Prof. William Graham; by my friend Prof. Walter Rauschenbusch, in "Christianity and the Social Crisis"; by Prof. Francis G. Peabody, in his two noteworthy studies, and by innumerable other workers in this special field. And whether one is a socialist or not, he should not neglect such men as Karl Marx, in his great work, "Capital"; or Blatchford, in his suggestive plea "Merrie England"; or Loria, in "Economic Foundations of Society"; or Labriola, in "Materialistic Conception of History"; or Henry George, in "Progress and Poverty," and his other books; or Benjamin Kidd, in "Social Evolution" and "Western Civilization." In fact, it seems almost invidious to name any special students in this field when there are so many earnest workers. Several factors enter into this problem and make at once its difficulty and its urgency.

1. In the more advanced Western nations political democracy has been gained and the people have become sovereign. But, as we have seen, in the chapter on the unfinished tasks of democracy, this has not by any means brought the people either liberty or contentment. In fact, the free citizen in the political State finds himself under bonds that are most irksome and galling. He finds that while in certain realms and relations his rights are defined and safeguarded, yet in other realms and relations they are wholly undefined and gross injustice is done. He may vote as a free citizen, but he is taxed without any representation, and government is without his consent. He may exercise his fraction of sovereignty in the political State, but he discovers that he is rated as a "hand" in an industrial class and has little real initiative in life. It is vain, as De Laveleye has said, to call the tramp of the street a sovereign when he is a proletarian. It is vain, as any one can see, to glorify one's political privileges so long as he has no social opportunity. "Liberty," said

Carlyle, "I am told, is a divine thing. Liberty, when it becomes the liberty to die by starvation, is not so divine."

2. Again, in the most advanced lands of the Western world there has been a remarkable increase of material wealth. And this wealth, it may be said, is of various kinds, and includes practically all of the means of man's physical and intellectual life. The nineteenth century solved one problem at least—the problem how to create the most wealth in the least time. Machinery has multiplied man's productive power many fold, and has correspondingly multiplied the commodities at his disposal. Indeed, machinery answereth almost all things, and at best man's labor is the superintendence of a machine.

But what is the result of it all, we may ask? Is the struggle of life less keen and wasteful than in the bad times of old? Is man, liberated from the toil and moil of life, now learning how to live the glad, free life of the spirit, and to rejoice as the emancipated citizen of the kingdom? In his day John Stuart Mill declared that it was an open question whether machinery had really lightened the burden of a single human being. In our times many things indicate that the increase of machinery is begetting a new slavery and is weighting man's load. Man is becoming the slave of the machine, and his work is more exhausting than ever. The machine may have been intended to serve mankind and to lighten its load, but it is enslaving the man and is tightening his chain. In fiction the inventor created his Frankenstein, a great creature in the semblance of a man, but without brain or soul, and only to be destroyed at last by the monster he had made. The fiction of the novelist, we are gravely told, is becoming the reality of our civilization.

3. And once more, in these Western lands, the home of democracy, we find that humanity has come into a marvelous heritage of knowledge and wealth. And this

social heritage, which represents the common toil of the fathers, is the common heritage of the children. In the wisdom and beneficence of God abundant provision has been made for all the needs of men, and there is plenty and to spare in the Father's house. It is only in recent times that man has begun to appraise the extent of this provision, but every year he is discovering ever new stores of wealth, and is tapping ever fresh reservoirs of power. But a few men have gained control of these natural resources, and are now exploiting them for their own advantage. They claim exclusive access to these resources, and other men who would enjoy these must obtain their permission and pay them tribute. From one cause and another, through neglect or inattention, through bad management or gross fraud, this social heritage has passed into the hands of a few privileged persons, and the great majority of the people have but a secondary share in the social inheritance. And, as the corollary of this, we find that "a large proportion of the population in the prevailing state of society take part in the rivalry of life only under conditions which absolutely preclude them, whatever their natural merit or ability, from any real chance therein. They come into the world to find the best positions not only already filled, but practically occupied in perpetuity. For, under the great body of rights which wealth has inherited from feudalism, we, to all intents and purposes, allow the wealthy classes to retain the control of these positions for generation after generation, to the permanent exclusion of the rest of the people" (Kidd, "Social Evolution," p. 232).

It is easy, of course, for one who is so inclined, to say that this is such a gross exaggeration of the social situation as to amount to a positive caricature. But this is the confirmed conviction of such brave thinkers and careful

sociologists as Ruskin and Mazzini, Ward and Kidd. And it is easy also for one who is so inclined, to say that those who have no heritage and portion in society have themselves to blame, while those who possess so much of wealth and privilege have themselves to thank. But we may note that many of those who control these resources have gained this control through methods that are neither wholly fair nor socially just. In any fair and just society there should be some proportion between service and reward, but in modern society this proportion is not always maintained (Ward, "Psychic Factors of Civilization," p. 321). In his day John Stuart Mill declared that in such a society as the present the very idea of justice, or any proportionality between success and merit, or between success and exertion, is "so chimerical as to be relegated to the region of romance."

4. And this brings us face to face with the problem of modern democracy, called by way of preeminence the social problem. This problem is the problem of social welfare; the problem how to bring greater happiness and larger possibility to all men; the problem how to equalize opportunity and thus enable each life to realize its highest capabilities; the problem how to bring the disinherited into the Father's family and to give them a fair inheritance in society. In any enduring commonwealth each man has his place and his work, and no commonwealth is either democratic or Christian till this man has found that place and is doing that work. The social problem is how to use the resources of society in promoting the whole life of the whole people, and thus enabling the laggards to march with the main army. Of all the problems of the modern man, the one which towers above all others, is the problem of the organization of society, so that the heritage of the past shall be transmitted to all its members alike (Ward, "Applied Sociology," p. 96). Stated in

different terms, the problem manifestly is how to secure to the members of society the maximum power of exercising their natural faculties (Ward, *ibid*, p. 25, 26). It is too early in the day for any one to forecast the future and to indicate the measures that must be taken to ensure this result. But Mazzini spoke with his usual insight when he said: "I think that our problem is not so much to define the forms of future progress as to place the individual under such conditions as make it easy for him to understand and fulfil it" ("Life," by King, p. 289).

The great problem of to-day is this social problem. The problem of to-day is not primarily a personal problem, and it is not distinctively a political problem. It is not how to make good individuals, for in a way this has been achieved; the problem now is to associate these good individuals and make a good society. The problem of to-day is not distinctively political, for political liberty and democracy have been won in these Western lands, and government of the people and by the people is approximately a fact; the problem now is to build a better society in which industrial democracy shall be a reality and men shall have a fair opportunity in life. The whole question how men shall live together in equality and peace and share in the common inheritance of society, is up for discussion, and upon the answer to this question depends the progress of mankind and the success and permanence of democratic government.

Growing out of what has been said are several very important conclusions.

First, modern society must face these problems and must then set about their solution. The time has gone by when men can put on blinders and refuse to see; and the time has gone by also when discontent can be quieted by the policeman's club. The people have begun to think, and they are coming to self-consciousness. And so they

are questioning old formulas and are searching for social justice. The people will insist that every question be brought out into the light and they will demand that it be tried by the standards of public welfare. No thought is safe which would keep thought out. No question is settled till it is settled right. It is vain, therefore, to cry peace, peace, and seek in this way to allay discontent. It is folly to cover up the wounds of society and refuse to admit that society is afflicted. We never can have peace in society till we first have righteousness. We never can have a healthy body so long as there are poisonous sores beneath the surface.

Again, there may be problems in modern society, but there are no isolated reforms. The world is full of men who are specialists in reform as well as in medicine. This is necessary, perhaps, to a certain degree, but specialism may easily be carried too far and become too exclusive. We find that in our modern world men divide up into little groups and schools, each studying some one problem and each advocating some one reform. This is necessary, perhaps, for some of these problems need special study and emphasis. But society is a unit and organic; one thing is as it is because all other things are as they are. It may be necessary to have special schools of special reform, such as the single tax and prohibition, direct legislation, and State socialism; but it is necessary also to remember that no one of these schemes of reform holds the key to the millennium. The frank admission of this fact would make superfluous a vast amount of moving rhetoric, but it would also make necessary a more organic scheme of progress. Society is a unit and our reforms must be unified. No isolated scheme can be a good scheme. Real progress must be advanced all along the line. Those who see only one thing can never see that truly, and so they work in a superficial and

mistaken manner. Idealism ought to be organic; that is to say, each particular ideal ought to be formed and pursued in subordination to a system of ideals, based on knowledge and good sense (Cooley, "The American Journal of Sociology," March, 1907).

And thirdly, society must face its problems in the confidence that there are no insoluble problems. Man is here under God to work out his destiny, and he is commissioned to rule the earth and subdue it to his purposes. He is called in the providence of God to build in the earth a city of God. There are no necessary evils. There are no insoluble problems. Whatever is wrong cannot be eternal, and whatever is right cannot be impossible.

Every problem is an opportunity. The clear statement of a problem is one-half of its solution; at any rate, there can be no solution of an unclear problem. Some of these modern problems are before us, and they must be faced by the modern Christian who believes in democracy. In their study and solution man will prove at once the sincerity of his faith and the strength of his virtue. Modern society is confronted with more real and more urgent problems than was ancient society; and this means that the modern man has more real and more practical ways than the ancient man of proving his faith and hope and love and wisdom.

XIV

THE PROGRAMME OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY

IT is the constant and characteristic quality of life to become organic. It is the steady and supreme effort of life to create around itself a body in which it shall realize its type, and through which it shall express its power. It follows, as a matter of course, that the quality of the life will determine the form of the organization; and it is almost a tautology to say that the method of the organization will reveal the quality of the life both in itself and its relations.

The State is the people organized in a political capacity to promote the welfare of all its members. Democracy is the confession in social and political relations of the highest faith of a people. In the Christian conception of things we have the ideal of a human society on earth, a kingdom of God that has become the kingdom of man. Since this is so, there are certain great aims that a Christian and democratic people must set before themselves; there are certain definite tasks to which a democratic and Christian society is fully committed. In the last chapter we shall consider the nature of the Christian State, and we may postpone for the present some of the objections that are brought against this whole conception. Without forestalling the argument of that chapter we may here concern ourselves with those aims that are implied in the Christian conception of the State; that is, we may limit ourselves to those tasks which are involved in these converging lines of thought. In a word, we are concerned with that programme which men with the Christian spirit,

believing in the great principles of democracy, will seek in and through the political State.

In view of all the facts in the case, in view of the ideal of the kingdom of God on earth, and the relation of the State to the welfare of man, it is necessary that we have some definite conception of the ideal to be realized in and through the State and some knowledge of the steps that must be taken in the realization of that ideal. In ancient and modern times alike there has been little vision of the great goal of the State, and so there has been little united effort to realize a large and comprehensive programme. There has been progress, but it has been more or less haphazard and accidental. Men have corrected great abuses and have made many advances, but they have usually been opportunists and politicians, working only for some local and partial good when they might have been seers and statesmen working for great and far-reaching ends. In ancient and modern times alike there have been some great and prophetic souls who have had visions and dreamed dreams, men who were pioneers and pathfinders, showing humanity the way and helping the world toward its goal; and their influence upon their generation and people cannot be measured by any mete-wand. And yet, it must be confessed that the number of such souls is pitifully small; and worse than all, they have usually shared the untoward fate of all prophets and pioneers.

This is not all; but the men of to-day, the men upon whom the ends of the ages are come, cannot show much advantage over the men of yesterday. One of the most interesting and yet saddening inquiries to-day is a careful study of the platforms and policies of the great political parties, whether in Great Britain or the United States. In these platforms much is said about liberty and progress, about free trade and protection; in these pronouncements there are many paragraphs in denunciation of the

follies and failures of the opposition party, with many appeals to the people to support a particular platform. But one will read these platforms in vain for any constructive ideal; not one word will he find which indicates the true direction of human progress; in fact, he will scan them in vain for any comprehensive conception of what human progress means. So also one may listen to the great political leaders who are much in the public eye and solicit the people's suffrage. But he will listen in vain to their orations for any great words of light and leading; he will vainly watch for the words which shall point out the way of human advance; and at last he will turn away without having learned one syllable about the real mission of the State and the whole progress of man. He will find that there is no clear vision of the goal or any definite understanding of the way to the goal. He will find that there is no great ideal before men which shall include and explain all lower ideals; there is no social synthesis that can marshal the people as one army and send them forth to do battle with the ills of life, and to seek the perfection of society.

In view of all this, the time has come, we must believe, for men to consider well the great goal of the social State and then to define some of the steps that lead to it. The time has come in the progress of man and the development of Christian thought to define the ideal of human society and to formulate some programme of social advance. The State will fulfil its calling in the world when men have both an idea of the State's mission and end, and a worthy and Christian programme of social and political action. It is better to live on the small arc of an infinite circle than to compass the whole area of a ten-foot circumference.

It is too early in the day for any one to formulate such a final programme of political action; it is, in fact, a

grave presumption for any one age to attempt to define the task of a later age. Hence every programme must be more or less provisional and provincial; for the idea and ideal of to-day must be outgrown to-morrow. But none the less to-day ought to have its ideals and policies, for only in this way can the larger to-morrow be realized. We do not want a hard and fast programme with all its items fully defined; but we must have some sense of direction in social progress, and must know some of the paths that lead to the goal. All we can do is to note a few of the more marked items, with a few suggestions as to their scope. We rejoice to believe that every one of these aims is revealed, in germ at least, in the best modern States. But we desire to see them in their whole application become the conscious and constant aim of all States. And we are not careful to determine how far these aims are to be sought through political action alone, and how far they are to be realized through so-called spiritual agencies. As a matter of fact, the State, at bottom, is a spiritual institution; and spiritual principles must realize themselves at last in political institutions. In this chapter we shall suggest a few of those aims which men must set before themselves if they would be true to the ideal of Christ and would move forward in the direction of true progress.

I. The Steady Pressure Against All Things that are Harmful to Man and Hurtful in Society. According to the best interpreters, it is the work and function of the State to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, and promote the general welfare. In the prophetic hope of Israel we have the conception of a State in which a king reigns in righteousness, and where justice is done throughout the land, a society from which all evil and hurtful things have been cast, and in which only good things are permitted. In the

Christian apocalypse we have the vision of a Holy City coming down from God out of heaven, to be set up on earth, a city into which nothing enters that defiles, that works abomination, or that makes a lie; a city from which all evil things have been removed and cast into the lake of fire. Beneath all this drapery of prophecy and apocalypse there is the definite and splendid vision of a society that hates the things that are evil, and gives them no recognized place in its life. Beyond all the local and transient elements in these visions there abides the conception of a society that maintains a steady pressure against the things that are evil and injurious. Combining these functions of the State and these visions of Christianity, interpreting the functions of the State in the light of these Christian hopes, carrying these prophetic visions into the State to guide its action, a very definite result follows and a very plain duty is seen. We have the conception of a society that exerts a steady pressure against all things that are evil and defiling, a society that makes a collective effort to take up all stumbling-blocks out of the way of the people and to cast up straight paths for men's feet.

The State, in the last analysis, is the institute of right relations and the conserver of human welfare. It is called to interpret these relations and to define the things that make for social peace. It is the one agency through which the people can act in their interpretation of social welfare, in their search after righteousness, and their struggles in behalf of social progress. As men become more Christian, as they understand more fully the higher functions of the State, and seek more consciously the Christian ideal, they will more and more unite in making the State the medium of their search after righteousness and the agency of their warfare against evil. As the State becomes more Christian it will exert a steady

and increasing pressure against all things that are evil, and will maintain a steady purpose in behalf of virtue. Are there customs and institutions and agencies in society that are tempting and demoralizing in their tendency? Then the State will exert a steady opposition to these things, and will seek to cast them out of its life. In so far as the State exerts this constant pressure against evil, and makes this collective effort in behalf of righteousness, does it possess the first characteristic of the Christian State.

There are many things that the State can do in this direction, and in behalf of these ends. For one thing, it can define those courses of conduct that are hurtful to society, and thus can warn men back into the right way. It can vindicate in the visible order those high and safe principles of right and wrong, which are woven into the very texture of human society. Some forms of evil, it is possible, will continue for a long time, and the State may never wholly suppress them. But none the less it can make vice unprofitable and crime hazardous. It can take up the stumbling-blocks out of the way of the people, and can provide conditions that make a virtuous life possible. For a long time to come there may be men of evil will, men who, for the sake of their own advantage or their own pleasure, will place temptation before their brothers, and will make profit out of their fall. But when these things are done, wherever men are breaking human relations and are injuring their fellows, the State—acting in behalf of the common safety—must punish the offenders and must break up their man-traps. It can place under a ban all agencies and institutions whose tendency is to hurt man and to demoralize society, and it can labor for their suppression.

These are some of the tasks that the State cannot evade if it would be either human or Christian. Toward all

such evils the attitude of the State must be one of unchanging and relentless opposition, and with these things it can make no terms and permit no exception. For the State to declare by its legislation that a certain institution is socially demoralizing, and yet by its action to recognize that institution, is to stultify itself and discount its Christian profession. In the positive language of the Supreme Court of the United States: "No legislation can barter away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them" (Stone *vs.* Mississippi, 101, U. S. 816). In view of all this, the charge that by such State action we are attempting to legislate men into the kingdom of God is as inane as it is pernicious. That thinking men should have fallen into this blunder almost passes comprehension. In all this no effort is made to legislate men into the kingdom of God; but an effort is made to remove the obstacles that may keep men out of that kingdom. The State may not be able to eliminate many of the evils of society for a long time to come, but it can at least maintain a steady pressure against them; it can create and organize a sentiment hostile to them, and by legislation it can declare that they are illegal and wrong; it can provide that they never shall become accepted and legitimated institutions in society; by legal penalties it can make their continuance hazardous and their practice unprofitable; in fine, by a steady opposition to these things, it may oppose them and wear them down and crowd them out. The State can do much, possibly as much as the Church, to develop the social conscience of men and create a presumption in favor of virtue and morality. Thus the State that is becoming Christian will exert a steady pressure against all forms of social evil

and will seek to remove the stumbling-blocks out of the way of the people. There are no necessary evils.

II. The Administration of Justice With a Saving Purpose. In every State we find a large class of persons who constitute what is called in an indefinite way the criminal class. The presence of such a class endangers the peace of society, and entails heavy burdens upon the State; for the cost of crime first and last is one of the heaviest items in the State's budget. But passing the money cost of crime, the presence of such a criminal population in the modern State is one of the most perplexing problems of the Christian citizen. It discounts the power of Christianity and casts reproach upon our Christian civilization. For this reason it is becoming the cause of earnest heart-searching and social inquiry.

The aim of the State which we here consider has two aspects, which in the last analysis are reduced to one. It defines all those efforts of the State to reform and save offenders against its order; and it implies also all those efforts to save men from going wrong at all. The first effort of the State leads on to the second, and so the one necessitates the other.

The history of the world's treatment of its delinquents is one of the darkest pages in the volume of human misdeeds. The time has been when men regarded all punishment for crime as a just retribution; the wrong-doer must always be punished, and the more severe and brutal the punishment the better society was pleased and the safer men felt. No regard was paid to the physical or moral condition of prisoners, and no effort was made to separate the child prisoner from old and hardened criminals. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were in England two hundred and twenty-three capital offenses, and some of these were of the most trivial nature. At that time a judge could avow from the bench his belief

that there was no hope of regenerating a felon in this life; and as his continued existence would only diffuse a corrupting influence upon others, it was hence better for his own sake, as well as for the sake of society, that he should be hanged as speedily as possible (Mackenzie, "Nineteenth Cent.," Bk. II, chap. i).

But a new spirit has arisen in these later times, and has wrought a great change. This new spirit, which is at once Christian and scientific, is beginning to affect men's social and political life, and is working a complete revolution in their conception of crime and punishment. It has become very plain, for one thing, that the criminal is very much like the rest of his fellows, with practically the same inclinations and instincts as all normal persons, but who yet, from one cause and another, has allowed some of these instincts and impulses to develop in an exaggerated degree. In almost all persons there are tendencies and impulses which, if nourished by environment and unrestrained by society, will make criminals of the best of men. And it has also become plain that society is implicated in the crime of every criminal, and the existence of a criminal class is an indictment, not of that class specially, but of society at large. Thus "Every time a man enters the dock society enters with him, as *particeps criminis*" (Brierley, "Religion and Experience," p. 83). And thus there is "a pregnant truth in the saying that every society has just the kind and number of criminals that it deserves" (G. Stanley Hall, "Adolescence," Vol. I, p. 341).

In the light of this new Christian and scientific spirit which is beginning to pervade society, men are beginning to take up a different attitude toward the wrong-doer and criminal. They are coming to see that human nature in its essence is a pretty constant quality, and the differences in men are due rather to accidental causes than to

inherent qualities. "Human nature in its worst criminal forms is simply good stuff badly handled" (Brierley, *ibid.*, p. 79). Men are coming to believe that the making of criminals is wholly needless and the reformation of criminals is not impossible. These two things we now see go together, and each implies the other. This new spirit may be expressed in a few propositions somewhat as follows: The purpose of all punishment is the protection of society and the reformation of the wrong-doer. Reformation is possible, and wisdom and love can work wonders. The society that is under obligation to punish and restrain the criminal is under obligation to remove the causes that make the criminal. Crime has causes, and crime may be prevented by the cure of its causes.

It must be confessed with sadness that this Christian conception of crime and punishment has made its way very slowly in the minds of men, and has come very late into social action. But be its progress slow or rapid, this Christian conception is making its way in the minds of men, and is working a complete revolution in their social methods and their criminal systems. This conception, it may be said, "logically involves the upheaval and subversion of the entire structure of criminal law as it has stood from time immemorial. . . All the penal codes with their elaborate system of graduated penalties . . . this new method of procedure sweeps away as utter rubbish; it repudiates as false and indefensible the very foundations on which all criminal laws have been built; it substitutes a new corner-stone, that of protection of the public and reformation of the criminal, in place of vindictive retribution and expiation through punitive suffering; and upon the new foundation it would erect a radically new superstructure of criminal law. It logically reverses the attitude of the State toward the criminal; formerly the State presented itself to the criminal as an avenging fury,

seizing him only to inflict suffering upon him; and when it had wreaked its vengeance, casting him out with threatenings for the future; the new system represents the State to the criminal as a kindly parental power, seeking to uplift and rehabilitate him, aiming to fit him for restoration to freedom, and finally to send him forth with a helping hand." Thus the revolution in criminal law implied in this new conception of things is no less momentous "than the change wrought in astronomy by the Copernican system, which stopped the sun and stars in their absurd circuit about the stationary earth and set the world in motion" (Eugene Smith, in "Boies Memorial Volume"). Punishment, it is now seen, that is not reformatory, is mischievous to society and diabolical in principle. Penalty that is reformatory is Christian in spirit and beneficent in results.

And this conception necessarily implies a complete redistribution of blame for the criminal, and a new line of approach toward him. "It was the old view that crime is a constant factor in society, resulting from natural depravity or from persistent personal causes. It is the new view that political, economic, and social institutions, and especially the prevailing method of administering justice and the penal system, have much to do with the amount and kind of crime" (Edward T. Devine, in "Commons," April 20, 1907). It was the old view that we should try to suppress crime and vice; it is the new view that we should release virtues. It was the old view that the depraved man is the natural man; that the causes of crime are wholly beyond the reach of man or society; and little can be done either to keep men from going wrong or to save them when down. It is the new view that the depraved man is not the natural man, that crime has causes which are almost wholly within the control of society, and that the criminal is yet a man who, under

wise and Christian treatment, may be cured of his lapse and restored to his place.

Thus, as the State becomes Christian, it will put forth a steady effort to change the conditions of life and to remove the young from all hurtful and demoralizing influences. It will administer justice, not alone to save those who have gone wrong, but it will also labor to save them from going wrong at all. Thus more and more the resources and authority of the State will be used in creating conditions that promote virtue and make for uprightness. As the State becomes more Christian it will see more clearly its relation to the family and the church, and it will co-operate with these more fully and sympathetically, that thus better sentiments may be created in society and higher standards set up in the State. Along with this there will be a steady effort to effect the reformation of the wrong-doer and to restore him to his normal place in society. To this end the State will more and more substitute reformatories for prisons, indeterminate for fixed sentences, probation and suspended sentence for imprisonment for first offenses, and more than all juvenile courts for police courts and penitentiaries. The time is coming when less and less attention will be given to the building of jails, and more and more study will be given to the prevention of crime. The time is coming when the presence of penitentiaries in a State will be a confession to the world that society is unchristian in its spirit and unwise in its methods of dealing with men. The State that is becoming Christian will seek to administer justice with a saving purpose, and with a constant effort to prevent crime, rather than to punish it.

III. The Continuous and Collective Determination to Maintain Justice Throughout Society. At first sight this aim of the State seems commonplace enough, and one is likely to be met with the remark that this has been the

aim of every State from the first. In a sense this is true, and no one acquainted with history will care to minimize this characteristic of society. But the more carefully one observes the action of political States the more evident it becomes that justice is both imperfectly understood and applied. Justice, it may be said, is like the kingdom of God, which, while it is always here, is yet always to come. Two things as to this question may be kept in mind:

For one thing, the political machinery of the State, from time immemorial, has been in the hands of a political aristocracy, and legislation has been largely under the direction of a special class. It would be strange, therefore, if political action and legislation were not more or less colored by the customs and prepossessions of the controlling elements in the State. For another thing, political action is always conditioned by circumstances, and justice is hence an approximation. It is needless to say that as conditions change men's conceptions of justice also change. And thus what passes for justice in one generation may be denounced as injustice in a succeeding age. The State that is becoming Christian, however, is marked by a collective and continuous determination to establish justice throughout society, and that a type of justice which shall keep pace with the growth of man's moral life.

The moral imperative is as wide-reaching as life, and the law of justice is as binding upon societies as upon individuals. There is a just and Christian manner of life for the person, and there is a just and Christian constitution for society; and the law of justice is as much the life of the one as of the other. We pronounce a man unjust when he disregards the rights of others and makes his own wishes supreme; he is unjust when he uses others as means to his own ends; he is unjust when he seeks to receive goods and services from men without rendering

any fair and equitable return. In the same way we pronounce a society unjust when any number of persons are without true inheritance in life; "it is unjust when large classes in it are so enslaved by others as to be unable to develop their own lives; it is unjust, for instance, when there is any class in it so poor or so hard worked or so dependent upon others, as to be unable to cultivate their faculties and make progress toward the perfection of their own nature; it is unjust when the idle are protected and set in power, and the laborious are crushed down and degraded" (Mackenzie, "Manual of Ethics," Bk. III, chap. ii).

Making some applications of this principle of justice, we must pronounce a man unjust when either by himself or in combination with others, he seeks and secures control of any natural product and exploits it for his own advantage; he is unjust when he employs either the force of club, or skill of intellect, or power of money, to prevent free industrial action and to stifle fair competition; he is unjust when he uses short weights and misbrands goods, and when he picks men's pockets on the streets, or by means of a rebate; he is unjust when he adulterates goods and bulls the market no less than when he uses a false bottom in his peck measure and corners the market to fill his own pocket. In like manner a society is unjust when a disproportionate share of the goods of life falls into the hands of any special class; it is unjust when, according to the census of 1900 in America, the average per capita production is from twelve to fourteen dollars a day, while the average wage is one dollar and thirty-eight cents; it is unjust when a limited number of men by any means whatever, within or without the law, are permitted to gain possession of the land, hold all the strategic points of trade, and compel the people to pay them monopoly prices; it is radically unjust when any

class in society is handicapped from birth and any number are without a fair access to the common heritage.

In the State that is becoming Christian, the pursuit of justice is a primary duty that claims more and ever more attention. Toward this end there are many things that men can do through the State in behalf of justice. For one thing, it can provide by its laws and regulations that men shall live in society on the human and not on the jungle plane. The time has been when men interpreted the process of life as a struggle for existence in which the fittest survived; and by the fittest they usually meant the strongest, the most aggressive, those best fitted to claim and keep the lion's share. In certain lines of action the State has recognized its obligation to protect the weak and conscientious against the strong and immoral, but this principle must be applied all along the line of man's social and industrial life. Again, the State can guarantee fulness of opportunity to all its citizens, and can provide the conditions of a fair and human life in society. The time may never come—at least there is little prospect of its near approach—when all men are equally endowed with mental and moral power. But the time is forever here when all men, be they weak or strong, are entitled in justice to ample opportunity in life, with fair access to the inheritance of society.

For another thing, the State can provide that gains received and privileges enjoyed shall bear some proportion to service rendered and duties fulfilled. In every nation to-day there is wealth enough to give every person a fair material basis of life; and yet in every nation there are many who are in abject poverty, while others struggle hard to keep the wolf from the door. And all the time in these lands a few are living in luxury, hardly able to know how to spend their superfluous incomes. This, in itself, is significant enough, but more significant is the other

fact that the proportion of wealth falling to the various parties holds little or no relation to the real toil expended and service rendered. No one, probably not even the most reactionary individualist, is willing to maintain that these incomes are justly apportioned, and that no one receives more than he has really earned, while many receive less. The time may not come very soon when all these things shall be adjusted according to exact equity, and men must not expect the social millennium to-morrow. But none the less the State that would be Christian must set this aim before itself, and must make progress in this direction.

In the State that is becoming Christian there will be a continuous and collective determination to establish justice throughout society in the industrial as well as in the political sphere. In fact, this search for justice is the peculiar function of the State, and the State that is less than just is false to its first principle. Besides, the State is the only agency through which all the people can join in this search after justice among men. In saying this we do not mean that justice is to be the only object of the State, but we must insist that it is the primary object. No society can be even remotely Christian that is not approximately just. It is vain to talk of a Christian civilization or to hope for social peace without justice all along the line. There is a deep significance in the story of Melchisedek, the priest of God and the king of Salem. This man, whose name signifies the king of righteousness, dwelt in a city called Salem, or Peace. The discontent of men can be allayed and social peace can be ensured by nothing less than justice. Men may seek to appease the poor and help the disinherited by charities and benefactions, but no permanent solution of any problem can be found in this way, and society cannot advance an inch nearer its goal. "What may be called the great bluff of our times

is the effort to put gratuities and benefactions in the place of justice. There is no donation, however gaudy, that can fulfil the place of justice" (Brooks, "The Social Unrest," p. 203). There must be something more than justice, as we shall see, to make a Christian State, but the State can never be Christian with anything less than justice all along the line.

IV. The Steady and Collective Effort to Realize the Spirit of Brotherhood and Love in All the Relations of Society. As we have seen, the Christian spirit has created the finest type of personal character; it has created also the Christian family and the Christian church; and all of these achievements are of great worth and meaning. The Spirit of Christ and the law of love, it is admitted, are the spirit and law for the person, the family, and the church; in these relations we expect men to be loving and self-sacrificing; we expect them to bear one another's burdens. Brotherhood and equality, love and self-sacrifice we have accepted as the Christian principles for homes and for prayer meetings; and by the application of these principles these institutions have become approximately Christian.

But the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus is the law for men in all relations and realms of life. This law, by the very nature of the case, applies everywhere, or it applies nowhere. This law is as real and as obligatory in the State as in the Church. The man who believes in God believes him all along the line of life. This law of God requires men to love one another in halls of legislation as well as in family circles; it asks them to bear one another's burdens in corporations as well as in prayer meetings; it calls upon them to take thought for others and to seek their welfare in and through the political State as well as in and through the family circle and the Christian church.

I know, of course, that many men will question all this, and will write one down as an impracticable visionary. In some other world it is said, where a different order prevails, and where men live in different conditions, it may be possible to practise this law and principle. In some far-away millennium, when the selfish tempers of men have been toned down, it is conceded all men may live by the law of Christ, and a brotherly, social order may be possible. Now, in the face of all these questionings and denials, the Christian must confess his faith in Christ, and must dare to honor his law; he must declare that the State, equally with the family and the Church, must honor the law of Christ, and must fulfil that law in all its policies and practices. The time has come for the State to confess its faith in the law of love and the principle of brotherhood, and then to set about the task of their practical realization. In fine, the State also must become Christian.

Thus far in the thought of men and the progress of society, men and societies have been measured by their fulfilment of the law of justice. But the time is coming, nay, it is even now here, when men and societies are to be measured by their fulfilment of the law of love. It is not enough for a man and for a society to be simply just; this is no mean attainment, and must not be minimized; but they must be loving also if they would fulfil the law of Christ and stand justified before God. The man who would fulfil the law of Christ and be a citizen of the kingdom of God must therefore seek to adjust the relations of men in harmony with the law of love; and he must labor to build up in the earth a society that shall be the incarnation of love, and whose constitution shall be the organized fulfilment of the mind of Christ.

In the State that is becoming Christian, this law of love and this principle of brotherhood will find ever wider

and fuller realization. As society becomes more Christian, men will see more and more clearly that the State is one great family, and in this family men are to live as brothers; they will see that in this larger family, as in the smaller, each is for all, and all are for each. And in this family each is to find his life in and through the life of all; and in this larger family the statutes and arrangements will be but the political application of the law of love and the principle of brotherhood. In this social family the fellowship of men will be organized on the basis of service and not exploitation, and an effort will be made to give every person and class their fair share of the common inheritance. In this family the weak are not compelled to work the longest hours and to take the smallest wage because they are weak and are unable to organize themselves into trade unions. In this family the older and stronger do not seize the choicest bits of food and call it profit, nor do they crowd the sickly members out of the sunshine on the plea of demand and supply. In short, the State that is becoming Christian is beginning to regard itself as one great family in which each member has a place and a worth, and where fellowship is organized on the basis of the brotherhood of man and the solidarity of interests.[1]

In view of this, one of two things men must do: They must either renounce the Christian ideal and repudiate the Christian law; or they must begin to practise their faith in the Christian ideal and confess their loyalty to the law of love in the life and order of society as well as in the family circle and the prayer meeting. The fact is, the spirit of brotherly love will never have its perfect work and become a potent thing in the world till it becomes

[1] In this chapter, and especially in this section, I have received many valuable suggestions from an address by my comrade, Prof. Walter Rauschenbusch, as given in the "Proceedings of the Religious Education Society" for 1907.

incarnate in these larger relations of life. The faith that cannot dominate and transform all life can never become the final faith of the world. The love that can fill all life and transform all society is the love that will move the world and command the future. The steady and collective effort to realize the spirit of brotherly love in all the relations of society is one of the great tasks before the modern world.

V. The Collective and Unchanging Will to Secure for Every Person the Conditions of a Full, Human, Moral Life. In any complete view of man there are four factors that must be taken into account—heredity, environment, individual will, and the grace of God. At different times and by different men the emphasis has been thrown now upon one and now upon another of these factors. In fact, there has been an attempt upon the part of some to explain life in terms of one factor and to minimize all the others. Thus, among theologians, there has been a disposition to explain everything in terms of personal will and the grace of God; these, it is said, are the determining factors in man's life, and the others signify little. Among sociologists there is a tendency to explain life in terms of environment alone; man is the product of his environment, we are told, and we will have better men when they have better conditions. But all this is a mistake, and it leads to tragic results. It means a narrow and one-sided view of man, and it leads to one-sided and narrow effort in man's uplifting. As a matter of fact, all of these factors are essential, and it is unwise to exalt one at the expense of the others. Where all are vital all must be taken into account. Without in any sense minimizing or ignoring these other three factors, we here notice the influence of environment upon man's life, and then consider the action of the State with reference to this factor. It is not the only factor in life, but it is second to none in importance.

That this factor of environment—using the term in the large sense to connote the whole congeries of social conditions—is a determining factor in the lives of men is becoming very plain. Thus it is an accepted article of scientific and Christian faith that all mankind have descended from a common ancestor. Yet, in the race, as we find it, there are all kinds and conditions of men, of different colors and characteristics, with different mental and moral powers, with capacities and talents that range through the scale from zero to infinity. Not only so, but in every society in the world there are all kinds and conditions of people, of different capacities and powers, with some living in luxury and others living in poverty, with a few men standing on the heights of life, but the great majority still creeping in the valleys, with some enjoying a rich heritage of achievement and others little else than social wastrels.

There are two questions which go deep into the problem before us, and these questions society must seriously consider in the days to come; when these are answered the whole aspect of the problem is changed. How far are the differences observed among men due to innate and natural differences in the quality of life itself? How far are these differences caused by outward conditions and untoward circumstances? These questions we cannot discuss in detail, but one or two things may be noted here.

According to the Christian conception, mankind are all partakers of one nature. It lies within the purpose of God that every child born into the world shall have a fair chance for the best things in life. The time has gone by when men can believe that there are various grades of people, with whole classes doomed to slavery, and other peoples made for headship and ease. The time has gone by when men can believe that the differences seen in every

society are here by the decree of God. This is not all, but according to the modern sociological view of man the factor called environment is a kind of mold into which the plastic life is poured, there to be shaped and determined. According to the teachings of sociology human nature is a pretty constant quality, and in itself and of itself possesses no such differences as are found among men. This means, on the one side, that the factor of environment is chiefly responsible for the marked and distressful differences that we find among men in mental and moral capacity, as well as the obvious and ominous number of dependent and defective members of society. This means, on the other side, that if this factor of environment were fully understood and consciously directed, it might be possible to eliminate from society these worse phenomena and to narrow the differences among men.

In view of all this the State that is becoming Christian has a very definite duty to fulfil. It must hold its resources in pledge for all its members, and must provide that the help shall be greatest where the need is sorest. It must use its wisdom and authority in changing conditions that are hurtful and hindering, and in creating conditions that shall be helpful and uplifting. It must declare that no soul shall be allowed to grow up in evil and defiling surroundings, and it must guarantee to every person the conditions for a full, human, moral, and worthy life. The State has an interest in every one of its members, and no life is too insignificant to lie beyond its concern.

In the fulfilment of this aim there are many things that the State can do and must do if it would be approximately Christian. It will seek to remove all conditions that make for human weakness, and will exert its authority to provide those that make for human well-being. It will wage an unceasing warfare against all conditions

that make it easy for childhood to lose its bloom of innocence and hard for it to grow up pure and strong. It will put forth a steady effort to build a wall of protection around girlhood and boyhood, and to shield childhood from needless toil and hardship. It will exercise its sovereignty in removing the handicaps and hindrances that are upon men, and will show its wisdom in keeping the door of opportunity open before every soul within its jurisdiction. If the conditions are unsanitary the State will organize a board of health, and will endeavor to make them sanitary. If there are unfit tenements that poison life and breed disease, the State will condemn them and will order the very ground to be disinfected. If the State finds that children are growing up in evil surroundings and without fit parentage, it will assume the function of a guardian, and will either compel the natural parents to provide better conditions, or it will annul the bond of parenthood and provide new homes for its orphans. If it finds that children have no childhood and no playgrounds, it will tear down factories to provide playgrounds, and will consider this money well spent. If it finds that children are growing up in vicious ways it will establish juvenile courts and probation officers, and will hold its resources in pledge for the redemption of the young. If it finds that any set of men are making merchandise of girlhood, it will hurl the thunderbolts of its wrath, and will end this diabolism. In fine, the State will exercise its authority in providing the necessary moral conditions of a good life.

Again, in every society, there are many persons who begin the struggle of life at a disadvantage from other causes. Through the faults or the misfortunes of their parents they begin life without any real foothold or fair opportunity. They come into the world to find all its resources claimed in perpetuity by others, and thus they

begin life under conditions which utterly disbar them from any fair chance in life. They are early forced into the mine or the factory to work, and thus, growing up without an education, they are unable to rise out of their condition. Now, however it may have been in the past, the time is going by when the State that is gaining the Spirit of Christ will be willing that any soul should grow up handicapped and unprivileged in this way. And so it must put forth a continuous and collective effort to provide conditions for every soul which make possible a worthy human life.

This means that the State that is becoming Christian must make a collective effort to give all its citizens advantageous terms for the development of their lives. If great estates are increasing from generation to generation to the disadvantage of the people, the State will exert its authority and will tax and limit inheritances. If the natural resources of the earth are falling into a few hands and are being exploited to the disadvantage of the many, the State will vindicate the principle of eminent domain, and will change this order of things. If many of the people are unable to provide the means of a worthy education the State will establish a public-school system whereby every child may have a fair opportunity to develop its powers. If there is danger lest any of the people be denied access to knowledge and literature, the State will build and maintain libraries and will consider such expenditures as most wise. If any of the children are forced into mines and factories to labor, the State will wisely forbid such labor, and will seek to make it unnecessary for children thus to toil. If there is a large class of unemployed workers, the State will not only seek to provide work for them, but it will inquire into the causes of such unemployment, and will seek to remove these causes. If there is social deterioration at any point owing to un-

certain employment, low wages, and excessive toil, the State will consider these things and will not rest till it has found a remedy.

One is well aware of the objection brought by many who call themselves practical men of business. These things are good enough for preaching, but they will not work in this matter-of-fact world. Besides all this, the laws of trade are inevitable and inflexible; in order to maintain the present industrial prosperity and produce cheap goods, it is necessary that some children should labor in coal breakers and in factories; we may deplore the sad results, but these things cannot be avoided; we cannot stop the wheels of industry for the sake of a few children; and what is more, we cannot meddle with the laws of trade without producing a crisis, thus doing more harm than good. Such reactionary and unhuman pleas have been heard from the beginning at every forward step. But humanity has persisted, thanks to the brave faith of the people, and has ended one abuse after another; and humanity will persist in the future and will never rest till it has changed the whole order of things and has made it possible for every child to have a fair chance. Everything depends upon the point of view. The policy of the State in the last analysis turns upon the one question whether man is means or whether he is end.

Last of all, the State will seek to provide "fit opportunity in infinite variety" for all its members. It is needless to discuss the fact—so patent to all—that men differ greatly in endowments and aptitudes, and these differences are as inevitable as they are necessary. Since this is so, each man ought to respect his individuality and live his own life; and society should provide each man free scope for his talents and encourage him to make the most of his aptitude.

But, as a matter of fact, we find that there are—and

there always have been—influences at work which seek to run men into the same mold and reduce them to a dead uniformity. The modern factory turns out watches by the thousands every year, but it is enabled to do this by making them all exactly alike. If human society were an aggregation of Waterbury watches, it might be well enough to subject them all to the same discipline and expect of them all the same results; but since society is a union of human beings, each with his own aptitudes and capacities, the individuality of each must be recognized and fit opportunty must be provided. It will be a great day for the progress of man when society honors individuality and seeks both to multiply fit opportunity and to increase its variety ("Charities and the Commons," April 2, 1908). This means that each life is entitled to fair consideration, and should have opportunity to make the most of itself. The largest service which society can render to any life consists in providing it with fit opportunity to grow and unfold to the highest degree.

The world only grows better, even in the moderate degree in which it does grow better, John Morley reminds us, because people wish that it should and take the right steps to make it better. The progress of society will be accelerated, we may add, as men appreciate the importance of environment and set about the creation of conditions that are helpful to man. What then is the conclusion of this whole matter? The citizens of the State that would become Christian must study this question of environment, and must know what are the things that help or hinder the human being. Then these citizens, in and through the State, must resolutely set about the creation of social conditions which shall promote human development and shall make possible for every person a full and worthy life. "The watchful eye of the State must be directed for protection of all classes of persons who are

likely to lose ground by their own weakness, and to be permanently thrown out of the ways of advancement by the simple force of events" (Bascom, "Sociology," p. 45). And the resources of the State must be held in pledge for all its members, and the authority of the State must be employed in creating conditions that shall make for human progress and development. In fine, the State that is becoming Christian will not be satisfied that there shall be any outcast and unprivileged souls doomed from birth to poverty and sin, and debarred by conditions beyond their control from all the best things in life; and it will not rest till it has created conditions which make possible for every one of its members a full and worthy human and moral life.

This effort on the part of society to provide for every soul the material basis and necessary conditions of a human and worthy life is the negative aspect of a great social duty. It now remains for us to consider the positive aspect of this duty, which consists in the effort of society to evoke the possibilities of each life, to nourish it into fulness and maturity, and both to give it access to the best things in life and to train it in the appreciation and use of these best things.

VI. A Genuine Interest in All, with a Steady Effort to Give Each Person a Fair Inheritance in Society. In a previous chapter we have seen that in every society today there is a large class of the disinherited, who begin life under conditions which are a serious handicap, and which preclude them from any real chance therein. But since every human being possesses an infinite worth and has some meaning in the total value of society; and since social progress is the march of all together, it follows that the State should seek to bring up the laggards in the march and to give every person a fair inheritance in society.

In the pursuit of this aim there are three things which men must steadily keep before themselves. First, there is no reason in the will of God and the nature of man why there should be all this poverty and waste with a large disinherited class without any true inheritance in life. Secondly, a society which is approximately Christian in spirit and method will show a vital interest in every one of its members, and will use its resources in behalf of his uplifting. And thirdly, this is a social task, and must be achieved by social action, and not by individual action alone.

1. There is no reason in the will of God and the nature of things for all the waste of modern society and for the presence of a large disinherited class. It lies within the purpose of God that every life should grow up tall and straight, and should be clean and pure. That this is so is made very evident in the Christian Scriptures, wherein we have a revelation of God's character and purpose. Thus, the lawgiver of old dreamed of a time when there should be no poor in the land (Deut. 15 : 4), and to the best of his ability he sought to hasten on that day. The prophet foresaw the time when all men should dwell in peace, each under his own vine and fig tree (Micah 4 : 4), when the land should produce in abundance and there would be enough for all (Isa. 32 : 16-20). The Son of man declares that it is not the will of the Father who is in heaven that one of his little ones should perish, and he utters a heavy woe upon those who put a stumbling-block before the little child (Matt. 18 : 6-14). The seer of Patmos cherished the vision of a city in which there are no disinherited, but where all have access to the tree of life (Rev. 21 : 22). The Father's bounties are for all his children and, as there is plenty and to spare in the Father's house, there is every reason why every soul should have access to these bounties, and should have a

fair inheritance in life. That a human soul made for knowledge and power should die ignorant and neglected we must call a tragedy, whether it happen twenty times in a minute, as some maintain, or only once in a generation.

2. The will of God concerning his human children defines the policy of the State in its social action. In the State that is becoming Christian, an unceasing effort is made to widen the door of opportunity and to hold the resources of society in pledge for all its members. Several things may be mentioned briefly as entering into this part of our programme.

First, the State will seek to provide for every person the opportunity of an education, and thus to give him a fair access to the best things of life with a measurable development of his powers. One or two things may be noted here: Any real education means the development and unfolding of the native capacities of the soul; to prepare the person to make the most of himself for himself and for society. Education is a vital process, and consists in the development of each life in its highest capacities. This, in whole or in part, is recognized by the best modern State as the system of general education testifies. But this aim, none the less, needs to be newly conceived that the whole system may be enlarged to meet the ever-enlarging conception of human life. "There can be no equality and no justice, not to speak of equity, so long as society is composed of members, equally endowed by nature, a few of whom only possess the social heritage of truth and ideas of all past ages, while the great mass are shut out from all the light that human achievement has shed upon the world. The equalization of opportunity means the equalization of education, and not until this is attained is there any virtue or hope in schemes for the equalization of the material

resources of society" (Ward, "Applied Sociology," p. 281).

Again, the total resources of the State—the material basis of every life—are to be held in trust for the benefit of all, and no one class must be allowed to obtain an undue and disproportionate share of the common heritage. No man and no class of men can be allowed to preempt in perpetuity the strategic points of advantage and thus to compel all their fellows to pay them tribute. The authority of the State, which represents the highest will of the people, must be kept free from class control, and must steadily exert itself in behalf of social justice and human progress. It is intolerable to the Christian spirit that the resources of society should be manipulated by the few to the disadvantage of the many. It is contrary to the Christian conception of things that a few men shall preempt all the choice gifts of God, while the great majority must pay them tribute for the mere privilege of living and be content. It is part and parcel of the Christian conception that the highest goods of life are for all men, and to labor that all men may be raised up into the possession and appreciation of these goods. And so it is part and parcel of this conception that the strength and wisdom of all shall be held in pledge for the uplift and blessing of all; that in the strength and blessing of all each may find his own life and portion.

In the prosecution of this task it may not be desirable, as it may not be possible, for the State to inaugurate a system of communal ownership of land or to divide up the common inheritance in every new generation. It may be desirable and wise, however, for the modern statesman to consider the great principles that underlay the Mosaic legislation with reference to this whole question of social opportunity. In that legislation an effort was made by means of the jubilee provision, to erect a bar to the

monopoly of land and to prevent the rise of a permanently landless class without any true inheritance in the nation. The legislator recognized certain facts that are known to all; that in every society there are some persons who, from one cause or another, find it difficult to maintain their footing; he recognized the other fact that in every society there are some men who are ready to take advantage of their brothers' weakness and inefficiency, and use these as a means to their own ends. For many years the rich man might join house to house and lay field to field till there was no place where the poor man might rest; for many years the poor man might be kept out of his ancestral estate, but his children could not be hopelessly handicapped. For, after a time, this process of land monopoly must cease and the lands revert to their original owners. The whole tendency and aim of this jubilee system was to make land monopoly impossible and to prevent the rise of a permanent land-holding class that should control all the strategic points. And the whole tendency and aim of this system, on the other side, was to renew in every generation the conditions of a moral life and to declare that one generation should not be put out of the race by the action of a previous one. This legislation sought to broaden the way of success for all, to put a limit to the greed and cruelty of men, to give every one a fair start in life with a just inheritance in society (Lev. 25 : 10-13; also Munger, "Freedom of Faith," "Land Tenure").

It is probable that no modern legislator would seriously think of applying this law in its literal provisions to the life of to-day; but beyond question there are great underlying principles in this old legislation that must be considered and applied by every State that would truly promote the welfare of all its members. "The State has the difficult duty of encouraging and aiding unimpeded activity in every class, and at the same time re-

newing its conditions in each class. The race is to be renewed morning, noon, and night on equal terms." Again, "Society is to strive for a perpetual renewal of opportunities and redistribution of advantages, so that every child shall come from the cradle to a fresh world with fresh incentives, not to one overworn and used up for him by the errors of past generations" (Bascom, "Sociology," pp. 45, 252). This principle is clear and positive, and it will gain an increasing recognition as men become more just and society becomes more Christian.

3. And finally, the State that is becoming Christian, will regard this work as a social mission and not alone as an individual task. It may be said, in passing, that there are many who, while admitting these tragic phenomena, yet make short shrift of the whole question by saying that their cure is wholly an individual problem, and the State has consequently no duty in the premises. The vast majority of these people are poor and ignorant and sickly and helpless, we are told, because they prefer this condition, and will not rise out of it. The simple fact is, much of this poverty and helplessness is due to causes over which the individual has no control. The little child, driven by its parents to work in the mills and mines in foul and unhealthful conditions, is in no position to rise out of those conditions and become either a scholar or a farmer. The child born in a crowded tenement with weakened vitality and weighted will can never rise by his unaided efforts. In our modern society, from one cause and another, the denizen of the slums is actually walled in, and so is debarred from many fields of aspiration. One may preach to these people the gospel of self-help and personal goodness; but the fact remains that much of this preaching falls short of its full results; indeed, much of it is as inane in spirit as it is false in

method. By all means let men seek to arouse in these people an inward hungering after the ideal and teach them the value of individual initiative; by all means let society refuse to do for these people what they only can do for themselves. But let us know also that the gospel of self-help alone can never fully avail in these lives; let us remember that no cruelty can be greater than to expect man to do that which no man can do unaided. The man who attributes all the poverty and crime of the social delinquents and defectives to their individual discredit is neither clear-sighted nor wise-hearted.

The more carefully we study the whole life of man the more clearly do we see that this purpose of the State to give each person a fair inheritance in society is a social task and can never be fulfilled by individual action alone. This is made very clear in such writings as "The Relation of the State to Industrial Action," by Prof. H. C. Adams; "The Social Problem," by John Hobson; "Applied Sociology," by Prof. Lester F. Ward; and "Sociology," by President Bascom. And in view of all the factors involved in this task we are forced to the conclusion that all the institutions of man's life must cooperate to the one end. Since this is so, the State that is becoming intelligent and Christian will seek a wise and steady co-operation with the other institutions of man's life, the family, and the church, that all together they may create conditions in which noble lives shall be nourished and a social order insured in which every soul shall have a true inheritance. This aim is as novel as it is audacious, but this is the aim which society must seriously and steadily set before itself.

Three things combine to define and emphasize this task. First, the Father's bounties are for all his children; and there is plenty and to spare in his house. It is not his will that one of his little ones should come short of

any of these bounties, but the rather abound in them all. Secondly, the State, in the Christian conception of it, is a kind of mutual aid society, wherein the resources of all are held in pledge for the welfare and blessing of each; it is the highest function of the State to take thought for every child and to give him a fair inheritance. Thirdly, the very idea of democracy implies the Christian and fraternal type of State; for democracy is a confession of brotherhood; it is based upon the worth of man, and it is the equal recognition of mutual obligations. These central truths of Christianity, these fundamental ideas of democracy, are principles of social and political action no less than of individual effort and church policy; and hence they are to determine the aims and efforts of the State no less than those of the church and the individual. And so it follows that in the democratic State that is motived by the spirit of Christ a collective and continuous effort must be made to keep the door of opportunity open before every man and to make it possible for each to develop his possibilities to the full. It must make it impossible for any person within its borders to grow up in ignorance and poverty, to be unprivileged and disinherited, to be stunted and deformed and destitute of the things that make for the highest good. In short, in a State that is becoming Christian and democratic, there is a genuine interest in all with a conscious and organized effort to bring the outcasts into the family circle, to give them an outlook into the highest life, to bring the highest goods within reach of the downmost soul, and to lift up this downmost soul into the possession and appreciation of his heritage. And all this, it may be said, is not a matter of choice, but a plain necessity, being implied in the Christian faith and the democratic creed.

All these aims and objects, we may be told, are already recognized, in part at least, in the best legisla-

tion and policy of the more advanced nations, such as Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. This, we readily and gladly admit, and in all that we have said, we have simply sought to define and apply some principles that are more or less recognized by the more progressive peoples that profess the faith of Christ and accept the democratic idea. But, withal, the fact remains that these principles are but imperfectly understood and partially applied. And so the need demands that these principles be interpreted anew in every generation, and thus interpreted be given an ever wider and more resolute application.

VII. The Steady Determination to Exalt Man and to Make Wealth a Means and Not an End. This is not by any means the common aim on the part of the State to-day, nor of the mass of individuals. In all the great nations of the past the rank and file have had no meaning or value save in their relation to kings and nobles. The great mass of the people were regarded as fertilizer around the roots of a few fine specimens of humanity; and when these specimen plants were produced the whole process was justified. In modern times we have changed this estimate somewhat. In the democratic State there is a new appraisal of man's worth, and the common man is beginning to have some meaning in the total sum. Modern society, in theory at least, has accepted the Christian view of man, and has declared that his life has a value. It has made the average man a citizen and sought to create within him a sovereign's consciousness.

And yet it may be seriously questioned whether our modern estimate, in its practical applications, is one whit higher and worthier than the ancient valuation. A system of philosophy is at once the determiner of a people's faith and a definition of a people's practice. In these modern times there has grown up a study that calls itself the

science of political economy; and this study, it is confessed by its exponents, is concerned with the one question—the production of wealth. In this science the money standard of value is supreme, and everything is rated by it. The principles of this science have invaded other departments of life, and as a consequence the money standard has held almost unlimited sway over man's social and political life. One does not much wonder, therefore, that Carlyle should characterize this economic doctrine as "That Dismal Science." And one does not wonder either that Ruskin should flame out against this conception of man, and should declare that the model man of this dismal science was fit only to sit for the portrait of a lost soul. There are many passions of the human heart, the love of money and the desire for power, which have been fostered and excused by this doctrine of wealth, and as a result modern society has set up its gods of Mammon and has made the money standard supreme. Our whole civilization, says Felix Adler, is infiltrated with the money-getting idea. A brutal and soulless capitalism is getting control of modern production and distribution, and is using the machinery of government to further its own ends. "In so far as this capitalism is in control of the standards of business action, it is reducing the march of human progress to marking time in the lock-step of a chain gang." "The whole programme of our modern civilization turns at last on a calculation of effects upon the accumulation of capital; a programme fit for a Christian civilization would turn rather upon its effects on the quality of men that civilization shall produce. . . We have our modern way of turning moral values upside down. We are making men the means of making capital, whereas capital is only tolerable when it is simply and solely a means of making men. It would be infinitely to the advantage of men if every dollar of wealth should be

cleaned off the earth, provided we could have in its place industry and honesty and justice and love and faith, rather than to be led much further into this devil's dance of capitalism" (Professor Small, "The Outlook," June 17, 1899). And this, he reminds us, is not the familiar rant of the professional agitator, nor the easy generalization of the huckster of vain sensations. Some years ago a noted scientist of England declared that the greatness of England was due beyond all other causes to the abundance and cheapness of her coal. If it be so, said Ruskin, then ashes to ashes be her epitaph, and the sooner the better. At a political gathering some years ago a noted speaker declared: "No issue ever gets above the bread and butter issue." And the people applauded.

In the true and Christian conception of things, man is the end, and all other things are means. In this true and Christian conception of the State also human life is the supreme value, and all other things are brought to this standard. This is so evident to the one who reads the New Testament that it seems needless to amplify or prove it. Things are here for the sake of man, and not man for the sake of things. A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth. Man does not live by bread alone, but by every word of the Lord does man live. And the same is true of the State. A people's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which it possesses. A people does not live by bread alone, but by the things of the spirit and the word of God. The end of the State, said Aristotle, is not life alone, but good life; whence it follows that virtue is the serious care of a State that truly deserves the name. Let there be worse cotton, said Emerson, and better men ("The Method of Nature").

In a State that is becoming Christian, man is regarded as the end, and all other things are valued as means to

this end. In a society that is becoming Christian, financial questions, such as the tariff and railroads, revenue and manufacture, the protection of sheep and the extension of markets, will receive relatively less and less attention, while vital questions, such as education and child labor, temperance and morality, will receive relatively more and more. In a city that is becoming Christian, questions of paving and franchises, corporations and business, will more and more fall into the background, and questions of homes for the people, sanitary tenements, moral environment, and spiritual welfare, will more come into the foreground. In a nation that is becoming Christian the production of material possessions will be regarded as a means to an end, and the production of the largest number of healthy and moral men and women will be honored as its chief glory. In a society that is becoming Christian there is an ever truer and higher appreciation of man's true life, and less and less are men being concerned with things such as property and bank accounts. As society becomes more Christian the great outstanding features of the Holy City will appear in the societies of earth. And more and more men will be the ends, and wealth will be the means. And thus, little by little, the gold of the nation will be put down under foot to form the pavements of the city of God, and made to serve the true life of man. One had rather think of this earth as a shining planet in the divine galaxy on which God's children aspire after ideal ends, than to think of it as a dirt ball whose sign is a dollar mark and inhabited by a race of creatures whose only mission is to create wealth. In the last analysis the worth of every civilization and the value of every society must be measured by the man who is both its center and its product.

VIII. All the aims and efforts thus far considered sum themselves up in one comprehensive and synthetic aim

and effort: The political vision of the kingdom of God and the collective effort to realize that kingdom on the earth.

Thus far in the political life of man there has been little vision of the great end of the State, and as a consequence the metapolitical element has been almost entirely wanting. The great mass of the people have lived without any vision beyond the day, and they have sought only the things in plain sight. There has been no synthetic programme of social action which the whole people might follow in their search for the kingdom. For this reason one is not surprised to find that men have built their States without the inspiration of the ideal; nor is he surprised to know that they have made little collective effort to realize the kingdom of God in this present world.

It is just here that we perceive one of the most noteworthy characteristics of the Christian State and find one of the most hopeful signs of these modern times. There is coming to men a vision of the divine goal of the State; and there is growing in them a collective desire to seek this goal. As a consequence they are beginning to feel the evils of the world as men have never felt them before; they are beginning to ask whether these evils are necessary and inevitable; they are beginning to search into causes; and they are seeking for some programme in which they all can unite in their effort to promote the progress of society. They are beginning to realize that mankind is one family, and they are learning to think of the State as an agency of God in the distribution of his bounties to his children and as a medium through which his purpose is fulfilled in the earth. In fine, they are beginning to realize that the State has no other business in the world than to repeat in its life and organize in its order the spirit of Christ and the principles of the kingdom of God.

The three lines of inquiry running through our study converge at one point and make very plain the way that men must now take. The State has one great end to seek in the world, and that is to organize and incarnate in the social and political life of man the righteousness, the peace, and the joy of the kingdom of God. This mission of the State may be looked at from below or from above, but the end is one. Looked at from below it is here to serve the life of man, to be an agency and means whereby the race is blessed and man comes to maturity. Looked at from above the State has one object, and that is the fulfilment of God's gracious purpose concerning his human children; and thus the end of government is to apprehend and apply the principles and laws of the kingdom of God, and to make them regnant in human society. It may be a long time before the State will realize this end and will organize its life in the spirit of Christ; it may be a long time before men will fully understand the axioms of Christ and will observe the landmarks of the kingdom in their social and political life. But this is the divine meaning of the State, and this is the purpose which men must resolutely set before themselves. To hasten on this work is the business of the Christian citizen, and he has no other real business here below. To seek the kingdom of God and its righteousness in this present world and to build up in the earth the city of God, is the chief duty of society, and it becomes Christian in so far as it seeks this end. In the great words of Immanuel Fichte, "Christianity is destined some day to become the inner organizing power of the State." In the no less significant words of De Laveleye we may say: "There is in human affairs one order which is best. That order is not always the one which exists, but it is the order which should exist for the greatest

good of humanity. God knows it and wills it; man's duty it is to discover and establish it." One thing is certain beyond peradventure: our social and political practice must either conform to our ethical philosophy and our religious ideals; or our ethical philosophy and our religious ideals will conform to our social and political practice. That is, Christian men must either cast away the Christian ideal of society, or they must seek to realize that ideal in their political institutions.

In saying all this, in cherishing the hope of the Christian State, we do not indulge in Utopian dreams nor expect any impossible results. We know all too well the difficulties that lie in the way to Utopia; we measure fully all the delays that must be endured. "We know well that there is no perfection for man in this life; there is only growth toward perfection. In personal religion we look with seasoned suspicion at any one who claims to be holy and perfect; yet we always tell men to become holy and seek perfection. We make it a duty to seek what is unattainable. We have the same paradox in the perfectibility of society. We shall never have a perfect society, yet we must seek it with faith. . . At best there is always but an approximation to a perfect social order. The kingdom of God is always coming" (Rauschenbusch, "Christianity and the Social Crisis," pp. 420, 421). This vision of the ideal and this approximation toward it is the sign that the State is becoming Christian. There is no one reform, we fully admit, which will mean the reform of society; there is no one abuse which, if corrected, would insure the happiness and peace of mankind; there is no set of laws, no system of government which can alone bring in the millennium; there is no hour in all the future of the race when one can say that the world is perfect and the kingdom of God is fully come. And yet there is a vast amount

of remediable wrong; there are a hundred abuses that can be corrected and their correction will clear the way of progress. The world can be made better, and we are to set about it in a wise and hopeful spirit. Something can be done, and not to do this is to convict ourselves of high treason against the kingdom of God. Any experiment that will improve by a hair's breadth the condition of a single human being is well worth trying. Any effort that will help a single soul in any way, is the translation into deed of some article of the Christian faith. The only men for whom Christ had no hope, and for whom the future holds no promise, are the dead souls who are satisfied with the world and do not believe in social progress. The one failure in life which has no compensation and no cure is the failure of the man who has no ideal, and does not believe in a fairer to-morrow. The one success in life which has no shadow and no equal is the success of the man who cherishes this divine ideal and seeks to lead his fellows toward the sunrising. It may be a mistake to have an ideal that is too high; but it is a misfortune, yea, it is a crime to have no ideal at all.

XV

THE REALIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN STATE

THE State, in some form, is a universal phenomenon. Democracy, so the facts indicate, is acquiring such an irresistible momentum that its world-wide extension is only a question of time. Christianity, its followers believe, is the one religion that possesses the marks of universality and finality. The State, we have reason to believe, is destined to wax rather than wane in its influence and importance. Democracy, as the best students of history agree, is a Christian product; and what is more significant, democracy must become real as Christianity becomes regnant. Is it possible for the State to become Christian, and for Christianity to become political, and for both the State and Christianity to become democratic in spirit and form? These questions, it may be said, are among the most interesting and vital that man can ask, and upon their right solution depend a hundred questions in the life of man and the progress of society.

The time has come for us to gather up the threads of our study and to mark their relation to one another. In the first division we considered the nature and origin of the State, and noted some of its functions and ideals. We saw that the State grows out of the nature of man, that it is necessary to him, and that it has important functions to fulfil in the economy of life. In the second division we considered the forms of the State, noting especially the rise and development of democracy, attempting to define in part its meaning and

to indicate some of its tasks. We found that democracy is a product of the Christian spirit, that it is a confession in social and political relations of the great fact of brotherhood, and that in the fundamental truths of Christianity it has both its validity and its vitality. In the third division we are concerned with the relation between Christianity and the State, with the special tasks that confront a Christian society, closing with the realization in the world of the Christian democracy. We find that in Christianity we have the ideal of a human society on earth, that Christianity is no less social than personal, and that it will not have its perfect work till it has created the city of God among men. We find also that the State has some great goal toward which it is moving; that as society becomes more Christian in spirit it becomes more democratic in form, and that the State needs Christianity to be its informing and vitalizing spirit, as Christianity needs the State to be one of the spheres of its manifestation and power. Thus we find that the three lines of study all converge at the one point, and this point of convergence must be noted.

The State is here as a recognized fact and force in the life of man, and we are convinced that it has some human meaning and divine end. In the Christian conception we have a great ideal for man and for society, and in it the State plays an important part. What then is the relation between the Christian ideal and the political State? Is there any real and necessary relation between them, or must they ever lie in different realms? What are the aims which the Christian who is a citizen should set before himself? And what are the results which we may expect Christianity to achieve in the realm of man's social and political life? These are some of the urgent and practical questions of to-day, and upon their right

solution depend many things in man's thought and action. By the very nature of the case it is impossible for men to live permanently and harmoniously under a divided allegiance. They must therefore either lower their religious ideal to the level of their political life, or they must raise their political life till it shall synchronize with their religious ideal. This means that they must either make the State Christian, in the best sense of the term, or they must abandon the Christian ideal as an impracticable dream.

I. The Political State and the Perfection of Man. There are two or three questions that must be answered before we shall be in a position to understand the nature of the Christian State or to define the special tasks of the Christian citizen. Can the State ever become Christian? What is the relation between the kingdom of God and the political State? What is implied in the progress and perfection of man?

1. Can the State ever become Christian? There are many who have maintained very positively that the State never can become Christian; for Christianity, it is asserted, belongs to one sphere of life, while the State concerns itself with interests that lie in a different sphere. Men have cherished the conception of the kingdom of God, and they have been members of the political State; but withal they have seen little real relation between the two; on the contrary they have regarded the one as the antithesis of the other. They have thought of the kingdom of God and the political State as exclusive magnitudes, and so they have construed the interests of the two in wholly different categories.

Thus, in the name of what may be called the personal conception of the kingdom men have contended that Christianity has nothing to do with the political State. With many persons, from the first century to the

twentieth, the ideal of the kingdom of God has connoted a wholly subjective and individual good. The kingdom of God is within you, men have said, and hence it has nothing to do with such things as political States and social reforms. Our citizenship is in heaven, they have declared, and so we have nothing to do with the politics of earth. They have hence narrowed their horizon to the personal life, and have concerned themselves very little with what they are pleased to call "secular politics." In this conception it is evident that the perfection of man has no necessary relation to the perfection of the State; in fact, the perfect State is an absurdity; as men become Christian the State will pass away and be known no more forever.

Again, in the name of the ecclesiastical conception of the kingdom of God, men have maintained that Christianity has little to do with political matters. In this conception the idea of the kingdom of God is narrowed down to the dimensions of the Christian church; the boundaries of the two magnitudes are made conterminous; and hence the extension of the kingdom is the making of the church. In this conception whatever interest of life does not fall within the boundaries of the church lies outside the kingdom; and hence the extra-ecclesiastical interests have little relation to the kingdom; and so it follows that the coming of the kingdom has no relation to the development of the State. All through the centuries these conceptions have appeared, now here, now there, sometimes clearly expressed, more often silently implied. Many of the early Christians, as we know, thought lightly of the State, and gave it no place in the ultimate purpose of God; many regarded it with suspicion and fear, and looked upon it as an alien realm with which Christ had nothing to do. The political State in all such views has little relation to the kingdom

of God, and the coming of the kingdom means the unmaking of the State.

There are many, both within and without the church, who file an objection against this whole discussion of the Christian State, and this objection we must note. Every picture requires a background; thus against the objection brought against this conception we may behold the outlines of the Christian State. The Christian State, we are assured, is a contradiction in terms, and the building of such a State is a forlorn hope. The State is made up of all classes and conditions of men, and for this reason it must forever fall short of the perfection of the kingdom. The kingdom means perfection, and the State is composed of people at all stages of moral worth and social power. Beyond all this the kingdom of God is something that comes to men, and not something that can be built by men; something that persuades, not anything that forces; and though men may do something to prepare for the kingdom, they yet cannot make the kingdom. For these and many other reasons, it is contended, the Christianization of the State is a contradiction in terms, and we should cease all such misleading discussions. Just so far as the State becomes Christian it ceases to be political. Just so far as the State remains political it is not Christian. Respecting this, one or two things may be noted.

In many of these objections to the idea of the Christian State, there lurks a fallacy which shows a total misapprehension of Christianity; and some of the objections, pious as they may sound, are little other than transparent pharisaism. There are Christian men in the world, one likes to believe; but there are no perfect men, as far as one can observe. In men, in the best of men, there are always some things to be cast off and some advances to be made. The Christian man is one who is *being*

saved, and he is to be judged not so much by what he now is as by what he is coming to be. Again, there are Christian churches in the world one likes to believe, but there is no church, so far as man can discover, which is wholly Christian. If by a Christian church we mean a company of perfect people with a perfect organization, then no such church exists or has ever existed. In the churches—in every church known to man—there are members at all stages of immaturity and growth, and the church that claims to be wholly perfect and mature is guilty of an impudence that would shock a Pharisee. The Christian church is a body that is *becoming* Christian, and it is to be judged, not so much by what it is as by what it is coming to be. The same test may be applied to the State, and with precisely the same results. There is no State that is fully Christian except in the perfervid imagination of some dreamer, and the Christian State, so far as we can prophesy, is still far in the future. But, if it is fair to speak of Christian man and the Christian church, it is no less fair to speak of the Christian State, and for precisely the same reasons. The Christian State is a State that is becoming Christian, and it is to be judged, not so much by what it is as by what it is coming to be.

In much of the current discussion concerning Christianity and its expressions there lurks a subtle fallacy that vitiates many of our arguments and conclusions. There are some things that ought to be self-evident after all these centuries of Christian teaching and practice. For one thing, we have learned that the mere profession of the Christian faith does not by any means make one a Christian. For he is not a Jew who is one outwardly, says Paul, but the only circumcision that has meaning is the circumcision of the heart. In like manner the mere assumption of the Christian name does not constitute one

a Christian. "If any man have not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his." We have learned that a man is not a Christian because he subscribes to a certain creed or belongs to a certain church; neither is a man a Christian because he has attained unto the ideal or is already perfect. He is a Christian who has the spirit of Christ and is interested in the things that interest Christ. For another thing we have learned that the mere incorporation of an organization under the Christian name does not by any means make a people a Christian church. "But the true and grand idea of a church," says Thomas Arnold, "is that of a society for making men like Christ, earth like heaven, and the kingdoms of this world the kingdom of God" ("Life," Let. cxii). We have discovered also that a church is not necessarily Christian because it possesses an orthodox creed or administers certain ordinances in an apostolic way; neither is a church Christian because of any apostolic succession with a clear line of continuity to the apostolic age and with a regular set of officers to duplicate the early church. But a church is Christian when it has the spirit of Christ and manifests the apostolic zeal and love. We may conclude also, that a State does not become Christian when it incorporates the name of Christ in its constitution or opens the sessions of Congress with prayer; neither is a State Christian when certain theological ideas are embodied in its legislation and certain ecclesiastical functionaries dictate the policy of cabinets. In any real sense a State is Christian when it possesses the spirit of Christ and seeks certain great Christian ends in and through its life and service.

The conclusion is plain, and its bearing upon the question before us is no less plain. There are certain great marks that in a way are characteristic of Christianity wherever it appears, whether in the man, in the church,

or in the State. As there is a peculiar life and spirit in the Christian man with certain aspirations and ideals; as there is a peculiar life and spirit in the Christian church with certain definite purposes and methods; so there is a peculiar life and spirit in the Christian State with certain marked characteristics and aims. As the man who bears the Christian name possesses this peculiar Christian character in its beginnings at least; as the church that bears the Christian name manifests certain qualities in an ever-increasing degree, so the State that is becoming Christian bears certain definite characteristics in all its forms and features. As the sanctification of the Christian believer is his progressive growth into the likeness of Christ; as the progress of the Christian church is measured by its ever-growing power for service; so the making of the Christian State is the development and intensification of the Christian characteristics in its life and functions.

This brings us to the question which, in a way, lies beyond and beneath all of these other questions; till this is answered we shall find no clue to the problem; light here is light all along the way. This question we must now consider.

2. What is the kingdom of God, and what is the relation between the kingdom and the political State? In another study the kingdom of God on earth, the writer has considered the first part of this question, and the argument of that study need not be reproduced here. The kingdom of God, it will probably be admitted by all in these times, is the central truth of Christianity, at once the formative idea and the ethical center, the one truth that explains all other truths and gives them meaning. This kingdom of God, it is becoming very plain, is a great, all-comprehensive idea, and defines at once the whole purpose of God for man, and indicates the whole

progress of man in the purpose of God. The conception of this kingdom runs like a thread of gold through the whole fabric of the Christian revelation and gives it unity and power. At first, it is true, in the early life of Israel the idea is vague and indefinite, but as the generations pass it runs itself clear in the later prophetic hopes. In the life and teaching of the Son of man it is brought out into the open, and is given a very definite meaning and form. All the hopes and ideals of his people passed into his mind and heart, there to be tested and appraised, and then to come forth fulfilled and transformed. In his hands these hopes and ideals undergo such a purification and enlargement that what before was local he makes universal, and what was true for Israel he shows is now true for the world. From this time forward we have the same term, but how much more it connotes! We have the same hope, but how much larger it is! Then this hope and ideal thus enlarged and universalized Jesus returns to his people to become the possession of mankind and the inspiration of the race. The men who lived with Jesus and became his first disciples, for a time at least, shared the common hopes of the people, and for a while sadly and persistently misunderstood the Master. But in course of time this hope undergoes a gradual modification, and the whole later New Testament illustrates the steady unfolding of this idea in the thought and life of the early church. In the later Epistles of Paul we find the conception coming into prominence of a justified and reconciled humanity, a renewed and transformed society on earth, fashioned according to the will of God and filled with his Spirit (Eph. 2 : 11-22). In the Apocalpyse also the seer beholds the heavenly city coming down from God out of heaven to be set up on earth. Beyond the present order of things he sees the walls of the city of God rising in the earth, a city where men live

together in peace and brotherhood, a city where all men have equal rights to the good things of life, a city into which nothing enters that defiles, that works abomination or that makes a lie, a city where God dwells among men and men live together as his children. The kingdom of God, it is evident to the one who studies the Scriptures, means much more than a human society on earth, but it is certain that it never means less.

To sum up: The kingdom of God means the growing perfection of the collective life of humanity, the redemption of man's mental and moral and spiritual life—in a word, the creation of a perfect man in a perfect society. In one great synthesis is summed up the whole purpose of God for man and the whole work of man in the world. In one great synthesis is comprehended the regeneration of the soul and its renewal in righteousness, the quickening of the mind, and its instruction in knowledge and truth, the rightening and adjustment of man's social and political relations, the upbuilding and development and perfection of his body, the improvement of the home, the perfection of the church, the moralization of the social life—in short, the whole personal, mental, moral, spiritual, physical, social, ecclesiastical, industrial, and political perfection of man. In one great ideal is gathered up the whole purpose of God in the world, and so the kingdom contemplates not alone the salvation and perfection of the person, but the redemption and transformation of the relations and institutions of his life, the family, the church, and the State. The kingdom of God includes the whole life of man, and any conception of the kingdom that ignores any relation of man's life is by that fact so much less than the Christian conception.

3. What is implied in the conception of man's progress and perfection? In these latter times the race is gaining what has been called the sense of humanity, and a wholly

new conception of solidarity. The time has been when men began their thinking with the individual, and construed morality and progress in terms of individual life. But in these times it has become very evident that not the individual, but society is the true unit, and that one must construe morality and progress in terms of social life. There must be a society that there may be individuals; and paradoxical as it may seem, persons are, only because society is. The life of man is rooted in the life of humanity. Without society of some kind, the person could never be at all in any full and human sense; and without society of some form or kind his personality could never develop to any conscious and human degree. The life of one man is made possible by the lives of many men, and an isolated and abstract individual—if such were possible—would be a non-human monster.

This is not all, but one life comes to self-realization in and through the lives of others in social relations. Life, we have learned, is a matter of relationships, and the quality of these relations determines the quality of the life. The one man can advance toward personality, and self-realization, and salvation only by becoming a member of an organic society and taking his place in the common life (Jones, "Social Law in the Spiritual World," p. 77). The time has gone by when we can think of the extrication of the individual from all human relations and his perfection in isolation from his fellows. The time has come when the one who would think of salvation in any real and Christian sense must think of it as the salvation of the whole man with the perfection of the relations that are inwrought into his very being. The salvation of the person in all the length and breadth of the term involves the salvation of the society of which he is a part. The Son of man has not come to destroy but to fulfil; not to mutilate life but to perfect life; not

to save men out of the world, but to save them in the world. It is only as man comes into relations with others that he arrives at knowledge of himself, and it is only as he attains to the realization of the social end that he can attain to the realization of the personal end. In the last analysis it will be found that these two ends, the person and the society, are not really two but one. In so far as we come into relations with other human beings in the world, we are attaining to a partial realization of the ideal which our rational nature sets before us. And there is no other way by which we can come to such realization. "It is only in the lives of other human beings that we can find a world in which we can live at home" (Mackenzie, "Introduc. to Social Philos.," p. 260). The perfection of man is his perfection in and through the relations of his being, and any conception of salvation that means less than this perfection of his social life falls far below the Christian conception.

That this is so is made very evident in the Christian Scriptures. The hope of the gospel is a social and human hope rather than an individual and selfish hope. In the Christian conception of life everything is construed in terms of the collective life rather than the individual. In the Christian's prayer we find that everything is interpreted in terms of the collective good; for men are to pray that the Father's kingdom may come, that the Father's will may be done, on earth even as in heaven. Then, included in these petitions, we find that provision is made for our daily bread, for our deliverance from evil, for the forgiveness of our sins. Not for himself alone, but for all does the Christian pray, for he knows that in the blessings that come to all he shall find his own. In the apostolic teaching the great truth of solidarity is made very plain and cannot be mistaken. Thus the apostle defines the work of Christ in terms of human society, and

never once in terms of individual isolation. In his teaching the purpose of God in the world culminates in the creation of a humanity that has become the habitation of God through the Spirit. He conceives of the life of man as that of a member in a body, and the one member is saved in and through the salvation of the body. Thus "the whole body fitly framed and compact together through that which every joint supplieth, according to the working in due measure of each several part, maketh the increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love" (Eph. 4 : 16). The apostle never thinks of salvation as a purely individual gift that may be enjoyed in isolation, but always in terms of human relations and social life. And in the Apocalypse this same truth is even more plain. It is worth noting that Revelation closes with the conception of a holy city that has come down from God out of heaven to be set up on earth and to be realized among men. Humanity may have begun in a garden, as the book of Genesis suggests, but the life of man culminates in a city, as Revelation records. One may not agree with Ritschl in all of his positions, but he has correctly interpreted the essence of Christianity when he declares that it is primarily social, and that the great truths of religion cannot be understood when applied in isolation to the individual subject, but only when explained in relation to the subject as a member of a community of believers ("Justification and Reconciliation," chap. i). The social, the collective, the human ideal is preserved throughout, and this leads us to think of the ideal condition as life in a divine, human, righteous society. The salvation which Christ brings "is not finished when a man is forgiven or has obtained peace with God; it is completed only when Christ is all in all—that is, when humanity has been built up in all its parts and regulated in all its relations by the ideal of love and sonship that has lived from

eternity in the bosom of God" (Fairbairn, "Religion in History and Modern Life," p. 254). The kingdom of God is not an anarchy of good individuals, but a society of brothers who live together in righteousness and love.

There must be some medium through which men can express their social fellowship and co-operate for the common good. "We have such a medium," men say; "it is the church; it is the body of Christ and the agency of the kingdom." So far so good; but as every one knows large sections of life lie beyond the boundaries of the church; and by the very nature of the case the church has its own special aims and methods. We must either admit, therefore, that large provinces of life lie beyond the sovereignty of God and the interest of the Christian, or we must find some agency through which we can co-operate in promoting the wide interests of life, and in which we can express our Christian principles. The State, in some form, is necessary if men are to seek the whole kingdom of God. This is not all; but since Christian men are members of the State, they must carry the Christian spirit into all the relations and realms of society. They must do one of two things; they must either renounce their citizenship in the civil State, or they must carry the Christian ideal into every province and seek to build the State after the divine ideal. To renounce one's citizenship is to throw away one of the most precious opportunities of life; to limit the Christian ideal and to exclude the Christian spirit from any province of life is treason against the kingdom of God. To follow the Christian ideal and honor one's citizenship means the building up in the earth of a Christian State. Thus the Christian form of the State is inevitable if men are to seek the whole kingdom of God.

Thus all the various lines of thought converge at one point and lead to one conclusion. The life of the king-

dom, being a social life, creates around itself a human society; the Christian conception of the kingdom of God on earth implies the perfection of life in its social relations; the perfection of man involves the perfection of the social and political institutions of his life.

II. The Building of the Christian State is the Task Set Before the Christian Citizen. The very nature of Christianity and the very nature of man make several things very plain. For one thing, Christianity is a social religion, and the ideal of the kingdom of God is a social ideal. Nothing less, then, or lower than a social realization, can satisfy the purpose of Christianity. For another thing, Christianity can never be isolated and made a purely personal matter. They wrong Christianity and defecate it of all meaning who would treat it in this way and would regard it as an abstract and vague something or nothing that has no relation to the whole life of man. The principles of Christianity cannot work in a vacuum, and they are not mere counsels of perfection; on the contrary their confessed sphere of manifestation is human life with its interests and relations.

Again, the great virtues of Christianity are social virtues, and must have social expression. It is not enough that there be honesty and justice, sincerity and love in the hearts of men; these qualities, to have their largest meaning and fullest value, must express themselves in social institutions and human relations. The fact is, personal goodness and private virtue are never more than mere abstractions till they are expressed in outward acts and social forms. It has become very plain that abstract goodness is at best an impossible thing, an abstract nothing; the man who is good is good in a definite and concrete situation, and no other kind of goodness is conceivable. So also love is not a vague and impersonal feeling, but a definite and personal relation; the man who

loves always loves some one. The just man is just in a certain concrete relation with his fellows; and any other conception is inconceivable (King, "Rational Living," chap. xi; Small, "General Sociology," Part VIII). And for a last thing, Christianity can never attain to its full power till it is expressed in social forms. Any attempt to realize the full purpose of God must carry one out into social life and inspire him to build the Christian State. "Never in any case will Christianity appear in individuals without at the same time appearing in the form of a society" (Martensen, "Christian Ethics, General," Sec. 70). That is, the Christian life by its very nature and quality must seek to build around itself a body in which it can dwell and through which it can reveal its power. The idea of the kingdom of God includes the whole life of man, his personal and his family life, his church and his social life. Hence the programme of the kingdom must comprehend the perfection of man in all the realms and relations of his being with the transformation of all the institutions of his life.

This conception of Christianity imposes a new obligation upon the mind and heart of the Christian discipleship. Thus far Christianity has proved its ability to create the finest and highest type of personal morality and saintly life. The spirit of Christ came as a new creative spirit brooding over the abyss of human degradation in the pagan world and bringing forth new types of manhood. Before long the Christians were noted for their pure lives and their loving service, and even their enemies were compelled to mark and admire. In the progress of the centuries this ideal has developed and unfolded, and new aspects of it have been seen and loved. Without fear Christianity can point to the lives of men and women as illustrations of its power to transform human lives and to create the finest type of personal Christian character.

And the spirit of Christ dwelling in men has created the Christian family. Christianity arose at a time when the bonds of human society were dissolving, and when marriage was lightly esteemed. But in this time the gospel began its changeful but triumphant career, and soon its effects are noticed in Roman society. The home life of the Christians was remarkable for its purity and stability, and in the truest sense it may be said that the Christian family came into being. This is one of the great achievements of the Christian spirit, and through it there is given new hope for the future of the world.

Not only so, but the Christian spirit has created the Christian church, an achievement of no less significance. This church has been a continual witness for God and for the things eternal; it has come to men with a message of hope and love, and it has wrought wonders in human lives. It is easy for any one who is so inclined to frame a heavy indictment against the churches and to sustain that indictment at the bar of history. There have been times when the churches have been cold and worldly, when they have forgotten the real message of Christ and have hardly lisped the first syllable of his truth; in fact, there have been times when the churches have been practically antichristian and when the men who wanted to remain Christians were obliged to step outside of their boundaries. But with it all the churches not only have endured, but they have shown a wonderful power of moral renewal, and their words and works are a witness to the spirit of Christ. These things, thus enumerated, are all triumphs of the Christian spirit, and are illustrations of the Christian ideal, and they are to be classed among the great Gesta Christi.

But now, at last, the Christian has become a citizen, and in a way is responsible for the State's struggle for life and progress. It is a fact worthy of careful con-

sideration that in lands where Christianity is most regnant the government is most democratic. It is a fundamental principle of the Christian life, that one is to do everything in the name and for the ends of Jesus Christ; his whole life is to be lived out under the dominion of his Master, as his whole effort in the world is the endeavor to realize the Christian ideal in all the relations and realms of his life. The Christian has become a citizen, and is called to the privilege of sovereignty in the State. The Christian citizen has the ideal of a Christian society, and he is called to justify his faith in his deeds. Thus, by the very necessities of the case, the Christian citizen is summoned to the task of creating in the earth the Christian type of human society.

In these times men are coming to what may be called social self-consciousness, and through this self-consciousness they are discovering that many things in their lives, and in society, are contrary to the Christian ideal. But by the very terms of that ideal the men who profess and call themselves Christian are pledged to be faithful to it, and seek its realization in the world. It hence follows that the Christian ideal fairly and fully commits men to the task of building up in the earth a better and more Christian type of human society. This is the task that cannot be shirked by those who bear the Christian name and cherish the Christian hope. For men to say that the purpose of Christ has no relation to the State, is to exclude nine-tenths of life from the kingdom of God, belittle that kingdom, and deny Christ's claim to universal kingship. The man who believes in Jesus Christ must repudiate all such conceptions as these, and must dare to assert Christ's right to social headship. One cannot believe in a Christ who is Lord and King and then narrow and limit his sovereignty to any special realm. Not only so, but for men to say that Christianity has no message

and no meaning for the great world of social interests is to discount that gospel at the very start. The men who advocate these views know not what they do; for they are making it hard for the modern world to have any interest in such an emasculated and small gospel, and they are giving color to the belief of many that Christianity is outgrown and belongs to the museum of antiquities. And once more, for men to say, as many are now saying, that in the Christianity we now have there is no power adequate to this task of social regeneration and reconstruction is really to wound Christianity in the house of its friends. The fact is, a gospel that is not competent to meet the whole need of man is simply no gospel at all. A gospel of redemption that must abandon the world and must concern itself only with a few individuals who are saved out of the world, has no meaning for humanity, and might as well be cast aside at once. But such we believe is not the gospel of Christianity which is here to save the world and to bring in the kingdom of God.

The struggle of the world religions is upon us, and the law of the survival of the fittest applies here as elsewhere. It is simply folly for Christians to complain of this law and try to keep Christianity out of comparison with the other religions of the world. It is especially short-sighted and vain for them to avoid the simple test—the test of fruits—which the Master has himself proposed. The gospel, it is conceded, has demonstrated its ability to create the finest type of personal morality; it has proved its ability to create the Christian home and the Christian church, which are achievements of no little moment. While this is much, this is not by any means all that we ask of a religion. Christianity must now prove its power to create the finest and highest type of social and political life, and by its ability to do this it will be rated in the days to come. "This is the work set before the missionary

will and reason of the Church. This is the thing that Christianity must do in order to carry off from the great debate of comparative religions the prize of the world's allegiance" (Nash, "Ethics and Revelation," p. 167). The time is coming, and it is even now here, when Christianity is to be judged by its ability to create a higher and diviner type of human society. A religion that makes no provision for many great interests of life and falls short of the whole nature of man can neither be the final nor the perfect religion. Hence, the very plain and urgent duty resting upon all who call themselves Christians and who cherish the ideal of the kingdom of God, is to build up in the earth a Christian society that is founded upon righteousness and love, a society that is fashioned after the divine pattern—in short, a society that is nothing less than the kingdom of God. To this task the Christian citizen is fairly committed by the Christian ideal, and to this task he is fully called by the needs of humanity itself. The nature of Christianity and the processes of history have squarely committed to the Christian citizen this task of building a Christian State.

III. The Nature of the Christian State. That the Christian citizen is called and committed to the task of building a Christian State, the social realization of the kingdom of God, is a legitimate conclusion of all that has been said thus far. But this idea of the Christian State needs to be carefully analyzed and defined that it may be separated from some of its counterfeits. Not only so, but there are many who object to this conclusion, in whole or in part, in the name of religion and also of irreligion; for they see in it—or fancy they see in it—a grave danger. At once the specter of a theocratic government starts up in their minds to terrify them. They affirm that this idea of the Christian State is simply the old idea of theocracy masquerading under a new name, but unchanged in

character. Great is cant and incomprehensible is the aversion of men to things they do not understand. And yet it must be admitted that this fear of theocracy is not entirely without reason in view of the many things that have passed for theocracy during the history of man.

1. In the Christian centuries many attempts have been made to found Christian communities and to realize on earth the kingdom of God. These efforts illustrate and confirm the statement of Professor Seeley that religion is the great State-builder, and that the foundations of all States are laid in religion ("Natural Religion," chap. iv). These experiments in behalf of a Christian society constitute a brilliant page of human history that should be better known than is now the case.[1] Thus far, however, no comprehensive study has been made of these various efforts to establish a Christian society and thus to actualize the kingdom of God. It is not necessary here, and it is not possible, to give even an outline of these various attempts. But all of these experiments, it may be observed, have been vitiated by one or another error, and have failed from one of two reasons. In some cases they have been almost wholly ecclesiastical in character, as in the Roman Catholic branch of the church; or they have been markedly theological in quality, as in the Protestant division of Christendom.

In the Catholic branch of the church a studied effort has been made from the time of Constantine, to found a Christian society and to build a Christian State. In a number of lands, as in Italy, Spain, France, Austria, the Church has claimed authority over the State, and has

[1] Some of these experiments have been considered in some of their aspects by Fremantle in his notable study "The World as the Subject of Redemption," and by Westcott in his suggestive book "The Social Aspects of Christianity." One remarkable experiment has been discussed by Bryce in his epoch-making book "The Holy Roman Empire," and still other aspects of the question have been studied by the historians of the various socialistic communities.

sought to reduce the world under the dominion of Christ's vicegerent. These efforts have not only not succeeded, but they have led men astray from the right path and have put back the cause of human progress. In the Protestant division of Christendom a number of efforts have been made to found Christian communities, but thus far these efforts have had a theological basis. The theocratic State of Calvin was of this order; the Solemn League and Covenant of Scotland was a theological document; the Puritan and Pilgrim colonies of New England were founded on this idea and were dominated by doctrinal tests. All these were brave and honest efforts to found a Christian society and actualize on earth the kingdom of God; but these experiments all failed, as they were bound to fail, for the simple reason that their foundations were theological. To Calvinist and Puritan the world owes an immeasurable debt of gratitude, for they both asserted the right of the human spirit to be free from the domination of a Church. But from the experiments of both the Calvinist and Puritan the world turns away in disappointment realizing that they have missed the road to the Christian State.

2. The Christian State does not mean any of the things that men have tried to make it mean. It does not mean the supremacy of a priesthood, though it does mean the sovereignty of God; in fact, the sovereignty of God, rightly conceived, means the denial of a distinctly priestly class. It does not mean the supremacy of the church over the State. One of the most stupendous blunders of the ages has been the confounding of the church with the kingdom of God. The church is simply a means to an end, and the kingdom only is ultimate. The kingdom is the wider category and includes the whole life of man, spiritual, moral, personal, social, temporal, and eternal. Church and State are only so many realms in which the

reign of God is realized; both are means to an end, and both are subordinate to the kingdom itself. It is an arrogance approaching blasphemy for either church or State to claim lordship over the other—that very lordship which belongs only to the kingdom of God. We could as easily tolerate a State supremacy over the church as a church supremacy over the State. The church is itself subordinate to the kingdom and has no warrant for assuming lordship over any other sphere. The King of the kingdom is the head over all things, and for the church to arrogate to itself this function is to dethrone the King and climb into his seat. The Romanist is eternally right when he declares that the State must be subordinate to God; but he is as eternally wrong when he declares that the King has delegated a portion of his authority over the State to the Church of Rome.

Nor does the Christian State mean the dominance of a system of theological thought in human society. The fact is one thing, and the explanation of the fact is quite another thing. Creeds and theologies are statements of human belief, attempts to explain the great facts of God and man, words thrown out at great realities, the effort to correlate some of the doctrines of the Christian faith. At best all such creeds and theological systems are but men's conceptions of things, approximations to the truth, tentative efforts of human thought, and hence never finalities and fixities.

> Our little systems have their day,
> They have their day and cease to be;
> They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And thou, O Christ, art more than they.

Not only so, but men's relations with one another are personal through and through, and have thus some deeper

and stronger basis than an intellectual one. To attempt to build a Christian society upon an intellectual and creedal basis is to misconceive the very nature of man and is to assume an artificial ground for human association. To attempt to bring human society under the authority of a system of theological thought is to misconceive the very nature of the kingdom and miss the whole meaning of the Christian State. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that all attempts thus far made to build a Christian society on a theological basis and to subordinate the State to a system of theology should so signally fail. And yet Calvinist and Puritan were eternally right when they affirmed that the goal of God's purpose was the establishment on earth of a holy State in which God was the sole and rightful King; they were as eternally wrong when they endeavored to construe this kingdom in theological categories and impose them upon the minds of men.

3. The attempts thus far made to found a Christian State have had a theocratic color, with an ecclesiastical or theological basis, and for this reason they were doomed to failure. But however many and disappointing have been the failures of the past each age is called to attempt once more the divine task of building up in the earth a Christian State that shall be the human realization of the kingdom of God. There are three considerations that are of great service here, and will enable us to perceive the real nature of the Christian State.

For one thing, the Christian order of society is inspirational rather than institutional. That this is so is made very plain by the very nature of Christianity itself. The fundamental conception of Christianity is that God is an essentially moral and spiritual being. Judaism and Christianity are entirely unique among the religions of the world in this particular; they both have as their foundation the conception of a God who, in the very essence of

his being is holiness and love. Judaism, it has been said, was the only religion in the ancient world whose God had a moral character (Geo. Adam Smith, "Book of the Twelve Prophets," Vol. I, p. 55). Christianity enlarges and fulfils this idea of Judaism and makes it the possession of the human race. The sovereignty of God, it follows from all this, is that of a moral and spiritual authority over men. By the nature of the case it is neither an ecclesiastical rule nor a theological authority, but a personal relation and a spiritual sovereignty. The God of Christianity is neither an ecclesiastical pope nor a theological abstraction, but a moral personality and a spiritual character. Adapting the statement of Matheson, we may say that faith in God is a vision of his moral perfection and an aspiration of soul after his spiritual ideal. The man who believes in God, "believes in the beauty of goodness, the desirableness of purity, and the right of righteousness to be ultimately triumphant" (Matheson, "Landmarks of N. T. Morality," p. 108). Faith in God is faith in godliness with the choice of godliness. The kingship of God over men and societies manifests itself, not in the dominion of an ecclesiastical machine bearing his name, not in the prevalence of a theological system in which he is the logical center, but in the enthronement of his moral personality as the inspiration of men and the fulfilment of his righteousness as the law of human relations. It is well to remember that while religion seeks and finds expression in creeds and becomes organic and real in institutions, yet the fortune and fate of religion itself are not bound up with success or failure of our creeds and institutions.

For another reason, the Son of man did not come to create an institution, but to give life. An institutional rule of men is not God's ideal for men. Christ's rule is not external and formal, a matter of statutes and insti-

tutions; it is an inward control, a moral dynamic, a righteous impulse, an all-controlling mind. The kingdom of God, says the apostle, is not meat and drink, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit (Rom. 14 : 17). The kingdom comes less by statutes than by inspirations; it is hastened by ideals rather than by institutions. Tolstoy is right when he insists that little can be done for men till the Christian ideal of life prevails. The Christian conception of God is that of moral and spiritual personality, who in the very essence of his being is righteousness and love. The man who believes in God and seeks his kingdom lives under the authority of the divine ideal and makes the idea of the kingdom his guiding principle. What does this mean? It means that in the great correlated truths of Fatherhood and Brotherhood we have the measure and type and inspiration of every personal and social obligation. It means also that social customs will be made, legislative halls will be conscienced, national policies will be motived, industrial systems will be inspired, by the great eternal principles of the kingdom.

Thus the Christian State is the necessary outcome of the Christian life. In the progress of history and the providences of God it has come about that Christian men are more and more called to the privilege of citizenship in the great nations of the world. This democratic movement has behind it the whole inspiration of Christianity, and the whole prestige of history, and democracy will more and more become regnant as Christianity more and more makes its way. There is some great meaning in this movement, and there are some great responsibilities resting upon Christian men. It means that Christian men are more and more coming to have a part in making laws, and selecting rulers, in determining policies, and building political States. This brings us face to face

with the question of the relation of the Christian man to public affairs.

4. Religion, the religion of Christianity, is all-pervasive and all-determining. It means the pervasion of life in all its spheres and relations with the spirit of Christ, with the determination of life in all its interests and purposes by that spirit. Whatever the Christian does in word or in deed, in the Church or in the State, he does in the name of Christ and for his ends. The special acts of his life are only the manifestation of the life within, as the life within finds expression in the deed without. No man can be a Christian in one part of his life and a pagan in the other. The Christian who is a citizen must be a Christian citizen; that is, the acts of his citizenship are the flower and fruitage of his inner spirit. This means a great deal more than appears on the surface, and it has consequences that are simply immeasurable.

The Christian citizen is a man who has the Christian ideal and lives by the Christian spirit. By the very necessities of the case he will seek to realize that ideal in the life of the State and in society. Soon or late he who would be true to Christ finds himself confronted with these alternatives: Whether he will have nothing to do with political affairs; or whether he will make the acts of his citizenship the fulfilment of his Christian life. He must pursue the one course or the other. Either he must refrain from all participation in civil matters, or he must make all the acts of his citizenship the expression of his deepest consciousness. To refrain from all participation in public affairs is neither the wise nor the Christian thing to do. For no interest of man can be alien to the Christian as no part of life can lie outside the purpose of Christ. To go out into the State and live in the spirit of Christ, to seek the Christian ideal and to confess his faith in act, is the plain duty that lies upon the

Christian citizen. The Christian who votes must make his vote a confession of faith; the Christian who is in the hall of legislation must make the civil statute his interpretation of the Christian ideal; the Christian who administers law administers as a Christian in fulfilment of the gracious purpose of the Father of mankind concerning his children; the Christian who is planning for the city's good is seeking to build on earth a city after the pattern of the city of God. In every act and activity of his life, whether in the church or in the State, the Christian man makes the will and purpose of God his supreme and final standard. In every relation and sphere of life he must be true to his Lord and must seek to make the Christian ideal an earthly reality.

A man's belief in God is his programme of action. A nation's faith is written out in the nation's policy. The things men do are the revelations of the things men are. The statutes of a State are the written articles in its confession of faith. This being so, men show what manner of men they are by their deeds and words in political caucuses as well as in prayer meetings; in the way they conduct their business and frame their laws they show what kind of spirit they possess. The governmental regulations, the constitution and laws of a people, their social and industrial institutions, their policies, whether national or international, are the revelations of their life and the confession of their faith. Politics is the art of applied religion. Social justice is men's interpretation of human brotherhood. Civil law is the people's statement of doctrine. Political institutions are men's practice of the Golden Rule. It is in their political life that the real religion of a people is expressed and realized.

Christianity is the nature of things. The foundations of society are moral, spiritual, Christian foundations. No

other order of society than the Christian order is either stable or permanent. Just so far as society builds upon the principles and spirit and life of the kingdom of God that far it will be progressive and peaceful. Just so far as it ignores the life and spirit and principles of the kingdom, that far it will be unstable and full of unrest. All human legislation has validity and power in so far as it embodies in laws the principles of the kingdom; and all progress is to be measured by the fulfilment of the purpose of God in the life of humanity. The fact is, humanity can never know itself and its goal apart from the kingdom of God; and humanity can never reach its goal and end apart from the life and power of the kingdom. The kingdoms of the earth typified by the lion, the bear, the eagle, all fall and vanish and make way for the kingdom of man (Dan. 7 : 1-14). The only possible foundation for society is the life and spirit and law of the Son of man, the King of the kingdom. The builders of earth may reject Him whom God has appointed to be the chief corner-stone; they may say, Go to; let us build a great nation by our own ingenuity and wisdom and power. But in this way Babels and Babylons are built, and not great and enduring States. Men may frame their constitutions, and may devise their governmental systems with a careful provision of checks and balances; but it will avail them little unless the spirit of Christ is in their plans and the laws of Christ are in their lives. As certainly as God lives, as certainly as this universe is built on moral principles, so certainly will this nation or any other crumble and end in dismal failure whose only bond of unity is a written constitution, and whose only polity is a balance of expediencies. The words with which Mulford closes his great book on the nation cannot be too strongly emphasized: "It is only as the nation recognizes the law of humanity which He

(God) has revealed that it attains the realization of its being" (p. 412).

IV. The Christianization of the State. The life of the kingdom is working in the world and is seeking realization in social forms. The ideal of the kingdom is here pointing the way of human progress and inspiring the prophetic soul of the wide world.

1. But men, Christian men, have not allowed this life to do its perfect work in the wider relations of society; they have not accepted the Christian ideal in all its meaning and power, and so they have not borne this ideal into every province of life. They have said that the kingdom of God is a divine society and, as it is impossible to build a city of God out of earthly men, we cannot expect a Christian society in the present order of things. Be it so, but there are Christian men in the world, true children of the kingdom, suitable stones for the walls of the new city. Why then should not these children of the kingdom, these living stones, set to work together to build up in the earth this city of God? Why should not this divine life in men—which is a social life—be allowed to have its way and create a society after its own type? To become organic, to clothe itself in fitting forms is the one aim and effort of all life; and the life of the kingdom by its very nature is organic and organific.

"But then this life works from within, and the State works from without, and hence the life of the kingdom and the machinery of the State work in different spheres and at different levels." Granted that this life does work from within, yet it works outward through all the relations and realms of life. By the very necessities of the case it must soon or late manifest itself in visible forms and create around itself a fit and appropriate body. This is certain, that we must either expect this divine life to permeate and transform the world—and if it permeate

the world it must transform it—or we must consent that this life shall remain isolated and limited, which means that we must leave great spheres of interest beyond its reach and influence. The latter alternative is simply impossible to the man who believes in the kingdom of God and the universality of Christianity. It follows that we must either abandon the idea of the kingdom of God and believe in a provincial Christianity which is no Christianity at all, or we must expect the life of the kingdom as manifest in Christian men, to enter the world, to control all life, and transform society into its own likeness.

2. This Christian spirit, it may be said, *is* at work in the modern world, and the characteristics of the Christian State are beginning to appear. And this Christian spirit will abide in the world, and it will continue to work until it has transformed everything into its own likeness. This Christian spirit may work quietly, so quietly at times that men hardly detect its presence, but it will work potently and it will never rest till it has had its perfect work. It will go forth into the world to take of the ideal of Christ and show it unto men; it will give men a new conviction of sin and a new standard of righteousness; it will intensify in men a new passion for justice, and will drive them forth in a new campaign for truth; it will arouse men to challenge as with the lightning of God everything that injures man and wrongs childhood; it will send men forth in the wrath of the Lamb to cast out of their cities of earth the things that defile, that work abomination and that make a lie. It will undermine and repudiate many of the social sentiments that have long held sway, and will annul some of the commercial systems that have long prevailed. It will teach men to regard with the horror now shown the man-hunter, the buccaneer, and the wrecker, the men who exploit the labor of others and grow rich by speculating

in breadstuffs. It will inspire men to contemplate with shame and aversion the men who live in idleness and luxury on the toil of others without giving society a fair equivalent. It will win its first victories, no doubt, in mitigating the severity of the social struggle, and thus making it possible for every man to keep his footing in society. It will inspire men to labor and serve that every soul may have a fair inheritance in life. It will move men to infuse the Christian spirit into every realm and to realize the law of brotherhood in every sphere of industry. It will quicken men into a new allegiance to the ideal of the kingdom, and it will hearten them to go forth and hold up that ideal in the sight of all in the confidence that this ideal can win its way and supplant all others; in a word, it will work on and work out, never resting, never ceasing until it has made all things new.

This spirit will manifest itself not alone in the lives of individual men, but in their associated efforts in society. Under the increasing sway of this spirit citizens of missionary zeal will organize industries and trades not for the enrichment of the few, but for the profit of the many. Men of commercial capacity will put their talents in pledge for the benefit of the commonwealth, and not for their own. Men of character and capacity will seek to create social institutions and frame laws that will bring the strength and wisdom of all to bear upon the weakness and need of each. Men who bear the Christian name will more and more perceive that conduct is not a matter of customary practice and legal enactment, but of love and brotherhood. Under the increasing sway of the Christian spirit men will realize that the only standard of life is the spirit of Calvary, and the only interpretation of law is the mind of Christ. Under the increasing sway of this spirit the citizen who would be justified by faith

and have peace with God, must have a vision of God's ideal of society and must accept that ideal as the law of his life. He will find the seal of the Spirit and the witness of his sonship in his love for men and his anxiety for their welfare, and he will more and more make the duties of his citizenship the altar of his service.

3. In what kind of political programmes and social institutions the Christian ideal and the Christian spirit will embody themselves it is too early in the day to foresee. Life—it is a familiar truth—is the cause of organization; and organization—it is no less certain—follows life. The Christian life is organic, and seeks to create a body in which it may fully realize its inner nature. The kingdom of God is not an institution, and it can never be embodied in one, and yet it is the constitutive power and regulative ideal of every institution of man or of society. The spirit of Christ is ever seeking to become organic in human lives and institutions, and it cannot rest until it has attained its goal. The social conscience, to be effective and permanent, must realize and perpetuate itself in social laws and political states. Thus the life of the kingdom, the spirit of Christ, the conscience of man, will express themselves in certain programmes, create around themselves various institutions, and become organic in political forms. But it must be remembered that these forms and institutions and programmes are but the temporary body and transient expressions of this spirit and life and conscience, and that the fate and fortunes of the kingdom are not bound up with any of the forms and expressions of the kingdom's life. Life must ever be free to express itself according to its own nature, and life must also be free to adapt itself to new conditions.

It is quite possible that many programmes may be evolved as the generations go by and many experiments

may be tried as men build the Christian city. It is hence quite possible that some of the current systems of men, known as labor co-partnership and the co-operative commonwealth, socialism and the social State—in so far as they have the mind of Christ and illustrate the principles of the kingdom—may do something to bring the world a step nearer its goal. But we must expect these systems to be outgrown, one and all, as society moves on in fulfilment of the purpose of God.

> The serf of his own past is not a man;
> To change and change is life, to move and never rest;
> Not what we are, but what we hope is best.
> —*Lowell: The Pioneer.*

This spirit of Christ will create in men a Christian conscience, and this conscience, being Christian, will be an urgent and militant thing. It will have little patience with the doctrines of *laissez faire,* which teach that we must not meddle with nature's operations, and that we cannot hasten nature's processes. And it will have scant patience with that shallow pessimism which teaches that nothing can be done under the present order of things to improve the world and to Christianize society. It is not easy to say which is the worse doctrine, that doctrine of optimism which asserts that everything is coming out all right and there is nothing for man to do; or that doctrine of pessimism which declares that everything is hopelessly wrong and that nothing will avail that man can do. The Christian spirit will have little to do with either of these doctrines, but it will inspire men to go forward and live the truth in life and deed; it will impel them to make experiments in the confidence that any experiment that will improve by a hair's breadth the condition of a single soul is the translation into deed of some article of the Christian faith.

4. That the Christian State is yet far away in the future must be admitted by every informed man. That the characteristics of Christianity are yet graven deep into the life and purposes of society no one will probably care to assert. The leaven is here, we believe, and it is at work, but it has not yet by any means leavened the whole lump. Christianity has penetrated the life of the nations, but it has not yet transformed a single city. The man who would speak of a Christian State must use the future tense, and must live by faith. A Christian State! And yet in the most Christian State we find that six times as much money is spent for intoxicating liquors as for the whole work of God in the world; we find in this State that thousands of women are annually tolled off to minister to the lawless passions of men, and society regards all this as inevitable; we find that thousands of women, owing to confining labor and small remuneration, are under a continual temptation to barter womanhood for gain. A Christian State! And yet, in this State, in its chief city, one-tenth of all the burials are in potter's field, and forty per cent. of the families live in one room; in this city are tenements not fit for pigsties, where women fight with fever and infants pant for air and wail out their little lives; in this city whole sections are given over to vice and crime and slums, and at every turn is the brilliant grog shop and hard by is the gilded den and the house of infamy. A Christian society! And in this society the prizefighter and professional ball-player receive larger salaries and more newspaper notice than the university professor or the Christian prophet; in this society the rich and idle spend their time and money on tennis and golf, in horse-racing and bird-shooting, while millions of their fellows toil without rest or hope; in this society it is still thought necessary to build great battleships and to glorify the art of war. A Chris-

tian State! And in this State Congress spends far more time debating questions of revenue and finance than education and morality; in this State the railroads kill thousands of men every year because they find that men are cheaper than safety appliances; in this State measures to protect women and children are delayed and defeated, while measures to protect sheep and horses are immediately passed and enforced. Yes, some would say, it is a Christian State, for Christ has been named in it; and thousands of spires are pointing heavenward; hospitals and schools are found here and there throughout the land, and every one is free to worship God as his conscience dictates. No, we must say it is only remotely and approximately Christian as yet, and the streets of the new city are hardly staked out.

But that this Christian State is beginning to appear and society is moving toward its goal, must also be confessed. The State is becoming Christian and men are beginning to believe that it is not necessary that there should be so much waste in society with so many lives stunted and disfigured; and they are beginning to seek and find some collective means and methods whereby they may seek for the kingdom of God. The State is becoming Christian, for men are beginning to give more attention to its positive than to its negative functions; they are coming to see that the State is the conserver of human well-being and the promoter of good life; they are beginning to consider ways and means for equalizing opportunity and giving every child a fair inheritance in society; the State is becoming Christian, for in this America the most splendid building is a library which is a national confession of faith; and in this land men are catching glimpses of a holy city coming down from God out of heaven, and are seeking to create a society into which nothing enters that defiles. The State is becoming

Christian, for men are beginning to labor for a social order in which a Christian man can live and trade without the continual temptation to sacrifice principle in order to maintain one's self; they are beginning to believe that it is possible to build in the earth a society in which the children of God can live as brothers and the Spirit of God can find itself at home. Society is becoming Christian, for men are beginning to believe in the divine ideal, and are coming to feel that it is practicable and possible; they are beginning to labor that this world may be a purer place for children to be born into and a fairer world for departing saints to look back upon; they are beginning to realize that the building up in the earth of the city of God is the task that is set before them all, and in the prosecution of this task they will find their own lives and receive the seal of the Father's approval. Yes, the State is becoming Christian, for men are beginning to see that it is a divinely appointed agency in the making of men, and is the best medium through which the people may co-operate in their search after the righteousness of the kingdom.

But the State will not be fully Christian till the great principles of the kingdom—righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit, with their modern equivalents liberty, equality, and fraternity—are realized in the industrial, the social, and the political systems of men as well as in their personal lives, their families, and their churches. It will not be Christian till the lowliest member of society has been given a fair opportunity for life, and for the possession and appreciation of its best things. It will not be Christian till the infinite worth of every man has been recognized, and conditions have been secured which shall give all men an equal opportunity for the expression of their powers and the development of their personalities. It will not be Christian till human brother-

hood has become as real in the industrial world as in the family circle, and industry "is so organized that every honest and willing worker can find work, and work so remunerative as to give him and his children an opportunity for self-development as well as for mere life" (Abbott, "The Evolution of Christianity," p. 201). "It will not be fully Christian till the democracy of political power, founded upon religion and education, shall be accompanied with a social and industrial democracy, wherein the tool workers have become tool owners and class antagonisms are settled by the simple expedient of making the same class of men both capitalist and laborer. It will not be Christian till all service is honorable and all idleness is dishonorable; till the effort to get money by whatever strategy without furnishing a fair equivalent has become dishonorable spoliation and is treated as treason against society. It will not be Christian till brain and hand count for more than money and position in the world's markets; till the maxims of the present economic system are reversed and money has become the means and men have become the end and the measure of all wealth" (Abbott, *ibid.*, pp. 200, 201).

There are two things growing out of all this, as the conclusion of the whole matter, that may be noted:

The State will become Christian through the use of Christian means. By ignoring this principle men have gone sadly astray in their thought of the Christian State and its coming; by remembering this principle they will be saved from much confusion in thought and much uncertainty in action. After all that has been said it is needless to illustrate this principle in detail; but one or two things may be emphasized in this brief summary.

For one thing, the State no less than the family and the church, has a moral life and attains its ends by moral means. They who think of the State as an immoral or a

non-moral agency, the machinery and instrument of force and compulsion alone, seeking its ends wholly by brute strength and physical power, have mistaken a part for the whole, and have permitted one aspect of the State's action to fill the whole horizon. The State may use force and in its least advanced forms it may rely upon such means; but the use of force is at best an incident in its life and does not tell the whole story. However it may be with primitive and barbarous States, the facts will show that the most advanced and civilized States carry on their functions with comparatively little use of force. The fact is, the position of a State on the line from barbarism to Christianity may be determined by its reliance upon compulsion for the furtherance of its aims. The fact is also, the best modern States carry on the larger part of their activities with little appeal to force. It is far within the truth to say that nine-tenths of the State's activities are carried on without even the threat of constraint. It is manifest to all that the system of education, the vast charitable and reformatory agencies of society, and the hundred and one other interests of the modern State rely almost wholly upon moral means for their operation and efficiency. The average well-behaved citizen in a civilized community, probably not three times in his life, ever feels the strong arm of the State; so far as he is concerned the State attains its ends wholly by the use of social and moral means.

The State will increasingly become Christian through the increased use of Christian means. It should be needless to say, after all that has been said in this study, that we do not expect the Christian State to become a reality through the use of law and force alone; but lest any one should fail to grasp this principle we emphasize it here with all the stress possible. Law has its functions to fulfil in the economy of life; this is true of all

law, and it is no less true of civil law. Law in the State may imply constraint, but this is not the whole of the case. Law has an educational value no less that is deserving of more attention than it has received. One great purpose of all law is to define and declare what is socially right and wrong. Thus it is the standard of social judgment and the determiner of the people's conscience. "The statute books of a State," says Bishop Doane, "are to be not only the expression of the law, human and divine, but the education of the people till they know the meaning and authority of law. . . The true function of civil law is not only to enforce the right, but to elevate man to true perceptions of what is right" ("The Forum," Feb., 1896). The whole story of the Old Testament economy teaches us that law, whether human or divine—and the divine law, it may be noted, was civil law no less—is a kind of pedagogue leading men unto Christ.

This is not all, but as society becomes more Christian and intelligent there will be less and less necessity for the use of force, for the reason that public opinion and social judgment will become more and more potent. The fact is, government in the best communities is government by public opinion; what may be called the social judgment is potent enough for all practical purposes; with this public opinion and social judgment becoming ever more masterful and intense there will be ever less and less need for governmental compulsion. And this means that psychical and moral means will become ever more potent and dominant in the life of the State, so potent and dominant in fact as to make unnecessary an appeal to other agencies. All this, it may be said, is in perfect accord with the teaching of modern sociology through its best interpreters. Thus Professor Ross tells us that "It is necessary to regard social phenomena as essentially

psychic, and to look for their immediate causes in mind." Again, the causes of social action "are to be sought in mental processes, its forces are psychic forces, and no ultimate non-psychic factors should be recognized until it is shown just how they are able to affect motives and choice" ("Foundations of Sociology," pp. 152, 161). Thus also Professor Ward shows us in his "Dynamic Sociology and the Psychic Factors of Civilization," that the forces operating in society and determining man's conduct are primarily psychic and spiritual forces. In the last analysis the State, no less than the family and the church, is a psychical and spiritual realm and agency. As the State becomes more intelligent and Christian it will give an ever-increasing attention to its higher and positive functions, such as causes and conditions of social well-being, and consequently it will find an ever-decreasing call for the use of its lower and primitive functions, such as the purely police and defensive functions. That is, as the State becomes more intelligent and Christian the police and punitive functions will fall into the background and the more Christian aims and characteristics will grow and intensify and dominate. And thus, as the State becomes more Christian, the appeal to force will become less and less necessary, for the reason that the necessity for its use is less urgent. In fact, as the State becomes more Christian, it will seek to make unnecessary the use of force at all in its unceasing attention to the things which make for true peace and progress. In the home, in the best of homes, it is sometimes necessary to employ force in order to rescue a child from danger, and to use constraint for the child's own good. There is probably not a home in the land where the need has never arisen for the use of such force and constraint, as there is probably not a home in the land where force or constraint has never been most usefully employed.

But in the home, in the home that is even approximately Christian, the aim of the parents is to render the resort to force and compulsion wholly unnecessary. No home is possible without discipline of some kind; but the better the discipline the less necessity there is for constraint. The same principle applies to the State, and for precisely the same reasons. In the State that is becoming Christian the unceasing aim of the State is—whether through the use of compulsion or not—to make unnecessary all appeal to force. The Christian State, like the Christian man, the Christian family, and the Christian church is a *becoming;* and it is, therefore, as legitimate to speak of the one as of the other, and for precisely the same reason. The full comprehension of this principle will do much to clarify our thought and to determine our action.

Thus, the Christian State will become a reality through the *Christian* use of Christian methods. In the Christian conception of the kingdom of God on earth we have the ideal of a human society, a city of God come down to men. In the Christian conception of the State we have the idea of a human institution that is one of the spheres of manifestation of the life of the kingdom and one of the agencies for the kingdom's realization in the world. And in the Christian conception of the means and methods of the kingdom we have the emphasis laid upon moral and spiritual means working through the methods of life and growth. The man who cherishes the vision of the city of God that comes down to earth is thereby pledged to go out into the world and build a city after the divine pattern. The man who believes in the divine meaning of the State has a divine commission to go out into society and seek the divine kingdom through the life of the State. The man who possesses the new life of the kingdom, like the leaven and the salt, is to live and serve that the life of

society may be both sweetened and transformed. The people who have a political conscience quickened by the Christian spirit will write into civil laws the principles of fair dealing and brotherhood that are fundamental in Christianity.

Thus it is evident that in no formal and mechanical way do men seek the kingdom of God; not by any arbitrary and institutional methods do they use the machinery of the civil government. For Christianity is less a mold of doctrine than a spirit of life; it rules men, not by edicts, but by inspirations. It conquers the world, not by force of arms, but by the power of the Spirit. Jesus did not come to give men a code of laws, but an ideal of life. He did not come to found an institution, but to give men a new spirit. The State, it follows, becomes Christian, not by the insertion of the name of Christ in the constitution or by the enactment into statutes of the Sermon on the Mount. The State, it is evident, becomes Christian rather by the infusing of the Christian spirit into all the relations of life and the gradual transformation of society into the ideal of Christ. On the walls of the Palace of the Signoria, in Florence, is an inscription, placed there some four hundred years ago by the Mayor Niccolo Capprivi, which records how in the city council and afterward in the public assembly, the people of Florence solemnly elected Jesus Christ king of the city, and pledged themselves to be loyal to him.

Jesus
Christus Rex Gloriae, venit in pace;
Christus vincit; Christus regnat;
Christus imperat;
Christus ab omni malo nos defendat.

That was a purely formal transaction, and as history shows, availed little. The mere insertion of the name of

Christ in the constitution, the formal acknowledgment of his kingship, the recognition of his authority by some popular vote, may tell us something about the life of a people, but these things are not sufficient to create the Christian State. The kingdoms of this world become the kingdom of our God by the realization of the life of the kingdom in the life of the State and the transformation of the institutions of the State into the kingdom of God. The Christian spirit must create the Christian State. The Christian State is only a matter of time and patience.

The practice of citizenship is the highest expression of the Christian life and the best preparation for the future. According to the oldest tradition of our race man began his career in a garden as an isolated individual, with only the woman at first to share his fortunes. According to the closing chapter of Revelation, humanity culminates its course in a city, with its myriads of inhabitants, wherein men live together in solidarity and peace. This may mean many things, but only one or two things may be noted here. Heaven is pictured as a city, and so it follows that man's preparation for heaven is preparation for life in a city. Here on earth man is a member of society, and this means that the practice of citizenship in an earthly society is the best preparation that man can make for life in heaven. That this is so is shown in several ways.

In the quality of the ideal that one seeks in and through the State we can measure the height of his apprehension of the ideal of Christ. The ideal of Christ, the kingdom of God on earth, is a comprehensive and universal ideal, as wide as the nature of man, and as all-inclusive as the purpose of God. One man construes the Christian ideal in personal terms; another widens it to the dimensions of a church; a third conceives it as a

restful life in some other world; and so the story runs through all the scale. In the most real sense the quality and breadth of a man's vision are shown in the ideal that he seeks in and through his actual social life. Again, the quality of a man's faith is revealed in his vision of the ideal and his devotion to it. "Faith," says George Matheson, "is a moral aspiration; it is the sight of an ideal and the steadfast loyalty to that ideal in daily life." "To see the kingdom of God is to be already in possession of that kingdom, for it is only seen by that spiritual similarity which enables kindred minds to recognize each other's powers" ("Landmarks of N. T. Morality," p. 106). To be justified by faith, is to see the ideal, and to believe that it is the only thing worth following. Thus in the way that a man seeks the ideal of Christ does he show the real nature of his faith and declare that he is living a justified life. The man who is fully justified by faith is the man who has a vision for his whole life and has dedicated himself with all his powers to the ideal of the kingdom.

Then, in the way that a man takes thought for others and serves the common life does he show the reality of his Christian profession. The Christian life is a life of service; to bear one another's burdens is to fulfil the law of Christ; and to sanctify one's self for the sake of others is the very spirit of Christ. The State, we have learned, is the medium of the mutual sacrifices and services of the people; it is the one agency through which all the people can co-operate in their search for justice; it is, in fine, the most potent and masterful organization of man's social life. Thus the man who would serve in his day and generation will serve the State of which he is a member. Thus the good man is the good citizen, and the bad citizen cannot be a good man. The practice of citizenship is the flower and fruitage of a man's spiritual

life; one may be called a good man in so far as he plays the citizen and lives for the common good. The man who believes in the kingdom of God has a vision of a holy city; that is, he has a vision of what a city—his city—ought to be. He is hence called to go out into the city where he dwells and build on earth a city after the model of the city in the skies. He is to do what in him lies to cast out of the cities of earth—out of his own city—the things that offend, that work abomination and that make a lie. He is moved to put his life in pledge in behalf of a city where no one is wronged or trodden under foot, where straight paths are made for men's feet and all stumbling-blocks are taken out of the way, a city where all have access to the Tree of Life and all are partakers of its fruits. The man who does this shows that he is a citizen of the kingdom and is an heir of eternal life; the man who neglects these things shows that he is yet in the gall of bitterness and the bond of iniquity, and he has no reason to suppose that he shall ever stand within the pearly gates. The man who hopes to live in the city of God when time shall be no more, for the present at least, must learn to live his deepest and truest life amid the masterful organizations of the social order and to find the witness of his sonship in his concern for the common welfare. Heaven is a city, and the best preparation for heaven is the practice of citizenship. Thus each man who believes in the kingdom of God and has the vision of a city of God, just where he is must seek that kingdom. Each man where he is must learn to live in such a way that if all other men lived as he lives, the kingdom of God would be fully come. The Christian life is a life of service. In the long run the color and quality of a man's social relations are the infallible tests of his faith in God and his love for Christ.

Finally, in the light of all this, we see the meaning of

man's social and political life. The life of man and his progress, the relations of man with man in society, these are the real and vital things, and all other matters are but symbols and appearances. Questions of rights and liberties, problems of money and trade, all have a vast and vital interest because of their relation to man and his social welfare. They, the politicians and materialists, who see in these questions and problems nothing more than the superficial things, such as rights and liberties, money and trade, mistake shadows for substance and miss the whole meaning of life. But they, the seers and statesmen, who go behind these superficial things and consider men and the relations which underlie them all, and who view these objective things in the light of their human and spiritual meaning, see that all things have a divine and spiritual value. The Christian who looks out upon the great world of man's social and political life, and sees in it nothing more and higher than the mere struggle of men for honors and possessions, is blind and does not know the real meaning of his religion.

In the light of the Christian conception of things, the world of politics is not by any means the secular and vulgar world that men have supposed. The fact is, the man who looks upon politics in this way shows thereby that he is himself a vulgar and unspiritual man. In the light of the Christian conception of things, what we call politics in their inner nature are essentially moral and spiritual. The fact is, human relations, whether in the home, the church, or in the State, are the fundamental realities and underlie all such things as trade and money; these human relations are essentially spiritual, and there is no difference in sanctity between what we call church relations and political relations. The State, no less than the church and the family, is a medium through which man holds communion with God and fulfils his purpose,

and the State equally with the church and the family is a means through which the life of God is getting itself reborn into the life of humanity. The State no less than the family and the church is a moral and spiritual institution, and what are called social and political questions are at heart moral and spiritual questions. In the world, as nowhere else, in the world of politics more than anywhere else, men show what manner of men they are and prove the reality of their Christian faith. In their daily life—and in their political life in the fullest degree—the real religion of a people is expressed and realized. Their political institutions are the best definition of a nation's faith. Custom is sentiment that has become habitual. Civilization is simply applied conscience. Their laws are a people's interpretations of the Golden Rule. In their political life we have the highest expression of a people's religion, and in their practice of citizenship we read men's fitness for life in the city of God.

It may be many long generations before the political State is fully Christian and the kingdom of God is fully come. It may be, indeed, that the men who confess the faith we have suggested may be set down as dreamers and may receive scant respect in this present generation. But it is well for us to remember that the ideals and dreams of yesterday have become the commonplace actualities of to-day. And it may be well to remember also that the men for whom the future has no promise are the men who have no ideal; the man who has no ideal is a dead soul and already is living in the outer darkness. It may be a misfortune to have an ideal that is impossible; it may bring on one the scorn of the world to follow the ideal of Christ in the political world; but it is a fatal sin to have no ideal at all; and it is treason against the Christ to have his ideal, and yet deem it impracticable. The hope of a Christian State in this present world is vain

and Utopian? It may be so to those who have no faith; but to the man who believes in God and is willing to serve in his generation it ought to be the most certain thing in the world.

"I understand; you speak of that city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not think that there is such an one anywhere on earth?

"In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of such a city, and he who desires may behold this, and beholding, govern himself accordingly. But whether there really is or ever will be such an one is of no importance to him; for he will act according to the law of that city and no other.

"True, he said" (Plato, "The Republic," Bk. IX, sec. 592).

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
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